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On 31 December 1992 at midnight, hardly more than three years after the collapse of
communism, Czechoslovakia broke up, to be replaced by two successor states, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia.
This dissertation seeks to explain why the Czechoslovak state, which emerged on the
European map in October 1918, following the first World War and the disintegration of the
Habsburg Empire, disappeared in the post-Cold War era.
The rapidity of this "velvet", entirely peaceful, divorce has been interpreted by
observers such as Frederic Wehrle, Jacques Rupnik and Eric Hobsbawm, as evidence of the
artificial and ephemeral nature of a state founded on the union of two distinct nations, the
Czechs and Slovaks.
Much of the existing literature (such as the works of the Slovak-bom Canadian
scholar Stanislav J. Kirschbaum) stresses the unrelenting character of Slovak demands for
self-determination and consequently sees the break-up of 1992 as the ineluctable and
definitive outcome of a long historical trend (what could be defined as a "historical
necessity").
The thesis will however challenge this view and argue that the division of
Czechoslovakia was not inevitable, but rather the result of the complex interactions between
democratisation and Czech and Slovak nationalisms after 1989.
This dissertation seeks to prove that Czechoslovakia was not destined to dissolve by referring
to several concepts and approaches widely used in international relations and in area studies
of Central and Eastern Europe: political culture, the economics of secession, nationalism (and
especially the interactions between the competing Czech and Slovak national identities),
federalism, political elites, communism, as well as democratic transition (in a multinational
setting).
While the recent character of the events obviously has to be taken into account, unlike
previous attempts to examine the events of 1989-1992 by focusing on a single explanatory
factor (political-cultural, economic or legal-institutional), this work endeavours to analyse the
dissolution of the state through a multifaceted and pluri-dimensional approach.
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INTRODUCTION
On 31 December 1992 at midnight, hardly more than three years after the collapse of
communism, Czechoslovakia broke up, to be replaced by two successor states, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia.
This dissertation seeks to explain why the Czechoslovak state, which emerged on the
European map in October 1918, following the first World War and the disintegration of the
Habsburg Empire, disappeared in the post-Cold War era.
The rapidity of this "velvet", entirely peaceful, divorce has been interpreted by observers such
as Frederic Wehrle, Jacques Rupnik and Eric Hobsbawm, as evidence of the artificial and
ephemeral nature of a state founded on the union of two distinct nations, the Czechs and
Slovaks 1.
Much of the existing literature (such as the works of the Slovak-born Canadian scholar
Stanislav J. Kirschbaum) stresses the unrelenting character of Slovak demands for self-
determination and consequently sees the break-up of 1992 as the ineluctable and definitive
outcome of a long historical trend (what could be defined as a "historical necessity")^.
lEric Hobsbawm, Age ofExtremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (London; Michael Joseph;
1994), p.31 and 33; Jacques Rupnik, "The Reawakening of European Nationalisms", Social Research, Spring
1996, vol.63, n°l, p.41. For obvious reasons of time and given the recent character of the events, only a small
number of monographs on the division of Czechoslovakia have been written in Western languages. These
include Eric Stein's Czechoslovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (Ann Arbor;
The University of Michigan Press; 1997) and Frederic Wehrle's Le Divorce Tcheco-slovaque: Vie et Mort de la
Tchecoslovaquie, 1918-1992 (Paris; L'Harmattan; 1994). There are in addition several collections of essays
specifically on the break-up, the most significant being: Jiri Musil (ed.), The End ofCzechoslovakia (Budapest;
Central European University Press; 1995); Riidigcr Kipke and Karel Vodicka (eds), Abschied von der
Tschechoslowakei: Ursachen und Folgen der tschechisch-slowakischen Trennung (Koln; Verlag Wissenschaft
und Politik; 1993); Viktor Knapp and Sergio Bartole (eds), La Dissoluzione delta Federazione Cecoslovacca
(Torino; La Rosa Editrice; 1994); and Serge Regourd (ed.), Etudes Tchecoslovaques: La Partition (ler Janvier
1993) (Toulouse; Presses de l'lnstitut d'Etudes Politiques de Toulouse; 1993).
^See, for instance Stanislav Kirschbaum, "Czechoslovakia: The Creation, Federalization and Dissolution of a
Nation-State", Regional Politics and Policy, 1993, vol.3, n°l, pp.69-95 ; "La Fin des Mythes ? La
Tchecoslovaquie et les Slovaques", Revue dEurope Centrale, tome 1, n°2, 2nd Semester 1993, pp.147-156 ;
"Les Racines du Nationalisme Slovaque Moderne", Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol.XXXVII, Nos3-4, Sept-
Dec. 1995, pp.301-319; A History ofSlovakia: The Strugglefor Survival (New York; St-Martin's Griffin; 1995);
Slovaques et Tcheques: Essai sur un nouvel apergu de leur histoirepolitique (Lausanne; L'Age d'Homme;
1987).
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The thesis will however challenge this view and argue that the division of Czechoslovakia
was not inevitable, but rather the result of the complex interactions between democratisation
and Czech and Slovak nationalisms after 1989.
This dissertation seeks to prove that Czechoslovakia was not destined to dissolve by referring
to several concepts and approaches widely used in international relations and in area studies
of Central and Eastern Europe: political culture, the economics of secession, nationalism (and
especially the interactions between the competing Czech and Slovak national identities),
federalism, political elites, communism, as well as democratic transition (in a multinational
setting).
Unlike previous attempts to examine the events of 1989-1992 by focusing on a single
explanatory factor (political-cultural, economic or legal-institutional^), this work endeavours
to analyse the dissolution of the state through a multifaceted and pluri-dimensional approach -
thus taking into account the formidable institutional diversity which characterised the short
existence of the country.
Czechoslovakia experienced numerous types of political regimes: parliamentary democracy
(1918-1938 and of course 1989-1992), "semi"-democracy (1945-48 and arguably also 1938-
39), Nazi domination (1939-45), and communism (itself fluctuating from the Stalinism of the
early years to the "normalisation" of the seventies and eighties, via the reformist interlude and
the socialism with a "human face" of the Prague Spring in 1968).
^For examples of the politico-cultural approach, see ch.2 ; For economic approaches, see for instance Petr
Pavlinek, "Regional Development and the Disintegration of Czechoslovakia", Geoforum, vol.26, n°4, 1995,
pp.351-372 ; Oldrich Dedek (ed.), The Break-Up ofCzechoslovakia: An In-Depth Economic Analysis
(Aldershot; Avebury; 1996); Ales Capek and Gerald W. Sazama, "Czech and Slovak Economic Relations",
Europa-Asia Studies, vol.45, n°2, 1993, pp.211-235 ; Milica Zarkovic Bookman, "Economic Issues Underlying
Secession: the Case of Slovenia and Slovakia", Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, vol.4,
n°l, 1992, pp.111-134 ; Ivo Bicanic, "The Economic Causes ofNew State Formation During Transition", East
European Politics and Societies, vol.9, nu 1, Winter 1995, pp. 2-21.
Examples of institutional / legal approaches are to be found, in addition to Stein (Czecho/Slovakia), in, among
others, Karen Henderson, "Czechoslovakia: The Failure of Consensus Politics and the break-up of the
Federation", Regional and Federal Studies, vol.5, n°2, Summer 1995, pp.111-133 ; Lloyd Cutler and Herman
Schwartz, "Constitutional reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum ?", University ofChicago Law review,
1991, vol.58, pp.51 1-553 ; Holly Osterland, "National Self-Determination and Secession: the Slovak Model",
Case Western Reserve Journal ofInternational Law, vol.25, Summer 1993, pp.655-702; Katarina Mathernova,
"Czecho?Slovakia: Constitutional Disappointments", in A.E. Dick Howard (ed.), Constitution Making in
Eastern Europe (Washington D.C.; The Woodrow Wilson Center Press; 1993) pp.57-92 ; Jon Elster,
"Transition, Constitution-Making and Separation in Czechoslovakia", Archives Europeennes de Sociologie,
tome XXXVI, n°l, 1995, pp.105-134.
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Similarly, the relations between Czechs and Slovaks evolved according to constitutional
changes and the state gradually lost its unitary character to become increasingly marked by
the Czech-Slovak divide (ultimately recognized by the federalisation of January 1969).
The purpose (unlike the studies published by Valerie Bunce, Carol Skalnik Leff, Reneo Lukic
and Allen Lynch, or Soren Rinder Bollerup and Christian Dons Christensen^) is not to
develop a general and inductive theoretical framework (necessarily partial) or a comparative
approach. The underlying assumption of this thesis is instead the conviction that
Czechoslovakia is a valuable case study in the dissolution of a multinational state in its own
right, and one which has been so far understudied (even if the recent character of the events
obviously has to be taken into account). International relations theory and comparisons will
therefore be used only to the extent that they are deemed to provide a pertinent contribution to
our understanding of the split.
The first part (and first chapter) of the dissertation starts by considering what has probably
become the mainstream view of the division of the Czechoslovak state: the idea that the
merging of the Czechs and Slovaks in a common state in 1918 was a deeply unnatural but
pragmatic process, a "marriage of convenience" which was somehow bound to fail from the
outset.
After having reviewed the (valuable) arguments which would tend to prove the inevitability
of the division of the state, it will eventually be argued that this view is reductionist and
cannot provide an explanation to the events of 1989-1993. The break-up of Czechoslovakia
was not "historically necessary" and, contrarily to the claims of Slovak (but also some Czech)
post-communist leaders, it was not the ineluctable result of the two nations' desire to exercise
their right to self-determination.
^Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: the design and the destruction ofsocialism and the state
(Cambridge, New York; Cambridge University Press; 1999); Carol Skalnik Leff, "Democratization and
Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist Federation", World Politics, vol.51,
January 1999, pp.205-235; Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe From the Balkans to the Urals: The
Disintegration ofYugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1996); Soren Rinder
Bollerup and Christian Dons Christensen, Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Causes and Consequences ofthe
National Revivals and Conflicts in Late-Twentieth Century Eastern Europe (Basingstoke, London; MacMillan
Press; 1997). See also Robert Kaiser's unpublished doctoral dissertation, National Territoriality in
Multinational, Multihomeland States: A Comparative Study of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia (unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1988).
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The union of the Czechs and Slovaks in 1918 could have appeared as a politically daring
operation given the deep historical, linguistic, economic and social faultlines between the two
peoples but the ideology of "Czechoslovakism" (the belief in the existence of a single and
unified "Czechoslovak" national consciousness) at the root of the first republic of 1918-1938
was not necessarily as unrealistic as commonly assumed. Building a Czechoslovak identity
under the democratic institutions of the interwar period was a possibility, had it not been for
the rise of Nazi Germany and Hitler's ruthless determination to destroy the country in
1938/1939, hardly twenty years after its creation -too soon to allow any form of meaningful
and enduring national integration between Czechs and Slovaks.
A second part (chapters 2, 3 and 4) therefore considers three foundational problems which
have often been deemed to suggest the impossibility of maintaining a common state between
Czechs and Slovaks, and subsequently contends that none of these three fixed elements can
satisfactorily -on its own or even in combination- "explain" the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia.
Chapter 2 examines the widespread notion that the essential differences between Czech and
Slovak political cultures made their continuing coexistence in a common state impossible.
Observers such as Jacques Rupnik, Otto Ulc, Martin Biitora, Zora Butorova, Silvia
Mihalikova, Grigorij Meseznikov and Sofia Szomolanyi have argued that the democratic
tradition of the Czechs contrasts sharply with the authoritarian leanings which tend to prevail
among the Slovaks^. This manichean evaluation will be contested on at least two grounds:
Czech political culture is not as intrinsically "democratic" as certain observers believe, and
the concept of anti-democratic "exceptionalism" hardly presents an accurate picture and
characterisation of the extremely complex Slovak political culture. Czechs and Slovaks had
distinct political traditions but this did not make their common state obsolete and does not
explain its break-up.
^Jacques Rupnik, "Cultura Politica", in Vaclav Belohradsky, Pierre Kende and Jacques Rupnik (eds),
Democrazie da inventare: Culturepolitiche e stato in Ungheria e Cecoslovacchia (Torino; Edizioni della
Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli; 1991), p. 9; Otto Ulc, "Czechoslovakia's velvet divorce", East European
Quarterly, Fall 1996, vol.30, n°3, pp. 331-353; Sona Szomolanyi and Grigorij Meseznikov (eds), The Slovak
Path of Transition - To Democracy ? (Bratislava; Slovak Political Science Association; 1994).
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Chapter 3 considers the economic aspects of the division of Czechoslovakia and the long-
lasting economic inequalities between the developed, early-industrialised Czech lands and the
traditionally more backward Slovakia.
Contrary to an important trend in the literature on the break-up (illustrated by the writings of
Petr Pavlinek, Ales Capek and Gerald Sazama, Milica Zarkovic Bookman and Ivo Bicanic)",
it will be argued that the economic divergences between Czechs and Slovaks also appear to
have a limited explanatory power.
Under the communist regime, according to official statistical records, a genuinely successful
process of economic and industrial equalisation between the two regions had taken place and
in 1989, the Czechs and Slovaks had, at least in this respect, never been so close from each
other. The hardships of the economic transition nevertheless made it paradoxically possible
for Czech and Slovak "ethnic entrepreneurs" to play with the insecurities and fears of their
respective constituencies -creating to a large extent an environment where perceptions
mattered more than realities.
More or less justified talks of Slovak economic specificity and of the necessity to adopt a
path of economic reform more sensitive to Slovak national interests were matched on the
Czech side by the dominant and intransigeant neo-liberal rhetoric of politicians such as
Vaclav Klaus but, ultimately, economic considerations were at best instrumental to the break¬
up of Czechoslovakia and, in this specific case at least, separatism (especially in Slovakia)
was only loosely connected with the notion of material interest.
Chapter 4 discusses what will be termed the "geopolitical argument", i.e. the idea that
Czechoslovakia was a fragile state, whose cohesion and integrity was bound to be questioned
after each shift in the international system. As William V. Wallace wrote,
the original marriage, however well-meant, was practically and contractually flawed,
in need of greater internal and external understanding than circumstances allowed, and
^See footnote n°3
likely to end in divorce as soon as the external constraints that held it together were
removed'.
This seemingly triggered the two break-ups of the country -in 1939, when
"Czechoslovakism" proved a sham in front of Hitler's divisive strategies but also (according
to Wallace, Judy Batt, Jacques Rupnik or Frederic Wehrle)^ in 1992, after the end of the Cold
War.
In the context of the "new world order" and the apparent decline of the traditional German,
Hungarian and Soviet/Russian threats, many Czechs and Slovaks felt that there was at last a
window of opportunity to achieve independence on their own. While more and more Czechs
thought that getting rid of the allegedly less "democratically"-oriented and economically
developed Slovaks would allow them to "return" faster into Europe, Slovak nationalists and
demagogues presented Slovakia's first genuine independence as the fulfilment of a long
process of national emancipation.
The end of Czechoslovakia in 1992 was not however a direct result or consequence of the
changing international environment: international aspects only played a minor, "supporting"
role in the dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation and did not make it inevitable. The
international community conditioned the (peaceful) nature of the break-up more than the
break-up itself.
Having hence shown why the political-cultural and economic differences between Czechs and
Slovaks and the international environment all provide only partial and unsatisfactory
explanations to the split, the dissertation's third part turns to an examination of the factors
that ultimately led to the division of the state.
Firstly, the institutional context of post-communist Czechoslovakia deserves closer
examination and chapter 5 considers how the divergent nature of the Czech and Slovak party
systems contributed to the failure of the constitutional negotiations between 1989 and 1992.
^W.V Wallace, "From Czechs and Slovaks to Czechoslovakia, and from Czechoslovakia to Czechs and
Slovakia", in Seamus Dunn and T.G Fraser (eds), Europe and Ethnicity: The First World War and
Contemporary Ethnic Conflict (London and New York; Routledge; 1996), p.47.
^Judy Batt, The New Slovakia: National Identity, Political Integration and the Return to Europe (London;
The Royal Institute of International Affairs; 1996), p.2; Jacques Rupnik, "The International Context", in Musil,
The End, pp.271-278.
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Secondly and relatedly, the role and responsibility of the Czech and Slovak post-communist
leadership in the break-up of Czechoslovakia is assessed (ch.6). Different personalities could
have meant a different outcome (the preservation of its integrity?) for Czechoslovakia. A
typology of post-communist Czech and Slovak elites will distinguish between what will be
referred to as the "postcommunist dissident elite" represented by Vaclav Havel and the
"technocrats" or "professional politicians" such as Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar, who
gradually superseded them on the political landscape. The postcommunist dissident elite, and
most notably Havel, failed to realise the importance of the Slovak question and to give it the
priority it deserved in the aftermath of the velvet revolution but the most important share of
the blame should be ascribed to the "professionals", and especially Klaus and Meciar who
were determined to uncompromisingly pursue their own separate political agendas at the
price of a state, whose citizens (Czechs and Slovaks) still thought well worth preserving^.
Even more essential to an understanding of the division of the state is the resurgence of
nationalism after 1989, examined in chapter 7.
Slovak nationalism, skilfully manipulated and electorally exploited by the pragmatic Meciar
played a decisive role in the events leading to the split, even if the impact of the quasi-
simultaneous and reactive outburst of Czech nationalism, albeit under the somehow more
"respectable" disguise of Klaus's neoliberal rhetoric, should clearly not be underestimated.
Chapter 8 looks at the negative economic, political, "semantic" and institutional legacies of
communism on the Czech-Slovak relations and considers -as the Polish intellectual Adam
Michnik wrote, borrowing from Lenin- why nationalism was bound to become, in
Czechoslovakia like in the rest of the former Soviet bloc, the "highest stage of
communism" 10.
9Opinion polls consistenly show the support of both Czechs and Slovaks for the maintenance of a common
state and it should be pointed out that just before the elections of 1992, as many as 81 percent of the respondents
in the Czech Republic and 63 percent in Slovakia declared themselves opposed to the split. Figures in Carol
Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation versus State (Boulder and Oxford; Westview Press;
1997), p. 137
^quoted in Jacques Rupnik, L'Autre Europe: Crise et Fin du Communisme (Paris; Editions Odile Jacob;
1990, 1993), p.412.
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The tendency of the communist regime to resort to an opportunistic strategy of divide-and-
rule in blatant contradiction to its Marxist-Leninist "internationalist" ideals aggravated the
mutual grievances between Czechs and Slovaks (even if it did not create them).
Finally, the fourth and final part of the thesis (chapter 9) aims to broaden the analysis of the
Czecho-slovak divorce by providing an insight into the arena and the "rules of the game" of
Czechoslovak ethnopolitics and examining the "system" itself as an additional layer-of-
explanations.
The break-up of Czechoslovakia was not inevitable but the analogy of balance of power is
used to suggest that the system "Czechoslovakia" was intrinsically unstable, because of its
(Czech and Slovak) bi-polarity. Political bargaining and the search for a constitutional
arrangement after 1989 was made more difficult for two essential reasons.
Firstly, the powers of the federal, "Czechoslovak", centre were gradually eroded in the post-
communist era and the bipolarity of the state less and less allowed it to appear as a credible
partner of the two increasingly assertive federal republics, the Czech republic and Slovakia.
Secondly, bipolarity implied that the Czechs and Slovaks became each other's "constituting
others". The two nations tended to define themselves in opposition to one another, not merely
Czechs and Slovaks, but more and more often, Czechs versus Slovaks - hardly a recipe likely
to lead to an easy consensus, especially given the conspicuous unwillingness of the dominant
Czech and Slovak elites to compromise and their exploitation and ethnicisation of mutual
grievances.
Carol Skalnik Leff, following Claus Offe, emphasises that Czechoslovakia after 1989 had
simultaneously to manage a difficult "triple transition" ^: a political transition from
communism towards the establishment of democracy and a dynamic civil society (rule of
law), an economic transition from a planned socialist economy toward capitalism and free
market and, last but not least, an "identity-seeking" (or national) transition.
There were some deep-rooted historical contentions, what Joseph Rothschild calls "ethnic
markers" 1% between Czechs and Slovaks but the causes of the break-up of 1993 are probably
11 Leff, The Czech, p. 135; Claus Offe,"Capitalism by Democratic Design ? Democratic Theory Facing the
Triple Transition in East Central Europe", Social Research, vol.58, N°4, Winter 1991, pp.865-892.
Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York, Guildford; Columbia University
Press; 1981), pp.26-27
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much more hard-headed and "materialistic": essentially, the capacity of Slovak, but also
Czech, elites to exploit the fears springing from the transition and the impossibility to
overcome the legacies of communism.
For all these reasons, Oscar Jaszi's observation about the disintegration of the Habsburg
Monarchy 13 could be applied to the break-up of Czechoslovakia: the "velvet divorce" was to
a large extent "a tendency, not a fate".
A tendency, because the Czech and Slovak nations are undoubtedly distinct and the struggle
of the Slovaks to achieve a higher level of autonomy vis-a-vis the Czechs has been a constant
during the seven decades of the Czechoslovak state. Not afate, because, as this dissertation
aims to demonstrate (and despite the systemic weakness of a bipolar state), Czechs and
Slovaks could have surmounted their differences and signed a new "contract ofmarriage" in
the post-communist era.
^quoted in Frangois Fejto, Requiem pour un empire dejunt: Histoire de la destruction de I'Autriche-Hongrie
(Paris; Seuil; 1993, 1988). Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago and London;




CZECHOSLOVAKIA: AN ARTIFICIAL STATE BOUND TO BREAK UP ?
Lord, when I am writing about this Czechoslovak state, I always have the feeling that
it is an illusion !
Kornel Stodola, in his diary, February 1918^
In November 1989, the "Velvet revolution" put an end to 41 years of communist rule in
Czechoslovakia^. The event was welcomed by a wave of optimism concerning the future of
the country, qualified by some observers as "the most Western of the so-called East European
countries" 16 and Czechoslovakia seemed in a good position to succeed its transition toward
democracy and its "return to Europe".
However, in spite of these positive omens, at midnight on 31 December 1992,
Czechoslovakia disappeared from the European maps, replaced by two successor states, the
Czech and the Slovak republics.
The break-up of Czechoslovakia has often been interpreted as the ineluctable consequence of
the artificiality of the peace treaties of 1918-1919, which merged two distinct nations, the
Czechs and the Slovaks, into a common state. According to this view, the end of
Czechoslovakia was inevitable because the Czechoslovak state created in 1918 was artificial
and fragile, destined to failure from the outset.
To push the argument further, 1992 thus exemplifies not so much the end of the Europe of
Yalta as the end of the Europe of Versailles. The creation of separate Czech and Slovak states
has been perceived as the final, and long-delayed, stage of the dissolution of the Habsburg
^quoted in Antoine Mares, Histoire des Pays tcheques et slovaque (Paris; Hatier; 1995), p.264
15The regime officially ended on 10 December 1989, when Gustav Husak resigned from the state presidency
and thus opened the way for the election of the first non-communist president since 1948. The non-communist
dominated coalition executive led by (the former communist) Marian Calfa governed until the first free post-
communist parliamentary elections in June 1990.
^Timothy Garton Ash, We the People: the revolutions of 1989 in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague
(London; Granta; 1990), p. 130
21
empire into ethnically homogeneous nation-states. For Eric Hobsbawm, T imothy Garton Ash,
Jacques Rupnik or Frederic Wehrle, the break-up of Czechoslovakia should therefore be
assessed as part of a general process that also provoked the tragic disintegration of another
multinational (and no less artificial) state created in 1918 - Yugoslavia. As Hobsbawm writes,
the national conflicts tearing the continent apart in the 1990s were the old chickens of
Versailles once again coming home to roast...There was absolutely no historical
precedent for or logic in the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak combinations which were
constructs of a nationalist ideology which believed in both the force of common
ethnicity and the undesirability of excessively small nation-states. All the southern
slavs (=Yugoslavs) belonged to one state, as did the western slavs of the Czech and
Slovak lands. As might have been expected, these shotgun political marriages did not
prove very firm. Incidentally, except for rump Austria and rump Hungary, shorn of
most - but in practice not entirely of all - their minorities, the new succession states,
whether carved out of Russia or the Habsburg Empire were no less multinational than
their predecessors...^
This would suggest that the merging of two distinct, even if related, nations in a common
state was not justified by any objective criteria. Clearly, the implicit assumption here is that
what differentiated the Czechs and Slovaks is more significant than what brought them
together and this chapter considers the arguments (most of them extremely valuable) which
would tend to confirm the inevitability of the break-up.
However, it will be contended that this conception is to a large extent reductionist and cannot
adequately provide an explanation for the events of 1989-1993 which led to the dissolution of
the country. The Czechoslovak state was not doomed from the start to failure and its break-up
was not "historically necessary".
Czechoslovakia, as Rupnik points out, was born in the name of the idea of self-determination
of the "Czechoslovak" nation, and died when Slovaks and Czechs decided to invoke the same
'frlobsbawm, Age, p.31 and 33 ; see also Timothy Garton Ash, History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and
Despatches from Europe in the 1990s (London, New York; Allen Lane, The Penguin Press; 1999), p.220 ;
Rupnik, "The Reawakening", p.41; Wehrle, Le Divorce, pp.21-36.
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national self-determination in the post-communist era^°: as this thesis however attempts to
show, this does not imply that a Czechoslovak state was not viable in post-Cold War Europe.
The first section will hence examine just how "close" were the Czechs and the Slovaks in
ethnic, geographical, linguistic as well as historical, cultural and economic terms, at the times
of the foundation of Czechoslovakia in 1918.
The extent to which the new state was a "pragmatic" creation, which corresponded to the then
interests of two small nations in need of a partner, as well as (perhaps more cynically and
importantly) to those of their victorious protectors, especially France and the United States is
subsequently assessed.
We then look at the failure of the idea of "Czechoslovakism" (the attempt to build a
"Czechoslovak" identity) during the seven decades of coexistence of the Czechs and Slovaks
in a common state, before considering how the break-up of Czechoslovakia and the
subsequent establishment of two independent Czech and Slovak states could be said to fit the
notion of national self-determination -"the right or aspiration of a group, which considers
itself to have a separate and distinct identity to govern itself and to determine the political and
legal status of the territory it occupies" 19.
Finally, it will be argued that the merging of Czech and Slovak identities into a
"Czechoslovak" identity was a possibility, had it not been for three obstacles: the tragic
interruption after only 20 years of the "state/nation-building" experiment in which the new
state had been engaged, the unfortunate (even if not necessarily deliberate) Czech insentivity
to Slovak demands, as well as the fact that by 1918, Czechs, but also Slovaks, had already
reached a level of national consciousness that made the creation of a "Czechoslovak" identity
extremely difficult.
^Rupnik, "The Reawakening", p.41.
^Graham Evans (with Jeffrey Newnham), The Penguin Dictionary ofInternational Relations (London;
Penguin Books; 1998), p.497. For an assessment of Slovak claims to self-determination, see Holly A. Osterland,
"National Self-Determination and Secession: the Slovak Model", Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, summer 1993, vol.25,pp.655-702.
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Two nations, two different historical, cultural and economic backgrounds
Czechs and Slovaks are two distinct nations with many similarities
Dusan Kovac^O
Czechs and the Slovaks share a three-fold connection: they are ethnically, linguistically and
geographically related^!. Both peoples are Western Slavs speak mutually understandable
languages and live in the same region of central Europe.
Yet, even the simple and straightforward affirmation of this three-fold connection appears
unconvincing.
Firstly, the geographical proximity and "closeness" of the Czechs and Slovaks has to be
nuanced because "mountains cut off much of Slovakia from the Czech lands"22 and the
Small or White Carpathians constitute a natural border between the two nations. This might
seem irrelevant in a late twentieth century where communications have reached such a level
of performance but it was clearly an hindrance to the establishment of contacts between
Czechs and Slovaks in the nineteenth century. Until 1918, the Slovak economic, political and
cultural life revolved around Budapest or Vienna more than around Prague (even if this
started to change in the last decade of the nineteenth century with the activities in Prague of
politicians or intellectuals like the professor at Prague University and future first president of
^Dusan Kovac, "Czechs and Slovaks in modern history", in Mikulas Teich (ed.), Bohemia in History
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1998), p.364
See for example Jan Mlynarik, "Geschichte der tschechisch-slowakischen Beziehungen", in Kipke and
Vodicka, Abschied, p. 16 ; Bruce Garver, "The Czechoslovak Tradition: An Overview", in Hans Brisch and Ivan
Volgyes (eds), Czechoslovakia: The Heritage ofAges Past, Essays in Memory ofJosefKorbel (Boulder, East
European Monographs; New York, Columbia University Press; 1979), pp.25-56. The nature of the historical
links between Czechs and Slovaks is discussed later.
^^Owen Johnson, Slovakia 1918-1938: Education or the making ofa nation (Boulder, East European
Monographs; New York, Columbia University Press; 1985), p. 15
He argues that this was a hindrance to the creation of a Czechoslovak awareness.
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Czechoslovakia, Tomas Masaryk23 as well as the creation of organisations devoted to the
promotion of Czech and Slovak rapprochement like Ceskoslovanska jednota or the
publication of the monthly Hlas between 1898 and 1904). The Slovak railway network was
for instance oriented towards Budapest, the connections with the Czech lands being limited to
only two lines24.
Secondly, and more problematically perhaps, the notion of "linguistic proximity" itself can be
contested and has constituted a recurring subject of dissension between Czechs and
Slovaks^.
Before the codification in 1843/1844 by Eudovit Stur (1815-1856) of a Slovak literary
language based on the dialect of central Slovakia, the Czechs and the Slovaks were sharing a
common literary language, a form of Czech developed in the Bible of Kralice (1579-1588)
and usually called biblictina. The creation of a Slovak literary language, already attempted
without success by the Catholic priest Anton Bernolak (1764-1813) at the end of the
eighteenth century, has been traditionally described (and clearly rightly so) as a badly
disguised blow to the concept of Czechoslovak unity. Czech or "Czechoslovak-oriented"
Slovak scholars or politicians such as Ladislav Rieger, Karel Havlicek, Karel Kalak, Jan
Kollar26 and Pavel Safarik, perceived Stur's initiative as an unnecessary "schism"27 between
the two nations. A not insignificant part of the supporters of the "Czechoslovak idea" saw the
adoption of a language more accessible to the common Slovak than the biblictina, and
22H.Gordon Stalling, T.G. Masaryk: Against the Current, 1882-1914 (University Park, Pennsylvania; The
Pennsylvania State University Press; 1994), pp.64-80
^Victor S. Mamatey, "The Development of Czechoslovak Democracy, 1920-1938", in Victor S.Mamatey
and Radomir Luza (eds), A History ofthe Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948 (Princeton; Princeton University
Press; 1973), p. 115.
2 5The most usefhl works on the gradual development of a Slovak literary language are probably Peter Brock
's The Slovak National Awakening: an Essay in the Intellectual History ofeast central Europe (Toronto and
Buffalo; University of Toronto Press; 1976) and Hugh LeCaineAgnew, "Czechs, Slovaks and the Slovak
Linguistic Separatism of the Mid-Nineteenth Century" in John Morison (ed.), The Czech and Slovak Experience
(Basingstoke and London; MacMillan Press; 1992), pp.21-37. See also Kovac, "Czechs", pp.365-369.
2 6who edited in Prague in 1846 Hlasove o potrebejednoty splolecneho jazyka pro Cechy, Moravany a
Slovaky (Voices Supporting the need of a common language for Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks)
22This view was for example also adopted by one of the most important politicians of the First Republic, the
(Slovak) agrarian Milan Hodza, in a work entitled Ceskoslovensky rozkol (the Czechoslovak schism) published
in 1920.
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therefore more efficient as a communication tool, at best as a pragmatic but in any case
temporary solution to unite more firmly the Slovak people in times of heightened
Magyarisation.
Confronted by advocates of a "Czechoslovakist" linguistics such as his fellow Slovaks Kollar
and Safarik, Stur wished to enhance the unity of the nation and his linguistic nationalism was
at the time the most efficient way to achieve this objective:
[e]ach nation is most easily united by what is its own, what is nearest to it, for in that
it senses itself, its spirit, its thought, and thus too the Slovak nation will be most
quickly and most certainly united through its unique, national, ancestral language^.
In fact, the Slovak novelist Vladimir Minac seems strangely reminiscent of Stur when he
wrote in 1965, one century later:
[the Slovak] national history is not the history of great historical movements, of
military, social and political transformations; it is in the first place the history of the
written word29.
The Slovak language, because of its distinctiveness, has been "constitutive" of the Slovak
identity and could be considered as legitimating the existence of a Slovak nation, separate
from the Czech^O. This is why Ladislav Holy suggests that if, at the end of the eighteenth
century, Bernolak failed to impose the western Slovakian dialect as the Slovak literary
language, it could be because it was too close to Czech dialects^ 1.
^L.Stur, quoted in LeCaine Agnew, "Czechs", p.32.
^Vladimir Minac, "Tu zije narod", Kulturny zivot, 15, 22, 29 October 1965, quoted in Bernard Michel,
Nations and nationalismes en Europe centrale, XlX-XXe siecle (Paris; Aubier; 1995), p.31 (see also Dusan
Kovac, "Philosophic und Mythologisierung der slowakischen Geschichte", Osterreichische Osthefte,\ol.35, n°4,
1994, p.534)
-^Hugh Seton-Watson (Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins ofNations and the Politics of
Nationalism, London; Methuen; 1977) argues that "The creation of a Slovak nation in the nineteenth century is
essentially the emergence of a language group into national consciousness. There is no more striking example
than the Slovak case of the role of language in nation-forming"(p.l69).
^ 1 Ladislav Holy, The little Czech and the great Czech nation: National identity and the Post-communist
social Transformation (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1996), p.94
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The importance granted to language by Stur and other Slovak awakeners in the nineteenth
century should not come as a surprise: Miroslav Hroch points out the decisive impact of the
assertion and the codification of a national language for the national movements in nineteenth
century multinational empires like Habsburg Austria-Hungary or tsarist Russia32. Slovakia is
no exception to the rule and, to a large extent, Stur and the generation of Young Slovaks were
following the example of Josef Dobrovsky (1753-1829), Josef Jungmann (1773-1847)23 and
the first Czech awakeners, who strove to give Czech its respectability as a scholarly language.
The linguistic separation between Czechs and Slovaks is in this respect just another
illustration that, as Toynbee put it,
[i]n Central and Eastern Europe, the growing consciousness of nationality had
attached itself neither to traditional frontiers nor to new geographical associations but
almost exclusively to mother tongues34.
There was hence something ironic and politically dangerous, in the 1920 Language Law
which recognised a completely fictious "Czechoslovak" language as the official languague of
Czechoslovakia. As late as 1931, a new Slovak grammar, commissioned by the
"Czechoslovak"-oriented (Slovak) minister of education Ivan Derer, still advocated the
adoption (alongside and separate from Czech) of the West Slovak dialect and its many
Czechisms as the Slovak literary language, thus trying in vain to reverse, at least in part, the
"schism" of the 1840s35.
^Miroslav Hroch, "Language and National identity", in Richard L.Rudolph and David F. Good (eds),
Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union (New York; St-Martin's Press; 1992),
p.65-76.
^^The philologist Josef Jungmann was the most influential proponent of linguistic nationalism among the
Czechs and is the author of a Czech-German dictionary, as well as of translations of Western works such as
Chateaubriand's Atala and Milton's Paradise Lost.
3^A.J Toynbee, The World after the Peace Conference (1926), p. 18, quoted in Alfred Cobban, The Nation
state and National Self-determination (London; Collins; 1969), p.69
James Ramon Felak, "At the Price of the Republic": Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929-1938 (Pittsburgh
and London; University of Pittsburgh Press; 1994), p. 87 ; CA. Macartney, Hungary and her successors: The
treaty of Trianon and its consequences, 1919-1937 (London, New York, Toronto; Oxford University Press;
1937), p. 127
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The linguistic split marked to a large extent the end of the Czechoslovak idea as a concrete
and practical reality and jeopardised the impact of "Czechoslovakism"36; perhaps more
importantly, it established certain enduring conflictual elements in the Czech-Slovak
relationship, such as the Czech stereotypes of Slovak "betrayal" and "separatism"^, which
will be examined in chapter 2.
A reassessment of the linguistic, and implicitly, ethnic proximity of the Czechs and Slovaks
is thus needed. However the gist of the problem does not rest with these elements, since many
"nations" exist self-consciously as the hybrid of two or more nations. The Czechs and
Slovaks may be linguistically separated, but they still had a better claim to forge (or even
merge into) a common identity than many other generally uncontested nations^. The more
unambiguous fact is that the Czech lands and Slovakia had before 1918 strikingly different
historical, cultural and economic backgrounds.
History could indeed hardly be invoked as a justification for the union of the Czechs and
Slovaks. The Great Moravian Empire of the ninth century and the influence of the Hussite
movement in Slovakia^ were not significant enough to legitimate by themselves the creation
of a common state.
In fact, after the collapse of the Great Moravian empire, the historical fates of the Czechs and
the Slovaks had been only remotely linked. The Czechs achieved a high degree of autonomy
and statehood, personified by the kingdom of Bohemia and the integrity of the lands of the
Crown of Saint-Wenceslas, whereas the Slovaks began a long period of submission to
Magyar domination, their history becoming a mere part of Hungarian history.
^Brock, The Slovak, p.33
^See Kovac, "Czechs", p.368
3 ^Discussed later in this chapter.
^ 9Josef Korbel, Twentieth century Czechoslovakia: The meanings of its history (New York; Columbia
University Press; 1977), p.91 ; RW Seton-Watson, 25 years ofCzechoslovakia (London; The New Europe
Publishing Company; 1945), p. 13 ; Roger Portal, The Slavs (London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson; 1965), p.239.
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The defeat of the Czech Protestant estates at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620
considerably limited the sovereignty of the "historic" Czech nation but even under the
Habsburgs and especially after the Ausgleich of 1867, the Czechs lived under the relatively
benevolent Austrian rule, whereas the Slovaks endured the deliberate policy of Magyarisation
of the Hungarian authorities.
Czechs and Slovaks occasionally cooperated, most evidently in 1848 when Slovak leaders
such as Stur participated to the Slav Congress in Prague, but their divergent historical paths
were to have profound implications on the relations between the two nations, especially in the
context of the national revivals of the nineteenth century.
In the Czech Lands, the national movement was, especially from the 1890s, accompanied by
the steady emergence of a dynamic civil society.
The Czech political landscape became increasingly pluralist. The traditional spokesman of
Czech national interests, the Old Czech party, was successively challenged by the creation of
the Young Czechs in 1874 and the Social democratic party in 1878. By the end of the
century, six other parties had come into being: the Agrarians, the National Socialists, the
Christian Socialists, the Radical Progressives, the State Rights Radicals, the People's (later
Progressive) Party^O.
The Czechs gradually acquired all the symbolic attributes of a nation without a state: a
National Museum (founded in 1818)41, a National Theatre as well as an autonomous Czech
university (following the division in 1882 of Prague university into a German and a Czech
institutions). Their associative life took off with for instance the creation in 1862 of the
patriotic gymnastic movement Sokol ("Hawks") on the model of the German Turnverein^2.
^For a discussion of the emergence of pluri-partism in the Czech lands, see for instance Bruce M. Garver,
The Young Czech Party 1874-1901 and the emergence ofa Multi-party System (New Haven, London; Yale
University Press; 1978) and "The Czechoslovak Tradition", pp.51-52
41 Originally devoted to "Bohemian" (without "national" distinctions between Czech and German) traditions ,




Consequently, as vividly illustrated in the short stories of Jan Neruda and Rainer Maria Rilke,
Bohemia was more and more Czech and less and less German^. This process of
"Czechisation" of public life was nowhere more evident than in Prague, where the share of
the German population dropped from more than 40 percent in 1855 to less than 7 percent in
1910, on the eve of the First World War^4.
Neruda thus pointedly remarked in 1874 that
Prague, which was still celebrated fifty years ago because it was here that was spoken
'the most beautiful German in the world' and where, still twenty years ago, anyone
who spoke Czech in public was still shyly whispering, is nowadays a resolutely Czech
town. The intelligentsia has developed in an unhoped for manner and speaks a
perfectly correct language, the middle classes have deeply evolved thanks to the
associative and social life, to the journals and to theatre^.
This dynamism of Czech political and cultural life was however in sharp contrast with the
limited size of the Slovak intelligentsia, estimated by RW Seton-Watson and Jorg Hoensch at
no more than 750 to 1000 personalities^o^ and ofwhom C.A. Macartney wrote:
43jan Neruda, Prague Tales (Budapest; Central European University Press; 1996; first publication 1878);
Rainer Maria Rilke, Zwei Prager Geschichten (Konig Bohusch, Die Geschwister) (Werke 3: Prosa und
Dramen; Frankfurt am Main, Leipzig; Insel Verlag; 1996, pp. 149-241). See also a short story of 1902 by the
French writer (and visitor) Guillaume Apollinaire, Le Passant de Prague [the Passer-by of Prague] where the
narrator "to his amazement", cannot make himself understood in German when he asks his way in the
Bohemian capital (Apollinaire, Oeuvres en Prose Completer, Paris; Gallimard; 1977; p.83).
^Henry Bogdan, Histoire despays de I'Est: Des origines a nos jours (Paris; Perrin; 1990 and 1991), p. 174 ;
Gary B.Cohen, The Politics ofEthnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914 (Princeton; Princeton
University Press; 1981), p.10. A.J.P. Taylor (The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian
Empire and Austria-Hungary, London, Penguin Books, 1990, p.27) writes that in Prague "in 1815 there were
50,000 Germans and only 15,000 Czechs ; even in 1848 respectable people spoke only German in the streets,
and to ask the way in Czech would provoke an offensive reply" [the contrast with Apollinaire's experience half
a century later is indeed striking]. See also Alfredo Laudiero, Api e cinghiali: Culturepolitiche dell'Europa
Centrale, il caso ceco (Soveria Mannelli; Rubbettino Editore; 2000), pp.39-42. Derek Sayer, "The Language of
Nationality and the Nationality of Language: Prague 1780-1920", Past and Present, n°153, November 1993,
p.176
45"Neco z prazske ceStiny" (1874), in Studie kratke a kratsi, 1876, volume 1, p.128 (quoted in Bernard
Michel, La Memoire de Prague: Conscience Nationale et Intelligentsia dans I'histoire tcheque et slovaque,
Paris; Librairie Academique Perrin, 1986, p.77)
46rw Seton-Watson, The New Slovakia (Prague; Borovy; 1924), p. 14 ; Jorg K. Hoensch, "Die Verfassung
der CSR und die slowakische Frage", in Karl Bosl (ed.), Die demokratisch-parlamentarische Struktur der
Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik (Munich and Vienna; R.Oldenburg Verlag; 1975), p.86
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[t]he active Slovak nationalists, even when reinforced by the inevitable band of turn¬
coats, remained a mere handful, consisting only of a few hundreds of men, totally
insufficient in numbers and sometimes in training or even capacity to undertake the
complex task of ruling the country. The remainder of the intelligentsia, who might
have given a lead to the masses, had become Magyarized both in language and
mentality.47
In fact, some prominent figures of the Hungarian national movement such as Sandor
Petdfi48; Count Zay and perhaps even Lajos Kossuth himself^ were Magyarised Slovaks
(often called Magaryones)50.
The Czechs had in Prague a "natural" historical, political, economic and cultural centre but
the Slovaks were forced to concentrate their activities in small isolated towns such as
Turciansky Svaty Martin (where the cultural institution Matica slovenska was established in
1863), Ruzomberok, Liptovsky Svaty Mikulas, Banska Bystrica or Trnava and this thwarted
the establishment of a strong national movement5 1.
Bratislava, the largest town in Slovakia, remained until after the War a predominantly
German and Hungarian city, often better known under the name of Presburg (in German) or
Pozsony (in Hungarian). In 1910, the Slovaks still accounted for less than 15 percent of its
population (as opposed to 41 percent of Germans and 40 percent of Hungarians)^.
^Macartney, Hungary, p. 111
48petofi was the son of a Southern Slav butcher-inkeeper and a Slovak mother (George Barany, "The Age of
Royal Absolutism, 1790-1848", in Peter F.Sugar (ed.), A History ofHungary, London; Tauris; 1990; p.206)
^Taylor, The Habsburg, p.58. Istvan Deak has however argued that Kossuth was not of Slovak origin (The
Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849; New York and Guildford; Columbia
University Press; 1979; pp.9-10)
•^Macartney, Hungary, p.89 ; S. Kirschbaum, Slovaques et Tcheques, p. 102
5 1 Johnson, Slovakia, p.25
52ibid., p.24. A positive evolution could however be detected by outsiders such as the French historian Ernest
Denis who noted in 1917 that "the old German city which still counts 30 000 Germans out of its 50 000
inhabitants, is now an islet, lost in the middle of an overwhelmingly Slovak county. When I have visited it,
already some years ago, I had, on the market, among the peasants of the neighbourhood, the very clear
sensation of the Slav pressure which slowly drives the foreigner back and takes again possession of the territory
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Similarly, while the Czech representation at the Austrian Diet was influential and benefited
from the introduction of the universal suffrage in 1907, the Slovaks had to cope with an
electoral system characterised by gerrymandering and discriminatory practices^. As a
consequence, the Slovak delegation in the Budapest parliament between 1867 and 1918 was
minimal: the most "successful" elections for the Slovak political parties were 1901 and 1907,
when respectively four and seven Slovaks were elected (in 1910, the number of Slovak
deputies fell again to only three out of the 58 representatives sent by Slovak constituencies to
Budapest)54.
Moreover, the contacts between the Czech lands and Slovakia remained limited and the
involvement of Slovak intellectuals such as Kollar and Safarik in the Czech national
awakening of the nineteenth century55 cannot be taken as illustrative of the reality of the
situation: as Jan Hajda contended, "before 1918 educated Czechs had fewer acquaintances
among Slovaks than among Germans, Poles, Yugoslavs or Frenchmen" and Czech people
tended to confuse Slovakia and Slovenia (in Czech, Slovensko and Slovinsko)^. The Slovak
population was largely rural and the small nationally-aware elite found it hard to publicise the
Slovak question to the larger world, especially since any attempt to link the fate of the
Slovaks to the fate of the Czechs was irremediably condemned by the Magyar regime as a
pan-Slav "provocation".
once imprudently abandoned" (Ernest Denis, La Question d'Autriche: les Slovaques, Paris; Librairie Delagrave;
1917; p. 88)
53An account of the methods of electoral fraud and gerrymanding techniques used by the Magyar regime in
the Slovak regions is to be found in the book of R.W Seton-Watson (published under the pseudonym Scotus
Viator) , Racial problems in Hungary (London; Archibald Constable; 1908).
^Korbel, Twentieth, pp.90-91 ; Jozef Lettrich, A History ofSlovakia (New York; Frederick A.Praeger;
1955), pp.37-38. This contrasted with the situation of the Czechs who occupied 107 seats of 516 in the Austrian
Reichsrat - 20.74 % of seats for 23.24 % of the population (Paul Vysny, Neo-Slavism and the Czechs',
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1977; p.47).
^^For more details, Robert B. Pynsent, Questions ofIdentity: Czech and Slovak Ideas ofNationality and
Personality (Budapest, London, New York; Central European University Press; 1994).
5°Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking ofa State, 1918-1987
(Princeton; Princeton University Press; 1988), pp.35-36. To be fair, the Slovak "self-identity" was itself rather
confused, many Slovaks defining themselves as "Slav" rather than "Slovak" (Brock, The Slovak, p.3 and 16;
Pynsent, Questions, p. 60)
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For all these reasons and as a consequence of the lack of democratic (pluralist) tradition in
Slovakia as well of their sheer numerical superiority (in 1918, around 7 million Czechs
against only 2 million Slovaks), the Czechs logically took the leading role in the newly-
created Czechoslovakia. This predominance of Czech politicians and of the Czech way to do
politics was initially recognised as desirable by the majority of Slovaks^ and even Andrej
Hlinka, who would later create the nationalist Slovak People's Party, stated in 1918 that
Slovakia needed "one million Czechs" as administrators, teachers and technical experts^.
Consequently, the new Czechoslovak administration was set up as a product of the former
Austrian bureaucratic system, widely acknowledged to be more efficient than its Hungarian
counterpart^.
However, the differences between the two nations were not only political, but also cultural -
and primarily religious.
Religious questions were the source of persistent tensions between Czechs and Slovaks*^.
While the Slovaks inclined towards a rather conservative Catholicism, the Czechs were
nominally Catholic but traditionally deeply influenced by the legacy of the Hussite
movement, which was considered by certain Czech "awakeners" like the great historian
Frantisek Palacky (in his History of the Czech nation in Bohemia and Moravia) or Tomas
Masaryk as the defining event in Czech history. According to this school of historiography^!,
the Catholic Counter-Reformation and the consolidation of Habsburg rule on the Czech lands
which followed the White Mountain were perceived as a Period of Darkness (obdobi
-^Seton-Watson, The New,-p.?,, 15
-^Jorg K.Hocn3ch, "Tschcchoslowakismus odei Autuiiumie- Die Auseinandersetzungen um die
Eingliederung der Slowakei in die Tschechoslowakische Republik, in Hans Lemberg and Peter Heumos (eds),
Das Jahr 1919 in der Tschechoslowakei und in Ostmitteleuropa (Munich, Vienna; R.Oldenbourg; 1993), p. 140
-^Helmut Slapnicka, "Der neue Staat und die biirokratische Kontinuitat, die Entwicklung der Verwaltung
1918-1938", in Bosl, Die demokratisch-parlamentarische Struktur, pp.121-147
6®See Seton-Watson, The New, pp.32-50
The controversy about the meaning of Czech history is considered in chapter 2.
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temna)62 and the conflict between Protestantism (under its Hussite form) and Catholicism
was placed at the core of Czech political and cultural development (with arguably the
struggle against the Germans)^.
Given the essential role of the Hussite legacy for the Czech national movement and the rather
lukewarm attitude of the Czechs towards Catholicism and religion in general, Hlinka, a
Catholic priest and the foremost advocate of Slovak autonomy, declared as early as 1908, that
he was "not worried about the language, since each is almost the same as the other ; it is
[Czech] atheism which could destroy us"64.
The religious policies of the First Republic met with resistance in the more traditionalist
Slovakia.
The destruction by a Czech mob of the column of the Virgin Mary on Prague's Old Town
Square on 3 November 1918^5? the secularisation of education and the support given by the
regime to the foundation of an autonomous Czechoslovak Church in the Hussite tradition did
nothing to assuage Slovak fears of Czech anticlericalism^^ but the most significant polemic
emerged after the commemoration on 6 July 1925 of the burning of Jan Hus at the stake.
Following the participation of president Masaryk and other members of the cabinet to the
ceremony, diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and the Vatican were broken off. A
modus vivendi was later signed by the Foreign Minister Edvard Benes on 2 February 1928,
partly as the price to pay for the participation of the Slovak Populists to the governmental
coalition between 1927 and 1929.
^^Mikulas Teich, "Introduction", in Teich, Bohemia, p. 16
useful summary of the issue can be found in fielak, "At the Price", p.21-22
^quoted in Samo Fal'tan, Slovenska otazka v Ceskoslovensku (Bratislava; Vydavatel'stvo politickej
literatury; 1968), p.22
^^Seton-Watson, The New, p.36; Michel, Histoire, p.314 ; Felak, "At the Price", p.22. The column was
significantly replaced by a monument devoted to Jan Hus.
6^See for example Jorg K.Hoensch, Die Slowakei und Hitlers Ostpolitik: Hlinkas Slowakische Volkspartei
zwischen Autonomic und Separation, 1938/1939 (Cologne, Graz; Bohlau Verlag; 1965), p.2
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Masaryk's view that the separation of the Church from the State was the first and most
important step towards the "de-Austrianization" of Czechoslovakia hence antagonised the
Slovak (and overwhelmingly Catholic) part of the country^?.
Crucially, these religious differences between Czechs and Slovaks survived despite the atheist
policies of the communist regime. In Slovakia, the role of religion as a manifestation of
dissent was significant and some of the most eloquent displays of opposition to the
communist regime were the pilgrimages^, for instance the celebrations in 1985 of the eleven
hundredth anniversary of the death of St-Methodius, Bishop of Slovakia:
When the commemorative day of July 7 arrived, the difference between Czech and
Slovak religiosity was once again demonstrated. Although Methodius had lived and
worked in the traditional Czech lands and was buried in the Moravian town of
Velehrad, some 100,000 to 250,000 Slovaks swarmed to Velehrad for the occasion,
while only a few Czechs turned out. The commemoration of the death of a missionary
to the Czechs had become a Slovak national religious event... The believers
spontaneously chanted, "We want the pope ! We want freedom"- and this again
suggested a link between the desire for religious freedom and the desire for political
self-determination. For the Slovaks it was perfectly natural that a religious event
should assume a nationalist character...69
The potential threat to the regime that Catholicism constituted in Slovakia was recognised by
the communist authorities, which concentrated anti-religious policies in the region. An
"^Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making ofa State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918 (London;
George Allen & Unwin; 1927), p.438.
6^even if the Slovak Catholic church has sometimes been accused of complicity and compromise with the
communist regime
^Pedro Ramet, "Christianity and National Heritage among the Czechs and Slovaks", in Pedro Ramet (ed.),
Religion and nationalism in Soviet and East European politics (Durham and London; Duke University Press;
1989), pp.282-283 (emphasis added)
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Institute for Scientific Atheism was established in Bratislava in 1971 and Slovak universities
became endowed with Atheism Faculties^,
However, official statistics of 1984 showed that, if the percentage of believers in
Czechoslovakia was only 36 percent, this figure reached 51 percent in the case of Slovakia
(30 percent in the Czech lands). As far ar the practice of religion is concerned, "in 1984, 71.6
percent of the children born in Slovakia were baptized, whereas in the Czech lands it was
31.2 percent. Church funerals stood at 80.5 percent in Slovakia and 50.6 percent in the Czech
lands. Fifty-three percent of weddings were held in churches, though in Czech parts it was
only 15.8 percent"^ 1.
The first census of the post-communist era, conducted in 1991, confirmed that only 9.8
percent of the Slovak population declared themselves "without confession", in stark contrast
with Bohemia-Moravia, where 39.7 percent of the respondents were registered as non-
believers^.
The religious divergence between Czechs and Slovaks was also vindicated in the immediate
aftermath of the Velvet Revolution, especially by the good initial electoral showing in 1990
of the Slovak Christian democrats which emerged as the main competitors of the
"revolutionary" movement Public Against Violence in Slovakia.
Religious issues had also provoked a political rift among the Slovak elites during the First
republic. The Slovak protestants, who constituted only approximately 16.8 percent of the
Slovak people and 12 percent of Slovakia's population^ exercised an important and
disproportionate political influence. Being customarily more supportive of a "Czechoslovak"
orientation than the Catholics, they tended to assimilate easily with Czech elites and, at the
example of personalities like Milan Hodza or Ivan Derer, consequently occupied some of the
highest positions in the newly-founded state.
10ibid., p..279
Milan J.Reban, "The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia", in Pedro Ramet (ed.), Catholicism andpolitics
in communist societies (Durham and London; Duke University Press; 1990), p. 152
72§tefan OCovsky, "Zur Religionsgeographie der Slowakei", Osterreichische Osthefte, Jahrgang 36 / 1994,
Heft 1, p.74
7^Vaclav L. Benes, "Czechoslovak Democracy and Its Problems, 1918-1920", in Mamatey and Luza, A
History, p.57. See also Johnson, Slovakia, p.27.
36
On the whole, religious differences were an important element of differentiation between
Czechs and Slovaks, because they became -at least during the First republic- one of the main
channels of opposition to Prague's policies in Slovakia^. The staunchly Catholic Hlinka's
Slovak People's Party (SPP), whose motto was "for God and the [Slovak] nation"^
presented itself as the main defender of Slovak interests and the spokesman of the Slovak
nation in front of the anticlerical and "godless" Czechs. The SPP gradually diversified its
themes to include economic or more strictly political revendi cations but its consistent
electoral record as the first party in Slovakia (table 1.1) would tend to demonstrate the impact
that religion still had on Slovak political life.
Table 1.1 : Parliamentary elections interwar period (percentage of votes in Slovakia)
Party 1920 1925 1929 1935
Slovak People's Party 17.6 34.3 28.4 30.1
Social Democrats 38.0 4.2 9.5 11.4
National Socialists 2.2 2.6 3.1 3.2
Agrarian Party 18.0 17.4 19.5 17.6
Communist Party - 13.9 10.7 13.0
Czechoslovak People's
Party
- 1.3 2.5 2.3
National Democrats - 1.8 3.8 1.6
Smalltraders' Party - 0.8 2.1 2.6
Source: Johnson, Slovakia, pp.65-66
Not surprisingly therefore, the Slovak Nazi-puppet state established during the second World
War (1939-1945) was based on a rather contradictory mix of fascist and clerical ideas, and
74See for instance Hoensch, Die Slowakei,, pp. 1-3
7 $ ibid., p.20
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was headed by Jozef Tiso -Hlinka's successor as chairman of the SPP and, like him, a
Catholic priest^.
Finally, besides these profound historical and socio-cultural faultlines, the economic
differences between Czechs and Slovaks were also important.
Before the creation of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia)
were the richest and the most industrialised region of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy^, and
by 1880 were producing "75 percent of all lignite in Austria, 94 percent of anthracite output,
84 percent of cast iron output, 70 percent of chemical output, 54 percent of output in machine
building, and 94 percent of refined sugar ouput. In other sectors, the share of the Bohemian
regions in the fast growing sectors rose sharply between 1880 and 1910 - the share in iron ore
output grew from 11 to 33 percent and the share of pig iron production grew from 37 to 58
percent "7 8.
Depending on the estimates, the Czech lands acccounted for between 60 and 80 percent of the
total Austro-Hungarian industrial production^ - while including on its territory only 20.22
percent of the Austro-Hungarian population^.
In contrast, Slovakia, while being one of the wealthiest areas of Hungary and accounting for
between 17 and 20 percent of all Hungarian industries^!, was lagging considerably behind,
^Yeshayahu Jelinek for instance called the Slovak state the "parish republic" (The Parish Republic: Hlinka's
Slovak People's Party - 1939-1945; Boulder, East European Quarterly; New York, Columbia University Press;
1976).
^David F. Good, The Economic Rise ofthe Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London;
University of California Press; 1984), p. 129-135; Bruce Garver, "The Czechoslovak Tradition", p.43
"^Good, The Economic, p. 132
^Victor Mamatey estimates that about 80 percent of the empire's industrial production was concentrated in
the Czech lands, but a somewhat more icalistic assessment would appear to put the figure at no more than 70
percent (Petr Pavlinek, "Regional Development and the Disintegration of Czechoslovakia", Geoforum, vol.26,
n°4, 1995, p.369 ; Victor S.Mamatey, "The Birth of Czechoslovakia: Union of Two Peoples", in Brisch and
Volgyes, Czechoslovakia, p.76 ; Frank Hadler, "Bohmen und Mahren im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, in Joachim
Bahlcke, Winffied Eberhard and Miloslav Polivka (eds), Bohmen und Mahren (Handbuch der historischen
Statten), Stuttgart; Alfred Kroner Verlag; 1998; p.CXXIII).
^calculation based on the figures of the recensement of 1910 given in Bogdan, Histoire, p.178
^V.Benes, "Czechoslovak", p.48 ;Alice Teichova, The Czechoslovak Economy: 1918-1980 (London;
Routledge; 1988), p.35 ; Macartney, Hungary, pp.82-83; David W. Paul, "Slovak Nationalism and the
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still a predominantly rural society. As demonstrated by table 1.2, the western part of
Czechoslovakia (Bohemia and Moravia) had less than one third of its population working in
agriculture, but, with only slightly less than two-third of its population employed in this
sector, Slovakia was still a predominantly rural society.
Table 1.2
Regions Year Number of inhabitants Percentage of the population
employed in agriculture
Bohemia 1910 6,769,237 32.28
1921 6,670,610 29.69
1930 7,109,376 24.06
Moravia 1910 3,379,173 38.57
1921 3,338,977 35.27
1930 3,565,010 28.56
Slovakia 1910 2,925,251 62.57
1921 2,998,244 60.63
1930 3,329,793 56.82
Subcarpathian 1910 595,598 71.29
Ruthenia 1921 604,593 67.63
1930 725,357 66.29




Source: Statisticka rocenka republiky Ceskoslovenske, Praha 1938, p. 15 (quoted in Jirf Kosta,
"Die soziookonomische Entwicklung der CSR-Wirstchaftliche und soziale Probleme", in
Bosl, Die demokratisch-parlamentarische, p.26).
The new Czechoslovak state was thus created with a west-east developmental gradient
between the industrialised Czech lands, rural Slovakia and backward Subcarpathian Ruthenia
Hungarian State, 1870-1910", in Paul Brass (ed.), Ethnic Groups and the State (London and Sydney; Croom
Helm; 1985), p.121.
(Carpatho-Ukraine)82 and in 1918, Slovakia accounted for only 8.5 percent of the new state's
industrial production^
The establishment of Czechoslovakia had as an immediate and somewhat paradoxical
consequence the deindustrialisation of Slovakia. Slovak firms could not survive the
competition with their more performant and efficient Czech rivals and, "from 1918 to 1923
over 200 plants in Slovakia were shut down"84.
As C.A Macartney gloomingly stated,
the Slovak industry had to face the competition of the great and old-established
Bohemian and Silesian concerns. The richer firms bought up, or obtained control
through holding-banks (notably the Zivnostenska Banka) over, the greater part of the
Slovak establishments. The latter were thus left at the mercy of the owners in the
Historic Lands, who worked them or closed them down as they pleased. Probably
nearly one-third of all the Slovak industries disappeared in this way during the
immediate post-War period, the heavy industries and textile factories being chiefly
affected 8
For instance, the Slovak iron industry, relatively competitive within the Empire before 1918,
produced 10 percent of Czechoslovak iron in 1919, but this share quickly dropped to a mere
2.7 percent in 1926^6. This situation was also reproduced in the agricultural sector, the
traditional lifeline of Slovak economy^.
^A.Teichova, The Czechoslovak, p.9 ; D.F. Good, The Economic, p. 12 ; this economic differential is
actually reflected in literacy rates (see table 1.6)
83pavlinek, "Regionalp.352
^Mamatey, "The development', p.l 16
^Macartney, Hungary, p.130
^Teichova, The Czechoslovak, p.35
^Teichova, ibid., pp.24-26 ; Pavlinek, "Regional", p.369 ; Ladislav K. Feierabend, "Agriculture in the First
Republic of Czechoslovakia", in Miloslav Rechcigl, Czechoslovakia Past and Present, volume 1: Political,
International, Social, and Economic Aspects (The Plague, Paris; Mouton; 1968), p. 178
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Furthermore, the disruption of the economic contacts and trade between the successor states
of Austria-FIungary had, given the traditional links between Slovakia and Hungary, a direct
and negative impact on Slovakia. Czechoslovak trade with Hungary continuously decreased
during the First Republic, from 6.1 % in 1924 to 5.6 % in 1929, and reached even lower
levels as a consequence of the protectionist measures taken after the economic crisis (2.1 % in
1932 and 1.7 % in 1937)88. Slovakia lost the competitive advantage formerly provided by its
geographical proximity to Budapest and this put for example an abrupt end to the seasonal
migrations of Slovak peasants or workers to Hungary89.
On top of this, the economic crisis hit Czechoslovakia and provoked further tensions between
Czechs and Slovaks -even if most scholars now argue that the more industrialised (and
export-oriented) Czech lands suffered more losses than Slovakia^.
The First Republic lacked a clear development and redistributive policy in direction of the
eastern provinces of the country (Slovakia and Ruthenia) and it is only in 1935 that Milan
Hodza, the first (and only) Slovak prime minister of interwar Czechoslovakia, launched the
idea of an investment programme to foster the equalisation of living standards between the
Czech lands and Slovakia^!.
This apparent lack of concern was nevertheless not the manifestation of a deliberate
discrimination but the result of the unconditional belief of Czech politicians in the virtue of
free market (it will be later argued^2 that this was also probably the case after 1989). One
could also add, in defence of the policy-makers of the First Republic, that economic theory
has only recently started to address the issue of regional underdevelopment^ which was
hardly a matter of discussion before World War II.
figures in Jin Kosta, "Die soziookonomische Entwicklung der CSR-Wirstchaftliche und soziale Probleme",
in Bosl, Die demokratisch-parlamentarische, p. 18
^Hugh Seton Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 178
9®Felak, "At the Price", p. 106
"' Hoensch, Die Slowakei, p.29
9^See chapter 3
^Zora p. Pryor, "Czechoslovak Economic Development in the Interwar Period", in Mamatey and Luza, A
History, p.214.
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Most significantly, the economic perspectives of the Czechs and Slovaks were strikingly
divergent. Whereas Bohemia-Moravia constituted an industrialised, individualist society with
a widely developed social stratification and an influential middle class, Slovakia was still
characterised by its agrarian and collectivist outlook. The interaction between these two
dissimilar societies was consequently marked by misunderstandings and mutual
incomprehension: economics is (largely) a matter of management rather than a fundamental
feature of social relations, but the economic disparities between Czechs and Slovaks were in
any case likely to make their coexistence difficult.
Having thus considered the political, socio-cultural and economic differences between the
Czech lands and Slovakia at the time of the foundation of the Czechoslovak state in 1918,
there are grounds to believe that the country was from the start impossible to govern, if only
because of the difficulty to create a "Czechoslovak" national identity.
The notion of "Czechoslovakism" -the belief in the existence of a single "Czechoslovak"
nation divided into a Czech and a Slovak branches- was a determinant factor in the
legitimisation of the state creation, yet the "dualism"94 0r "asynchronism"95 between the
Czech and Slovak nations has never been bridged during their nearly 74 years (interrupted
for six years during the Second world war) of coexistence in a common state. The previous
discussion indeed makes a strong case that Czechoslovakia could never have worked and was
an artificial construction.
The two following sections -on the pragmatic reasons at the roots of the creation of the state
in 1918 and the failure of the idea of "Czechoslovakism"- will momentarily reinforce this
view, before proceeding to refute these claims and demonstrate why Czechoslovakia was
viable and could have been saved after 1989.
^Wehrle, Le Divorce, p.71
^Zora Butorova and Martin Butora, "Die unertragliche Leichtigkeit der Trennung", in Kipke and Vodicka,
Abschied, p. 112
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The formation of Czechoslovakia for pragmatic considerations
Given the "developmental" differential between the two regions, it would appear legitimate
to conclude that the Czechs and the Slovaks were united in 1918 for pragmatic reasons. For
Masaryk and the Czech politicians, the 2 million Slovaks constituted a counterweight to the
German (3 millions) and, to a lesser extent, Hungarian (650,000 according to the 1921
census96) minorities -ensuring, with the 7 million Czechs a Slav majority in the newly-
created stated
However, the Slovaks were also following pragmatic aims: the partnership with the Czechs
was deemed to be the safest protection against Hungarian influence, and later revisionism,
especially given the traumatic experience of Magyarisation. As Hlinka wrote on 9 November
1918 in an article of Slovensky Dennik, "the Slovaks can find protection and security against
age-old abuses by Hungarians only in the Czechoslovak state"98.
The formation of Czechoslovakia was largely based on mutual interests: for the Czechs, it
was the best way to solve the problem of German nationalism and it provided the Slovaks
with the means to escape Hungarian domination^. The British historian R.W. Seton-Watson,
hardly an opponent of the formation of Czechoslovakiaacknowledged the importance of
pragmatism in the creation of the new state, when he remarked that
^^Ludvik Nemec, "Solution of the minorities problem" in Mamatey and Luza, A history, p.422
97Felak, "At the Price", p. 18
9^Pavel Blaho, "Personal Recollection of a Few Episodes in Czecho-Slovak Relations", in Rechcigl
Czechoslovakia, p. 101
"ilubomfr Liptak, "Der 'Krach' der tschechoslowakischen Staatsidee", in Jorg K. Hoensch und Dusan Kovac
(eds), Das Scheitern der Verstandigung: Tschechen, Deutsche und Slowaken in der Ersten Republik (1918-
1938) (Dusseldorf; Veroffentlichungen des Instituts fur Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen im ostlichen
Europa; 1994), p.43
lO^as his life and works prove it. See his Masaryk in England (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press;
1943); the two-volume publication R. W Seton Watson and His Relations with the Czechs and Slovaks:
Documents, Dokumenty, 1906-1951 (Prague; Ustav TG Masaryka; 1995-96) and Hugh and Christopher Seton-
Watson, The Making ofa New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the last Years ofAustria-Hungary (London;
Methuen; 1981).
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the closest co-operation between Slovak and Czech was no mere luxury, but a
compelling necessity, if the Czechs and Slovaks, occupying dangerous salients on the
racial map of Europe, were to avoid utter destruction 101.
As a consequence, the Czechoslovak state was based on a confusion between the notions of
"historic" and "natural" rights. If the historic rights of the Crown of Bohemia-Moravia had
been upheld, Slovakia would not have been included in the new state and Hungary had
arguably a legitimate claim to maintain its rule on a region which had been part of the
kingdom of Saint-Stephen for about 1000 years and was commonly called Upper-Hungary (or
Felvidek, "the Hills" 102). On the other hand, the principle of natural rights could have
justified the inclusion of Slovakia in the new state, which should however have then
renounced to the German minority of Bohemia 103. in fact, as Igor Lukes pointed out, when
Slovakia was under discussion at the Versailles conference, Edvard Benes, the foreign
minister of the new state "argued somewhat inconsistently that borders ought to be marked in
such a manner that the carved-out territory would form a viable economic unit...Thus,
Czechoslovakia's borders in the West were drawn in accordance with the historical principle,
while in the Slovak east the diplomats at Versailles applied the more pragmatic, economic
principle of demarcation" 104.
This contradiction was later conceded by Masaryk himself when he declared that "it was
Slovakia that mattered to me; and yet, according to the historic right, we should have
relinquished Slovakia to the Hungarians" 105.
lOlRW.Seton-Watson, 25years, p. 14.
102johnson, Slovakia, pp. 16-17
lOSxhis argument is made by Fejto, Requiem, p.433-434.
lO^Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy ofEduard Benes in the 1930s
(New York, Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1996), p.5.
lO-'Karel Capek, Entretiens avec Masaryk (La Tour d'Aigues; Editions de 1'Aube; 1991), p. 160
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Even more explicitly, in his memoirs of the first World War, Masaryk (the son of a Slovak
peasant from a region then called Slovacko, at the crossroads between Moravia and
Slovakial06) states his personal reasons for the integration of Slovakia in the new state:
My programme was a synthesis of Czech aspirations in the light of our constitutional,
historical and natural rights; and I had kept the inclusion of Slovakia constantly in
view, for I am by descent a Slovak, born in Moravia. Hungarian Slovakia I knew, as I
had often been there, and I had a border line between Slovakia and the Magyar
country clearly in mind^^.
Under this light, the union of the Czechs and the Slovaks was the result of the aspirations and
activities of a handful of politicians, often in exile and hardly aware of the desires of the
populations. The creation of Czechoslovakia was not brought about by a popular uprising or
movement but was the successful outcome of the effective propaganda of the "Triumvirate"
composed of the Czechs Tomas Masaryk, Edvard Benes and the Slovak Milan Stefanik^8
The active lobbying of the Slovak immigration in the United States was also a decisive
influence. Masaryk travelled extensively around the United States and successfully rallied the
numerous Czech and Slovak American communities to the idea of a Czechoslovak state^O^
The Cleveland Agreement (October 1915) and the Pittsburgh Declaration (May 1918, in
presence of Masaryk, who signed it) between the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak
League of America constituted decisive steps towards the realisation of the Czechoslovak
1 ^Gordon Skilling, T.G. Masaryk, p.64-65: "it is not easy to identify Masaryk's real national origin or even
his national consciousness. Although in his earlier years he sometimes called himself a Czech or a Moravian, in
later life he claimed that he was Czech and Slovak, or "half-Slovak" or, sometimes, that he was of pure Slovak
origin". See also Thomas D. Marzik, "Masaiyk's National Background", in Peter Brock and H.Gordon Skilling
(eds), The Czech Renascence ofthe Nineteenth Century (Toronto and Buffalo; University of Toronto Press;
1970), pp.239-253.
"-^Masaryk, The making, p.41
lO^Hoensch, "Tschechoslowakismus", p. 136
109Josef Kalvoda, The Genesis ofCzechoslovakia (Boulder, East European Monographs; New York;
Columbia University Press; 1986), esp. pp.271-303.
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ideal, chiefly because the American citizens of Czech and Slovak descent were increasingly
oblivious of the distinction between their national origins HO.
The fact that Czechoslovakia was "made" through elite bargaining and diplomatic
interventions would tend to emphasize the "weakness" of the new state and one of the many
ironies of the existence of the common Czecho-slovak state was that, born in 1918 without
referendum, or generally speaking without genuine and widespread popular legitimacy, it was
also destroyed from above in 1992 ^ * v
The "geopolitical argument"
There exists nevertheless an alternative, and more cynical, way to look at the creation of
Czechoslovakia: Czechoslovakia was founded after the First World War because it served the
interests of the victorious Western powers of the Entente - France, the United Kingdom and
the United States. The new state could in their eyes act as a useful buffer state between
Germany and the new Bolshevik-led Soviet Union.
Czechoslovakia remained until Munich the most important element in the French system of
alliances in the region, and the president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, became one
of the most popular personalities of the country - Prague's train station even taking his
namel 12
This leads to consider the broader argument according to which the union of the Czechs and
the Slovaks was a consequence of the geopolitical situation of two small nations in need of a
I ^Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg
Monarchy, 1848-1918, volume 1 (Empire and Nationalities) (New York; Octagon Books; 1964), p.282. The
Cleveland Agreement and the Pittsburgh Declaration aimed to promote the union of the Czechs and the Slovaks
in a common state on the basis of an administrative and cultural autonomy for Slovakia. The Declaration was
however later dismissed by Masaryk as "a local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks upon the
policy they were prepared to advocate" (Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making ofa State: Memories and
Observations, 1914-1918', London; George Allen & Unwin; 1927; p.220)
II ^See chapter 6. The organisation of a referendum in 1918 would however have been unlikely (and would
not necessarily have brought legitimacy to the new state).
l^Victor S.Mamatey, "The Role of President Wilson in the Foundation of Czechoslovakia", in Rechcigl,
Czechoslovakia, p. 19 ; Herbert Adolphus Miller, "What Woodrow Wilson and America meant to
Czechoslovakia", in Robert J. Kerner (ed.), Czechoslovakia: Twenty Years ofIndependence (Berkeley, Los
Angeles; University of California Press; 1940), pp.71-87 ; David Kelly, "Woodrow Wilson and the Creation of
Czechoslovakia", East European Quarterly, XXVI, n°2, June 1992, pp. 185-207
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"partner" to survive in a Central Europe, at the crossroads between the German "Drang Nach
Osten" and Russian (for most of the twentieth century, Soviet) expansionism 1 ^
The domestic politics of Czechoslovakia has been largely influenced and conditioned by the
nature of the international environment.
As a consequence, for the proponents of the inevitability of the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia, the union between Czechs and Slovaks was due to be contested as soon as
the external constraints would become less important and the international environment more
favourable. These conditions seemed to be present after 1989, probably for the first time in
this century because of "the retreat of Russia, the self-absorption of Germany , [and] the
disintegration of the Soviet empire" without these exogenous forces, the "partnership"
between the Czechs and the Slovaks could not be sustained, and the break-up of 1992 should
in fact be taken as the definitive illustration of the relevance of what could be called the
"geopolitical argument". Created by the great powers in 1918, Czechoslovakia disappeared as
soon as these great powers lost interest in its fate. Each shift in the international system
affected the ethnopolitics of the country, inducing the first break-up of 1938/39, as well as the
definitive end of the state after the end of the Cold War.
The fourth chapter of this dissertation will come back to this approach and seek to refute it,
arguing that, unlike in the 1930s, the international environment did not pre-determine the
dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1992.
The failure of the "Czechoslovakism" of the First Republic and of the Marxist
conceptions of the communist regime
What should however tor the moment be considered more relevant to our study, is the fact
that the successive attempts to bring together the Czechs and the Slovaks all failed.
1The Czechs and Slovaks were however traditionally well disposed towards Russia, as we shall see in
chapter 4.
1 l^Rupnik, "The international context", p.272
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This could at first sight be taken by the proponents of the inevitability of the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia, as a further confirmation of their theory, since they consider the union of the
two nations as a mere "marriage of convenience": according to them, all attempts to
"integrate" the Czech and the Slovak nations were destined to fail anyway.
The centralist constitution of 1920 questionably recognised the principle of a "Czechoslovak
nation" H ^ anc)5 while it granted a specific status and extensive minority rights to the 3
million Sudeten Germans, the 2.5 million Slovaks, as a part of the "state-forming nation"
(statotvorny narod), did not have any specific collective rights. As Jacques Rupnik indicated,
the core of the Slovak problem [was] that, in the mind of the founders of the State, the
Slovak nation constituted with the Czech nation the backbone of the State, whereas its
real political situation put it instead on the side of the national minorities 116
Masaryk stressed as the solution to this situation the role of education as a factor capable of
ensuring the cohesion of the state. The differences between the Czechs and the Slovaks were
to disappear naturally "as soon as a generation has grown up which has been educated in the
same schools and lived in the same state" H7. This policy met with some success since
Slovakia experienced a real cultural development during the interwar period, but the
imbalance between this significant improvement of cultural and educational perspectives and
the corresponding lack of economic opportunities (partly a consequence of the worldwide
economic depression after 1929) unintentionally contributed to the formation of a distinct
Slovak consciousness. The newly-educated generation of Slovaks was hence not
"Czechoslovak" but on the contrary increasingly aware of the specificity of the Slovak nation.
C.A Macartney estimated in 1937 that about two-thirds of the younger generation of Slovaks
1 l^The Preamble of the constitution started by "We, the Czechoslovak nation". See for instance Victor
Knapp, "Development of the Czechoslovak State from Its Origin to Its Extinction", in Knapp and Bartole, La
Dissoluzione, p.7
' ^Jacques Rupnik, Histoire du Parti communiste tchecoslovaque: Des Origines a la Prise du Pouvoir
(Paris; Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques; 1981), p. 129. We consider later whether this
was a unconscious or deliberate tactic of the Czech leaders.
1 Czechoslovakia, Prague, 1924, p.28, quoted in Eugen Steiner, The Slovak dilemma (Cambridge;
Cambridge University Press; 1973), p.22
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had become "autonomist" (believing in the individuality of the Slovak nation and advocating
some measure of political autonomy from Prague), as opposed to one-third of "centralists"
who still adhered to Czechoslovakism (and to the unitary state) 118.
This generational gap in Slovakia was actually reflected in the composition of the leadership
of Slovak-based political parties. The young generation of Eudaks (the name traditionally
given to the members of the Slovak People's Party) was more and more "autonomist" and
constituted an important proportion of the radical faction of the SPP, who eventually
negotiated with Hitler the creation of the Nazi-sponsored Slovak state in 1939^9.
Even among the "internationalist" communists, young Slovak communists such as Gustav
Husak or Vlado Clementis increasingly expressed specifically Slovak "national" interests 120
What is more, the following attempt by the communist regime after 1948 -probably as a
recognition of the "mistakes" of the interwar period- to emphasise the process of economic
equalisation as the definitive solution to the national issue equally failed. The starting point of
the communist approach was the Marxist doctrine which stated that nationalism was just an
expression of class conflicts and could therefore be overcome by economic equalisation:
nationalism was a bourgeois phenomenon resulting not only from the unequal
economic development of two societies but above all from the exploitation of one by
the other. With the industrialization of Slovakia, the regime had hoped to put an end
to Slovak national demands in Czechoslovakia, which in themselves were vestiges of
its bourgeois past, and to allow for the joint socialist development of two societies
where national differences would manifest themselves and be protected only on the
1 ^Macartney, Hungary, p. 146. To be fair, this phenomenon seems in fact characteristic of what has been
later defined as the "diploma disease" (and has recently been for example applied to the case of the Kosovo
Albanians in the 1970s and 1980s). (See Robert Bidclcux and Ian Jeffries, A History ofEastern Europe: Crisis
and Change; London and New York; Routledge; 1998, p.432 and 300; Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and
Albanian: a History ofKosovo', New York, Columbia University Press; 1998); Aleksandar Pavkovic, The
Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State (New York; St-Martin's Press; 1997), p. 80.
1' ^Felak, "At the Price", p.83; Hoensch, Die Slowakei, p.33.
120Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, The Lustfor Power: Nationalism, Slovakia, and the Communists, 1918-1948
(Boulder, East European Monographs; Columbia University Press; 1983).
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cultural level. Political solutions like autonomy and federation would eventually
disappear in an integrated socialist which itself would lead to the withering away of
the state .121
But this policy had, like the "educational" policy of the First Republic, reverse consequences:
"development, rather than creating a broad 'national [i.e, Czechoslovak] political society' has
given Slovakia resources to build its own society" 122 ancj communist leaders proved as
unable as their "bourgeois" predecessors to bring together the Czech and the Slovak
nations 123 Tfte national policy of the Czechoslovak communists under Klement Gottwald
and Antonin Novotny has been described as "neo-Czechoslovakist"124 ancj the asymmetrical
model in force between 1945 and 1969 appeared to many Slovaks as a proof that Slovakia
might belong to the Slovaks but Czechoslovakia still belonged to the Czechs 125 -phe notion
of centralism was deeply enshrined in the constitution adopted in 1960, which defined the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as "a unitary state of two fraternal nations" 126
Therefore, the "Czechoslovakism" of the First Republic and the communist regime failed
because they were both perceived by most Slovaks as a disguised attempt of "Czechisation" -
and not of "Czechoslovakisation"- of the Slovak nation:
l^lstanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Federalism in Slovak communist politics", Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol. 19
n°4, 197, p. 457.
122Leff, National conflict, p.290
123see chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of this concept and of the Marxist-Leninist approach to the
national question.
124the expression is used by Kirschbaum, A history, p.245
125petr Pithart, Osmasedesaty, quoted by Holy, The little Czech, p.101
1 ^Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, July 11, 1960 (chapter one, article 1, §2), in Jan F.
Triska (ed.), Constitutions ofthe Communist Party-States (Stanford University; The Hoover Institution on War,
Revolution and Peace; 1968), p.432 (emphasis added).
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although the more sensitive Czech political elites proclaimed that Czechs and Slovaks
would merge to become a new 'Czechoslovak' nation, the general consensus among
Czech political elites was that the Slovaks were a lesser part of the Czech nation ^ 27
This is reflected in the declarations of the Czech "founders" of the Czechoslovak state.
Masaryk explicitly stated in 1915 that "Slovaks are Czechs in spite of using their dialect as a
literary language"*28 arK} Benes, as late as December 1943, declared that
the Slovaks are Czechs and the Slovak language is only one of the dialects of the
Czech language-for example, that spoken in Hana [a town in Central Moravia], I
cannot stop anybody from calling himself a Slovak, but I shall not agree with a
declaration that a Slovak nation exists. 129
This refusal to acknowledge the existence of a Slovak nation sharply contrasts with the
conception of the third member of the "Triumvirate" , the "Czechoslovak Slovak" Stefanik,
for whom every Slovak was a Czech living in Slovakia, and every Czech was a Slovak living
in the Czech Lands. Stefanik's notion of Czechoslovakism seemed to have been
"bilateral" implying the equality of the Czechs and the Slovaks and a notion of
reciprocity, whereas for most Czechs, it was a purely unilateral process, with the Slovaks
considered as nothing more than "Czechs to be developed". This dichotomy could also be
found in the linguistic issue examined earlier: the ideal of the "Czechoslovakists" Safarik and
Kollar was a language that would be both "a Slovak Czech and a Czech Slovak (chcme
slovenskou cestinu a ceskou slovenstinu)" and Kollar wondered why the Czechs could not
127R0bert J.Kaiser, "Czechoslovakia: the disintegration of a binational state" in Graham Smith (ed.),
Federalism: the multiethnic challenge (London and New York; Longman; 1996), p.213.
l^See the memorandum "Independent Bohemia" (1915), reproduced in RW Seton-Watson, Masaryk, p. 125
^quoted by Steiner,77m Slovak, p.53
130§tefanik's premature (and controversial) death in a plane crash in 1919 during his return to
Czechoslovakia prevents us to draw any definite conclusions about what his reactions to the policies of the state
could have been.
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"give way at least a little bit to the Slovaks... when the Slovaks have been willing to sacrifice
everything to the Czechs with respect to the [literary] language" 131.
The creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 was thus based on an evident absence of consensus
between the Czechs and the Slovaks as far as the future of the state was concerned.
"Czechoslovakism" provoked durable misunderstandings, and it is only with the
federalisation of 1968-69 and the nomination of the Slovak Gustav Husak as general
secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party that references to a "Czechoslovak" identity
almost completely disappeared 132
Hence, after the failures of the First Republic and of the communist regime, the gap between
the Czech and the Slovak societies was far from reduced. Czech feelings of having been
betrayed by the Slovaks, in 1939 at the time of the founding of the Slovak state or in 1968
when the federalisation law was adopted in the aftermath of the invasion of the country, were
paralleled by similar Slovak feelings, concerning the promises of autonomy unkept by the
Czechs (the Pittsburgh agreements of 1918 or the Kosice Programme of 1945)133.
The break-up of Czechoslovakia: a "historically necessary" process ?
As a result, when the democratisation of 1989 came, the Slovaks had developed a sense of
their national distinctiveness stronger than ever before. This is to be contrasted with their
13 ^ quoted in Brock, The Slovak, p.23
132although after his dismissal and replacement at the head of the Party by the Czech Milos Jakes in
December 1987, some manifestations of what the Slovak intellectual Milan Hiibl called "neo-Novotnism"
reemerged (Wehrle, Le divorce, p.212 and 223)
133see more on this in ch.2. The Kosice programme, the government programme adopted by the Czech and
Slovak elites, formally recognised the equality of the Czech and Slovak nations, established a Slovak National
Council and confirmed the autonomous status of the Slovak Communist Party. Yet the subsequent Prague
agreements effectively reduced to nothing the influence of Slovak authorities on Czechoslovak politics.
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situation before 1918, about which Robert Seton-Watson was able to write that "there can be
little doubt that in another generation...assimilation would have been complete" 134
Slovak independence in 1993, according to a somewhat optimistic view, was therefore
logical, what Jin Musil describes as "the ultimate fulfilment of Slovak national emancipation,
a belated formation of a nation-state which for many internal and external reasons could not
have been established earlier" ^5 -pfre emancipation of the Slovaks appears to have been a
gradual process, marked by several significant stages: 1918 and the end of Hungarian
domination, 1939 and the creation of the Slovak state, 1945 and the "asymetrical" model
granting them a formal autonomy, 1968 and the federalisation of the state and finally 1
January 1993^6
However, provided we accept this interpretation, the split of 1992 could and should probably
also be considered as an achievement for the Czechs, the realisation of a "Czech statehood"
liberated from the shams and pretences of the notion of "Czechoslovak statehood" and the
establishment of a homogeneous nation-state based on the historic rights of Bohemia-
Moravia.
Yet the argument that the break-up was inevitable is founded on two contestable assumptions.
First of all, it assumes that Czech and Slovak political cultures are not only different, but also
in fact so contradictory and irreconcilable as to preclude the further coexistence of the two
nations in a common state -an argument which will be refuted in chapter 2.
Before that, and for the moment, the next section concentrates on the second factor often
invoked as an explanation for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia: the idea that the search of
the Slovaks and the Czechs for their national identity had to end with the establishment of
two separate independent states.
134rw Seton-Watson, 25 years, p.14 ; Mamatey, "The Birth", p.79
135Jiff Musil, "Introduction", in Musil, The End, p. 10
136,\s early as 1981, KrejcSi and Velimsky similarly called this process a "catching-up by stages" and
distinguished at the time four stages, each of which brought the Slovaks some progress vis-a-vis the Czechs :
1918-1938, 1939-1945, 1948-1968, and a last stage starting from 1968 (Jaroslav Krejci and Vizslav Velimsky,
Ethnic andpolitical nations in Europe', London; Croom Helm; 1981; p. 150-151)
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The "historical argument"
The argument about the supposed "historical necessity" of the break-up was used by Slovak
separatists, who emphasised the ineluctability of the creation of a Slovak nation-state.
It was subsequently adhered to by Vaclav Havel himself, who first wrote in 1991 that "the
Slovak will to emancipation is an integral part of the present historical moment" ^7 Even
more explicitly, after his resignation from the Czechoslovak presidency in July 1992, he
stated that he did not think "a single person could have stopped what is historically
necessary" ^38.
This section however contends that national statehood was perhaps not a historical necessity
in the case of Slovakia and that the maintenance of a common state between Czechs and
Slovaks was possible. Slovak and Czech secessionist claims were mostly based on the
ambiguous notion of the right of national self-determination.
The trouble with national self-determination is not that it would tend to lead to a system of
Kleinstaaterei, and the idea that the division of Czechoslovakia is dangerous because it
created two fragile small states misses the point, and for at least three reasons.
First of all, and to put it in a simplistic way, "micro-states" like Andorra, Liechtenstein or San
Marino have been recognised by the international community and there appears to be no
reason for denying the rights of the Czechs and the Slovaks to create their own nation-
states!39 In post Cold-War Europe and with the advent of globalisation, virtually every
137vaclav Havel, Summer meditations on Politics, morality and civility in a time of transition (London;
Faber; 1992), p.29-30
13° The New York Times, July 21 1992, quoted in Sona Szomolanyi, "Was the dissolution of Czechoslovakia
inevitable ?", Scottish Affairs, n°8, Summer 1994, p.43 (emphasis added)
139f0j- an analysis of the concept of "micro-states", see Tom Nairn, Faces ofNationalism: Janus Revisited
(London, New York; Verso; 1997), pp.143-149. A special issue ofNew Statesman and Society (19/06/92, vol.5,
n°207, p. 18) for example lists as European micro-states Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, San Marino, and the
Vatican. This argument however neglects to consider the very different (stable) political and geopolitical
conditions which allowed these micro-states to preserve their sovereignty (interview with Professor Rainer
Baubock, Vienna, 01/09/1999).
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political-geographical unit is now viable, and the Czech and Slovak republics undoubtedly
more so than most others 140
Secondly, much more importantly, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have achieved a lot
since their independence and have proved to be economically and politically stable entities -
even if some (legitimate) doubts were periodically expressed as far as the democratic
credentials of the Slovak prime minister Vladimir Meciar were concerned 141.
Thirdly, the dissolution of a binational state ridden by conflicts between Czechs and Slovaks
and the establishment in its place of two homogeneous nation-states (at least in the case of the
Czech Republic, since Slovakia still has an important Hungarian minority) could also
arguably -even if controversially- be considered as a factor of stability in the region!42.
The real issue lies therefore in the definition of national self-determination which would
equate self-determination and independence. The right of national self-determination should
not be taken as a synonym for secession and it does not imply that a nation or minority is
legitimate in seeking to establish an independent state:
once the possibility for a variety of types of political association with differing forms
and degrees of self-determination is appreciated, dissastified groups within existing
states will not be faced with the stark choice of either remaining in a condition of total
dependence within the centralized state or taking the radical step of seceding to form
their own sovereign state...Exercising the right of self-determination need not always
involve secession if other degrees and forms of self-determination are available 143
140see more on this in chapter 3 and 4.
141 See ch.2 and 6
142paavo Vayrynen, "Nation State: some Basic Concepts and Definitions", in Tyrki Iiovonen (ed.), The
Future ofthe Nation State in Europe (Aldershot, Brookfield; Elgar; 1993), p.17: "A sense of national
unity...is...the only truly necessary precondition for the emergence of stable democracy..." He argues that in
societies like Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union (and one feels tempted to add Czechoslovakia), "national
disintegration is a necessary precursor to democratization...National struggles at present seem to be a necessary
first step towards the emergence of stable democracy in the future, just as they were in Western Europe in the
nineteenth century...".See also Richard Rose, "Eastern Europe a Decade Later: Another Great Transformation",
Journal ofDemocracy, vol.10, n°l, January 1999, p.53
'43Allen Buchanan, "Self-determination and the right to secede", Journal ofInternational Affairs, vol.45,
n°2, Winter 1992, p.351, quoted by Lukic and Lynch, Europe, p.35
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Moreover, if self-determination does not presuppose accession to independence and, as
Oppenheim put it, "independence is a question of degree" 144^ ^ becomes legitimate to look at
the alternatives to full independence.
In the case of Czechoslovakia, the alternative to secession ^5 was assimilation or integration.
The policies of "Czechoslovakisation" of the First Republic failed but the process of "state-
building" began in 1918 was not necessarily bound to fail. The first section of this chapter has
stressed the differences between Czechs and Slovaks, but it has also implicitly made evident
that the two nations had a better chance to merge into a common ("Czechoslovak") nation
than most others.
Our purpose here is not to discuss the ethical and moral aspects of the integration of Slovak
culture into Czech identity but one could merely remark that cultural assimilation is not
necessarily intrinsically condamnable. As John Stuart Mill put it in a different context,
[njobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton or a Basque of French
Navarre to be ... a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the
privileges of French citizenship...than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic
of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest
in the general movement of the world 146
Three factors therefore explain why the potential (and possibly not "undesirable") merging
between Czechs and Slovaks did not happen.
Firstly, had the First Czechoslovak Republic not been brought to a premature end under
circumstances related to the international environment in 1938, Slovaks and Czechs might
'"^Oppenheim, International I .aw, I 736, quoted in Cobban, The Nation Stale, p.149 ; see also Kamal S.
Shehadi, "Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-up of States", Adelphi Papers, 283 (December 1993), p.84 :
"The doctrine and the right to self-determination do not single out independent statehood as the only possible
end"
'"^Federalism, another alternative, will be examined at length in chapters 7 and 8, since it was applied in
Czechoslovakia from January 1969 to December 1992.
'46j0hn Stuart Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government", in On Liberty and Other Essays
(Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1998), p.431
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have gradually merged into a single, unified "Czechoslovak" nation. Vaclav L.Benes stresses
the importance of a time factor:
To forge a strong and stable state out of the conglomerate of different peoples located
in a geographically exposed position between East and West and surrounded mostly
by hostile nations, required not only great skill but also time 147
This echoes Masaryk himself, who stated that the country "needfed] fifty years ofundisturbed
peace and only then shall we have achieved what we would like to have today". History let
only 20 years of peace to Czechoslovakia, but one could clearly contend that an integration
based on a French centralist model was a possibility, had Czechoslovakia disposed of more
time 148. The French Third Republic, whose educational and social policies aimed at the
deliberate realisation of the concept of a nation "une et indivisible"^^, was indeed perceived
as an example to follow by Czechoslovak policy makers such as the French-educated Benes
or Stefanik, who was a French citizen and an officer in the French army during the War^O
Secondly, the Czech elites of the new state were all too often arrogant and insensitive to
Slovak demands.
The Czechs created Czechoslovakia according to their image (the "maly cesky clovek")^$\
and overestimated the willingness of the Slovaks to adopt the Czech way of life.
Benes, "Czechoslovak", p.51
*4°See also Korbel, Twentieth'. "Despite great progress during the twenty years of the Republic, another
thirty years of peace was needed to permit these dissimilar societies to grow together and resolve their
problems" (p.87)
'^See for example Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization ofRural France, 1870-
1914 (London; Chatto and Windus; 1977).
l^Benes submitted and defended in 1908 a doctoral dissertation on Austria-Hungary and the Czech question
at the university of Dijon (see Zbynek Zeman (with Antonin Klimek), The Life ofEdvard Benes, 1884-1948:
Czechoslovakia in Peace and War, Oxford; Clarendon Press; 1997, pp. 10-11). For a general assessment of the
role of France as a model for Czech leaders, see Fejto, Requiem, pp.305-365 and Kirschbaum,
"Czechoslovakia", p.79
1 Zbynek Zeman (with Antonin Klimek), ibid., p.52
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"Czechoslovakism" should not however be seen as a deliberately cynical strategy, a "plot" of
the Czechs to destroy Slovak identity. Many Czechs (starting with Masaryk, who once
declared that he was "a living embodiment of [the] Czechoslovak programme" 152) sincerely
and in good faith believed themselves to be one with the Slovaks and thought that they had a
moral duty to assist their Slovak "younger brothers" 153
To be fair, such paternalism (not altogether incomparable to the sense of mission which
characterised European colonialism) could potentially only breed resentment between the two
nations. Yet, the implementation of a less uniformally anticlerical religious policy, the
allocation of funds to the economic development of Slovakia, the recognition of the
individuality of the Slovak language as well an increased participation of Slovak elites to
decision-making at the highest level (in Prague) could have gone a long way to alleviate
Slovak grievances 154
As illustrated earlier by our discussion of the notion of Czecho-Slovak reciprocity, "Czecho¬
slovakism" failed because it was too "Czech" and did not leave enough room to its "Slovak"
component. More than a merging (or acculturationl55) 0f two nations, Czechoslovakism was
untenably conceived as an assimilation of the Slovaks by the Czechs 156
Finally, the most important obstacle to the creation of a "Czechoslovak" nation was arguably
that the Slovaks, like the Czechs, had by 1918 developed a sense of their national identity too
lipomas G.Masaryk, "Slovenske vzpomienky", Slovenske hlasy, n°15, 22 Oct. 1917 (quoted in Marzik,
"Masaryk's", p.253)
l^This was the case of the majority of the Czech teachers who were sent to Slovakia after 1918 to help the
establishment of an educational network. (The stereotype of the Slovak as the "younger brother" of the Czech
will be developed in ch.2)
l^Hoensch, "Tschechoslowakismus", p. 156
155 Michael Hechter for instance defines acculturation as the process when "the interaction of the
collectivities leads to the establishment of a new culture, which is created by borrowing elements form each of
the constituent groups" (Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966]
London; Routledge & Kegan Paul; 1975, p.48)(emphasis added).
156-pjje Czechoslovak experience confirms that "the unity of multiethnic polities depends largely on the
willingness of the dominant element not to think of itself as an ethnic category. It is not enough for the state to
seek to assimilate its diverse groups; the dominant element in the state has to dissolve itself within or identify
itself with a broader territorial, political, and / or ideological concept as well" (Roman Szporluk, "The Imperial
Legacy and the Soviet Nationalities Problem", in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger (eds), The Nationalities
Factor in Soviet Politics and Society (Boulder; Westview Press; 1990; p. 17)
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strong to allow it to be merged easily into a larger "Czechoslovak" identity. The recent
research of scholars such as Peter Brock, Owen Johnson or David Paul has nuanced and even
contested Seton-Watson's gloomy portrayal of a Slovak nation on the verge of extinction
before 1918, and has emphasised the relative dynamism of the Slovak national movement in
the nineteenth century 157
It was therefore extremely difficult to build a Czechoslovak nation-state, with as a starting
point two nations aware of their distinctiveness (if only, as seen earlier, through their use of
two separate literary languages). To use the influential theoretical framework developed by
Hroch, the Slovak national movement had already begun by 1918 the last phase (phase C,
characterised by the rise of a mass national movement) of its development 158 ancj thjs
impeded the subsequent integration of the Czech and Slovak nations into one "Czechoslovak"
nation.
Given all these elements, the division of the state was not the result of some form of
"historical necessity" but the consequence of the failure of the attempts to build a
"Czechoslovak" national identity -a failure which, as we have seen, was far from ineluctable.
Conclusion
Even if the distinctiveness of the Czech and Slovak nations and the artificial character of the
considerations that provoked their merging in a common state in 1918 have to be
acknowledged, the creation of Czechoslovakia was a "noteworthy experiment in political and
social progress" 159
l^Brock, j'he Slovak, pp.53-54; Paul, "Slovak Nationalism", p. 145; Johnson, Slovakia, p. 10; Robert Seton-
Watson, A History ofthe Czechs and Slovaks (London, New York; Hutchinson & Co; 1943), p.283.
158Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions ofNational Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis ofthe
Social Composition ofPatriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge; Cambridge
University Press; 1985), esp p.22-24. According to Serhy Yekelchyk, this is evidenced by the emergence in the
years 1890 and 1900 of political parties, such as the Slovak National Party (created in 1868, but increasingly
active in the 1890s) and the Slovak People's Party (founded in 1905)(see Serhy Yekelchyk, "Nationalisme
ukrainien, bielorusse et slovaque", in Chantal Delsol and Michel Maslowski (eds), Histoire des Idees Politiques
de I'Europe Centrale\ Paris; Presses Universitaires de France; 1998, p.384).
' 59the expression is from RW Seton-Watson, 25 years, p.6
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*
The achievements of the First republic (and its benefits for the Czechs and perhaps even more
for the Slovaks) ultimately justified the creation of the new state.
This could be demonstrated at several levels.
First of all, Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1938 remained a stable democracy and the
"exception" in Central and Eastern Europe 160 The establishment and maintenance of
democratic institutions, as well as the respect of individual human rights, constituted a
considerable improvement if compared to the situation under Austro-Hungarian rule. This
applies with particular strength to the Slovaks, who were now free from the pressures of
Magyarisation and "advanced from a position of a provincial backwater to a position of
relative prominence as part of a new and interesting Central European country" 161.
The second and correlated important reason to reject the vision of Czechoslovakia as merely
another kind of "prison of the nations", is the reality of Slovak cultural and political
development. The interwar period was marked by a genuine and durable Slovak revival as
well as the development of an educational system in Slovakia.
Before 1918, "only 0.3 percent among the Slovaks... had any education above the elementary
level" and, if a Slovak had received an education, it was generally in an Hungarian school.
The illiteracy rate of the Slovak population in 1921 was 15 percent, about six times as high as
in the Czech lands (table 1.3).
Table 1.3 : Percentage of illiteracy in Czechoslovakia, according to census of 1921
Areas Percentage of illiteracy of all





160Antony Polonsky, The Little Dictators, The history ofEastern Europe since 1918 (London, Boston;
Routledge & Kegan Paul; 1975), pp.107-126
161peter Petro, "Slovak Literature: Loyal, Dissident and Emigre", in H.Gordon Skilling (ed.),
Czechoslovakia 1918-88: Seventy Years from Independence (New York; St-Martin's Press; 1991), p.200
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Sources: International Labour Office, Geneva; The Rural exodus in Czechoslovakia, results
of investigations made by Dr H. Boker and F.W. von Biilow, Geneva, 1935 (quoted in
Teichova, The Czechoslovak Economy, p. 15)
The first republic created a widespread network of educational institutions and teaching in
Slovak became generalised, from the elementary to the university level (on 6 June 1919, the
first Slovak university was founded in Bratislava 162)
As a result of these improvements, Slovakia was endowed with an educated class and
Johnson even argues that "the sheer size of the intelligentsia developed in the interwar period
-nearly 30,000 men and women- was, in fact, too large to be incorporated into a
Czechoslovak nationality" 163
Seton-Watson went as far as to somewhat emphatically contend in 1924 that "no such
remarkable example of cultural progress is to be found in the entire history of modern
Europe, as the transformation of the school system of Slovakia during the past five years" *64
For all these reasons, it seems reductionist to consider Czechoslovakia as an "artificial" or
"ephemeral" state - or as Nazi Germany propaganda derogatorily put it a kiinstliche Staat or a
SaisonstaaA^:
[wjhatever were the deficiencies of the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic in
solving the Slovak problem, however unsound has been the theory of one
'^Strictly speaking, the first university (which did not however survive long - closed for financial reasons in
1490) in Slovakia was the Academia Istropolitana established in Bratislava in 1465 by the Hungarian king
Matthias Corvin (Bideleux and Jeffries, A History, p.200; Richard Marsina, "Slovak Historiography on the
Middle Ages: Early Tenth to the Early Sixteenth Century", in Elena Mannova and David Paul Daniel, A Guide
to Historiography in Slovakia; Bratislava; Studia Historica Slovaca; Institute of Historical Studies; Slovak
Academic of Sciences; 1995; p.74). A university was furthermore founded in Trnava in 1635, before being
transferred to Buda in 1777 (Kirschbaum, "Les Racines", p.304)
In relation to our discussion of Czech insensitivity to Slovak culture, it should be noted that in 1918, the
university founded in Bratislava took the name of Jan Amos Komensky, one the most influential figures of
Czech reformation - and hardly a Slovak role model.
163Johnson, Slovakia, p.316.
164rw Seton-Watson, The New, p.51
165victor S. Mamatey,"The Establishment of the Republic", in Mamatey / Luza (eds), op.cit.,p.28.
Hitler in a famous speech at the Sportpalast on September 26, 1938 for instance claimed that "the Czech state
was born a lie" and added that "the Slovaks have little desire of being with the Czechs... the Czechs annexed
Slovakia" (Max Domarus, Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945; London; Tauris; 1992; p.l 187)
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'Czechoslovak people',...the creation of a 'bourgeois' Czechoslovakia in 1918 meant
for the Slovaks a positive step in their political, cultural and economic
development 166
The break-up of 1993 intervened because of internal tensions and conflicts between Czechs
and Slovaks, but this thesis will try to demonstrate that the perceptions of differences
between Czechs and Slovaks would probably not have led to the division of the state, if they
had not been skillfully exploited by politicians.
The idea of "Czechoslovakism the fiction of a unified Czechoslovak nation, became from
very early on discredited: as we saw, it was already considerably jeopardized by Stur's
codification of a distinct Slovak language and was adopted for essentially pragmatic reasons.
On the other hand, the idea of "Czechoslovakia", as a common state of two nations, was still
relevant and meaningful in post-Cold War Europe.
The presence of historically-based resentments between the Czechs and the Slovaks
contributed to their separation, but was not sufficient in itself to justify a "divorce" and it did
not make the break-up of Czechoslovakia inevitable. This dissertation will show that the
maintenance of a common state was made impossible by the complex interactions between
democratisation and the emergence of Czech and Slovak elites willing to use nationalism as a
way to reach power.
Having argued in this first chapter that the Czechoslovak state founded in 1918 and merging
Czechs and Slovaks in a common state was not as artificial as many observers alleged but
clearly "acquired" a legitimacy following its achievements, and that the break-up of
Czechoslovakia in 1993 was not a "historically necessary process" justified by an appeal to
the principle of national self-determination, we now turn to review (and eventually reject) the
argument according to which Czech and Slovak political cultures were so different as to
preclude the continuing existence of a common state between the two nations.





CZECH AND SLOVAK POLITICAL CULTURES AND THE BREAK-UP OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
It is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the
basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them
Sigmund Freud 167
The second part of this dissertation considers three foundational problems which have often
been deemed to suggest the inevitability of the break-up of Czechoslovakia and the
impossibility of maintaining a common state between Czechs and Slovaks. The differences
between Czech and Slovak political cultures, the economic consequences of the democratic
transition of 1989, and the changing nature of the international environment after the end of
the Cold War have been traditionally pointed out as the main explanations for the dissolution
of the country. This thesis nevertheless argues that none of these three elements (on their own
or in combination) satisfactorily elucidates why Czechoslovakia ultimately broke up on 31
December 1992, and will consequently proceed to advance and examine other hypotheses.
For the time being however, the more limited purpose of this chapter is to examine the first of
these three potential ("classic") interpretations of the end of Czechoslovakia: the contention
that the state had to break up because of the irreconcilable differences between Czech and
Slovak political cultures.
We will accordingly first of all look for concrete evidence of authoritarian and undemocratic
aspects in Slovak political culture but also, of a Czech reputedly democratic tradition: we will
' ^"quoted in Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Consciousness (London;
Vintage; 1999), p.48.
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thus show to what extent it is legitimate to accept the notion of a "Czech-Slovak dualism"
alluded to in chapter 1.
Then, a second section will try to relativise this rather manichean and somewhat one-sided
appreciation of the "politico-cultural" divergences between Czechs and Slovaks by showing
that: 1) Slovak political culture might not be as antidemocratic as commonly assumed and 2)
the Czech political tradition is far from being uniformly and unambiguously democratic.
The section concludes that the differences between Czech and Slovak political cultures and
traditions did in no way imply that their common state could not be viable and had to be
divided.
Defining "democratic" political culture
Before developing these points, it is useful to define "political culture" and what makes a
political culture "democratic".
Firstly, to quote Archie Brown, political culture is "the subjective perception of history and
politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the
political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical
experience of nations and groups" 168 jn ]jne this definition, we will of course discuss
and analyse the divergent reactions of the Czechs and Slovaks in confronting the post-
communist transition, the introduction of democratic politics and of a free market economy
after 1989, but we will also aim to put these events into a wider historical context. This
implicitly supposes (for the moment) the a priori acceptance of the notion of "national
character", which will allow some useful generalisations. The assumption behind a such a
comparative analysis of Czech and Slovak political cultures is that, as Anatol Lieven bluntly
put it, "character counts"!69 should of course not be taken to mean that there is such
thing as "a" Czech or "a" Slovak character - and that every Czech and every Slovak holds the
' ^Archie Brown, "Introduction" in Archie brown and Jack Gray (ed.), Political culture andpolitical
change in communist states (London and Basingstoke; The MacMillan Press; second edition 1979; 1977), p.l
169Anatol Lieven, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ? Scholarly debate and the realities of Eastern Europe", The
national interest, N°49, Fall 1997, p. 18
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same views as the entire Czech and Slovak population respectively - and the second section
of this chapter will therefore introduce the concept of political "sub-cultures".
Secondly, determining what characterizes the political culture of a nation as "democratic" is
equally problematic. Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, in an influential work published in
1963, defined a "democratic" political culture as a "a pattern of political attitudes that fosters
democratic stability, that in some way 'fits' the democratic political system" 170 They argue
that democracy and democratic institutions are likely to be best sustained by a "civic culture",
mixing and "intrincately balancing" three types of political attitudes (participant, parochial
and subject). In a similar line, Larry Diamond adds the following requirements: "tolerance of
opposition and dissent ; trust in fellow political actors ; a willingness to cooperate,
accommodate, and compromise; and hence, a certain flexibility, moderation, civility, and
restraint in one's partisanship"!^.
The essential issue remains however to select which "indicators" are most appropriate and
relevant to the assessment of the political culture of a nation. This chapter will deliberately
use both quantitative (such as support for political institutions or the rule of law) and
qualitative ("historical" or factual) evidence to attempt to draw as accurate and complete a
picture as possible.
1 ^Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton; Princeton University Press;
1963), p.473
1^! cf Larry Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of democracy", in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds),
The Global Resurgence ofDemocracy (Baltimore and London; The John Hopkins University Press; second
edition, 1996), p.l 19.
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Czech and Slovak political cultures: different and contradictory ?
The literature on Czechoslovakia and Czech-Slovak relations generally stresses the
contradiction between the democratically-oriented Czechs and the authoritarian and populist
tendencies inherent to the Slovak political scene:
in Czechoslovakia, we are in presence of a divided political culture: overwhelmingly
democratic and western in the Czech lands, in Slovakia the nation is still archaic,
more nationalist and exposed to authoritarian temptations... 172_
This argument was first made, rather unsurprisingly, by Czech media and politicians, but the
idea that "the contemporary reality of the Slovak political scene echoes the Balkan-oriented
trends" -that "Slovakia differs from the Czech lands in its historical development, which is
directed more toward the East than the history of the more Western-oriented Bohemia" 173.
subsequently became and still appears to be commonplace in Western scholarship and
popular opinion. For instance, the respected observer of East European politics Zbigniew
Brzezinski, claimed during a visit to Slovakia in July 1993 that Slovakia was on a par with
such notoriously unstable countries as Albania or Romania* 74 Another revealing example of
the Western perception of Slovakia was an article of the Belgian daily La Libre Belgique,
which contended, following the first parliamentary elections held in independent Slovakia in
^ ^-^Rupnik, "Cultura Politica", p.9. Characteristic of this trend in the literature is also Otto Ulc's
"Czechoslovakia's velvet divorce" {East European Quarterly, Fall 1996, vol.30, n°3, p.331), where he states
that after 1989, "the two parts of the federation embarked upon dissimar paths: a pluralistic democratic
orientation and a radical reform luwaid a market economy in the Czech Republic, and a socialist-leaning
orientation, continuing paternalistic role of the state in the economy, along with strongly nationalist, even
chauvinist overtones in the Slovak Republic".
173cesky denik, 1 September 1992, quoted in Holy, The little Czech, p. 107
174 Silvia Mihalikova, "Understanding Slovak political culture", in Fritz Plasser and Andreas Pribersky
(eds), Political culture in East Central Europe (Aldershot, Brookfield; Abevury; 1996), p. 167 ; Lubomir Rehak
and Victor Kirillov, "Slovakia as a New Factor in European Politics", International Relations, vol.XII, n°5,
August 1995, p.56.
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1994 that "it is hard to make serious study of an adolescent nation, which selects according to
its emotions" 175
Finally, Slovak scholars such as Martin Butora, Zora Butorova, Silvia Mihalikova, Grigorij
Meseznikov and Sofia Szomolanyi, also tend to share a critical and somewhat pessimistic
approach towards Slovak political culture!76
Slovak "exceptionalism" or the undemocratic aspects of Slovak political culture
For many observers,"Slovak exceptionalism" made the velvet divorce inevitable:
Slovaks were too different from Czechs, and so their joint state was only an
artificially and forcibly maintained entity, incapable of an independent and democratic
life17?
This could be verified through "historical" evidence, that is by Slovak attitudes and reactions
during several "turning points" of the existence of Czechoslovakia.
The first hint of the lack of Slovak democratic traditions came early in the 1920s, when the
Slovak People's Party led by Hlinka, resorted to virulent nationalist and populist rhetorics to
denounce the dominance of the Czechs on the political life of the First republic. As seen in
chapter 1, the nationalist bloc continuously achieved electoral successes in Slovakia (37.3 %
of the Slovak vote for the parliamentary elections of 1925, 28.3 % in 1929, and 30.1 % in
1935) , which was taken by Czech politicians as a proof of the political immaturity of the
^^http://www.slovensko.com. For a discussion of the perception of Slovakia abroad, see Miroslav
Beblavy and Andrej Salner, Tvorcovia obrazu a obraz tvorcov: vnimanie Slovenska v zapadnych krajinach,
1989-1999 (Bratislava; Centrum pre spolocensku a medialnu analyzu; 1999).
17"See Sona Szomolanyi and Grigorij Meseznikov (eds), Slovakia: Parliamentary Elections 1994 :
Causes- Consequences-Prospects (Bratislava; Slovak political science association, Friedrich Ebert foundation;
1995).
l^Miroslav Kusy, "Slovak exceptionalism", in Musil, The End, p. 139
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Slovaks. The stereotype of the Slovak as the Czech's slightly irresponsable and rebellious
brother was then widespread, for instance in the writings of Karel Kalal as early as 1905:
The Czech is the elder and the Slovak the younger brother. The younger brother is
usually inclined to believe that the elder aims in his advice only at his own advantage.
He rejects your helping hand, he kicks you...And what about you, elder brother ?
Your duty is to look after the younger brother even more carefully, to make sure that
when alone he will not lose his way or drown^^.
Tomas Masaryk himself wrote to his daughter Alice, following discussions with Slovak
leaders in autumn 1924: "[i]t is necessary to be patient with the Slovaks - they are children, or
rather spoilt brats" 179. The image of Slovak "ungratefulness" and "immaturity" thus became
from very early on an enduring feature of Czech self-definition and this, even for the
"cosmopolitan" intellectual Vaclav Havel, who, in October 1992, three months before the
division of the state, publicly regretted the failure of "70 years of Czech efforts to civilize [the
Slovaks] and 'bring them to the West"'180
But this condescending, yet still rather benign, image of the Slovak as a "problem child"
changed in 1938 after Munich, when the radical wing of Slovak populists led by Vojtech
Tuka, Ferdinand Durcansky and Sano Mach, not only took advantage of the weakness of the
Czechs to ask and obtain their autonomy in October 1938, but also negotiated with Hitler in
March 1939 the creation of a Slovak "independent" state under the protection of Nazi
Germany ! 81. The Slovak "clerico-fascist" state was characterised by the suppression of the
democratic institutions of Masaryk's republic and the adoption of an ideology close to
l^Karel Kalal, Slovensko a Slovaci (1905, p. 143), quoted in Holy, The Little., p. 104. For a discussion of
Kalal's role as a promoter of the idea of Czecho-slovak unity, see David W. Paul, The Cultural Limits of
Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia (Boulder, East European Quarterly;
New York, Columbia University Press; 1979), pp. 194-195.
!^Letter 27 September 1924, quoted in Zeman (with Klimek), The Life, p.51
l^See Edward Mortimer, "East of Maastricht", Financial Times, Wednesday 7 October 1992
!^See Dorothea H. El Mallakh, The Slovak Autonomy Movement, 1935-1939: A Study in Unrelenting
Nationalism (Boulder, East European Monographs; New York, Columbia University Press; 1979); Felak, "At
the Price', Hoensch, Die Slowakei.
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German national-socialism. The most shameful aspect of the regime was without any doubt
its implementation of antisemitic policies, which led to the deportation of around two thirds
of the 135 000-strong Slovak Jewish community!82 por many Czech politicians, the role
played by the Slovaks in the collapse of the First Czechoslovak republic as Hitler's "Fifth
column" was to be assimilated to an ignominious treason, and in December 1943, Benes told
Stalin and Molotov
[w]hat they [the Slovaks] have done is totally unacceptable for us [the Czechs and
...the Soviets ?]; also from the Slav point of view, we must judge them as having
worked for the Germans against the Slavs! 83.
The image of the Slovaks as rebellious younger brothers was replaced by the "stab in the
back" thesis: for a not insignificant part of the Czechs, following in Benes's steps, the Slovaks
were from now on to be considered as potential "traitors".
But the 1938-1945 years were not to remain the only illustration of Slovak "undemocratic"
tendencies and ambiguity marked the relation of the Slovaks with the communist regime.
During the Prague spring and the short-lived attempt to build a "socialism with a human face"
in 1968, the Slovaks appeared only half-hearted in their support for democratic reforms. Their
priority was the achievement of autonomy and to the "no federalism without democracy" of
the Czechs, the Slovaks usually answered "no democracy without federalism". Public opinion
surveys showed that the federalization of the state was considered by the Slovaks as the most
urgent political reform, whereas it came only a distant seventh on the list of Czech priorities.
National equality was similarly perceived as an essential issue by 91 percent of Slovak but
only 5 percent of Czech respondents !^.
' 8 2 See for instance Jorg K.Hoensch, Geschichte der Tschechoslowakei (Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne; Verlag
W.Kohlhammer; 1992), p. 114; Jelinek, The Parish; and the influential work by Raul Hilberg, The Destruction
of the European Jews (Chicago; Quadrangle Books; 1961), pp.458-473
l^Vojtech Mastny, "The Benes-Stalin-Molotov conservations in December 1943: new documents",
Jahrbiicherfur Geschichte Osteuropas, Band 20, 1972, p.390
! 84Lidova demokracie, May 4, 1968 ; Rude Pravo, May 5, 1968 (quoted in Ulc, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet
Divorce", p.331)
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Therefore, the fact that the only lasting reform which survived the Prague spring was the
adoption of a federative constitution on 28 October 1968 (signed in the castle of Bratislava on
the 50th anniversary of the creation of Czechoslovak state; officially in force from 1 January
1969) was taken as a new betrayal by many Czechs^
Similarly, the influential role played during the years of "normalisation" by Slovak politicians
like Gustav Husak (general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party from 1969 to
1987 and president of the republic from 1975 to 1989) and Vasil Bil'ak (a neo-Stalinist
hardliner, number two of the regime) did not help to enhance the democratic credentials of
the Slovaks, especially given the weak Slovak participation to dissident organisations.
Charter 77 was for instance at the time of its creation signed by 243 personalities, among
whom only one, Miroslav Kusy, was a Slovak, and by 1978, still only eight Slovaks, most of
them residing in Prague, had formally endorsed the document 186
One explanation for this apparent lack of active Slovak involvement in dissident activities is
the different nature of the normalisation that affected the two regions. Whereas the Czech
lands experienced what Louis Aragon described as a "Biafra of the Soul" and some of its
brightest artists, writers or scientists were forced to emigrate or entered the ranks of the
dissidents, the impact of the end of the Prague spring in Slovakia was more limited. The
federalisation of the state and the high-profile position of Slovak politicians during the
"normalisation" years eroded the potential support for oppositional movements and
discontent with the regime was much less widespread than in the Czech republic^ ^7_ The
"grey zone" between collaboration with the regime and passive resistance was more
important in Slovakia than in the Czech lands and the velvet revolution which ultimately put
an end to communist rule in 1989 has often been described as a mostly Czech event.
These past "ambiguities" of Slovak political culture are essential to an understanding of the
break-up of Czechoslovakia, because they have been linked to certain disturbingly
185see for instance Robert Dean, Nationalism and Political Change in Eastern Europe: The Slovak
Question and the Czechoslovak Reform Movement (Denver; University of Denver; 1973)
186pigures in Wehrle, Le divorce, p.254 ; See also H. Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in
Czechoslovakia (London; George Allen & Unwin; 1981), pp.54-58.
^^Otto Ulc for instance argues that many Slovaks felt that Charter 77 was "an insidious maneuver aimed
at discrediting President Husak because he was a Slovak" (Ulc, "Czechoslovakia's velvet divorce", p.331)
antidemocratic aspects of the Slovak political scene since 1989 and the start of the democratic
transition.
The so-called "hyphen war" over the name of the country in the spring 1990 was probably the
first expression of separatist tendencies among the Slovak population. Vaclav Havel's
suggestion to drop the adjective "socialist" from the official name of the country,
"Czechoslovak socialist republic" was accepted by the National Assembly, but a
constitutional row developed when Slovak deputies proposed to call the state "Czecho-slovak
republic". The hyphen was controversial and rejected by Czech representatives, because it
was to them an attack on the essential integrity of the state, and a compromise -the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic- eventually had to be found. For most Czechs, the hyphenated name
was painfully reminiscent of the official denomination of the country during the semi-
authoritarian "second" republic, which lasted from the Munich agreement until March 1939.
However, the most problematic element of the Slovak political scene from 1989 to 1993 was
the nostalgia expressed by a part of the Slovak population for both the fascist Slovak state of
1939-1945 and the communist regime.
The success in June 1990 in the first free parliamentary elections of the post-communist era
of the Slovak National Party (Slovenska Narodna Strana-SNS), which campaigned on an
openly separatist, anti-Czech and anti-semitic platform and became with 14 % of the votes
the third political force in the Slovak National Council, appeared to demonstrate the appeal of
ultra right-wing extremism to the Slovak population. Incidents during the demonstrations of
1990 and 1991 marking the aniversary of the declaration of independence of the Slovak state
on 14 March 1939, as well as repeated "(egg") attacks on Havel during his visits to
Bratislava (notably during the celebrations of the foundation of the Czechoslovak state on 28
October 1991) convinced many Czechs that the Slovaks were proud of their fascist
heritage^ 8®.
Antisemitism, one of the traditional indicators of social and ethnic illiberalism, also
reemerged in Slovakia: pro-federation Slovaks were "threatened with lynching and accused of
l^Holy, The Little, p. 109
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'not speaking Slovak but Hebrew'" and Havel was described in a Slovak paper as a "swinish
Jew" conspiring against the Slovak nation 189.
Moreover, a positive attitude towards specific aspects of the communist regime was
widespread among the Slovak population.
On a mediatic scale, this was evidenced by the participation of the Slovak Christian democrat
leader Jan Carnogursky to the burial of Husak in 1992^0 it was also extensively
documented by the opinion polls carried out after 1989. In October 1993, 51 % of the Slovaks
"saw more disadvantages in the (then) present political system than in the old one" and in
May 1994, 31.3 % of the Slovaks declared that the Czechoslovak Communist Party had had a
primarily positive role^l.
Slovaks tended to favour the continuing intervention of the state in the economy and in May-
June 1991 58 % preferred a controlled economy - whereas the Czechs overwhelmingly and in
a completely opposite way supported 'free' economy (54 %)192_ Slovaks were also more
likely to believe that the state has the responsability to fight against unemployment even at
the price of a slowdown or even a suspension of the economic reforms (34 percent, compared
to only 9 percent in the Czech lands according to a 1990 survey! 93)
The following table shows how Czech and Slovak expectations markedly differed in 1990:
189otto Ulc, "The Bumpy road of Czechoslovakia's Velvet revolution", Problems ofcommunism, May-
June 1992, p.30. For a discussion of the resurgence of antisemitism in Slovakia since 1989, see for instance:
Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, '"A Wary Approach1: Attitudes towards Jews and Jewish Issues in Slovakia",
East European Jewish Affairs, vol.23, n°l, 1993, pp.5-20 ; Yeshayahu Jelinek, "A Whitewash in Color:
Revisionist Historiography in Slovakia", East European Jewish Affairs, vol.24, n°l, 1994, pp.117-130.
l^OHoly, The Little, p.l 10. Carnogursky's attendance was somewhat paradoxical since he was one of the
last political prisoners of Husak's regime and was freed only during the revolution of 1989.
!91silvia Mihalikova, "Understanding", p. 171.
! ^Association for Independent Social Analysis (Prague), Czechs and Slovaks compared, A survey of
political and economic behaviour (Glasgow; University of Strathclyde; 1992), p.22
!93sharon L.Wolchik, "The politics of ethnicity in post-communist Czechoslovakia", East European
Politics and Societies, vol.8, n°l, Winter 1994, p.182
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Table 2.1
Czech Republic (%) Slovak Republic (%)
Satisfied with the current political
situation
70 58
Agree that unemployment should be
avoided even at the cost ofhindering
or even suspending economic reform
19 34
Would select a harsher and more
accelerated version of economic
reform
61 51
Would accede to 50 percent price
increases in essential goods
53 39
Willing to accept the loss of current
employment
48 37
Fears about a decline in the standard
of living
60 70
Would strike following a considerable
increase in the cost of essential goods
37 50
Would strike if major cut in social
security
62 61
Think that the state should bear
complete responsability for finding
employement for every citizen
32 47
Think that the state should bear
complete responsability for ensuring a
decent standard of living for each
citizen
34 46
Willing to achieve a top level in job or
occupation
39 44
Prefer being self-employed, intend to
start a private enterprise
7 7
Plan to set up private enterprise 14 13
Source: Marek Boguszak, Ivan Gabal and Vladimir Rak, Ceskoslovensko leden 1990 (Prague;
Skupina pro nezavislou socialni analyzu; 1990)194
^quoted jn James R.Millar and Sharon L.Wolchik, "Introduction: the social legacies and the aftermath of
communism", in James Millar and Sharon L.Wolchik (eds), The Social Legacy ofCommunism (Cambridge and
New York; Cambridge University Press; 1994), p.9
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The reluctance of the Slovaks to support unconditionally economic reforms is not a
necessarily valid test of their democratic (or in this case, "un"-democratic) leanings and
democracy is not synonymous with capitalism and free-market economics. Yet, in the eyes of
Czech (and subsequently, Western) opinion leaders, the Slovaks came to be perceived as
regretful of the communist era - and therefore, quickly branded as "anti-democrats".
Given all this, it would appear tempting to see the break-up of Czechoslovakia as the
unfortunate consequence of an upsurge of Slovak authoritarian tendencies, which have
proved to be "unrelenting" 195 during the existence of the common state with the Czechs.
The development of the Slovak political scene after the achievement of independence in
January 1993, and especially the personality of Vladimir Meciar, Prime minister from June
1992 to October 1998 (with an interruption from March to October 1994, when a coalition led
by Jozef Moravcik replaced him 196) furthermore retrospectively confirms this
impression197
Czech political culture: democracy as "destiny" ?
This bleak painting of Slovak political culture contrasts with the usually idyllic portrayal of
the democratic traditions of their Czech neighbours.
Virtually all the literature on Czech political culture or national identity points out that the
Czechs have had a concrete experience of democracy since the last decades of the Habsburg
empire!98 As discussed in chapter 1, the Czech lands had already by the 1880s a significant
exposure to pluralist political life and the universal suffrage was introduced in the Austrian
195The expression is used, though mostly in the context of the First Republic, by EL'Mallakh, The Slovak.
196f4eciar was also Slovak prime minister from June 1990 to April 1991.
197see chapters 5 and 6 for a discussion of MecSiar's personality and political "tactics".
198see for instance Garver, "The Czechoslovak", pp.25-56 ; Gale Stokes, Three Eras ofPolitical Change
in Eastern Europe (New York and Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1997), pp.38-44.
part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy (Cisleithania) in 1907. Moreover, the absence of an
influential native nobility after the repression that followed the Battle of the White Mountain
favoured the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes on the political arena and is
usually considered to have entrenched egalitarian and democratic values in Czech society 199
The endurance of Czech democratic traditions was further demonstrated when the Czech-
dominated first republic remained a working democracy until the Munich agreements.
Similarly, during the communist years, the "Prague Spring" has been interpreted as an
illustration of the continuity of Czech democratic traditions^OO The role of Czech
intellectuals in the reform movement showed that Czech creativity still existed. The writers
Milan Kundera, Josef Skvorecky and Ivan Klima, the playwright Vaclav Havel, the directors
Milos Forman and Jin Menzel, and many others, spearheaded the revival of the Czech
traditionally democratic "dominant" political culture - strikingly different from the regime-
imposed "official" political culture^Ol.
The communist regime even made certain concessions to this "dominant" political culture
and the maintenance of a presidential function (a form of "tribute" to the interwar republic)
was one of the specific features of Czecho(slovak) communism202>
199see for instance David W. Paul, "The Repluralization of Czechoslovak Politics in the 1960s", Slavic
Review, vol.33, N°4, December 1974, p.730. Scholars such as Joseph Rothschild and George Schopflin
compare the case of the Czech lands with the case of Poland or Hungary and contends that one of the major
causes of the resilience of Czechoslovak democracy during the interwar period was the influence of the Czech
middle classes on the political process (Joseph Rothschild; East Central Europe Between the two World Wars',
Seattle and London; University of Washington Press; 1974; pp.75-76; George Schopflin, Politics in Eastern
Europe, 1945-1992; Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.; Blackwell; 1993).
200see for instance Paul, "The Repluralization", pp.721-740 and The Cultural; A.H Brown, "Political
Change in Czechoslovakia", Government and Opposition, vol.4, n°2, Spring 1969, pp.169-194. Significantly
perhaps, the term "Prague Spring" (and not "Czechoslovak") has been widely adopted (one exception is the
recent Fran?ois Fejto and Jacques Rupnik (eds), Le Printemps Tchecoslovaque 1968 (Paris; Editions Complexe;
1999).
2011 use here the distinction made by Archie Brown between the dominant political culture and the official
political culture: "In Communist states, in particular, the official political culture is promoted incessantly
through the mass media, in educational establishments, and through other agencies of socialisation. But do the
official values, orientations and perceptions actually dominate the minds of the majority of the citizens ?... The
official political culture and the dominant political culture may coincide, substantially overlap, or be at
considerable variance from one another, and the precise nature of the relationship is one of the problems which
students of political culture should be tackling..." (Archie Brown, "Introduction" in Brown and Gray, Political
culture, pp.7-8)
292See for instance Kurt Glaser, Czecho-Slovakia: A Critical History (Caldwell, Idaho; Caxton Publishers;
1961), p.156
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The communist movement had furthermore asserted before its Bolshevisation and the
nomination as general secretary of Klement Gottwald in 1929 its ideological and
organisational autonomy towards Moscow. The party could at its creation in 1920 count on
the support of the largest, best organised and politically active working class in Eastern
Europe with strong social-democratic leanings and in 1925, 70 per cent of its membership -
including its leader Bohumir Smeral- was constituted by former social democrats. Up to
1929, the Czechoslovak Communist Party tried to establish its democratic credentials: it
became regularly criticised by the Comintern for its alleged "deviationism" and even earned
for itself the qualificative of "worst section of the International"203
The democratic character of Czech political life seemed vindicated after the fall of
communism and the "velvet revolution" (a mostly Czech event). The end of forty years of
communist rule occurred without violence and has been traditionally celebrated as an
example of the power of civil resistance204 The elevation to the presidency of the respected
intellectual Havel was taken as a sign of Czech kulturnost, the "high culture" of the Czech
nation205 The relative ease of adaptation of the Czechs after 1989 and the fact that they
came to be considered as the most promising nation of the former communist bloc (there
were talks of a "Czech miracle")206 Were branded as illustrative of the pragmatism and the
quality of the Czech political elite: the federal Finance minister, then Czech prime minister,
Vaclav Klaus received (at least until 1997) general praise for his management of economic
reforms.
Contrarily to the Slovaks, the Czechs hence benefited from an optimistic assessment of their
ability to (re)join the camp of Western so-called democratic nations. The continuity of the
Czech democratic political culture, in spite of six years under the Nazi regime and four
203RUpnik; Histoire; or Schopflin, Politics, pp.33-36 and 52. Otto Bauer, one of the leaders of the Austrian
social democrats, used to quip that he knew of "only two outstanding social-democratic parties. The first, is of
course, the Austrian Party ; the second is the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia" (Rupnik, Histoire, p.61).
•^O^See for instance Garton Ash, We The People, pp.78-130 ; William H. Luers, "Czechoslovakia: Road to
Revolution", Foreign Affairs, 69:2, Spring 1990; Adam Roberts, Civil Resistance in the East European and
Soviet Revolutions (Cambridge MA; The Albert Einstein Institution; 1991), pp.22-24.
^O^The COncept of kulturnost is for instance discussed by Holy, The Little, p. 85
206see Magdalena Hadjisky, "Republique Tcheque: la fin annoncee du 'miracle tcheque' de Vaclav Klaus
?", Relations Internationales et Strategiques, n°26, ete 1997, p.75
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decades of communism, made logical and highly legitimate the "return to Europe" of the
nation. The break-up of an authoritarian regime imposed from outside acted as a resumption
and a long overdue reassertion of the true democratic and humanist "meaning of Czech
history" (smysl ceskych dejiri) identified by Palacky or Masaryk.
The adoption of a manichean vision of the Czechs as democratically-oriented and of the
Slovaks as subject to worrying and unrelenting authoritarian tendencies is however
conceptually untenable.
From a theoretical and methodological point of view, the historicist conception of history as
having a "meaning" and of political culture and traditions as "continuous" is flawed. The
conservative historian and intellectual foe of Masaryk, Josef Pekar and perhaps even more
importantly, the philosopher Jan Patocka, contended that Czech history hardly answered a
predetermined plan or providence^O^ "Democracy" is not a collective and continuous
attribute of the Czechs, while the Slovaks would be adperennis bound to be "authoritarian".
Political cultures are most of the time heterogeneous and the melting pot of different "sub¬
cultures", which compete with each other:
A fundamental feature of a country's political culture -its heterogeneity- must also be
recognized. Even if a dominant pattern may be discerned, the political culture will be
fragmented, with more or less important sub-cultures always present^OS
A closer look at the "subcultures" within Czech and Slovak political cultures is therefore
necessary, and the next section argues that the notion of Slovak "exceptionalism" is an
inadequate description of a Slovak political culture, which is far from being only
characterised by recurrent outbursts of authoritarianism. Consequently, Czech political
culture is also not as unambiguously "democratic" as usually assumed, thus prompting a
207patocka argued that "discontinuity is the starting point when thinking about Czech history and it must be
taken into account when one takes side regarding the "philosophy of Czech history" (Jan Patocka, "La
philosophie de l'histoire tcheque" (Filosofie ceskych dejin), in L'Idee de I'Europe en Boheme, Grenoble;
Editions Jerome Millon; 1991; pp. 130-131). See also Josef Pekar, Der Sinn der tschechischen Geschichte
(Briinn/ Leipzig/Wien; Verlag Rudolf M.Rohrer; 1937); Jan Patocka, "Does History Have a Meaning", in
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy ofHistory (Chicago and LaSalle, Illinois; Open Court; 1996), pp.56-58.
20^H.Gordon Skilling, "Stalinism and Czechoslovak political culture", in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), Stalinism:
Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York; WW Norton & Company; 1977), p.259.
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reassessment of the idea that the break-up of Czechoslovakia was the result of the differences
between Czech and Slovak political cultures.
A refutation of "Slovak exceptionalism"
A different interpretation of Slovak political culture could shed light on certain positive
aspects of Slovak political culture.
The fascist nature of the Slovak state of 1939-1945 is undeniable, but the real level of support
of the Slovak population for the regime should not be overestimated. There was clearly in
Slovakia a strong demand for more autonomy and even for independence, but the Slovaks'
backing of the national-socialist ideology of the puppet state was more limited and
overwhelmingly conditioned by the initial satisfaction with the achievement of national self-
determination for the first time in their history.
The Slovak national uprising of August 1944 (according to the Slovak historian Eubomir
Liptak, "one of the greatest armed resistance activities carried out in German-controlled
territory during the Second World War")209 even suggests that the resistance was much more
active in Slovakia than in the Czech lands -the protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia^lO.More
controversially, and regardless of the resistance activities of the Slovaks, the setting up of a
Nazi-puppet state did not and does not in itself mean that Slovak political culture is uniformly
undemocratic (the same way the exactions committed under the Vichy state in wartime
France have usually not been assumed to make French political culture as a whole
undemocratic).
^^Lubomir Liptak, A history ofSlovakia and the Slovaks, Bratislava, 1992, p. 15, quoted in Miroslav Kusy,
"Slovak exceptionalism", pp.141-142.
a comparison, see Vojetch Mastny, The Czechs Under Nazi Rule: The Failure ofNational
Resistance, 1939-1942 (New York, London; Columbia University Press; 1971), who emphasizes the relative
passivity of the Czech population, (for an account of the assassination of the Reichsprotektor Heydrich, the
most significant act of resistance in Bohemia-Moravia, see Callum MacDonald, The Killing ofSS
Obergruppenfuhrer ReinhardHeydrich; Basingstoke and London; Papermac; 1990).
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Furthermore, a reassessment of the extent of the Slovak participation in the opposition to the
communist regime is needed.
Firstly, organisations such as Charter 77 and the Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly
Prosecuted (Vybor na ochranu nespravedlive stihanych, or VONS) were perceived as
essentially Czech circles, and the Czechs appeared reluctant to involve Slovaks in their
activities^! 1 Alexander Dubcek (a Slovak) claimed that
[t]he Charter was a Czech response to the situation. In Slovakia, we agreed with
virtually every idea in it, but we had our own ways to support these ideals212.
Secondly, the effectiveness of the communist regime in preventing the establishment of
contacts between Czech and Slovak dissidents cannot be underestimated. It was in practice
very difficult to diffuse the message of Charter 77 in Slovakia and the police authorities
managed to hinder communication and isolate Slovak activists, even by means of arrests. For
instance, "[t]he Slovak dissident Miroslav Kusy has told how his attempt to meet a friend in
Prague was reduced to nothing by his arrest by the Prague police authorities and his return by
the first train to Bratislava. In a similar way, some chartists coming from Prague to visit him
were arrested in front of his residence in Bratislava and sent back manu militari to
Prague"2!3.
Finally, expressions of dissent appeared in Slovakia under different forms than in the Czech
lands, most spectacularly through the Catholic Church and the pilgrimages it organised^l^
but also through various interest groups such as the ecological association Bratislava nahlas
(Bratislava Aloud)215.
211 Gordon Skilling, Charter 77, pp.54-55.
2 ^Alexander Dubcek (with Jin Hochman), Hope Dies Last: the Autobiography ofAlexander Dubcek
(London; HarperCollins; 1993), p.264
2U\Vehrle, Le Divorce, p.255
21^See pp.35-36
21 -^IVIartiri Butora, "The roots of the Revolution in Slovakia", 15/12/1989, in Tim D. Whipple (ed.), After the
Velvet revolution: Vaclav Havel and the new leaders ofCzechoslovakia speak out (London; Freedom House;
1991), p.219.
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The Slovak contribution to the fall of communism was far from insignificant and the creation
of the Slovak movement Public Against Violence in November 1989 eventually followed by
only one day the establishment of its Czech counterpart, the Civic Forum.
More generally, the notion of Slovak "exceptionalism" cannot adequately encompass the
complexity and nuances of Slovak political culture.
Kusy (now an academic at Comenius university in Bratislava) has relativised and refuted the
accuracy of the five main presumed characteristics of the Slovak compared to the Czechs: (1)
"Slovaks are more nationalistically oriented", (2) "Slovaks are more separatistically oriented",
(3) "Slovaks are more Christian-oriented", (4) "Slovaks are more left-wing" and (5) "Slovaks
are more eastwardly oriented"216
First, concerning the nationalist orientation of the Slovaks, Kusy notes that:
[i]n spite of all the nationalistic excesses which appeared in Slovakia after the 1989
revolution..., Slovakia did not suffer too severely from over-excited nationalistic
passions: there were no wounded or dead, no looted shops, and there was no burning
of state buildings.217
This is important in its own right, since it clearly puts the Slovaks among the nations of the
former communist bloc where the democratic transition and the subsequent resurgence of
nationalism have taken place without violence^ 8; "the Slovak nation as a whole remained
•^l^Kusy, "Slovak Exceptionalism", p. 140
212ibid., p. 143
218$ee Bollerup and Christensen, Nationalism, pp. 134-135. This is however to an extent hardly a worthy
distinction for two reasons: first, the revolutions of 1989 and the democratic transitions in which the former
communist bloc engaged have been overwhelmingly (Romania and of course Yugoslavia being the main
exceptions) defined by their peaceful character (see for instance Karen Henderson and Neil Robinson, Post-
Communist', London, New York; Prentice Hall; 1997; p.28) and second, there are, as we shall see throughout
this dissertation, several other explanations for the non-violence of the Czecho-slovak divorce (most
significantly perhaps, the absence of an history of hatred between the two nations, the "clarity" and
straightforwardeness of ethnic boundaries between Czechs and Slovaks, and the bipolarity of the state).
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relatively indifferent towards [the nationalist] movement" and "nationalism did not become a
mass, nationwide movement"219
The second stereotype of the Slovaks as "separatist" is related to their "nationalism", and
equally contestable. The refusal of the Slovak separatists to organise a referendum about the
independence constitutes, according to Kusy, a clear indication of their awareness of their
lack of support among the Slovak population and public opinion polls (see chapter 6)
consistently demonstrated that the majority of Slovaks favoured the continuation of
Czechoslovakia.
Third, Slovaks are more religiously-oriented than their secular Czech neighbours but the
political implications of this are not necessarily clear-cut. The Slovak Christian Democrats
appear to follow the pattern of "secularisation of Christian politics" evident in Western
European Christian Democratic political parties such as the German CDU, and Kusy
contends that "the Slovak voter behaved in basically the same way as voters in other
developed European countries, including the Czech Lands"220
However, disproving the characterisation of the Slovaks as "more left wing" and "more
eastwardly oriented" seems more problematic.
The apparent nostalgia of the Slovaks for the communist era is more complex than usually
interpreted. The electoral support for the communist party in Slovakia after the velvet
revolution tended to be lower than in the Czech lands -during the parliamentary elections of
June 1990, 13 % compared with 15 %. These figures are however not especially significant
since many of the themes developed by the communist party (necessity of the maintenance of
the role of state in the economy for instance) were part of the mainstream Slovak political
scene and therefore included in the electoral programme of most Slovak parties. Yet, after the
split of the Czechoslovak communist party into a Czech and a Slovak branch, whereas the
Czech party refused to engage itself on the path of "refoundation", the Slovak party under the
2D"rhiS for instance tentatively made Slovak nationalism very different from the much more widespread and
"mass-supported" Serb nationalism (see for instance Branimir Anzulovic, Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to
Genocide', London; Hurst & Company; 1999). The role of Slovak nationalism in the breakup will be discussed
in detail in chapters 6 and 7.
220Kusy, "Slovak exceptionalism", p. 149
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leadership of Peter Weiss quickly abandoned the label "communist" and resolutely became a
reformed communist party on the model of the Hungarian or Polish parties^ 1.
More generally, the Slovaks were not against the market economy in itself, but were clearly
suspicious of the economic policies (somewhat insensitive to Slovak interests) of Vaclav
Klaus. Pointing out the ambiguity of the Slovak attitude towards the communist regime as
evidence of the undemocratic features of Slovak political culture is to apply a selective and
one-sided test of "democracy" since, as the next chapter will demonstrate, for agrarian
societies such as Slovakia, communism as an economic system could tentatively be seen as
"democratic". Communist economic policies made the industrialisation of Slovakia one of
their priorities and managed to a not inconsiderable extent to "elevate" Slovakia and reduce
the differential with the Czech lands222
Finally, Kusy dismisses the fifth element of the alleged Slovak 'exceptionalism' by referring
to Samo's state in the seventh century, Cyril and Methodius, the Slovak Reformation or the
Western influences that led to the nineteenth-century national revival223 The resort to
historical evidence, and very often 'myths', appears however in this context unconvincing.
More concretely, most Slovaks were and are still convinced that their destiny lies in a 'return
to Europe', alongside the Czechs. Suffice it to refer in this respect to the vision expressed by
Jan Carnogursky, Slovak prime minister from April 1991 to June 1992, of the adhesion of a
sovereign Slovakia to the European Union, or to the declaration of the Slovak president
Michal Kovac in the spring 1994 that "Slovakia wants to be a stable, democratic country, a
country that wants to join Europe's political and economic structures"224 There was a great
perplexity among the Slovak population after the non-inclusion of the country in the first
waves of the eastward expansion of Nato and European Union and the comment of an
221 See for instance Anna Grzymala-Busse, "Reform Efforts in the Czech and Slovak Communist Parties and
Their Successors, 1988-1993", East European Politics and Societies, volume 12, n°3, Fall 1998, pp.442-471
222see chapters 3 and 7
223Kusy, "Slovak", pp. 152-153
224quoted in Leff, The Czech, p.243. Michal Kovac represented however only one strand of Slovak thinking
(although Vladimir Meciar wanted economic integration without political change or obligations). See chapter 4,
p. 160
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anonymous Slovak rapported in an article of the Guardian on Saturday 5 July 1997 is more
explicit than many long political speeches:
If the Czechs are allowed into Nato, how come the Slovaks are not ? It's ridiculous.
We've been the same country since 1918. There's hardly a difference between us. But
Nato will make the differences bigger. I don't know what I'm supposed to make of
this front line. History is full of such paradoxes.225
The dark sides of Czech political culture
Having considered the positive aspects of a Slovak political culture usually held as anti¬
democratic, we now turn to the search for the "dark" sides of Czech political culture.
A certain attachment to democratic values and political pluralism characterises Czech
political culture but this democratic tradition has been interrupted for nearly fifty years: from
1939 to 1945 under the Nazi protectorate and from 1948 to 1989 under the communist
regime226 Czech political culture is therefore best defined by what Gordon Skilling calls "a
dialectic of continuity and discontinuity"227
The first problematic aspect of Czech political culture is the gift of the Czechs for passive
resistance or "Schweikism"228 Schweik, the famous hero of Jaroslav Hasek's novel who
enlists in the Austro-Hungarian army during the first world war and constantly ridicules the
authorities by being over-zealous, has become the symbol of a certain Czech attitude in front
of political adversity and the proof that "[t]he strength of the nation is not in its moral
225The Guardian, Saturday July 5 1997. See also Karen Henderson, "Slovakia and the democratic criteria for
EU accession", in Karen Henderson (ed.), Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European
Union (London; UCL Press; 1999), pp.221-240.
226The second (1938-39) and third (1945-48) republics were moreover only "semi"-democracies, during
which the role ofpolitical opposition was seriously constrained.
227} LGord0n Skilling, "Czechoslovak political culture: pluralism in an international context", in Archie
Brown (ed.), Political Culture and Communist studies (London; Macmillan; 1984), p. 130.
228see Paul, The Cultural, p.236.
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victories ... but in its ability to survive three hundred years of Habsburg oppression, six years
of German occupation, and forty-three years of communism through pretended loyalty and
tacit or explicit collaboration"229
The Czech unwillingness to resist a stronger power could be perceived as a manifestation of
political clear-sightedness, since openly confronting or fighting the Habsburgs, Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union would have endangered the long-term survival of the small
Czech nation. This was at least how leaders such as Benes justified the decision to accept the
Munich's ultimatum - opposing it to the distinctly more proactive yet desesperate and
ultimately harmful attempt of the Polish army to fight Wehrmacht tanks with cavalry230_
This positive reading of "Schweikism" is however contestable. Schweik is a sympathetic
literary figure but whether he is an intelligent man deeply aware of his nation's best interest, a
simpleton or (and more likely, I would argue) simply a coward unable to stand up to an
oppressive regime in a determined way231 remains a matter of debate:
Schweik's legacy is ambiguous. He can serve as an alibi during periods of oppression
and dictatorship, because he replaces all force of resistance by an apparent
conformism, which seeks to justify itself by hidden motives in order to dissimulate its
own cowardice...232
Czech history has often been one of fatalism and resignation in front of a superior power. The
failure of the Czechs to defend their country in 1938 - leading to the "Munich syndrome" and
the debate around the question "could we have fought?"- is in a way merely a reflection of
what Gordon Skilling calls the "capitulationist complex in the Czech nature"233: "[t]he
229Holy, The little., p. 130
230see Eduard Benes, Memoirs ofDr Eduard Benes: From Munich to New War and new Victory (London;
George Allen & Unwin; 1954)
231 See for instance Mastny (Czechs, p. 160): "Only a superficial reader ...can consider [Schweik's] behavior a
form of resistance. In reality, 'Schweikism', the ostensibly zealous though sceptical compliance often typical in
repressive societies, was little more than the sly opportunism of the 'little man' - which, however, extended also
to the highest ranks".
232Michel, Histoire, pp.324-325.
233(3ordon Skilling, "Czechoslovak political culture", p. 128.
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average Czech, confronted with what he believes to be superior power, prefers to bend and
presence his strength for a better opportunity, rather than to break in a gesture of bold
defiance"234
Similarly, the reactions of the Czechs towards the communist regime were ambiguous: the
Prague Coup in February 1948 did not meet with the resistance of the population and the
communists had a sizable measure of support among the Czechs, as illustrated by the (mostly
free) parliamentary elections of 1946, when the communist party easily became the first
political force in the Czech lands with 42 percent of the votes. Interestingly, Slovakia proved
a much less fertile ground for communist rhetoric, and the communists only attracted 30
percent of the Slovak electorate, far behind the resounding 62 percent of the votes polled by
the Democratic Party235
What is however perhaps even more significant is the passivity of the Czechs after the
crushing of the Prague Spring in August 1968^36 -phe weakness of the Czech dissent
suggests that the "normalisation" was, if not actively supported, at least tolerated by most
Czechs. The influence of dissident organisations was essentially limited to the circle of
Prague intellectuals (the "Prague intellectual ghetto") and did not have a visible impact on the
average Czech.
The "normalisation" essentially reposed on the existence of an implicit social contract
between the regime and the population: "we provide you with material advantages, a free
health care system and a job, but you pretend to believe in the official slogans". By raising
2-^Edward Taborsky, "The Triumph and Disaster of Eduard Benes", Foreign Affairs, July 1958, vol.36, n°4,
p.681
235por an assessment of the "indigenous" support for the communist regime, see Jacques Rupnik, "The Roots
of Czech Stalinism", in Raphael Samuel and Gareth Stedman Jones (eds), Culture, Ideology and Politics:
Essays for Eric Hobsbawm (London; Routledge; 1982), pp.302-320. For a personal account of the attraction of
communism to the Czech population, see the memories of one of the leaders of the Prague Spring, Zdenek
Mlynar (Nachtfrost: Erfahrungen aufdem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus; Koln, Frankfurt am
Main; Europaische Verlagsantalt; 1978, pp.7-32).
236even jf tfg attitudes of the Czechs in the first weeks and months after the Warsaw pact invasion - most
famously, Jan Palach's self-immolation in January 1969 - could be legitimately considered as an illustrative
example of passive resistance (see for example Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and its aftermath:
Czechoslovak Politics, 1968-1970; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1997, p.42).
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living standards and the access to consumer goods, the regime was, especially during the 70s,
effectively able to curb and stem political contestation237.
In the seventies and most of the eighties, Czech democratic tradition was "under the ice"238
and what Carol Leff calls the "typewriter culture" of the Czech dissent sharply contrasted
with the vitality of the Hungarian and Polish underground societies. Havel was hardly
exagerating when he declared in August 1988 that
[W]hen friends from the Polish Solidarity whom we meet occasionally at the Czech-
Polish border ask how many people Charter 77 has behind it, I feel like answering that
while there are millions of people behind Solidarity, there are only millions of ears
behind Charter 77^39_
After decades of authoritarian rule, it looked in 1989 as if Czech political culture needed to be
"de-communised", almost in the same way as Masaryk urged his compatriots to "de-
austrianise" (odrakoustet) after the end of Habsburg domination240 Jhc pragmatism
characteristic of Czech political culture was during the years of domination what could be
called a reverse or an inverted pragmatism. In order to establish a durable democracy, the
Czechs will need to transform this negative pragmatism (synonymous of passivity and
resignation in front of a stronger power) into a more positive pragmatism, a forward-looking
and clear-cut support and defence of their democratic institutions.
Despite the militaristic aspects of Czech traditions (most notably the Hussite warriors led by
the blind general Jan Zizka or the Siberian anabasis of the Czechoslovak legions in 1918/19)
and the lessons of Masaryk (a consistent opponent of Leo Tolstoy's doctrine of non-resistance
237The widespread possession of (low-quality) country cottages (called chaty) was one of the most visible
illustration of Czech "inner" emigration: by the late 1980s, Czechoslovakia ranked second in the world in the
number of summer cottages per capita and 80 percent of the population had access to them.
238Timothy Garton Ash, "Czechoslovakia under the ice", in The uses ofadversity: essays on thefate of
Central Europe (New York; Vintage Books; 1990), pp.61-70.
239Times, 12 August 1988
240see ch.l
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to evil)241? Czechs have been for most of their modern history at best "reluctant democrats",
who often proved unwilling to fight for their ideals.
Having said that, we proceed to refute, or at least somewhat critically reassess, two Czech
"myths": first of all, we show why the reference to the First interwar Czechoslovak republic
as a model democracy is to an extent partial and, secondly, we endeavour to demonstrate that
there is a Czech nationalism - and that the Slovaks are not the only ones to be (to go back to
Kusy's expression) "nationalistically oriented".
First, the traditionally idyllic vision of the first republic has to be nuanced. If pluralism,
regular free elections, freedom of press and of association, were respected during the twenty
years between 1918 and 1938, the picture also includes several less "glorious" elements242_
The Czechoslovak democracy has often been qualified as "praetorian" because of its reliance
on informal, extra-parliamentary yet highly influential power structures. The most significant
of these groups was the Petka ("The Five"), an informal council constituted of the leaders of
the initially five political parties members of the governmental coalition. The Petka had a
positive role, since it helped to ensure a consensus among the parties and prevented the
concentration of power in the hands of one party, thus ensuring the stability of the political
system243 However, an institution like the Petka was also clearly by-passing the powers of
the elected parliament - which is problematic in a democracy. Moreover, the constitution of a
circle of experts, politicians and intellectuals around the Hrad (Prague Castle, seat of the
241 Roman Szporluk writes that "One of the main lessons Masaryk sought to teach his nation was that force
should be resisted with force ; he never said that it should rsists only a weaker opponent. We have seen that he
was wont to invoke the name of Jan Zizka to remind the Czechs that in the past they had had leaders who fought
against powerful enemies, and Masaryk was himself an embodiment of his teachings. What were his struggles
against the Manuscript forgeries, his campaign in defense of Hilsner, his exposure of Austrian plots in the
Balkans or finally his decision to fight Austria in 1914, if not lessons by example in political behavior T'(The
Political Thought ofThomas G. Masaryk', Boulder, East European Monographs; Columbia University Press;
1981; pp. 165-166)
242for an extremely critical (and biased) view of the "legend" surrounding the First republic, see Kurt
Glaser, Czechoslovakia.
243see Pavel Belina, Petr Cornej, and Jin Pokorny (eds), Histoire des Pays tcheques (Paris; Editions du
Seuil; 1995), p.371 ; Mamatey, "The Development", p. 108; Seton-Watson, A History, pp.228-230; Edward
Taborsky, Czechoslovak Democracy at Work (London; George Allen & Unwin; 1945), p. 105.
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presidency) and under the moral authority of Masaryk and his successor Benes could equally
appear to be a sign of a certain disregard for the legitimately elected democratic
institutions244
But one more disturbing aspect of Czech political culture was also characteristic of the First
Czechoslovak republic: a benign cult of the leader was established around the person of the
founder of Czechoslovakia, the "philosopher-king" Tomas Masaryk. The interwar republic
has often significantly been dubbed "Masaryk's republic" and the president-liberator was
often called with affection taticek (little father) or stary pan (the old gentleman)245_ jn fact5
there appears at least in this respect to be a certain continuity between Masaryk and Havel: as
Holy put it, "[t]he role of Havel in present-day Czech politics is analogous to Masaryk's"246
Havel has (like Masaryk had) only limited constitutional powers, but he benefited from a
great popularity: he was perceived "not only 'as a liberator [from communism] and as a
redeemer [from the compromissions of that time]', but also as the garant of democracy and
the defender of civil society"247 -phis WOuld tend to confirm that a certain tendency to
"deify" the leader, what Vojtech Mastny (writing about the interwar years) defined as a
dictature du respecP-^°, is an integral part of Czech political culture. A law introduced in
1961 stating that "those who defame the president for his performance in power or in political
life are liable to receive up to two years in prison" was hence only amended in September
1997, nearly 8 years after the Velvet revolution, under the pressure of the European Union,
Amnesty International and Havel himself249_
244cf for example Rupnik, Histoire, p.220-222 or Schopflin, Politics, p. 16 and 20-21. Masaryk himself had a
somewhat Platonician and elitist view of democracy (see R.Szporluk, "Masaryk's Idea of Democracy", Slavonic
and East European Review, vol.41, n°96, December 1962, pp.31-49)
245see for instance Hanus J. Hajek, T. G. Masaryk Revisited: A Critical Assessment (Boulder, East European
Monographs; New York, Columbia University Press; 1983), p.20 and 165. Joseph F.Zacek goes as far as to see
in Masaryk "a sort of democratic fiihrer" ("Czechoslovak Fascism", in Peter F.Sugar, Native Fascism in the
Successor States 1918 1945; Santa Barbara; ABC Clio; 1971; p.62, author's emphasis).
246Holy, The Little, p. 167
247Re Monde, Thursday 22 January 1998
248y4astny, The Czechs, p.20
249The Guardian, 29 September 1997
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Eventually, it would seem appropriate to adopt a more nuanced assessment of the degree of
entrenchment of democratic values in Czech society between 1918 and 1938.
There was a not insignificant amount of censorship during the interwar years and a Law for
the Defence of the Republic allowed the state to monitor public gatherings and to control the
activity of anti-systemic political groups such as the Communists, the Slovak populists or the
small Czech fascist movement led by Rudolf Gajda^^O
More importantly, the lack of resistance during the Nazi and communist "takeovers" of 1938
and 1948 has to a certain extent its origin in the internal weaknesses of the interwar
democratic regime, and especially in Czech chauvinism. Despite the promises of Benes at the
Versailles Conference to make from Czechoslovakia another Switzerland^ 1 ? the de facto
ineluctably multinational state was, as shown in chapter 1, clearly established as a Czech
state. The Czech political elite which was dominant in the institutions of the new state (often
for logical reasons, as we saw), clearly did not give enough consideration to the sometimes
legitimate claims of the national minorities (German and Hungarian especially) and of their
"junior partners", the Slovaks. Adopting a more "civil" conception of the state and politically
"generous" attitudes, as advocated by intellectuals such as Emanuel Radl or Jan Patocka2525
would arguably have contributed to reinforce the democratic traditions of Czech political
culture and helped to eliminate (or at least alleviate) the fundamental contradiction between
the realisation of the Czech national ideal and the belief in the universal democratic and
humanist "mission" of the Czechs253_
250see for instance Andrew T.Green and Carol Skalnik Leff, "The quality of democracy: mass-elite linkages
in the Czech Republic", Democratization, vol.4, n°4, Winter 1997, p.66. The work of D.El'Mallakh (The
Slovak) for example draws extensively on police reports of meetings of the Slovak's people's Party. For a
discussion of the Czech fascist movement in the interwar period, see David D. Kelly, The Czech Fascist
Movement, 1922-1942 (Boulder, New York; East European Monographs; 1995); Jan Havranek, "Fascism in
Czechoslovakia", in Sugar, Native Fascism, pp. 49-51
25lHajek,rG Masaryk, pp.25-27
252gee Patocka, L 'Idee; E. Radl is the writer of the influential Valka Cechu s Nemci (The War of the Czechs
with the Germans, Prague, 1928). In the nineteenth century, the name of the mathematician Bernard Bolzano
(1781-1848) figures predominantly among the advocates of a civic and territorial Bohemian nationalism
(Landespatriotismus) - as opposed to a divisive ethnic nationalism, bound to lead to conflicts between Czechs
and Germans. Cf Jaromir Louzil, "La lutte pour la 'nation' tcheque entre la pensee des Lumieres et le
nationalisme romantique: Bernard Bolzano", in Delsol and Maslowski, Histoire, pp.296-309 and Derek Sayer,
The Coasts ofBohemia: A Czech History (Princeton; Princeton University Press; 1998), pp.57-62.
253§ee for instance F.Gregory Campbell, "Empty Pedestals ?", Slavic Review, vol.44, n°l, Spring 1985, p.12
; Olivier Cauly, "De l'Ideal democratique et humanitaire des Tcheques", Cahiers d'Europe, Printemps-Ete 1997,
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However, the myth of the First republic is not the only one to be in need of a relativisation,
and the widespread idea that "there is no Czech nationalism" also has to be refuted. The
impact of Czech nationalism on the break-up of 1992 will be discussed in detail in chapter 6,
but several important points should probably be raised at this stage already.
To start with, after World War II, the decision to expel the German minority of
Czechoslovakia was an expression of Czech nationalism and a settlement based on the
dubious application of the principle of "collective guilt". Interestingly, in spite of the
apologies of Vaclav Havel to the German government in 1990, in 1993 70 percent of the
Czechs still considered the "transfer" (odsun) of the Sudeten Germans legitimate254
Similarly, and more recently, the post-communist era has unfortunately been marked by
several manifestations of a revival of Czech nationalism: it was demonstrated for example by
the electoral successes of the ultra-right wing Republican party led by Miroslav Sladek,
which polled 6 % of the votes during the 1992 elections at the House of Deputies and 8 % in
1996255 The Republican party was in fact the only Czech party explicitly hostile to the
break-up of Czechoslovakia and still calling for the "reunification" of the country: the party
even threatened to open in September 1992 criminal proceedings for treason against Vaclav
Kaus for his role in the division of the state256 Qne of the recurrent themes developed by the
Republicans is the fear of Germany and of a German economic "takeover": in fact, during
Havel's re-election at the presidency in January 1998, Sladek was in preventive detention
awaiting trial for "incitation at racial hatred" following his declarations one year before,
during a demonstration against the signature of a Czech-German reconciliation treaty257
n°2, pp.117-118. More generally, H. Gordon Skilling shows for instance how Masaryk attempted to reconcile
the idea ofhumanity (idea humanitni) and the idea of nationality (idea narodnostnT) (T.G Masaryk, p.148).
254LidOVe Noviny, 10 August 1993 (quoted in Holy, The Little, p. 124)
255see aiso pauj Hockenos, Free to Hate: The Rise of the right in Post-communist Eastern Europe (New
York; Routledge; 1993) , pp.209-236 ; Thomas S.Szayna, "Ultra nationalism in Eastern Europe", Orbis, vol.37,
n°4, Fall 1993, pp.539-542
2^'Thomas S.Szayna, "The extreme-right political movements in post-communist Central Europe", in Peter
H.Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (eds), The revival ofright-wing extremism in the nineties (London, Portland;
Frank Cass; 1997), pp. 123-128
257'Le Monde, Vendredi 30 Janvier 1998
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Another example is the emergence of an anti-Gypsy racism, which triggered in the summer
1997 -following the diffusions on Czech television of two documentaries about the life of
Gypsies in Canada and the United Kingdom - a wave of emigration among the estimated 200
to 300000 Czech Romanies. Racial "discrimination is neither open or legal: it is hidden and
relies on the intolerance and the xenophobia of great part of the population". Public opinion
polls for example showed that 69% of the Czechs declared that they had a "negative reaction
towards the Roms" and 87% did not want them as neighbours258
More generally, in two surveys realised in 1990 and 1992 in the Czech republic, respondents
mentioned the adjective "envious" as the most distinctive trait of the national character (12 %
in 1990, but 28 % in 1992 1)259 77^ js not jn itself significant, but Czech society appears to
be permeated with a rather negative form of egalitarianism, which tends to express itself,
especially in the post-communist era, in the form of jealousy towards talented or successful
people. M. Smetana observes, in a passage worth quoting at length that:
A hero in Bohemia faces many more difficulties than anywehere else because he is
confronted - sooner or later- with malicious petty-mindedness and envy. With us, this
envy is the obverse ...of popularity. A proud, sincere and truthful person is a thorn in
the side of the people of Bohemia, whether he is a politician, an entrepreneur, or an
artist. Since times immemorial, democracy with us has degenerated into a kind of
egalitarianism which is intolerant of authority, rejects responsability, and dissolves
everything with doubts and slander, as if our people did not believe that greatness is
indeed greatness, noble-mindedness is noble-mindedness, and truth is truth...260
There is perhaps thus a downside to Czech "democratic" egalitarianism. It has controversially
be argued that the near absence of a native cosmopolitan aristocracy led in the nineteenth
century, to a relative "mediocrity" and nationally-oriented narrow-mindedness in Czech
intellectual and cultural life - to an extent illustrated in music by the cult status achieved in
Monde, 28 October 1997 ; The Guardian (14, 20, 23 August and 20 November 1997)
259]q0iy; The Little, p.75-76
260m.Smetana, Dve kariery Jana Trisky, (1991, Prague, Interpress, p.97) quoted by Holy, ibid., p.74. See
also, on a satirical and humorous note, Benjamin Kuras, Czechs and Balances: a Nation's Survival Kit (Prague;
Baronet; 1998), pp. 16-17.
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Bohemia by Bedrich Smetana's "national" compositions, as opposed to the more "universal"
themes and inspiration of Antonin Dvorak's works.
More specifically, Jan Patocka contended in his influential essay Co Jsou Cesi ? (written in
German in 1975) that the incomplete societal structure of Czech society had prevented the
emergence of the resolute decision-makers and "action men" that the Czechs would have
needed to meet the challenges of their troubled recent history^ 1 . This failure to nurture
"exceptional" statesmen (Masaryk once famously denounced the inability of his fellow
politicians to be "lions" rather than "foxes")262 had therefore very concrete and practical
consequences, most evident perhaps in the conduct of interwar Czechoslovak foreign policy
and its ultimate failure at Munich: "since the country possessed no hereditary aristocracy with
a 'corner' on diplomatic assignments, Czechoslovakia's career diplomats were essentially run-
of-the-mill civil servants with limited responsabilities and corresponding abilities"263_
For all these reasons, as the historian and one time Czech prime minister (from January 1990
to June 1992) Petr Pithart rightly put it, "the street of the little Czech man has never been far
removed from xenophobia, vile hatred, petty selfishness and cowardly antisemitism"2645
even in some influential figures traditionally considered as "democratic" role models such as
the influential journalist of the interwar period Ferdinand Peroutka265
Czech democratic tradition is hence far from being flawless and marked by continuity. The
claim of the Czechs to have a democratic tradition unique in Central and Eastern Europe
261 even if he concedes that Masaryk was "an exception to the rule" (Jan Patocka, "Qu'est-ce que les
Tcheques ?", in L'Idee, pp.18-19 and 103). In another essay, The Philosophy of Czech history, Patocka laments
the absence of grand-style conservatism in Czech society ("La Philosophic de l'Histoire Tcheque", in ibid.,
p. 131). Aviezer Tucker sheds light on the ambiguous and inconsistent nature of Patocka's conception of
democracy and, while signalling the philosopher as "a great anti-nationalist democrat", he also aptly argues that
his elitism is "distintly anti-democratic" (Aviezer Tucker, "Shipwrecked: Patodka's Philosophy of Czech
History", History and Theory, vol.35, 1996, p.208).
262jn Ceska Otazka ("The Czech Question", 1895), quoted in H.Gordon Skilling, "Lions or Foxes: Heroes or
Lackeys ?", in Gordon Skilling (ed.), Czechoslovakia 1918-88, p.3.
263paui Zinner, "Czechoslovakia: the Diplomacy of Eduard Benes", in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert
(eds), The Diplomats (Princeton; Princeton University Press; 1953), p. 106.
264qUOted in Michel, Nations, p.265
265gee Eva Schmidt-Hartmann, "The Enlightenment That Failed: Antisemitism in Czech Political Culture",
Patterns ofPrejudice, vol.27, n°2, 1993, pp.119-128
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appears questionable: the Czechs lived from 1939 to 1945 and from 1948 to 1989 under
authoritarian regimes and the average Czech had before 1989 spent most of his life without
any concrete experience of democracy (except during the Prague Spring of 1968 ?266) j^g
democratic tradition survived mainly through vague memories, but more often mere hearsay
about the "good old times" of Masaryk's republic - itself far from being a perfect model of
democracy.
Hence Slovak political culture is not characterised only by "authoritarian" tendencies and
Czech democratic tradition also includes certain ambiguous elements. We now turn to prove
that the differences between Czechs and Slovaks cannot account for the break-up of the
Czechoslovak state in 1992.
Contrasting Czech and Slovak political cultures in a vacuum is reductionist and the extension
of our comparative approach to other East European countries would show that, if it is fair to
say that Slovaks seem less "democratically-oriented" than Czechs, they however compare
fairly well and sometimes extremely favourably with Hungarians and especially Poles. Three
common quantitative indicators could be used to vindicate this point.
First, 8 % of the Czechs favoured a single-party system in 1992 but the Slovaks (14 %) were
more supportive ofpluralism than the Hungarians (22%) and the Poles (31%).




1991 1992 1993 1994
Czech Republic 6 8 8 6
Slovakia 14 14 16 20
Hungary 18 22 - 22
Poland 19 31 - 23
Source: Fritz Plasser and Andreas Pribersky (eds), Political culture in East Central Europe
(Aldershot; Brookfield; Avebury; 1996), p.22
266The Prague spring was indeed an experience of democratisation more than an experience of democracy (and
one could perhaps go as far as to see this ambiguity as a parallel to the case of the First republic - see above)
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Second, the Slovaks tended to be more confident than the Hungarians and the Poles as to their
capacity of influencing the governement (22 % compared with 10 and 8 % respectively).
Table 2.3












Source: Plasser and Pribersky, Political culture, p.237
Finally, and perhaps even more significantly, the Slovaks appeared more reluctant than the
Hungarians, the Poles and even the Czechs, to believe in the necessity of a "strong man" (19
% compared to 26, 36 and 22 %).
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Table 2.4: Authoritarian tendencies in East-Central European states




and abolition of parties"
Austria 22 8




Source: Plasser and Pribersky, Political culture, p.238
Slovak political culture seems representative of what could be defined as a Central European
political culture and clearly has some common points with the political traditions of its
Hungarian and Polish neighbours: Slovaks would even tend to appear slightly more ready to
support democracy.
If anything, rather than talking about a Slovak exceptionalism, one should probably talk about
"Czech exceptionalism": the support of the Czechs for economic reforms and market
economy (see table 2.1 and chapter 3) and for political pluralism (table 2.2) suggests that the
Czechs were rather atypical in the Central European and post-communist context. The two
successor states of Czechoslovakia have an European destiny, even if less "manifest" as far as
Slovakia is concerned, largely because of the undemocratic tendencies of its long-serving
prime minister Vladimir Meciar.
But the concept of "political culture" itself is not as "static" or predetermined as previously
assumed and a viable analysis must allow for the possibility of changes or evolutions in the
political culture of a countiy.
In the case of the former Czechoslovakia and contrarily to the generally accepted vision of the
split as having been caused by the increasingly irreconcilable divergences between Czechs
and Slovaks, it is possible to witness a process of "convergence" of Czech and Slovak
political behaviours.
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Nearly eight years after the division of Czechoslovakia, the Czech and Slovak paths to
transition are starting to draw nearer again. The muddy end of the Czech economic 'miracle'
(and of Vaclav Klaus's government in 1997) and the nearly simultaneous defeat of Vladimir
Meciar in September 1998 seem to have reversed the trends of 1989-1992. The initial
(over?)confidence of the Czechs has evaporated after the emergence of economic difficulties
and has been replaced by a widespread pessimism, whereas Slovakia is now striving to make
up for the time lost under Meciar's rule267
Conclusion
There are many aspects which differentiate Czechs and Slovaks in term of their political
cultures and traditions, but they are however closely related. To go back to the quotation in
exerguis, Czech-Slovak relations were characterised by what Freud called 'the narcissism of
minor differences'268
'[Njational identity, like all other identities, is always constructed in opposition to those
perceived as the Other'269: the Czechs had before 1918 defined their identity in opposition to
the Germans and under the communist regime (especially after August 1968) they conceived
their identity as contrary to the 'Soviet' system. Similarly, the Slovaks had before the
foundation of the Czechoslovak state defined themselves in comparison with the Hungarians.
After the shock of 1989, Czechs and Slovaks were however left facing each other in a
binational state^^O an(j were led to assert their respective identities in contrast to the identity
of the other nation of the state.
267see for example Jacques Rupnik, 'Un Bilan du Divorce Tcheco-slovaque: Transition democratique et
consliuclion d'Etats-nations', Critique Internationale, n°2, Winter 1999, pp. 91-115
268xhe reference to Freud's 'narcissism of minor differences' comes from Ignatieff, The Warrior's, 1999, p.
34-71
^^^Holy, The Little, p. 5
270-n.e most numerous minority was the Hungarian community which constituted only 3.8 percent of the
Czechoslovak population in 1991 (even if 11 percent of Slovakia's population).
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This process appears to be a constant in the political life of multiethnic states. The example of
the United Kingdom- where the Scots (and the Welsh) are more and more assertive of their
identity and cultural heritage as distinct from the English -comes as a confirmation of this
phenomenon. Does this mean that Czechs and Slovaks could not go on coexisting and would
not have found an advantage in the maintenance of their common state ?. Our tentative
answer to this question is no: after all, English and Scots, Wallons and Flemish, but also
Prussians and Bavarians are different, but they still live together, even if an interethnic
consensus is sometimes difficult to achieve in the case of the United Kingdom and Belgium.
Any attempt to explain the break-up of Czechoslovakia cannot underestimate the fundamental
role played by perceptions in the process that led to the velvet divorce of the Czech and
Slovak nations, and there is arguably a good deal of moderate or mild 'orientalism' in both the
perception of Slovak political culture as inherently undemocratic and the related (opposite)
idealisation of Czech democratic traditions^ 1. Through a sociological process which became
a widespread political strategy in the post Cold War era272; Czech leaders such as Vaclav
Klaus or Vaclav Benda were able to present the Slovaks as their constituting 'Eastern' others
in order to emphasize the Czechs' alleged Westernity and appartenance to the West.
In other words, defining the Czech lands as 'West' and Slovakia as 'East' is not only an
inaccurate description based on only partial evidence. It does not either provide us with a
viable explanation of the break-up.
The 'political-cultural' argument furthermore faces at least two additional caveats.
The non-violence of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia tentatively demonstrates in its own
right, especially if compared with the cases of Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union, that
^21 Even if, contrary to Adam Burgess (Divided Europe: The New Domination of the East', London and
Chicago; Pluto Press; 1997; pp. 47-48), I believe the isolation of Meciar by the West was justified by the
authoritarian nature of his regime. The concept of'orientalism' has of course originally been developed by
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul; 1978), and has been recently applied to
Eastern Europe by Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind ofthe
Enlightenment (Stanford; Standford University Press; 1994).
222see for instance Iver B. Neumann, Uses ofthe Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation
(Manchester; Manchester University Press; 1999).
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Czechs and Slovaks, despite of their undeniable differences, share a certain, if far from
perfect, democratic tradition, which led them to avoid violence and to a 'velvet divorce'273
Finally, and much more importantly, the next chapter discusses why the 'statistical'
divergences between Czechs and Slovaks should not be uniformly interpreted as evidence of
deep-rooted (historical) political-cultural differences between the two nations - but rather as a
normal and rational consequence of the divergent 'actual' economic experiences of the Czech
lands and Slovakia between 1989 and 1992^74
273even if Samuel Huntington would undoubtedly argue -thereby, indirectly and implicitly vindicating our
point- that the breakup of Czechoslovakia was non-violent, because there was (is) no civilizational faultline
between the 'Western' Czechs and Slovaks (The Clash ofCivilizations and the Remaking ofWorld Order,
London and New York; Touchstone Books; 1998; p. 37)
274-pjjjg p0int is convincingly made by Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans ('Political Culture Versus
Rational Choice: Explaining Responses to Transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia', British Journal of




THE ECONOMICS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK DIVORCE
After having demonstrated in the previous chapter that the differences between Czech and
Slovak political cultures cannot account for the break-up of Czechoslovakia, we now turn to
the second "foundational" problem that has been deemed to suggest the inevitability of the
division of the state: the long-term and continuing economic divergences between the
Western (Czech) and the Eastern (Slovak) halves of the country.
The Czech and Slovak conflict translated in economic terms and economic issues became
quickly "ethnicised" in the post-communist era. The wider debate about the desirable strategy
of economic transformation tended to take in Czechoslovakia the form of a "national" (Czech
versus Slovak) divide.
The idea of a rapid transition through a series of bold and speedy structural reforms ("shock
therapy" or "big bang") gained the upper hand among Czech decision-makers and - as we saw
in the previous chapter - among Czech public opinion. The Slovaks were however
considerably more reluctant and pleaded for a softer approach to economic transition (so-
called "gradualism"), taking into account what was held to be the "specificity" of the poorer
and less developed Slovak economy and society275 -phe formal adhesion of the federal
centre to a policy of shock therapy (especially under the auspices of the finance minister
Vaclav Klaus) was therefore bound to meet with strong opposition in Slovakia.
This clash of economic and social perspectives inevitably had consequences for the integrity
of the country, and the creation of two independent states in January 1993 has commonly
been explained on economic grounds276
The orientations and priorities of the Czechs and Slovaks were held to be incompatible and
appeared to have become definitively irreconcilable after the parliamentary elections of June
1992, when the Czechs massively voted for the free-marketeer, disciple of Milton Friedman
2"^Drawbacks of this generalisation are presented below in this chapter.
^^See Introduction, footnote n°3
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and Margaret Thatcher, Vaclav Klaus, whereas the Slovaks backed the "gradualist" rhetoric
of Vladimir Meciar 277
This chapter argues that economic factors were in no way instrumental in the break-up of
Czechoslovakia. In order to prove this point, the "economic paradox" of the Czechoslovak
state -the (largely successful) commitment of the communist regime to a policy of
equalisation of the Czech and Slovak parts of the country- is considered.
The following section examines the economically-based (and often more or less explicitly
"secessionist") arguments developed by leading Czech and Slovak politicians such as Klaus
and Meciar, before attempting to demonstrate that the economic case for a divorce was in
many respects extremely tenuous.
It will subsequently be contended that the use of a simplistic economic rhetoric which would
tend to perceive the "Other" nation as unambiguously responsible for one's economic
hardships, was inevitable in the context of the transition from a planned to a market economy
in Czechoslovakia. Economic considerations appeared at best secondary in the break-up of
Czechoslovakia and, if only in this specific case, separatism was only loosely linked with the
notion of material interest.
Popular perceptions of relative economic deprivation, exploited by both Czech and Slovak
politicians, were more significant than "really existing" economic conditions, and the splitting
up of the state could therefore be more valuably explained by political determinants.
The "economic paradox" of the break-up of Czechoslovakia: the success of the
economic equalisation undertaken during the communist regime
When considering the economic aspects of the division of Czechoslovakia, one is
immediately forced to look at a rather confounding fact, what could be called the "economic
paradox" of the break-up: the division of the state in 1993 occurred at a time when, at least on
paper (if not psychologically), Czechs and Slovaks had probably never been so close to each
other in economic and sociological terms.
2^7see chapter 2.
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As seen in chapter 1, at the creation of the Czechoslovak state in 1918 and during the interwar
period, the gap between the Czech western half and the eastern half (Slovakia, but also, until
1945, Subcarpathian Ruthenia) of the country was extremely important. The Slovak economy
was characterised by its reliance on a primary sector, which employed as much as 60.6 % of
the population according to the census data of 1921 - in sharp contrast with the corresponding
figure of only 31.6 % in the Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia)278
What is more, during the two decades of the First Republic, the economic development of
Slovakia does not appear to have been significant, and the gap with the Czech area in certain
respects actually increased. For example, the share of the Slovak industrial production in the
total industrial production of the state declined from 8 % to 7.8 % between 1921 and 1937.
Similarly, the Slovak contribution to the national income fell from 18.2 to 12 percent during
the same period279
The Great Depression had a significant and lasting impact on the Slovak economy. As table
3.1 shows, Slovak economic indicators all considerably fell between 1929 and 1933, even if
the most industrialised and export-oriented Czech lands were hit even harder in relative terms
than the still predominantly rural Slovakia^SO However, in absolute terms, given the low
starting point of the Slovak economy, the conditions in the eastern half of the state became
nothing less than precarious, with about one-third of the Slovak population driven out of the
job market without a steady income281.
278jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonin, Czechoslovakia, 1918-1992: A laboratoryfor social change
(Basingstoke and London; Macmillan; 1996), p.58
2"^Figures in Wehrle, Le divorce, p. 173
280Most significantly, it has been estimated that around two thirds of the 920 000 unemployed in
Czechoslovakia during the depression were German (Frank Hadler, "Bohmen und Mahren im 19. und 20.
Jahrhundert", in Bahlcke, Eberhard and Polivka, Bohmen, p.CXXXIV). The Sudeten Germans, traditionally
reliant on export industries, suffered extensive losses after the rise of new protectionist trade barriers.
^^^Mamatey, "The Development", p.143; Fellak, "At the Price, p.83.
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Table 3.1: Selected economic indicators - Eastern half of Czechoslovakia 1913-1937
(Ruthenia included) - 1913 (indice 100)
1913 1924 1929 1933 1937
Inhabitants 100 101.1 104.8 107.6 109.4
Industry 100 100 125.0 75.8 120.4
Coal 100 95.7 105.1 68.8 93.1
Textile 100 76.6 92.6 56.1 82.2
Agriculture 100 100 (1925) 101.8 99.9 111.3
Exports 100 84.3 110.2 44.1 78.5
Source: Jan Vachel, "Fakta o vztazich ceske a slovenske ekonomiky", Hospodarske noviny,
24 April 1991, p.4, quoted in Wehrle, Le Divorce Tcheco-slovaque, p. 173
The incapacity of the interwar regime to ensure the economic development of Slovakia had
nevertheless deeper roots.
The nationalists of Hlinka Slovak's People Party (SPP) argued that Slovakia's continuing
backwardness was due to its peripheral position in the economy of the state and the
exploitation by the Czechs of its potential. According to this theory, if Slovakia was
underdeveloped, it was largely because of its status as a "Czech colony"282 Czech
administrators, teachers and specialised workers who had been (by necessity and at the
request of prominent Slovak leaders283) brought to the province after the war quickly
became the objects of the resentment of the new and fast-growing Slovak elites. Tiso (then
the SPP's deputy chairman) condemned in May 1933 the "colonial policy...which has for
objective the open economic and social downfall [of Slovakia]"284
entry of the Czech Commercial Encyclopedia (Ottuv Ochodni slovnik) of 1927, stating that "Slovakia
is going to be our colony" was for instance perceived as representative of Czech "imperialist" mindset (Ottuv
Obchodni slovnik, Prague, 1927, vol.11, p. 1217, quoted in Renee Perreal and Joseph A. Mikus, La Slovaquie:
Une Nation au coeur de I'Europe; Lausanne; Editions L'Age d'Homme; 1992, p.49.
2^See chapter 1
2^Zprava, 30 May 1933, p.6, quoted in Stanislav Kirschbaum, "Die Stellung der slowakischen Volkspartei
zur Aussenpolitik Prags", in Karl Bosl (ed.), Gleichgewicht-Revision-Restauration: Die Aussenpolitik der
Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik im Europasystem der Pariser Vorortevertrage (Munich, Vienna;
R.Oldenbourg; 1976), p.328.
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Applying to Czechoslovakia the concept of "internal colonialism" would however fail to take
into account and belittle the otherwise undeniable social, cultural, and political achievements
of the first republic in Slovakia285
The main fault of the Czech-dominated first Czechoslovak republic was not its economic
"exploitation" of Slovakia but its reluctance to implement an economic policy that would
have actively promoted the development of Slovakia. The reliance of many Czech policy¬
makers on liberal economic principles negatively affected the less competitive Slovak
economy, and, as noted earlier, the first plan for the economic modernisation and
industrialisation of Slovakia was only published and made public in April 1937286. t00 little,
too late to have significant results given the international political context.
Under the Slovak state between 1939 and 1945, the Slovak economy actually experienced a
wartime industrial boom and the output of the manufacturing industry increased by 63
percent between 1937 and 1943^87
The Slovak industry usually fared better than the Czech during the war, in terms of
employment (+43 % versus +25 %), production (+56% versus +17%) and productivity (+9 %
versus -6 %).
2^See Chapter 1. The model of internal colonialism has been most famously developed by Michael Hechter
in his influential (and controversial) study of British economic development, Internal Colonialism.




Table 3.2 : Performance of Czech and Slovak industry in 1943 (1939 = indice 100)
Slovakia Bohemia and Moravia









Source: Krejci and Machonin, Czechoslovakia 1918-1992, p.72
When the communists took power in Czechoslovakia in 1948 in what was now (following the
expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and the cession of Ruthenia to the Soviet Union) mostly a
bi-national (Czech and Slovak) state288, they adopted the Marxist-Leninist doctrine as far as
nationalism was concerned. The communist regime intended to eradicate Slovak nationalism
and to solve the Slovak question that had plagued its interwar predecessor through a
programme of economic equalisation of the two parts of the state. This was in line with the
theory according to which nationalism was a temporary and objective expression of identity
linked to economic disparities and deprivation - and therefore with the belief that investing
massively in Slovak economic development would automatically eliminate Slovak
nationalism. In contrast to the "bourgeois" republic, the Czechoslovak socialist republic
would become, thanks to its economic policies, a "class-social structure without exploiting
classes, indicating that the Czech and Slovak nations have changed into communities of
working people"289 an(j proletarian internationalism has replaced bourgeois nationalism.
288see ch.9
Juraj Zvara, "National development under the conditions of socialism" in Jacques Dofhy and Akinsola
Akiwowo (eds), National and Ethnic Movements (Beverly Hills, London; Sage; 1980), p.148.
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The communist regime continuously encouraged a massive transfer of budgetary funds and
subsidies from the Czech lands to Slovakia to ensure faster growth rates in the latter and thus
actively promoted the "socialist industrialisation" of Slovakia.
Between 1949 and 1965 for instance, 30.8 % of Slovakia's capital investment budget came
from the centre, more than its share of the country's population290 The region also had a
constantly higher rate of investment than the Czech lands : "the investment allocated to
Slovakia always exceeded its share of the produced national income" and the proportion of
total investment directed towards Slovakia gradually increased "from 29.9 % in the 1950s to
34.4 % in 1989"291. Relatedly, the capital investment per worker in Slovakia was on average
22.6 % higher than in the Czech republic between 1950 and 1989 (table 3.3).
Table 3.3
Capital investment per worker of the national economy in the Czech Republic and Slovak
Republic in market prices (in Czechoslovak Koruna)






1951-60 48,059 55,228 87,0 114,9
1961-70 85,351 111,632 76,5 130,8
1971-80 177,232 212,836 83,3 120,1
1981-88 166,247 185,467 89,6 111,6
v v ^
Source: A. Balek, Vyvoj postaveni Ceskych zemi v Ceskoslovensku, Ceske perspektivy, 2,
1990 (quoted in Pavlfnek, "Regional Development", p.357)
In April 1985, on the 40th anniversary of the Kosice Programme which marked the liberation
and the "reunification" of the country after World War II, prime minister Lubomir Strougal
290Milica Zarkovic Bookman, "Economic Issues Underlying Secession: the Case of Slovenia and Slovakia",
Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, vol.4, n°l, 1992, p. 124.
291pavlinek, "Regional", p.356. See also for instance Capek and Sazama, "Czech", p.216 and Adrian Smith,
"From Convergence to Fragmentation: Uneven Regional Development, Industrial Restructuring, and the
'transition to capitalism' in Slovakia", Environment and Planning, vol.28, n°l, 1996, pp.140-141.
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proudly announced that the "process of equalisation of the two republics had reached its
targef'292 The following year, Slovakia's share of national production was triumphantly
declared by the communist regime to be proportional to its population in 1986^93
The statistics clearly confirm that an economic equalisation had taken place between 1948
and 1989: for example, the national income by inhabitant in Slovakia reached in 1989 85.7
percent of the level of the Czech Lands (only 61.2 % in 1948). Similarly, the share of
Slovakia in the national income of Czechoslovakia was 30.9 % in 1989 (for a share of the
population of 33.7 %) - it is instructive to compare this figure with the share of Slovakia in
1948 (only 19.2 % for a share of the population of 29.7 %). Finally, the average monthly
wages in Slovakia in 1989 was 98.5 % of the Czech average wage (here again, a marked
improvement if we consider the 91.6 % of 1948).294 The figures presented in the table below
equally illustrate and sum up the significance of the Slovak catching-up.
Table 3.4: The process of economic equalisation
Contribution of
Slovakia
1948 1960 1970 1980 1989
Population (%) 27.9 29.3 31.6 32.6 33.7
National income
created (%)
19.2 23.5 25.0 29.2 31.8
Gross agricultural
product (%)
29.3 31.3 31.9 32.3 32.6
Gross industrial
product (%)
13.0 18.6 22.7 28.9 30.5
Source: Statistics of the Czechoslovak state, quoted in Wehrle, Le Divorce, p.219
292prucj1a, "Economic", p.73. The president Gustav Husak contended in May 1981 that "the historically
rooted distinctions between the levels ofeconomic, social and cultural development ot the vanous regions have
been overcome, and relations of equality, brotherhood and solid unity between the Czechs and Slovaks ...were
established" (Gustav Husak, Speeches and Writings', Oxford, New York; Pergamon Press; 1986; p.121,
emphasis added).
Pravo (17 March 1986) quoted by Carol Skalnik Leff, "Czech and Slovak nationalism in the
twentieth century" in Peter Sugar (ed.), Eastern European nationalism in the 20th century (Washington DC;
American University Press; 1995), p. 157.
294pjgUres "Economic", p.62.
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than the Czech lands. Partly
cadres2955 Slovakia had by




According to certain indicators, Slovakia even performed better
because of the regime's ideological emphasis on training new
1989 proportionally more secondary school and university








0.58 0.84 0.96 1.10 1.16
Source: Czechoslovak statistical yearbooks, quoted in Dedek (ed.), The break-up of
Czechoslovakia, p.23
To be fair, the catching-up had some superficial aspects and Slovakia was still lagging behind
in significant indicators of social development such as the number of telephones per 1,000
inhabitants (257 against 314 in the Czech lands), the ownership of television sets (241 against
309) or the infant mortality (2.7 °/°° higher than in the Czech Republic).
295por an early policy statement by two Marxist economists, see Pavol Turcan and Viktor Pavlenda, Le
Developpement Economique de la Slovaquie au sein de la Tchecoslovaquie Socialiste (Bratislava; Editions de
l'Academie slovaque des sciences; 1963), p.200.
29%ee also Kaiser, National Territoriality, p.217.
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Table 3.6
1992 Czech Republic Slovakia
Population 10.3 5.3
GDP $bn 25.3 10.2
GDP $ per person 2,440 1,920
Telephones per 1,000 pop. 314 257
Televisions 309 241
Infant mortality per 1,000
births
9.9 12.6
Source: The Economist, 1994, 12-18/11, p.41
Despite this, the success of the process of economic and social equalisation undertaken by the
communist regime remains striking. The "process of the Slovak economic catching-up with
the Czech Lands was a world unique phenomenon. Neither Italy with its regional policies to
support the underdeveloped south, nor Britain attempting to promote its northern parts have
managed to reach similar results"297
However, regardless of this concrete evidence of the success of the economic equalisation
between the Czechs and the Slovaks, after the fall of the communist regime in 1989, both
Czech and Slovak politicians resorted to economic arguments to advocate the break-up of the
state.
^^Dedek, The break-up, p.26; see also Jin Musil, "Czech and Slovak Society", Government and Opposition,
vol.28, n°4, Fall 1993, p.483: "The swiftness of such 'levelling' between both parts of the state is, in the modem
history of Europe, something of quite special significance". This appears even more impressive in contrast to
the situation observed in the two other communist federations - i.e the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It should
for instance be recalled here that in Yugoslavia, in the late 80s national income per capita was seven times
higher in Slovenia, the richest republic of the federation, than in Kosovo. Moreover, in Yugoslavia, the position
of the poorest republics actually worsened over the four decades of communism. Czechoslovakia was also a
relatively integrated federation, another major difference with Yugoslavia, where the richest Slovenian and
Croation republics had for a long time started to reorient their trade towards the West and to pursue economic
policies according to what was considered to be their "national" interest (see Musil, the End, p.69, Vesna
Bojicic, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Causes and Consequences of Dynamic Inefficiency in semi-
command economies" in David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, Yugoslovia and after: a study in fragmentation,
despair and rebirth (London; Longman; 1996), p.40-44, and Sabrina P.Ramet, Nationalism andfederalism in
Yugoslavia: 1962-1992 (Bloomington, Indianapolis; Indiana University Press; 2nd edition, 1992), p.136-161).
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The next section turns to an examination of the respective claims of the Slovaks and the
Czechs, before trying in a following section to demonstrate the deep ambiguity of any
economically-based (Slovak or Czech) plea for the division of Czechoslovakia.
The Slovak arguments: was there a Slovak economic "specificity" ?
Soon after the fall of the communist regime, Slovak leaders such as Vladimir Meciar or
economic think-tanks such as the Independent Association of Slovak Economists (NEZES)
started to contend that the rapid economic transition to a market economy engaged under the
management of the federal centre (and outlined in the "Scenario for Economic Reform" in
1990298) should be slowed down to take into account the so-called "specificities" -or "special
circumstances"- of Slovak society. In a characteristic statement, NEZES for example argued
in March 1991 that
the big experiment, the so-called radical economic reform, is fast approaching the
limits of what can be borne. The Czechoslovak economy is in danger of
collapsing...The destructive economic consequences of the current course of reform
reveal the failure and the antisocial character of the concept. A reform that permits
experimenting with the economy and the costs of an incompetent transformation to be
borne by the population is undemocratic... It is high time to subject the reform to
fundamental corrections299
By September, the message had become even clearer:
we will not overcome our poverty as long as the economic policy of the Slovak
Republic, including reform policy, is determined by the Federation^OO
298jhe "Scenario for Economic Reform", founded on the necessity of "shock therapy", was largely the
brainchild of Vaclav Klaus and started to be officially implemented on January 1, 1991.
299qjK, March 2, 1991 (quoted in Peter Martin, "Economic Reform and Slovakia", Report on Eastern
Europe, RJFE / RL research institute, vol.2, n°27, July 5, 1991, p.8)
390sWB, EE/1180 B/3, quoted in Paal Sigurd Hilde, "Slovak Nationalism and the Break-up of
Czechoslovakia", Europe-Asia Studies, vol.51, n°4, June 1999, p.656.
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Slovak grievances essentially focused on five specific issues.
Firstly, the industrialisation of Slovakia had mostly taken place during the communist regime
and was based on Soviet economic principles. In practice, this meant that the economic,
political and strategic interests of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet bloc as a whole, often
predominated over the interests of Slovakia. Slovak development was concentrated in certain
areas which proved to be the most vulnerable and affected by economic competition after
1989.
After the fall of communism, regions of mono-industries were unable to adapt to the
changing economic environment. Adrian Smith has demonstrated that Slovak districts, which
had undergone a process of (diversified) industrialisation before the second world war and the
advent of communism in 1948 (such as Liptovsky Svaty Mikulas) had been markedly more
successful after the revolution of 1989 than areas later industrialised under the communist
regime (such as MartinpOl.
The most significant illustration of this phenomenon is the armament and arms industry. This
sector was traditionally a strong point of the Czechoslovak economy, amounting for around
5-6 percent of the total Czechoslovak industrial production and about one fifth of the country
exports at the end of the 1980s.
However, the arms industry was severely affected by the economic transformation and since
60 percent of the industrial capability in this field was concentrated in Slovakia, the region
was hit hard by the considerable decrease in production after 1989. The armaments
production accounted for as much as 24 percent of the mechanical and electronic industry in
Slovakia, compared with only 7 percent in the Czech republic302_ that is to say between 5-6
percent of Slovak total industrial output, compared to less than 2 percent in the Czech
lands^CU Moreover, Slovakia was mainly specialised in heavy armament, which made
301 Adrian Smith, "Constructing Capitalism ?: Small and Medium Enterprises, Industrial Districts and
Regional Policy in Slovakia", European Urban and Regional Studies, vol.4, n°l, January 1997, pp.55-56, 64.
302Lubomir Brokl and Zdenka Mansfeldova, "Zerfall der Tschechoslowakei- strukturelle Ursachen und
Parteihandeln", in Dieter Seigert and Csilla Machos (eds), Parteien in Osteuropa: Kontext und Akteure
(Opladen; Westdeutscher Verlag; 1995), p. 139.
303a.i6§ Capek, "The split of Czechoslovakia and the specific features of the Slovak economy", in J. Krovak,
Current economics and politics of (ex-)Czechoslovakia (New York; Nova Science Publishers; 1994), p.56.
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reconversion difficult304 as a result, the (at least initial) commitment of post-communist
leaders (such as Havel and the foreign minister Jin Dienstbier) to a "moral" approach to
foreign policy305 ancj the plan of the federal centre for the reconversion of the military-
industrial complex were "widely resented and interpreted as an insidious plot to stab the
Slovaks in the back. Allegedly, it was 'the greatest catastrophe that the Slovak people have
had to endure since the Turkish invasion in the 17th century"'306_
Secondly, Slovakia was relatively more dependent on foreign trade with the Soviet Union and
the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) than the Czech Republic.
In 1989, the share of the communist bloc in Slovak imports was 72 percent (66 percent in the
Czech republic), and it was as much as 73.5 percent (compared to 65.8 percent) for the
imports destined to industrial production^O^
The collapse of the CMEA in 1991 provoked a dramatic decrease of Slovak exports to the
former USSR. Data for 19 industries in 1991 show that the "share of decrease in sales to the
former Soviet Union in [the] total drop [of exports] represented in the SR 8.27 percent and in
the CR 5.65 percent even though in absolute terms the decrease in the case of the Czech lands
was higher"308 Most strikingly, the Slovak industries of metallurgy (iron), machinery,
woodworking and printing were significantly more affected than their Czech counterparts by
the end of the Soviet connection.
304walter Goruppi, "La Slovacchia sulla via della separazione: alcuni aspetti politici ed economici", Est-
Ovcst, n°3 / 1992, ISDEE (Istituto di studi e duuumeiilazione sull' Europa comunitaria e l'Europa orientale), p.8
also Ch.4
^O^Ulc, "The bumpy road", p.24
^^^Dedek, The Break-up, p.55
308Capek, "The Split", p.57
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By 1992, Czech and Slovak foreign trade had been thoroughly and surprisingly rapidly
reoriented towards Western Europe, but Slovakia still lagged behind the Czech republic309
Exports to the former USSR constituted only 9 percent of Czech foreign trade but 17 percent
of Slovakia's. Similarly, imports from the former USSR amounted to 18 percent of the
exchanges of the CR but accounted for 36 percent of Slovakia's trade flows.
Table 3.7
Orientation of Czech and Slovak foreign trade in 1992
Exports (in %) Czech Republic Slovak Republic
-to Eastern Europe 12 13
-to the former USSR 9 17
-to Western countries 68 54
Imports (in %)
-from Eastern Europe 6 7
-from the former USSR 18 36
-from Western countries 70 51
Source: OECD, Economic studies, Czech republic and Slovak republic, Paris, 1994, quoted in
Wehrle, Le Divorce, p.98
Thirdly, many Slovak economists claimed that the Slovak industrial production was
fundamentally flawed because often limited to the output of raw materials or semi-finished
goods destined to be "finished" in the Czech Republic. This was perceived as an illustration
of the continuing "exploitation" of the Slovak Republic, whose 56 percent of the industrial
output was constituted of semi-finished goods consumed in the Czech lands (the equivalent
figure for the Czech industrial output was only 21 percent)^ 10. The dependence of Slovak
economy on low added value sectors was thus bound to cause a painful restructuring after the
reintroduction of market economy in the country.
^O^Even if it could be argued that the Slovak economy could and can still benefit from its traditional
commercial links with the former Soviet Union (see for instance Gerard Wild, "Une Croissance Prometteuse",
Politique Internationale, n°78, hiver 1997-1998- special issue on Slovakia, pp.47-61).
^l^Dedek, The Break-up, p.55
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Fourthly, another source of complaints for the Slovaks was the limited amount of foreign
investment: in 1991, only 13 percent of the 640 millions dollars invested in the federation
were destined to Slovakia, far less than the share of the Slovak population in the state^ 11.
This lack of interest of foreign investors was taken to demonstrate once more the
"Pragocentrist" and Jacobin character of the Czechoslovak federation. Foreign businessmen
or policy-makers were received in Prague but were given no incentive to make the trip to
Bratislava.
After the break-up, Meciar contended that the unequal distribution of foreign investment
(which he perceived to be the consequence of a "deliberate policy of discrimination") was one
of the decisive factors that led to the end of the common state312. Slovakia, it was argued,
should have been made more "visible" on the international scene, and the Czech-led federal
centre did not do enough to promote the economic attractivity of the region.
Geography itself, in sharp contrast with the cold war era, where Slovakia's proximity to the
Soviet Union was perceived as a strategic and economic advantage, seemed to have doomed
Slovakia to a secondary position: whereas the Czech lands have a large network of
communications with the - especially German-speaking and economically affluent - West, the
only Western country with which Slovakia shares a (small) border is Austria^ 3
Finally, and as a somewhat logical consequence of all these factors, Slovakia was much
harder hit than the Czech Republic by unemployment. As shown by the table below, Slovak
unemployment rates were usually three or four times higher than in the Czech lands.
311 "Divorce a la tchecoslovaque", in Conjonture (Journal of the bank Paribas), October 1992, p. 132.
3Lidove Noviny, 8 March 1993, p. 16 (quoted in Pavlinek, "Regional", p.366)
313jeffj-ey Simon, "Czechoslovakia's 'Velvet Divorce', Visegrad cohesion, and European faultlines",
European Security, vol.3, n°3, Autumn 1994, pp.483-484. See more on that in chapter 4. Significantly, this
geographic position allowed Czech workers to find work in Germany ( Karel Dyba and Jan Svejnar, "A
Comparative View of Economic Developments in the Czech Republic", in Jan Svejnar (ed.), The Czech
Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe (San Diego, New York; Academic Press; 1995), p.39;
Jaroslav Blaha, "L'economie tcheque en 1995-1996: une croissance modele", Le Courrier despays de TEst,
n°409, mai-juin 1996, p.41). The former prime minister of the Czech Republic, Petr Pithart, even contended in
October 1992 that "[i]f there were no Bavaria just across the border these regions of Bohemia would have an
unemployment rate comparable to the worst regions of Slovakia" (Lecture at the Institute for Foreign Relations,
Prague, 20 October 1992, quoted in Jan Urban, "The Czech and Slovak republics: Security Consequences of the
Breakup of the CSFR", in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge ofTransition',





1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Czechoslovakia 1.7 6.6 5.5 - - -
Czech Republic 1.1 4.4 2.6 3.5 , 3.5 2.9
Slovakia 2.4 11.8 10.4 14.0 14.3 13.1
Source: Carol Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republic, p. 183
This indicator is clearly the most relevant, because a high unemployment rate has a concrete
and visible effect on the attitudes of the population. It was easy for Slovak politicians and
economists to put the blame on the federal authorities for their incapacity to curb the rise of
unemployment in their region.
In a way, the situation of post-communist Czechoslovakia was hence comparable to the
situation of the interwar period, when the Czech-dominated "central" authorities failed to
elaborate a regional policy taking into account the specificities of Slovak economic
conditions.
According to many Slovaks, it is indeed no coincidence if Vaclav Klaus, the prime proponent
of a quick and decisive liberal reforms, referred to Alois Rasin, the first finance minister of
the Czechoslovak republic in 1918 and author of unpopular austerity measures, as his role
model and adopted his motto "Let them shout, the results will demonstrate that we were
right"314 such declarations were taken at best as evidence of a certain Czech arrogance and
profound insensitivity to their problems and at worst as a definitive proof that Slovakia would
be better on its own, being able to design economic policies more adapted to the realities of
the region. There was among the Slovaks a (somewhat Utopian) feeling that political
independence was the key to the full realisation of the economic potential of the nation. As
Vladimir Meciar once put it:
3 ^Entretien avec Vaclav Klaus, "Tchecoslovaquie: l'art des privatisations", Politique Internationale, n°53,
Automne 1991, p.216. As Jin Vecernik states, "it is not by chance that... Klaus., had on the wall above his table
a portrait of ...Rasin, who applied a restrictive monetary policy, asserted the reevaluation of the Czechoslovak
crown and was largely responsible for the economic recovery in early 1920s"( Markets and People: The Czech
Reform Experience in a Comparative Perspective', Aldershot; Avebury; 1996; p.239).
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[N]ew markets will be created, and dependence on the Czech economy will be
eliminated. Slovakia will become an element of international relationships, enabling it
to defend its own interests. The emancipation of Slovakia must be considered not as a
new isolation but as a new opportunity^ 15
Economists such as J. Hajko began to think of the geographical position of Slovakia as an
advantage, enabling it to be a "bridge between East and West in Europe"316 Both Meciar
and Marian Tkac, Slovak vice-governor of the Czechoslovak Bank (in an interview for
Lidove noviny on December 8, 1992) even suggested that Slovakia had the potential to
become "the Switzerland of Eastern Europe"317.
The Czech arguments
Similarly, the Czechs started to develop after 1989 arguments that tended to favour a
loosening of economic links with the poorer Slovak part of the state.
The main Czech grievance concerned the amount of budgetary transfers from the Czech to
the Slovak Republics. More and more Czech economists and politicians believed that, given
the success of economic equalisation, the subsidisation of Slovakia (popularly described by
the notion ofpenezovod, "money pipeline"318) was no longer necessary and that it was time
to reconsider the nature of the economic relationship between the two parts of the state. As a
report of the Institute for Economics of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences stated,
James O.Jackson, "Can this marriage be saved ?", Time, July 6, 1992,p.39
316j.Hajko, Trend, 26 January, 1, 4 and 5 (quoted in Adrian Smith, Reconstructing the Regional Economy:
Industrial Transformation and Regional Development in Slovakia; Aldershot; Edward Elgar; 1998; pp.232-
233).
312 Meciar quoted in "Slovaquie: Les Records d'un Dragon de l'Est", Le Moci (Moniteur Official du
Commerce International), 18-25 Avril 1996, p.72 ; Tkac quoted in Pavlinek, "Regional", p.364.
31 ^Ulc,"Czechoslovakia", p.331.
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For how long yet will the Czech republic be able to do without the sums of which it is
deprived each year by a system of relations based on the so-called social justice,
without it constituting a serious threat for the living standard of the current and future
populations ?319
Accordingly, following the negotiations concerning the repartition of budgetary resources, the
percentage of the funds allocated to the Czech republic increased from 40 percent in 1990 to
43 percent in 1992, while Slovakia's share was reduced from 25 to 22 percent - the remaining
35 percent being attributed to the federal centre.
Table 3.9 : Budgetary repartitions (in percent)
1990 1991 1992
Federation 35 35 35
Czech republic 40 41.5 43
Slovak republic 25 23.5 22
Sources: Jan Adam, "Transformation to a market economy in the former Czechoslovakia",
Europe-Asia studies, vol.45, N°4, p.632 (1990-1991) and Jaroslav Blaha and Frederic
Wehrle, "La Federation tcheque et slovaque mise en cause: aspects politiques et
economiques", Le courrier des pays de I'Est, n°370, June 1992, p.50
However, having successfully questioned the budgetary repartition of the state and the basis
of Czechoslovak fiscal federalism, the majority of Czech leaders also proclaimed their
attachment to the rapid completion of the economic reforms. The "Scenario for economic
reform" made public in September 1990 by finance minister Klaus, committed
Czechoslovakia to a programme of "shock therapy" based on the liberalisation of prices, the
adoption of a policy of monetary austerity where anti-inflationary measures got the priority
over the maintenance of full employment or economic growth320
Czech federal policy-makers refused to jeopardise the transformation programme because of
Slovak objections concerning the pace of the reforms and the alleged "specificity" of their
^l^Ekonom, n°2, 1992, quoted in Jaroslav Blaha and Frederic Wehrle, "La Federation tcheque et slovaque
mise en cause: aspects politiques et economiques", Le courrier des pays de I'Est, n°370, June 1992, p.50.
320gee for example Sharon L.Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in transition: Politics, Economics and Society
(London, New York; Pinter; 1991), p.249.
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economy. They initiated on the contrary one of the fastest and most drastic privatisation
schemes in Central and Eastern Europe and justified the resort to the innovative method of
"voucher privatisation" by the need to go quicker than the other neighbouring countries.
Czechoslovakia had before 1989 practically no private sector at all and lagged in this respect
behind its Central European neighbours, where the "second" or "underground" economy was
openly thriving: "Czechoslovakia was the most 'socialized' country in Central and Eastern
Europe; its industry, agriculture and virtually the whole tertiary sector were owned either by
the state or by co-operatives (in the Marxist conception). The private sector was practically
non-existent, and private property was all but liquidated"321. in 1989, at the ouset of the
transition, "only 1.2 % of the labor force, 2% of all registered assets and a negligible fraction
of the nation's GDP" were privately managed322 an(j in 1990, the estimated percentage
contribution of the private sector to GDP in the Czech Republic and Slovakia was 5 percent,
far behind Hungary (16 percent) and Poland (31 percent)323_
Moreover, the Czech insistence on maintaining an integrated "Czecho-Slovak" economy
concretly rendered the divergent economic standpoints irreconcilable.
By the second-half of 1992, the Czechs had come to the conclusion that they would be
economically better off and achieve a faster "return to Europe" without the Slovaks and could
relate to the Baits or the Slovenes, who had decided to stop economically and financially
supporting the poorer parts of the states (the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) of which they
were part324;
32lDusan Hendrych, "Transforming Czechoslovakian Public Administration: Traditions and New
Challenges", Public Administration, vol.71, Spring/ Summer 1993, pp.47-48.
322pyka ancj Svejnar, "A Comparative View", p 79
^^Allan M.Williams and Vladimir Balaz, "Transformation and Division in Central Europe", in Ray Hudson
and Allan M.Williams (eds), Divided Europe: Society and Territory (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi;
SAGE Publications; 1999), p. 172. See also Karla Brom and Mitchell Orenstein, "The Privatised Sector in the
Czech Republic", Europa-Asia Studies, vol.46, n°6, 1994, pp.893-894. For a historical perspective on the
suppression of the private sector after the second World War, see Martin Myant, The Czechoslovak Economy
1948-1988: The Battlefor Economic Reform (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1989), pp.42-55.
324'i he Czech experience is also in this respect similar to the experiences of "rich" Western regions such as
Catalonia and Lombardy where economically-based separatist movements have emerged in recent years.
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When the split came, the Czechs got rid of all the bad parts. We got rid of the old
weapons factories, we got rid of the unemployment, we got rid of the old Soviet
frontier. We got rid of all our problems, and we gave them to the Slovaks325_
The problem is that in a binational state like Czechoslovakia, the discussion quickly polarised
and crystallised around national lines - the Slovaks becoming more and more "separatist" and
the Czechs becoming more and more anxious and willing to "ditch" the Slovaks326
The economic debate was therefore following national faultlines even if this assertion has to
be immediately nuanced by two remarks.
First of all, it would be wrong to contend that all the Czechs supported "shock therapy",
while all the Slovaks favoured a "gradualist" approach. One of the most influential and
consistent advocates of gradualism was the Czech Valtr Komarek, before 1989 head of the
Institute for Prognostics and deputy prime-minister in charge of the economy in the first post-
communist federal government327: he was even for some time the most popular politician in
Slovakia. Similarly, some Slovaks like Marian Calfa, federal prime minister from December
1989 to June 1992, or the Slovak Deputy Prime-Minister Jozef Kucerak328 supported the
adoption of "shock therapy".
Furthermore, the boundaries between the Czech and the Slovak economic views were more
blurred than what would appear at first sight. Vaclav Klaus's policies were clearly not as
radical and "Thatcherite" as his rhetoric. "[T]he way in which Klaus pursued his economic
objectives...showed him to be a savvy politician...His reform agenda was a workable mix of
economic daring and political caution. Although he talked a free-market game and backed the
rhetoric with rapid privatization ... the reality was more moderate than the facade. Klaus kept
Czech journalist, quoted in Leff, The Czech, p. 13 6.
326see for instance Jerome Filippini, '"Petite nation' et politique: la Tchecoslovaquie et le nationalisme
slovaque", Herodote, n°63, october/november 1991, p. 182.
327yiartin Dangerfield, "Ideology and the Czech Transformation: Neoliberal Rhetoric or Neoliberal Reality
?", East European Politics and Societies, vol.11, n°3, Fall 1997, p.443
328peter Martin, "Economic Reform", p.7
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an eagle eye on unemployment, selling the public on patience with lower wages in order to
carry larger payrolls and attract foreign investment. His economic programme moved more
quickly to transfer formal ownership than to relinquish state control..."329 jqe aiso
acknowledged his concern for the social consequences of economic reforms:
Systemic transformation is not an exercise in applied economics or in applied political
science. It is a process that involves human beings; that affects heir day-to-day lives;
that creates new groups of gainers and losers; that changes the relative political and
economic strength and standing of different socio-economic groups; and that thereby
destroys the original political, social, and economic equilibrium330
The Slovaks, lukewarm in their support for the rapid economic reforms and privatisations if
compared to the Czechs appeared under a somewhat different light if compared to the Poles
and Hungarians. The programme of privatisations drafted by Klaus has often been considered
as the most drastic in post-communist Eastern Europe as far as its scope and pace were
concerned and the Slovak reaction in front of the hardships that it brought about was for this
reason rather natural and predictable. As Leff put it,
[although Slovak hesitations and inconsistency in pursuit of the privatization process
contrasts (sic) rather sharply with the radical Czech initiative, the difference between
the two should be seen in the context of the larger pattern of privatization issue in
post-communist states. In that context, it is the Czechs who appear atypical 1.
Similarly, the table below shows that the unemployment rate in Slovakia was actually
conforming to the pattern observed in Hungary or Poland and was even lower than in these
two countries in 1992. This should however not be taken as a significant factor, since the
The Czech, pp. 180-181. See also ch.6 and, for a general discussion of the discrepancy between
rhetoric and practice in Klaus's economic and social policies, Dangerfield, "Ideology", pp.436-469.
330vaclaV Klaus, Renaissance: The Rebirth ofLiberty in the Heart ofEurope (Washington D.C; Cato
Institute; 1997), p.8 (see also p. 17 and p.66)
33 ^Leff, The Czech, p. 195. See chapter 2.
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obvious point of comparison for the Slovaks was the Czechs, not the Poles or the Hungarians,
and they consequently experienced a feeling of relative (if not absolute) deprivation.
Table 3.10 : Unemployment rates in East-Central Europe
1990 1991 1992
Czechoslovakia 1.0 6.6 5.1
Czech Republic 0.8 4.1 2.6
Slovak Republic 1.5 11.8 10.4
Hungary 1.5 8.5 12.3
Poland 6.1 11.8 13.6
Source: Statistical Bulletin, n°l, 1992 and n°2, 1994, Prague ; Focus: Eastern Europe, n°101,
Deutsche Bank Research (quoted in Dedek, The Break-up, p.52)
In fact, after having reviewed the economically-based "separatist" arguments used by both
Czech and Slovak politicians and economists after 1989, the next section now turns to
demonstrate the flaws of these claims and it will be subsequently argued that neither the
Czechs nor the Slovaks had any serious economic or material incentives to leave the common
state. In other words, there is clearly more to the break-up of Czechoslovakia than pure
economics, and the political motivations of decision-makers such as Meciar and Klaus should
not be underestimated (the role of political elites in the break-up is assessed in detail in
chapter 6).
We hence first refute the notion of Slovak economic "specificities", before examining and
putting into a wider perspective Czech "secessionist" arguments.
A refutation of Slovak "specificities"
The so-called "specific" features of Slovak economy were used as a plea for the
implementation of a more "gradualist" economic transformation policy than in the Czech
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republic. However, economists have been able to refute the validity of Slovak claims and
showed that, for several reasons, Slovakia was probably not as atypical as it was claimed to
be.
The first illustration of this point is the arms industry. The production was heavily
concentrated in Slovakia and the federal authorities implemented a programme of conversion
which especially targeted the huge factories located in the Slovak town of Martin. Subsidies
of 1.5 billion crowns were granted for the industry in 1989 and 1990, and in May 1991, the
federal government agreed to subsidy up to 30 percent of investment costs to support
conversion programmes, and added another 1.5 billion crowns332_
As shown in table 3.11, the federal government support for conversion was mostly (and
increasingly) allocated to Slovakia: as much as 70,83 % in 1990 and 80% in 1991 of the
funds went to the eastern republic.
Table 3.11: Federal government support for conversion (billion Kcs, current prices)
1989 1990 1991
Total 0.4 1.20 1.5
CR - 0.35 0.3
SR 0.4 0.85 1.2
Source: Ministry of Defence, Prague, 1992 (quoted in Yudit Kiss, "Lost Illusions ? Defence
Industry Conversion in Czechoslovakia, 1989-92", Europa-Asia Studies, vol.45, n°6, 1993,
p. 1051)
What is more, the conversion of the Czechoslovak arms industry was not a typically Slovak
("national") issue but a wider question of regional policy. Central Slovakia, which employed
30 percent of the labour force of the country in the military industry, was not the only area
affected by the post-communist changes: Southern Moravia and Prague, where respectively
^^^Martin Myant, Transforming socialist economies: the case ofPoland and Czechoslovakia (Aldershot;
Edward Elgar; 1993), p.224
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20 and 17 percent of the labour force of the industry was employed, were also strongly
affected by the reduction of the ouput of the Czechoslovak arms production333_
As far as the structure of the industrial production is concerned , it seems similarly difficult to
confirm the claims that the Slovak economy was geared towards the production of raw
materials or intermediate, semi-finished goods exported to the Czech republic to be
completed.
Certain sectors traditionally producers of semi-finished goods like construction materials or
paper industry, amounted to a higher share of the industrial production in Slovakia than in the
Czech lands. However, the share of certain industries equally involved in the production of
semi-finished goods such as metallurgy was more important in the Czech Republic than in
Slovakia.
333see Ales Capek, "The Split", p.56; Blaha and Wehrle, "La federation", p.52; Oldrich Dedek et al., The
break-up, p.56; A.Smith, Reconstructing', OCDE (OECD), Politiques et Problemes Regionaux en Republique
Tcheque et en Republique Slovaque (Paris; OECD; 1996).
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Table 3.12 : The industrial structure of the Czech and Slovak economy in 1989 (in %)
Industry Czech Republic Slovak Republic
Total 100.0 100.0
A.Production of means of
production
70.2 70.1











Chemical and Rubber industry 9.7 16.1
Machinery 22.0 17.0
Electrical and electronics industry 3.9 5.6
Metalworking (inc.plastics) 3.2 6.1
Construction materials 3.0 4.0
Wood and furniture 2.9 3.8
Paper industry 1.8 2.7
Glass, china and ceramics 1.6 0.8
Textile industry 4.8 3.4
Apparel 1.2 2.0
Leather 2.2 2.9
Printing industry 0.4 0.5
Food and beverages 16.6 17.5




Source: Ales Capek, "The Split of Czechoslovakia and the Specific Features of the Slovak
Economy, in J. Kfovak, Current Economics and Politics of (ex-)Czechoslovakia, p.53
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Furthermore, the analysis of the supplies for production use and final use from selected
industries in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1987 shows that for 16 out of the 30
industries considered, it is actually the Czech lands which relied more on semi-finished goods
- or goods for production use.
Ales Capek asserts in this respect that "[t]he total share of supplies for final use in the
[studied] industries represented 48.2 percent in the CR as compared with 48.9 percent in the
SR"334; this definitely contradicts the usual argument about the "less finished" nature of the
Slovak industrial production. The statistics concerning the structure of flows of goods
between the two republics moreover demonstrate that whereas as much as 64.1 percent of
Czech exports to Slovakia were semi-finished goods destined to production use, the
corresponding figure for the Slovak exports to the Czech lands was only 52.4 percent335
As far as the level of foreign investment in Slovakia is concerned, the figures commonly put
forward by the Slovaks according to which the share of Slovakia in the foreign investment in
the country in the years 1990 and 1991 was only 5 to 10 percent, appear contestable. The
statistics of the Czechoslovak Central Bank shed light on a slightly different situation: out of
the 700 million dollars invested in the country in 1991, 78.5 percent went to the Czech
republic and 21.5 percent to Slovakia - mostly in the region of Bratislava. Moreover, if the
huge investments negotiated in the Czech lands by Volkswagen with Skoda and Baz are
excluded, the share of foreign investments in Slovakia was as high as 37.6 percent, more than
the share of the Slovak population in the state336
As with the armaments industry, the issue clearly had a "regional", as well as a purely
"national" dimension. Most illustrative of this is the case of Bratislava, which constituted
(and still constitutes) a regional pole of prosperity and managed to attract 54.4 percent of the
foreign investments in Slovakia337
334 Capek, "The Split"., pp.54-55
33$ibid., p.54
336giaha and Wehrle, "La federation", p.52.
337a.Smith, "From convergence", pp. 149-150. See also A.M.Williams and V.Balaz, "Transformation", p. 183.
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Finally, the higher rate of unemployment in Slovakia cannot be uniformly explained by
invoking the insensitivity of the federal authorities to the characteristics of the republicans
First of all, Slovakia, having experienced exceptionally high birth rates at the beginning of
the "normalisation" in the seventies, had a high share of its population looking for a first job
in the early nineties. Demography was therefore a factor worsening the Slovak position,
especially if compared with the Czech lands.
Secondly, the fact that the social net was for a long time more important in post-communist
Slovakia than in the Czech republic did not help to curb unemployment: the Slovaks, who
could claim generous social benefits, had arguably as a consequence no real incentive to
actively look for a job.
Lastly, the responsibilities of the Slovak authorities cannot be disregarded. The employment
policy of the Slovak republic mainly consisted until 1992 of passive measures, such as the
allocation of important social benefits to the unemployed. An earlier emphasis on active
policies could have significantly helped to the reduction of the unemployment rate, as
illustrated by three elements. First, the Slovak authorities for a long time did not implement
or promote retraining policies: "during the first four months of 1992, only slightly more than
5 000 Slovak workers followed specific trainings ; one third of them later found a new
activity"339
Second, the Slovak republic equally lagged behind the Czech lands as far as the creation of
"state-funded" jobs was concerned: " [I]n the Czech republic, some 157 000 new jobs were
created by public policies in 1991 (of these, 50 000 assistant jobs, paid by the labour offices,
for fresh school graduates). In the Slovak republic, such activities began with a delay, and
there were only 24 000 new jobs created by public policies"340
Third, Slovakia did not actively support the establishment of a dynamic private sector able to
absorb some of the unemployment generated by the closures of the big state conglomerates.
338jhe following discussion largely draws on Dedek, The Break-up, pp.53-54.
■^■^^Gorappi, "La Slovacchia", p. 10.
340Kamil Janacek, "Transition to the market: interaction of macroeconmic and social policy", in Krovak
(ed.), Current, p.7.
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The difference between the Czech and Slovak unemployment rates has to be partly explained
by the higher dynamism and greater entrepreneurial opportunities of the Czech private sector:
"[I]n the Czech Republic, private sector's share in the gross domestic product was almost 10
% in 1991, compared to 4 % in Slovakia. As a result, the contribution of the private sector to
new job creation [was] different in both republics... [and] the different unemployment rates in
the two republics [were], among other factors, also due to the differing dynamics of the
private sector"341. The small and medium-sized private firms created in 1991 250,000 jobs in
the Czech republic, but only 30,000 in Slovakia342
The so-called Slovak "specificities" are therefore in practice difficult to prove and rather
contestable. Moreover, Slovakia fared better than the Czech lands on certain "structural"
indicators, such as the level of capital obsolescence or pollution (tables 3.13 and 3.14).
341 ibid., p.3
342Bernard Michel, "Tchecoslovaquie: le divorce de velours", Politique internationale, n°58, Winter 1992-
1992, p.35.
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Buildings Equipments Buildings Equipment
Productive
sectors
39.1 58.2 30.5 57.4
- Agriculture 32.0 61.2 23.8 54.2
- Industry 42.3 58.3 34.2 57.6
- Internal trade 32.1 57.8 23.3 56.3
- External trade 21.3 67.3 11.2 37.3
Non-productive
sectors
38.1 59.0 28.8 57.2
Science and R&D 37.5 60.6 27.2 50.3
Housing 38.6 44.6 28.0 39.8
Education 37.0 69.4 24.3 57.3
Health 47.4 63.9 27.1 41.6
Social sector 38.6 67.6 23.1 39.1
Source: Ekonom, n°2 / 1992, quoted in Jaroslav Blaha and Frederic Wehrle, "La Federation
tcheque et slovaque mise en cause: aspects politiques et economiques", Le courrier des pays
de I'Est, n° 370, June 1992, p.51
Table 3.14






Czech republic 78,865 10,362,553 8.5 25.3
Slovak republic 49,035 5,287,000 6.5 11.5
Source: Ekonom, n°2, 1992, quoted in Blaha and Wehrle, "La Federation", p.52
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The flaws of the Czech argument
Having thus demonstrated that the Slovak economically-based separatist arguments were only
partly legitimate, the flaws of the Czech contentions should now be considered.
Czech politicians often took a condescending approach towards their Slovak partners. During
the discussions about the privatisation programme, the opposition of several Sovak parties to
Klaus's project of "voucher privatisation", was for instance taken by the Czechs as a proof
that Slovaks "knew nothing about economics"343
The uncompromising attitude of the Czechs was however not necessarily economically and
politically justified. Economically speaking, "shock therapy" was not the only option opened
to a country like Czechoslovakia, which did not have in 1989 to face the immediate economic
difficulties of, say, Poland. Czechoslovakia could consequently have opted for a "gradualist"
option on the Hungarian model, rather than for a Polish kind of "shock therapy". As Marie
Lavigne put it, in 1989, the Czechoslovak
economy was still a standard centrally planned, state-owned and party-controlled
economy. But the current economic situation was good. External accounts were
balanced, the economy was growing slowly but there were no dramatic shortages and
the level of consumption and living was perhaps still higher than in the GDR. Prices
were stable through price control, and there seemed to be no major inflationary
pressures. The movement which had achieved the Velvet Revolution under the
political and moral leadership of Vaclav Havel, the Civic Forum, seemed to have
some margin of manoeuvre in launching a wide-scale, step-by-step restructuring
programme rather than introducing drastic stabilisation measures. The economy was
not overheating and its main problems seemed to be how to modernise obsolescent
343paui Wilson, "The end of the Velvet revolution", The New York Review ofBooks, August 13, p.58. In a
somewhat reminiscent episode, when a delegation of the IMF visited independent Slovakia in February 1993,
they left after three days, "in despair that the Slovak central bank seemed incompetent" ("Not so amicable", The
Economist, 17/04/1993, vol.327, n°7807, p.50).
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industries and to free decision-making of enterprises once the tutelage of the party on
the economy had ended. Nevertheless the 'shock therapy" model was used344
It remains a matter of debate whether the Czech advocacy of "shock therapy" was a simple
miscalculation resulting from a lack of awareness about the Slovak question, or a politically-
driven choice (this question will be discussed in chapter 6).
Suffice it for now to tentatively say that there was probably a not negligible amount of
political, indeed quasi-"ideological" and "nationalist", motives behind Klaus's advocacy of
speedy economy reforms.
With somewhat more confidence, it seems fair to argue that the adoption of a "gradualist"
economic policy would have met with less resistance and resentment in the Slovak part of the
country and could have thus largely contributed to make possible the maintenance of a
common state between the Czechs and the Slovaks.
Finally, it is morally possible to acknowledge the duty or responsability of the wealthier to
assist the economic development of less favoured areas of the same state: in Allen Buchanan's
words, "[i]f distributive justice requires some redistribution of wealth from the better off to
the worse off, and if this redistribution will cease if the better off citizens withdraw from the
cooperative scheme that has hitherto united them with the worse off, then we will be inclined
to conclude that secession by the better off is morally objectionable" 3 45 _ Qn this basis, the
Czech tendency to let the Slovaks secede without being willing to seriously consider a
compromise on the scope and the speed of economic reforms, might well appear unfounded
and illegitimate.
Therefore, none of the Slovak or Czech economic secessionist arguments really seems to
resist serious consideration and an assessment of their respective claims meets with several
problems of definition.
^^Marie Lavigne, The Economics ofTransition: from Socialist Economy to Market Economy (London and
Basingstoke; Macmillan; 1995), pp.101-102.
345Allen Buchanan, Secession: the Morality ofPolitical Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec
(Boulder; Westview Press; 1991), p. 16.
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The most significant one is the result of the ambiguities surrounding the concept of
"equalisation". The Slovak economy consistently caught up with the Czech during the four
decades of communism, but this is only part of the picture and cannot account for the Slovak
contention that their economy was still lagging behind and needed Czech economic and
financial support.
This can only be explained if an alternative vision of "equalisation" is introduced. Whereas
the Slovaks tended to equate "equalisation" with the actual achievement of economic
"equality", the Czechs saw it as only limited to the duty of reducing the economic differential.
After 1989, the Czechs considered that the subsidisation of Slovakia had achieved its goals
and that there was no need anymore for a policy of transfer of resources between two regions,
which were, if not "equal", at least "equalised".
As a consequence, Czech and Slovak elites became convinced that they would be better off to
live in two separate and independent states. The break-up was considered economically
advantageous for several reasons.
First of all, it was deemed to be the best way to definitely clarify the situation of the state on
the international stage because Western investors hesitated to set up businesses in
Czechoslovakia as long as the negotiations between Czechs and Slovaks were not concluded.
Secondly, given the distinct economic contexts in the two republics, the creation of two
independent states was perhaps the only solution to allow the Czechs and the Slovaks to
pursue economic policies specifically tailored to their different needs and objectives.
Finally, the international economic context was favorable to the foundation of two small
independent states. The technological revolution has changed the conditions of economic
success, rendering obsolete the notions of economies of scale and scope, at the profit of
attributes such as flexibility or capacity of innovation. Accordingly, two small homogeneous
states like the Czech republic and Slovakia are economically viable, perhaps more than the
common binational state^46
346see chapter 4 and Josef C.Brada, "Breaking up is hard to do: the economics of creating independent
Czech and Slovak republics", in Krovak, Current, pp. 17-31.
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The economic consequences of the break-up
However, economic considerations only played a secondary role in the break-up of
Czechoslovakia.
A retrospective look at the economic consequences of the severing of the economic links
between the Czech and the Slovak republics demonstrates that the obvious discrepancy
between the Czechs and the Slovaks concerning economic reform, was not sufficient in itself
to explain the break-up: the economic situation was for both Slovaks but also Czechs an
incentive to remain in a common state.
The peaceful nature of the split is a positive factor which prevented serious economic
disruptions and thus presented a sharp contrast with the break-up of the two other communist
federations, the Soviet Union and especially Yugoslavia347 Yet, the economic consequences
of the division of Czechoslovakia should not be underestimated.
Three successive reports published in 1991 by the Czech government, the Slovak Academy of
Sciences and the Slovak government concluded that economic dissolution would have an
adverse effect on the economy of both republics, even if Slovakia was considered likely to be
more affected by the division.
To start with, a rapid examination of the interrepublican trade between the two republics
showed that Slovakia was much more dependent than the Czech republic on mutual trade.
Whereas only 11 percent of Czech goods were destined to the Slovak market, more than 27
percent of the Slovak production went to the Czech lands348_ The table below illustrates for
different kinds of goods the extent of Slovak dependence - 38.6 percent of Slovak wholesale
trade being for instance exported to the Czech republic.
347gee for example Milica Z. Bookman, "War and peace: the divergent breakups of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia", p.181, Journal ofPeace research, vol.31, n°2, 1994, pp.175-187.
348"Czechoslovakia: the economy in transition - Roundtable: prospects for reform", RFE /RL Research
report, p.29, vol.1, n°12, 20 March 1992, p.29
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Table 3.15: Interrepublican trade in 1989 (in percentages)
Exports Slovak Republic Czech Republic
Investment goods 37.4 19.6
Products for industry 30.8 16.2
Consumer goods (at retail
prices)
26.0 14.0
Nonproductive goods 38.4 5.5
Wholesale trade 38.6 8.7
Source: Aspekty a Dosledky Rozdelenia Ekonomiky CSFR na Obdelene Ekonomy SR a CR,
Bratislava, Slovak Academy of Sciences, November 1991, p.23 (quoted in Peter Martin,
"Slovakia: calculating the costs of independence", RFE / RL, vol.1, n°12, 20 March 1992,
p.34)
Similarly, due to the "socialist division of labour", the production of certain goods was
concentrated in one of the two republics: virtually all of the automobile industry was located
in the Czech lands, while 99 percent of TV sets and the totality of the refrigerators were made
in Slovakia349 xhe break-up was therefore bound to have a short-term negative impact on
Czech and Slovak trade patterns.
More generally, the division of the state was widely acknowledged as detrimental to the
prospects of both Czech and Slovak economies. The Czech and Slovak gross domestic
products were deemed to suffer from a loss of respectively 2.1 and 5.7 %, compared to the
optimal situation of the continuation of the joint state^SO
Conclusion
Considering all these elements, the real issue was not the economic divergences between
Czechs and Slovaks or the fact that it made "economic" sense for the two nations to split up.
349Conjoncture (Paribas), Octobre 1992, p. 134
350ivan Sujan, "The Czech and Slovak Republics: a starting point", in Krovak, Current, pp.45-46.
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The essential question is why, given the circumstances (i.e, the evident adverse impact of a
divorce on Slovak and Czech economies), Czech and Slovak leaders decided to pursue "go-it-
alone" policies.
Economic arguments were conveniently used by "populist" politicians to justify their
uncompromising policies -something of a paradox given the narrowing of the economic and
sociological gap between Czechs and Slovaks during the communist era. Meciar's eleventh-
hour attempts to secure the adoption of a common federal budget for 1993 and the proposal of
a Czech-Slovak union on 21 August 1992 suggest that he wanted to take advantage of Czech
subsidies for a bit longer.
As far as the Czechs are concerned, the assessment is somewhat more problematic. They had
an economic interest, at least in the short term, in letting the poorer Slovaks go, but the debate
surrounding economic reform was also something of a good pretext for Klaus and its
coalition partners of the CDA (Civic Democratic Alliance) to justify their adoption of an
uncompromising stance during the negotiations of the second half of 1992.
The economic reforms started by the post-communist government affected Slovakia more
than the Czech republic but the really existing economic differences between Czechs and
Slovaks were still limited and manageable: "it was not regional inequality which contributed
to the downfall of Czechoslovakia as much as the fear of its return"351.
Statistics are meaningless, unless they become politically mobilised: as early as 1988, Robert
Kaiser stressed that "equality and the process of equalisation is as much a matter of
perception as it is an issue suitable for objective assessment. For the nationalist, there is
undoubtedly sufficient evidence of inequality to induce feelings of relative deprivation"352
This was amply demonstrated by the debate between Czechs and Slovaks about "who [which
republic] subsidizes whom ?". An opinion poll conducted in 1991 showed that, if both Czechs
Peter Ferdinand, "Nationalism, community and democratic transition in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia",
in David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh and Paul Lewis (eds), Democratization (Cambridge; Polity
Press; 1997), p.484.
352Robert Kaiser, National Territoriality, p.221.
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and Slovaks overwhelmingly agreed with the statement that "one republic ought not to have
to pay for the other" (88 and 87 percent respectively), they had however in practice a clear
and completely opposite perception of "who was paying for whom". Only 10 percent of the
Slovak and 34 percent of the Czech respondents believed that the resources of the federation
were equally distributed between the two republics. Moreover, 67 percent of the Slovaks
thought that the system favoured the Czechs - who in turn strongly rejected this idea (70
percent disagreed with the statement "the present system favours the Czechs")353
Czechs and Slovaks also had deeply divergent economic histories, which logically affected
their reactions towards economic reforms in the post-communist era.
The Czechs looked at the interwar republic as an economic (and political, as seen in chapter
2) "golden age" when Czechoslovakia - and especially the Czech lands - counted among the
most developed regions of Europe. In sharp contrast, they considered the communist era as an
era of long and unchecked economic decline: at the end of the 1980s, Czechoslovakia
occupied the 42nd place in the economic rankings, "well below many Third World
countries"354 The conclusion drawn by most Czechs was thus predictable: planned economy
has obviously been a disaster and a swift transition to market economy is the only and fastest
way to go back into the fold of Western Europe.
For the Slovaks, however, the economic experience of communism was strikingly different.
As Ales Capek and Gerald Sazama put it, "[o]ne Slovak generation ha[d] seen Slovakia
change from a less developed agrarian country to an industrial economy, a process which was
accompanied by a rapid growth of the standards of living - by the standards of Eastern
Europe, - an economic miracle"355 'fhc Slovaks, which had fared relatively well under the
communist regime, were likely to be extremely reluctant and sensitive in front of the
economic difficulties inevitably brought about by the transition.
353m jchael J-Deis, "A Study ofNationalism in Czechoslovakia", RFE/ RL Research Report, 31 January
1992, p.10-11.
354Holy, The Little, p. 155.
353Capek and Sazama,"Czech", p.218.
Economic reasons were nevertheless at best secondary in the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
Economic transition cannot realistically be considered as the main cause of the velvet
divorce, but at most as one of its explanatory factors. The Slovak prime minister from April
1991 to June 1992, Jan Carnogursky implicitly admitted that and stated that "none of the
Baltic republics prior to their decision on independence calculated how much [sovereignty]
would cost"356 Similarly, Havel remarked that "for many Slovaks, whether they are
governed well or badly, with their participation or without it, with their interests in mind or
without them, is less important than the bare fact that they are governed from somewhere
else"357 jn post-communist Czechoslovakia at least, separatism was therefore only loosely
linked with material interest(s)358
The outbursts of nationalist feelings in the two republics had little to do with economic
inequalities (which had by 1989 largely disappeared), even if economic arguments were
demagogically used by politicians to justify the division of state.
Political determinants were more important than economic considerations in the process that
led to the break-up: in a binational state like Czechoslovakia, in the context of a dramatic
regime-change necessitating the management of a "triple transition" (and given the
contradictory economic experiences of Czechs and Slovaks), it was electorally-rewarding for
politicians to blame the "Other" nation for all the economic hardships.
■^Radio Bratislava, 27 September 1991, quoted in Peter Martin, "Slovakia: calculating the cost of
independence", RFE/RL research report, vol.1, n°12, 20 March 1992, p.36
•^frlavel, Summer meditations, p.26
^ ^ ^Except perhaps, the material interest of the elites (see ch.6). It would be interesting, but outside the scope
of this dissertation to see whether Steven Majstorovic's assertion that "the forces of ethnonationalism prioritize
non-material goals over material considerations and operate relatively independently from economic / class
interests that are represented by economic inequality" ("Politicized ethnicity and economic inequality: a
subjective perspective and a cross-national examination", Nationalism and ethnic politics, vol. 1, n°l, Spring
1995, p.48) could be proved in cases other than Czechoslovakia.
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CHAPTER IV
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS IN THE BREAK-UP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Both Palacky's and Masaryk's political thought is determined by threats. Europe is
threatened by two fatal dangers concentrated at its center. Central Europe, as a
federation of free nations or at least as the common democratic state of Czechs and
Slovaks, confronts these dangers from two sides and defends all of Europe... Palacky
justified the necessity of a Central European federation with the same arguments
Masaryk used to advocate a common state of Czechs and Slovaks -aggressive
Prussianism and Tsarist expansionism. The common state of Czechs and Slovaks was
founded when these threats were real. It ceased to exist when these threats
disappeared
Karel Kosik359
After having seen in the two previous chapters that the differences between the Czechs and
the Slovaks in terms of political culture or economic development cannot on their own, or in
combination, provide an explanation for the break-up of Czechoslovakia, this' chapter now
turns to the last of the three elements that would tend to suggest the ineluctability of the
division of the state.
What has been earlier termed the "geopolitical argument" seeks to explain the division of
Czechoslovakia by (at least implicitly) pointing at its inevitable character, and states that the
Czechs and the Slovaks logically split up since their union no longer made sense in the
changing post-1989 international environment and given the apparent end of the German
threat or international pressures disallowing separation (i.e Soviet hegemony).
Scholars such as Judy Batt, Jacques Rupnik, William Wallace, Frederic Wehrle or Karel
Kosik (in the quotation in exerguis) contend that, in the absence of external or exogenous
359Karel Kosik, "The Third Munich", Telos, vol.25, n°94, Winter 1993-1994, p. 150.
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constraints, the nature of the relation between Czechs and Slovaks, and subsequently the
existence of the common state itself, was bound to be opened to question after each shift in
the international system360
This chapter however purposes to provide a refutation of this "geopolitical" argument and
demonstrate that the end of Czechoslovakia in 1992 was not a direct result or consequence of
the international environment.
International aspects only played a minor role in the process of the dissolution of the
Czechoslovak federation and did not make it inevitable: the international environment was
not a sufficient condition for the disintegration of the state.
A first section looks at the controversies surrounding the foundation of a Czechoslovak state
and considers the extent to which the union of the Czechs and Slovaks was the artificial
product of international circumstances.
A subsequent section will argue that, whereas the collapse of the Yugoslav and Soviet
federations had a relatively limited impact on Czech and Slovak attitudes between 1989 and
1992, the gradual redefinition of security (in economic more than in military terms) was a
decisive factor in the velvet divorce. In this context, the connection between the desire to "go
back to Europe" (integration) and "secessionist" strategies (fragmentation) will be
documented.
After the end of the direct Soviet military threat, Czech and Slovak national interests
increasingly diverged. The traditional historical animosities between Czechs and Germans
and Slovaks and Hungarians reemerged and exacerbated Czech-Slovak tensions: Slovaks
were in this context seen by the Czechs as ambivalent towards reunified Germany, and
Czechs were allegedly unprepared to defend Slovak interests against Hungary.
Despite all this, the role of the international environment in the break-up of Czechoslovakia
remained limited and, unlike the end of the First republic in 1938/39, the second (and
definitive) dissolution of the state in 1992 was the result of internal dynamics. The union and
^^®Batt, The New Slovakia, p.2 ; Rupnik, "The International Context", pp.271-278 ; William V Wallace,
"From Czechs", p.47 ; Wehrle, Le Divorce.
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the eventual "disunion" of the two small Czech and Slovak nations rested on more than
international pressures.
The historical background: Czechoslovakia as a product of the international system ?
Chapter one briefly discussed the circumstances of the birth of Czechoslovakia. More
specifically, historians have advanced three contradictory conceptions of the state
creation361.
The first (and most widely accepted) emphasizes the decisive contribution of the emigre
leadership and especially of the Triumvirate Masaryk-Benes-Stefanik. The second, actively
promoted by the communist authorities, concentrates on the impact of the October revolution
and affirms the direct causality between the Bolshevik victory and the collapse of Autria-
Hungary. In the words of the chief communist ideologist Vaclav Kopecky, "[t]he historic fact
is that the decisive factor in the liberation of the Czech and Slovak nations in 1918 was the
powerful influence of the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917.
Without the Soviet October in 1917 there would not have been a Czechoslovak October 1918;
there would not have been an independent Czechoslovak state"362 Finally, the third thesis
focuses on the activities of the resistance at home and sees the role of politicians such as
Karel Kramar or Alois Rasin (the members of the so-called Czech maffia) as the determining
factor in the eventual foundation of an independent Czechoslovak state.
The origins of the state may therefore be the object of a long-standing Historikerstreit, but
what could be called the "Masaryk-Triumvirate" and the "Soviet" schools have nevertheless
in common their focus on the international environment.Moreover, even Kramar, an
^^^Kalvoda, The Genesis, pp.5-9.
362qUOted in Jaroslav Opat, "On the Emergence of Czechoslovakia", in Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia,
1918-88, p.41. See also the writings of the historian Vaclav Krai, who argued that "the revolutionary working
people at home and on the fronts who, having been inspired by the example of the Great October Socialist
Revolution, buried the old, reactionary monarchy" (Vaclav Krai, About Masaryk's and Benes's Counter-
Revolutionary and Anti-Soviet Politics, Prague, 1953, p.7, quoted in Kalvoda, The Genesis, p.510).
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outspoken proponent of neo-Slavism, also believed until 1915 that the "liberation" of Czechs
and Slovaks would come through the intervention of an external actor, Tsarist Russia.
The Czechs and the Slovaks have been dependent throughout their history on the inevitable
connections between their internal affairs and the international environment. As the Slovak
historian Daniel Rapant wrote in 1967,
the existing international conditions and, in particular, their dynamics...[have been]
the determining factor of our [the Slovaks... and the Czechs] national
developments
It was already on account of this perceived linkage that Frantisek Palacky, the historian
"father of the [Czech] nation", famously declined an invitation to the Frankfurt Congress in
April 1848, arguing that "if Austria did not exist, we would have had to invent it". Palacky
recognised the weak position of the Czechs as a small nation surrounded by two powerful
neighbours, Germany and Russia (who was however, probably until the invasion of 1968,
seen as a friendly power by a large proportion of the Czechs)364. He supported the idea of
Austro-Slavism, the preservation of the Habsburg monarchy as the best guarantee and
protection for the Czechs and advocated the federalisation of the empire on national lines365
Czech hopes suffered a major set-back after the 1867 Compromise, but the overwhelming
majority of the Czech elite (including Kramar and Masaryk) consistently attempted before
1914 to save the Austria-Hungarian monarchy on a new basis which would have granted
extensive self-government to the lands of the Crown of St-Wenceslas (trialism instead of
dualism).
Similarly, on the Slovak side, the survival of the nation was perceived to be best ensured
through autonomy within the Hungarian kingdom, not independence (or political union with
the Czechs). This message was repeatedly conveyed in the declaration of the Slovak national
363p)aniei Rapant, "Slovaci v dejinach: retrospektiva a perspektivy", Slovenskepohl'ady, 4 April 1967
(quoted in Wehrle, he Divorce, p.25).
364ihis Russophilism of the Czechs and Slovaks contrasts sharply with the deep-rooted distrust and
suspicion characteristic of Polish and Hungarian attitudes towards Russia.
365§ee for instance Frank Hadler, "Bohmen und Mahren im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert", in Bahlcke, Eberhard
and Polivka, Bohmen, p.CXI.
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assembly in Liptovsky Svaty Mikulas (10 April 1848), the memorandum of the Slovak nation
in June 1861 as well as in the speeches of Slovak representatives in the Budapest
parliament366
The first World War changed the rules of the game in the international system. The end of the
multinational Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman empires and the invocation of the principle
of national self-determination allowed the merging of Czechs and Slovaks into a common and
sovereign state. The country was in many respects a product of the new European concert
imposed by the victorious powers of the Entente (United Kingdom, France, United States,
Italy) in Versailles, and was conceived, as seen in chapter 1, as a cordon sanitaire between
defeated Germany and Bolshevik Russia.
The character of the Czecho-slovak union was subsequently questioned after each shift in the
international system.
Hence, in 1938, Hitler's determination to destroy the status quo provoked the downfall of
Czechoslovakia, once the country lost in Munich the support of its traditional backers, France
and the United Kingdom. Czechs and Slovaks went their own ways, the radical wing of the
Slovak People's Party taking advantage of the new international environment to declare, with
Nazi Germany's support, the independence of Slovakia in March 1939. Czechoslovakia thus
broke up for the first time because of external pressures and the expansionist policies of
Hitler - even if the disaffection of the Slovaks from the state played a role in the process
which led to the establishement of an "independent" Slovakia and of a protectorate of
Bohemia-Moravia.
In 1945 however, the defeat of Germany provoked a new systemic change. Czechoslovakia
was reborn and the communist and Soviet domination of the country from February 1948 to
December 1989 constrained relations between Czechs and Slovaks within the boundaries of a
common state.
366The texts of the 1848 and 18761 declarations can be found in Jorg K.Hoensch, Dokumente zur
Autonomiepolitik der Slowakischen Volkspartei Hlinkas (Munich, Vienna; R.Oldenbourg Verlag; 1984; pp.71-
74 and pp.92-99). See also for example p. 106 the oath to the Hungarian state taken by Ferdis Juriga on 26 April
1915.
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All this would a priori suggest that Czechoslovakia remained one only when the international
system was stable: as soon as the system changed, Czechs and Slovaks challenged the nature
of their union. This especially accounts for the split of 1938-39, even though common sense
would have dictated a unified approach to German (and Hungarian) revisionist aggressions.
Following this line of argument, what is of primary interest is how the end of the Cold War
changed the relations between Czechs and Slovaks. In other words, we shall consider whether
the shift of the international system had an impact on the divorce of the two nations in 1992,
and, as the proponents of the "geopolitical" argument put it, whether the end of the European
bipolarity caused the dissolution of the state.
To be sure, the fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia was itself an event
profoundly connected with international developments. The "velvet revolution" was made
possible largely by the domino effect of the collapse of the Polish, Hungarian and East
German regimes and the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine by the Soviet leadership led
by Mikhail Gorbachev367
First, the "contagious" impact of the declarations of sovereignty that swept across Eastern
Europe after the fall of communism on Czech-Slovak relations is appraised. A following
section then examines how the emergence of an international system marked by a redefinition
of security and the advent of globalisation put heavy strains on the Czecho-Slovak marriage
and acted as a catalyst for the dissolution of the common state.
The "revenge of the nations" ?
It has been commonplace to consider the break-up of Czechoslovakia as part of the broader
process of disintegration of the communist ethnofederations.
Stephane Pierre-Caps argues that the fact that the "nations without history" (without a state)
like the Slovenes , the Macedonians and of course the Slovaks, nearly simultaneously
achieved statehood is not a coincidence or the result of the irony of history but the
consequence of the belief of these small nations that they could after 1989 free themselves
from the geopolitical determinism until then an essential component of their self-
367see for instance Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford, New York; Oxford University Press;
1996) and Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of1989: The USSR and the Liberation ofEastern Europe (Berkeley;
University of California Press; 1997).
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definitions^^. jn a somewhat similar way, Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch adopt a standpoint
which purposely aims at stressing what they call the "structural comparabilities"369 between
the disintegrations of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia - even if they devote
only five pages of their more than 400 page-long book to Czechoslovakia. Generally
speaking, "[t]he formation of two new [Czech and Slovak] states, in 1993, can be seen as the
height of the disintegration of Austria-Hungary into nation-states ; this event could only take
place after the collapse of the Eastern bloc. According to this interpretation, it is then a
normal stage in the emancipation of minority ethnic groups...The break-up of the Czech and
Slovak federative republic...can be considered, in the context of the increasing relevance of
the ethnic factor since 150 years, as an expression of one of the 'mega-trends': the
mobilization of ethnic groups which do not hesitate to take risks"370
Several external factors could at first sight be seen to have accelerated the process of
dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia provoked a
frenzy of declarations of sovereignty (started by Lithuania in March 1990, followed by
Georgia in April 1991, Croatia and Slovenia in June, Tadjikistan, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine,
Belarus, Azerba'fdjan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August, Armenia and Moldova in
September, Turkmenistan in October and finally Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia in
1992)371 and it seems difficult to believe that these events had no impact on Czech, and
especially, Slovak elites.
Certain statements of Slovak politicians show how events in Yugoslavia, and to a lesser
extent in the USSR, may have acted as examples for Slovakia. Meciar's contention in July
1991 that "the struggle of the Slovenes for their identity is a model for the struggle of
368stephane Pierre-Caps, La Multination: I'Avenir des Minorites en Europe centrale et Orientale, (Paris;
Editions Odile Jacob; 1995), p. 13, pp.29-30 and 43-44
369Lukic and Lynch, Europe, p.6
^^Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "Identites en transition: de la Tchecoslovaquie a la Slovaquie",
Politique etsocietes, n°28, 14e annee, automne 1995, pp.113-114
321 See Guy Hermet, Histoire des Nations et du Nationalisme en Europe (Paris; Editions du Seuil; 1996),
pp.224-225; Shehadi, "Ethnic", p.54.
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Slovakia to solve many of its painful problems"372 ancj the three-point plan that its
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia started to implement after June 1992^73 -providing for
the adoption of a Slovak Republic's declaration of sovereignty (on 17 July 1992), a Slovak
constitution taking precedence over federal laws (on 1 September) as well as the election of a
Slovak president (a post to which Michal Kovac was finally elected in February 1993)- reflect
this.
Furthermore, Jozef Prokes, chairman of the Slovak National Party, and Jan Carnogursky,
Slovak prime minister, congratulated Slovene and Croatian leaders following their
declaration of independence in June 1991374
Carnogursky, in an interview he gave one month later to the French daily Liberation
expressed his belief that
the events in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union will find their echoes here [in
Czechoslovakia], too. The Slovaks have a sense of national solidarity. But the
Czechoslovak federation is not a priority for them, on the contrary375
At the same time, the Western powers, probably drawing lessons from the failure of their
intervention in Yugoslavia, were unlikely to insist strongly on the maintenance of
Czechoslovakia, and Slovak politicians acquired the conviction that the prospect of a division
of the state would not meet with the opposition of the international community. Frantisek
Miklosko, president of the Slovak National Council (and member of Public Against Violence,
the most "federalist" Slovak political formation), acknowledged in December 1990 that
372"Compare and contrast", The Economist, July 13th 1991, p.53 ; Michael Kraus, "Returning to Europe,
separately: international factors in Czechoslovakia's dissolution, 1989-1992", in Michael Kraus and Ronald
D.Liebowitz (eds), Russia and Eastern Europe after communism: The Search for New Political, Economic, and
Security Systems (Boulder; Westview Press; 1996), p.234.
373jan Obrman, "Slovakia declares Sovereignty ; President Havel Resigns", RFE/RL Research report, vol. 1,
n°31, 31 July 1992, p.25.
374jy[ary Hockaday, "Separatism stirring in a rural backwater", The Independent, 26 June 1991; Rick Fawn
and James Mayall, "Recognition, self-determination and secession in Post-Cold War international society"in
Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (ed.), International society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order
Reconsidered (Basingstoke and London; Macmillan; 1996), p.204.
-3T'5Interview in Liberation, quoted in M.Kraus, "Returning", p.234.
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[t]he movements of disintegration in the USSR and Yugoslavia strongly influence our
consciences, and one should not underestimate the effect that Slovenia's independence
would have. I can imagine quite easily the West, after being faced with the fait
accompli of Yugoslav disintegration, renouncing its hostility towards the changes of
borders in post-communist Europe376_
As seen earlier, the West also had a more indirect influence, since solving the "national" issue
was expected, particularly by the Czechs, to trigger a new wave of foreign investments:
Czechoslovakia had been lagging significantly behind Hungary and Poland in this respect
since 1989, allegedly to a large extent because of the uncertainties resulting from the
protracted negotiations between the Czech and Slovak leaders.
Meciar, Carnogursky, Miklosko and Prokes's claims would hence suggest that the "Soviet and
Yugoslav disintegrations and the rise of the successor states provided further ammunition for
the arguments of Slovak confederalists and separatists that national self-determination
required the creation of an independent Slovak state"377
Yet, the impact of the fall of Yugoslavia on Czechoslovakia was ambiguous, and more likely
to act as an incentive toward moderation than as a role model. As Rupnik put it,
[t]hough the division of Yugoslavia might, in its early stages (until June 1991), have
inspired some advocates of Slovak independence, the violence and war which
followed have if anything been a deterrent or a moderating influence on the
protagonists of the Czech-Slovak divorce. The Yugoslav counter-example has no
doubt made them aware of the risks involved and thus contributed to its peaceful and
negotiated outcome378_
Confronted with these evidence, it seems difficult to give much credit to the view that the end
of Czechoslovakia was conditioned by the international environment. The external influence
376s0phie Shihab, "La Crise de la Federation Tchecoslovaque", Le Monde, 29 December 1990
377M.Kraus, "Returning", p.234
•^^Rupnik, "jhe international context", p.273.
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on the break-up of the state was only limited and should not be overestimated: the
international community conditioned the nature of the break-up more than the break-up itself.
Czech and, to a lesser extent Slovak, politicians appeared concerned with their international
"image", and tried to mitigate the effects of a divorce (even "velvet") which undoubtedly
tarnished the reputation of Czechoslovakia as a model for all the other countries of Eastern
Europe. The sometimes unrestrained admiration of the West because of the "velvet
revolution"379 (referred to as the "kinder, gentler revolution"380; the "glorious"381 or the
"most delightful of all...Central European revolutions'^ 82^ $oon gave way to a badly
disguised disappointment where the only, limited, consolation was often something of the
type "at least, they did not fight like the Serbs and the Croats". Typical of Western European
attitudes were the reactions of M. Pinheiro, the spokeman of the European Community,
which declared on June 1992, after the parliamentary elections which sealed the fate of the
common state, that "the aim should be integration rather than disintegration"383 or 0f Alain
Lamassoure, the French minister for European affairs, which observed that "[i]t is paradoxical
that commercial barriers are being erected between Bohemia and Slovakia...at the very
moment when we are considering doing away with them between the EC and these
countries"3 84
In order to assuage the worries of the international community and especially not to
compromise the transfer of the association agreement signed by Czechoslovakia with the
European Community to the new states, Czech and Slovak leaders attempted to establish their
3^^For a full account of the events of November 1989 in Czechoslovakia, see: John F.N Bradley,
Czechoslovakia's velvet revolution, a political analysis (Boulder, East European Monographs; New York;
Columbia University Press; 1992); Michal Andrew Kukral, Prague 1989: Theater ofRevolution, A Study in
Humanistic Political Geography (Boulder, East European Monographs; New York, Columbia University Press;
1997); Luers, "Czechoslovakia's road to revolution"; Bernard Wheaton and Zdenek Kavan, The velvet
revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991 (Boulder; Westview Press; 1992).
380j.F Brown, Surge to Freedom: The End ofCommunist Ride in Eastern Europe (Durham NC; Duke
University Press; 1991), pp. 149-179.
38lMisha Glenny, The Rebirth ofhistory: Eastern Europe in the age ofdemocracy (London; Penguin; 1990),
p.22-49
3^2(3arton Ash, We the People, pp.78-79
-^Rupmk, "The international context", p.276.
^^Le Monde, 15 April 1993, quoted in Rupnik, ibid., p.276.
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credentials by, for example, negotiating the establishment of a customs union and the
maintenance of a common currency between the Czech and the Slovak republics^^.
However, the common currency only survived the Czechoslovak state by six weeks^86 and
the association agreements had to be renegotiated, which delayed their concrete
implementation, especially compared to Poland and Hungary387
The redefinition of security after the end of the Cold War and globalisation:
implications for Czech and Slovak nationhood
More than in the "contagion effect" of the post-1989 East European events, the
"international" roots of the Czecho-slovak break-up have to be found in a broader analysis of
the shift in the international system. In a study of the dynamic of secession, Viva Ona Bartkus
argues that "a gradual transformation of the international system has moderated the traditional
security and economic benefits of integration into a large state"388_
Security is "an essentially disputed concept"389# which tends to escape easy definition and
was often seen during the Cold War in purely military terms. The international system tended
to be by nature profoundly hostile to small nations, unable to ensure their physical survival
without becoming constituent parts of larger states. Small nations in the middle of one of the
most disputed areas of Europe, Czechs and Slovaks have had in the twentieth century to be
faced with the ineluctable military superiority of their German - in 1938/39 - and Russian
(Soviet) - in 1968- neighbours.
385see for example Judy Batt, Czechoslovakia in transition: From Federation to Separation (London; The
Royal Institute of International affairs, discussion paper n°65; 1996), pp.26-27.
386jifi Pehe, "The Czech-Slovak currency split", RFE/RL, Research report, vol.2, n°10, 5 March 1993,
pp.27-32; Dedek, The Break-up, pp.117-142.
3^Leff. The Czech, p.256. The renegotiated agreements went into effect on 1 February 1995 (Jin Pehe, "The
choice between Europe and provincialism", Transition, 14 July 1995, p. 15).
388viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic ofSecession (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1999),
p.22
-^9Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agendafor International Security Studies in the Post-Cold
War Era (New York, Toronto; Harvester Wheatsheaf; 1991, 2nd edition), p.7
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Czechoslovakia was undoubtedly a small state^^O^ but both the Czech republic with its 10.3
million inhabitants and Slovakia with its 5.3 millions appear even smaller in relation with
immediate neighbours such as Poland (38.6 millions), Ukraine (51.8 millions) and Germany
(80.9 millions), and this even if they can compare with countries such as Hungary (10.2
millions) or Austria (7.9 millions)391.
However, the end of the Cold War provoked a change in the definition of security and has
been characterised by the loss of salience of military issues^92 por Czechs and Slovaks, this
meant that the two nations could claim a place in the international community with better
security insurances than ever before393
Most importantly, small states can now hope to ensure their security through defence
guarantees provided by organisations of collective security such as NATO. Thus, Josef Ktrba,
a member of Klaus's Civic Democratic Party, argued in June 1992 that
the borders here [i.e, in the Czech Republic] are stable. There are some (unfounded)
fears of German claims, but the cooperation with NATO and the European
Community is, in view of these demands, a much more efficient defence than an
unstable confederal partner [i.e, Slovakia]394
^ ^Gabriel Sheffer for instance defines a small state as a state with a population of "up to 15 million
inhabitants" (Gabriel Sheffer, "The Security of Small States: A Counter Neo-Realist Argument", in Efraim Inbar
and Gabriel Sheffer (eds), The National Security ofSmall States in a Changing World (London, Portland; Frank
Cass; 1997), p. 10.
391 Figures in Financial Times, Thursday July 17 1997, p.3; The military balance 1994-1995 (London;
International Institute for Strategic studies; 1994; pp.49-52, 80-81, 103-105) (for Austria, Germany, Ukraine)
392However, some scholars, mainly in the realist stream of thought, insist on the lasting salience of military
power (cf for example John Garnett, Contemporary strategy, 2nd edition; London; Croom Helm; 1987; pp.71-
90, as reproduced in Richard Little and Michael Smith (ed.), Perspectives on World Polities', London, New
York; Routledge; 1991; pp.69-83). For a general discussion, see Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, "Contending
philosophies about security in Europe", in Colin Mclnnes (ed.), Security and Strategy in the New Europe
(London, New York; Routledge; 1992), pp.21-23.
has been argued that during the Cold War, small states were able to play one great power against the
other to their advantage, but the experience of Czechoslovakia, assigned after the Yalta and Postdam
conferences to the Soviet sphere of influence, contradicts this.
394Josef Ktrba, "Not to a confederation", The Prague Post, 23-29 June 1992, p.12, quoted in Wehrle, Le
Divorce, p.36.
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The diminishing relevance of military issues considerably decreased the cost of separation
and lessened the value of Czechoslovakia as a state and security-provider. This made the
establishment of two separate Czech and Slovak nation-states viable.
Less and less military, security is fast becoming more and more economic.
This is especially relevant to the Czechoslovak context, and the previous chapter has shown
that economic debates were at the core of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The economic
advantages of the common state for the Czechs and Slovaks were long perceived to outweigh
its disadvantages - and this, despite the occasional Slovak accusations of internal colonialism
and the reciprocal Czech complaints of Slovak ingratitude. However, in a world which
becomes more and more "global", small states increasingly become a credible and even
attractive economic proposition. The Czech leadership largely played up the economic risk of
maintaining an union with the more "backward" Slovaks, and the Slovaks argued that
becoming independent would allow the adoption of economic policies more sensitive to
national economic interests.
The technological revolution has changed the rules of the game and reduced the role of "size"
as a measure of the economic potential of a country:
[t]he emergence of supra-national institutions and concerns, the progress of
information science and the ongoing convergence of general codes of behaviour, the
penetration of countless links, the environment problem -all this creates an inter¬
dependent model of international relations. Economic and social globalization is
inevitably reflected in international politics. In this 'new' world, where mere physical
strength no longer plays such a pronounced role, a smaller state can find it easier to
assert itself and to stand out395_
395otto Pick, "The Czech republic in the world", Perspectives, n°8, summer 1997 (Institute of International
relations, Prague), p. 10.
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As Peter J. Katzenstein demonstrated, notions such as economies of scale and scope are now
rendered obsolete by concepts such as flexibility or capacity of innovation.396 jn statecraft
just as in marketing, "small is beautiful" (and one feels tempted to add, "fashionable").
Provided the models for the new Czech and Slovak republics are countries such as Austria,
Switzerland, or the Scandinavian states, this could be a factor favouring the establishment of
two independent states in place of the former Czechoslovak federation . The successor states
of Czechoslovakia benefit from a highly skilled and educated workforce, especially at the
technical and scientific level397; an(] this could further enhance their claims to prosperity, at
least on the long run398
From a political point of view, globalisation ("a social process in which the constraints of
geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become
increasingly aware that they are receding")399 has also introduced new elements facilitating
the independence of the Czech republic and Slovakia.
The global has reinforced the national at the expense of the state, and the somewhat
paradoxical links established by Czech and Slovak politicians between the advocacy of
autonomy and/or independence and the ideal of the "return to Europe" have to be understood
in this context. More specifically, the European Community (later, European Union) became,
as Pavel Baev put it, a centre of gravity for secessionist movements^OO.
396peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca and London;
Cornell University Press; 1985). See also chapter 3; Josef C.Brada, "Breaking up", pp.17-31; Michael Keating,
Nations Against State: The New Politics ofNationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland (London and
Basingstoke; Macmillan Press; 1996), p.57.
397pick? "Khe Czech", p. 10; Dusan Novotny, Une dangereuse meprise ou comment la Republique Tcheque,
le meilleur eleve de Moscou, est devenue le vrai-faux meilleur eleve de I'Occident (Paris; Gil Wern Editions;
1996), pp.14, 33-34, 132-134; Sharon Wolchik, "The Czech Republic and Slovakia", in Zoltan Barany and Ivan
Volgyes (eds), The legacies ofcommunism in Eastern Europe (Baltimore; The John Hopkins University Press;
1995), p.173.
398]- yen if one could argue that the economic orientation taken by the two successor states still relies far too
heavily on traditional, often non-modernised or non-restructured economic sectors, such as mechanical or steel
industry in Slovakia (Adrian Smith, "L'atout regional", Politique Internationale (special issue on Slovakia),
n°78, Hiver 1997-1998, pp.66-67). Dusan Novotny, in its iconoclastic assessment of the post-communist Czech
republic, contends that the necessary restructurings have not been made yet (Une dangereuse, .pp.115-116). See
also "Klaus eats humble pie", Business Week, June 16 1997, pp.22-23).
399jy[alcom Waters, Globalization (London and New York; Routledge; 1995), p.3
400pavej K Baev, Russia's Policies in Secessionist Conflicts in Europe in the 1990s (Oslo; The Norwegian
Atlantic Committee; Security Policy Library n°l 1/1998,), p.5 and 12.
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Typical of this changing outlook is for instance Carnogursky 's declaration in the first
semester of 1990 that Slovakia "would rather meet the challenge of [European] integration as
an autonomous entity than through Czechoslovakia's mediation" and should aim by 2000 to
have its own European "star" and grow into "a sovereign and equal" entity^. Similarly,
Jozef Horsky, deputy chairman of the Slovak National party, declared that "[Slovaks] want to
enter the EC as an independent, sovereign state with no commitments to Prague"402 Meciar
contended in September 1991 that "the time has come for the Slovak Republic to demand its
right to self-determination and achieve sovereignty", adding that "[postponing this matter is
a grave political mistake that will leave Slovakia outside an integrated Europe"403
Slovak attitudes were strikingly reminiscent of the strategies of other "secessionist"
movements such as the Basque National Party (whose leader, Xabier Arzallus keeps in his
office an EU flag with thirteen stars and contends that the Basques "can find [their] way to
Europe not through Spain, but as Basques)404 or the Scottish National Party (which purports
to establish "Scotland in Europe")405 Yet there is a major difference between autonomist or
regionalist movements in Western Europe and Czech and Slovak separatist rhetoric. The
dialectic fragmentation of a state/integration into a supra-national European Union was even
more fatal in Czechoslovakia than anywhere else, for at least two reasons.
Firsly, the Czechoslovak state was of course a recent political construction in comparison to
Spain, the United Kingdom or even Germany and Italy.
Secondly, in a globalised world economy, Czechoslovakia had become too small to affect
terms of trade and the attraction of union for Czechs and Slovaks was thus considerably
reduced. The cost of secession from countries such as France, Germany or the United
Kingdom, who still command "comparatively influential positions vis-a-vis their trading
Peter Martin, "The hyphen controversy", RFE/RL, April 20 1990, vol. 1, n°16, p. 17; Theodore Draper,
"The end of Czechoslovakia", The New York review ofBooks, 28 January 1993, p.22
402xerenCe Roth, "Nationalist Fervor Gains Among Slovaks", Wall Street Journal, 20/11/90.
402f)uoted in Jan Obrman, "Further Discussions on the Future of the Federation", Radio Free Europe,
September 20, 1991, pp.8-9.
404Bartkus, The Dynamic, p. 198; David Sadler, "The State Level: The Nation-State in Europe, east and
west", in G. Wyn Rees (ed.), International Politics in Europe: The New Agenda (London, New York;
Routledge; 1993), p.46.
4®5Edward Mortimer, "Scotland on the Danube river", Financial Times, 6 November 1991
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partners" (and have a decisive impact on EU policies) is far higher than the cost of leaving
Czechoslovakia^^
"Returning to Europe" consequently implied for the Slovaks the accession to independence,
and was a condition of it. As Meciar made clear,
[wjhat is being decided at the end of the 20th century in Europe is the question of
which nations will remain merely regional nations, and which will become state-
creating nations. The Slovaks wish to become a state-creating nation407
According to Emil Komarik, "states alone are accepted into Europe and if we do not get in it
as a State, we will have the same legal status as the Gypsies"408 This somewhat
schizophrenic confusion between the advocacy of a logic of disintegration (the need to divide
the Czechoslovak state to achieve independent statehood) and a logic of integration (the
ultimate goal to go "back to Europe") is problematic and bound to negatively affect the
process of definition of the Slovak "national interests", indispensable to the elaboration of a
coherent foreign policy.
Another Slovak argument was the need for international recognition and "visibility".
Characteristically, on 19 November 1989, two days after the beginning of the "velvet
revolution", the British newspaper Sunday Telegraph published an article entitled "Czechs'
last show trial proves a crowd-puller". Perhaps to the surprise of the more attentive reader, the
trial to which the article was referring did not however take place in Prague and no Czech was
standing in the dock: the "Czechs' show trial" was the trial in front of a Bratislava court of
five prominent Slovak dissidents. This example, in itself insignificant, was nevertheless
illustrative of the assimilation of "Czechoslovak" to "Czech", and the ignorance of the
external world vis-a-vis Slovakia became a highly symbolic and emotional issue. "Just as
^O^Bartkus, The Dynamic, pp.176 and 196.
407qUOtecj in M.Kraus, "Returning", p.241.
408"Federalne tahanice", Slovensky narod, 29/1990, 1 December 1990, quoted in Stanislav J.Kirschbaum,
"Les Slovaques et le droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-memes: a la recherche d'une solution", in Andre Liebich
and Andre Reszler (eds), L'Europe centrale et ses minorites: vers une solution europeenne (Paris; Presses
Universitaires de France; 1993), p.99.
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Scotsmen and Welshmen resent being called English, many Slovaks objected to the way
Czech was used both in the Czech Lands and internationally as an abbreviation for
Czechoslovak", and the electoral platform of Public Against Violence significantly stated in
1990 that
in the interest of both partners, it is important to make sure that "Czech" is not
identified with "Czecho-Slovak", but that like "Slovak" in "Czecho-Slovak" it only
makes up a parf409
It explains why Slovak deputies in the Federal Assembly launched the "hyphen war" or why
the Slovak government unilaterally established in June 1990 a Commission on Foreign Policy
(which later became a full-fledged ministry for International Relations led by Milan Knazko,
an influential political figure). The Czech government subsequently created its own office for
international affairs in March 1992, but the range of its activities remained far less developed
than its Slovak counterpart, which disposed from a budget nine times more important and
already counted by early 1992 over 90 staff members^lO.
Generally therefore, the international environment appeared more supportive than ever to
Czech and Slovak aspirations to independence. The decline of the relevance in security terms
of the idea of territorial integrity also made it easier for the (if only numerically) dominant
Czechs to accept the "amputation" of the Czechoslovak state^l 1 and Vladimir Reisky argues
that the Czechs were too inhibited by the concept of self-determination to campaign against
Slovak independence^^ Furthermore, the apparent absence of hostile foreign
^O^Koordinacne centrum hnutia Verejnost' proti nasilu, Sanca pre Slovensko , Bratislava 1990, p.6 quoted in
Sigurd Hilde, "Slovak Nationalism", p.654.
410M.Rraus, "Returning", pp.237-239.
41 ^See for instance Ola Tunander, "Post-Cold War Europe: Synthesis of a Bipolar Friend-Foe Structure and
a Hierarchic Cosmos-Chaos Structure ?", in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev and Victoria Ingrid Einagel (eds),
Geopolics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory And Identity (London, Thousand Oaks; SAGE Publications;
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo; 1997), p.34.
412Vladimir Reisky, "Identity Crisis in the Czech Republic", in Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), Revolutions in
Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R: Promises vs. Practical Morality (London, New York; Lanham, University
Press of America; 1995), p.lll
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("great power") involvement in the ethnopolitics of Czechoslovakia was a rare occurrence in
a region traditionally bitterly disputed.
The break-up of Czechoslovakia in the light of Czech and Slovak "national interests"
It appears however necessary at this stage to turn to a more specific analysis of the case for
the division from the Slovak and Czech standpoints. Czech and Slovak elites, purporting to
defend the "national interests", exploited the changing international environment to put
forward a more or less explicitly secessionist agenda^!3
If the national interest is "a set of strategic requirements of the state based on its geographic
situation, historical experience and on its relations to other centers of power"414? after 1989,
given the absence of external constraints, the pragmatic considerations (examined in the first
chapter) at the roots of the merging of the two nations in a common state in 1918 suddenly
looked increasingly irrelevant, and indeed unsustainable in the post Cold War world.
The Slovak standpoint
In 1967, Rapant argued that
[the Slovaks] are a small nation who could stay alive, and which will stay alive in the
future, only if it continues a cautious policy and carefully chooses its partners, at least
for as long as the international law does not develop to the point at which the
^l^The role of the elites is examined in more details in chapters 6 and 7.
4 '"^Oskar Krejci, Czechoslovak national interests: a historical survey ofCzechoslovak national interests and
reflections on the demise ofCzechoslovak communism (Boulder, East European Monographs; New York,
Columbia University Press; 1996), p. 19. For a realist perspective on the notion of "national interest", see W.
David Clinton, "The national interest: normative foundations", The review ofpolitics (Notre Dame), vol.48, n°4,
1986, pp.495-519.
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independent existence could be both guaranted and effectively ensured for the smaller
nations^
After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, partly thanks to the systemic changes in the
international system examined earlier, many felt that there was at last a genuine historical
chance for the Slovak nation to achieve statehood on its own and become for the first time
"visible" on the international stage.
According to nationalistically-oriented Slovak intellectuals such as Jozef Mikus^l", Stanislav
Kirschbaum4175 Milan Durica or Matus Kucera^l^ the achievement of independence in
January 1993 was the long-awaited and logical re-establishment of a Slovak state in Europe.
The use of the word "re-establishment" is significant, since it supported the (dubious)419
claim that the Great Moravian empire, which collapsed under Magyar invasion in the ninth
century, was the first Slovak state.
Behind this sense of "history", two ambiguities lie at the core of the Slovak definition of the
"national interest".
The first problem is the dialectic fragmentation/integration considered earlier, the second, the
avowed dream of many Slovak politicians to make from their country a "bridge"420 between
the Western and the Slavic world^21.
4^Daniel Rapant, " Slovaci v dejinach", pp.28-38, quoted in Wehrle, Le divorce, pp.26-27.
^' ^Joseph A.Mikus, la Slovaquie dans le drame de I'Europe: histoirepolitique de 1918 a 1950 (Paris; Les
lies d'Or; 1955), p. 16; see also Joseph A. Mikus and Renee Perreal, La Slovaquie: une nation au coeur de
I'Europe (Lausanne; L'Age d'Homme; 1992).
^l^Stanislav J.Kirschbaum, Slovaques et Tcheques, pp.34-41
Matus Kucera, "Quand l'histoire nous rapproche", Politique internationale, n°78, winter 1997-1998
(special issue on Slovakia), pp.32-33.
419por a refutation of the view of Great Moravia as a purely Slovak state, see for example Bernard Michel,
"Les racines historiques de l'independance slovaque", Revue d'Europe Centrale, tome 1, n°2, 2nd semester
1993 (special issue on the end of Czechoslovakia), p. 121 ; R.W Seton-Watson, A history ofthe Czechs and
Slovaks, pp.12-14 and 250 ; William V. Wallace, Czechoslovakia (London; Ernest Benn; 1977), pp.1-2.
420§ee for example Jeffrey Simon, "Czechoslovakia's 'velvet divorce'", p.482-486.
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The idea of a "bridge" was already entertained for Czechoslovakia by Benes during World
War II until it proved unsustainable in front of Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe, and came
effectively to an end during the Prague coup in February 1948^22 jan Masaryk, son of the
"president-liberator" and foreign minister from 1945 to 1948, once remarked that, while in
peace time a bridge is full of traffic jams, in war time, it is the first thing that gets blown
up423. The notion of bridge is superficial and no more realistic nowadays than in 1945-1948
- and this even if Slovakia does not face any immediate or obvious security threats at the
moment (notably, Vaclav Klaus rejected the notion of a "bridge" as far as Czech national
interests were concerned and was adamant on the unambiguous link of the state with the
West424).
Slovakia has some legitimate interests in the maintenance of political and especially
economic relations with its eastern neighbours like Russia and Ukraine, but it is only one part
of a broader picture. The Slovak elite, since the last century and the beginnings of the Slovak
national "awakening", has always tended to be split in two, between the Westemisers and the
more Slavophile-oriented leaders. Jeffrey Simon pointed out the contradictions between "two
competing security visions", one "western" (whose main representant was the former foreign
minister Milan Knazko) and one "eastern", which often supported the idea of a Slovak
"neutrality"425
42lHelene Carrere d'Encausse, "La Slovaquie et l'Europe", Politique Internationale, n°78, Winter 1997-98,
p.21. The idea is also entertained in Ukraine, for instance (see Anna Reid, Borderland: A Journey Through the
History of Ukraine', London; Phoenix; 1998; p.229).
422cf for exampie ias Memoirs {Memoirs ofDr Eduard Benes, pp.281-286). To be fair, Frantisek Palacky
already argued in his History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia that the Czech lands were "a bridge
between Germandom and Slavdom, between the East and West in Europe in general" {Dejiny naroda ceskeho v
Cechach a na A/orave,l 848, 1876 edn, p.3, quoted in Peter Bugge, "The Use of the Middle: Mitteleuropa vs.
Stredni Evropa", European Review ofHistory, vol.6, n°l, Spring 1999, p.20)
423Mares, Histoire, p.312 ; Zbynek Zeman, The Masaryks : The Making ofCzechoslovakia (London;
Weidenfeld and Nicolson; 1976), p. 197.
^^Batt, Czecho-Slovakia in transition, p.28.
425j.Simon, "Czechoslovakia's 'velvet divorce'", p.485.
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The Czech standpoint
As in Slovakia, many Czech politicians, especially within the Civic democratic Party,
considered that the post-Cold war international environment made possible the independent
existence of the Czech Republic.
The Czech elite was increasingly prepared to accept the division of the federation and the
establishment of a homogenous Czech state since Slovakia was perceived as a burden, which
would prevent the Czechs from managing a quick and smooth "return to Europe": as
indicated in chapter 2, reasoning such as "alone to Europe or together in the Balkans" became
widespread in Czech media. It was assumed that the Czechs did not need anymore to
accommodate Slovak "national interests" and could start to define their own Czech interests,
perceived as different from the Czechoslovak "state interests":
[t]he insurance policy Slovakia offered the Czechs at Versailles turned out to be the
time bomb of 1939, a determining factor in the post-1968 normalization, and
eventually the key to the 1993 disintegration426
As opposed to Slovak leaders, Czech politicians and elites unambiguously defined the
(re)integration to the West as their absolute priority.
Several reasons could explain this major difference of orientations between Czech and Slovak
foreign policies: the distinct economic conditions and, above all, political cultures, were
reflected in a divergent definition of the national interests of the two nations. However, as the
chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation tried to make clear, one should probably look for another
explanation: the next section shows how, on concrete issues, Czech and Slovak national
interests began to clash after 1989.
42(>Caroline Bayard, "The changing character of the Prague intelligentsia", Telos, N° 94, Winter 1993-1994,
p.141. See also Leff, National conflict, p.275.
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The impossibility for Czechs and Slovaks to define a common security agenda
after 1989 ?
In the post-communist era, the "national interests" of the Czechs and Slovaks were probably
too contradictory to allow them to agree easily on the specific "state interests" of a
Czechoslovak state. The international environment thus significantly contributed to reinforce
the political-cultural and economic divides between the two nations.
The best example of this is the controversy surrounding the "ethical" decision of the first
post-communist Czechoslovak foreign minister Jin Dienstbier to halt arms exports. He
announced in January 1990 to the New York Times that "Czechoslovakia will simply end its
trade in arms without taking into account what the pragmatists will say"427_ a position that
was bound to severely affect the arms industry, mostly based in Slovakia and was heavily
criticised by Slovak leaders^28 jn the spring of 1991, the sale by the Slovak government of
T-72 tanks to Syria provoked a debate between the federal and the Slovak republican
authorities, but in April, the Czechoslovak government agreed to back down, when during an
offical visit to Israel, Marian Calfa, the federal prime minister and himself a Slovak, declared
that
[t]anks are the same kind of goods as anything else and one of the few products we
can sell in the world. This is why we are going to sell to anybody^29
427The New York Times, 25 January 1990 (quoted in Kraus, "Returning", p.227)
428§ee Chapter 3 for more informations on the economic consequences of the decision; See also Martin
Plichta, "La Tchecoslovaquie relance ses exportations d'armes", Le Monde, 17 January 1991; Jacqueline
Henard, "Was versteht ein Minister aus Prag von Panzertechnik ?", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June
1991.
429susan Greenberg, "Minister grapples with tank-makers in lion's den", The Guardian, 7 April 1991 ; See
also Peter Martin, "Economic reform and Slovakia", RFE/RL, July 5 1991, vol.2, N°27, pp.10 and 13 ; Michael
Kraus, op.cit., pp.227-228 ; Paulina Bren, "Converting military industries: conversion slows down as Czechs
and Slovaks part", RFE/RL, vol.1, n°32, 14 August 1992, pp.38-43.
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In this context, chapter 3 shed light on the separate economic interests of Czechs and Slovaks
but the two nations also have different interests (and therefore foreign policies) because, to
put it pragmatically, they find themselves in different strategic and geopolitical situations.
From a geographic point of view, the creation of a new border between the Czech and the
Slovak republics has some concrete -and opposite- implications for the prospects of the new
states.
The Czech Republic, which has 62 percent of its 1300-border with Germany and Austria,
seems in a more favourable position than Slovakia, which shares only 5,9 percent of its
border with a Western country (Austria). As Jeffrey Simon concludes, after the separation
with Slovakia, "the Czech republic's ties to the West have been significantly enhanced"430
For more than four decades, Czech and Slovak relations were indeed constrained by Soviet
domination and separation was not an option. It would have faced the opposition of the
Soviet Union, which had already in 1945 put an end to the calls of some Slovak communists
(such as Julius Duris and especially Jan Osoha) for the creation of a Slovak Socialist republic
part of the USSR or an independent "Soviet" ("Red") Slovakia431.
By 1989, however, the velvet revolution was largely staged as a show of Czech and Slovak
unity against communism, now perceived as a Soviet/Russian import, and the former Big
Brother432 had lost its ability to inspire fear. One of the first concerns of the post-communist
Czechoslovak foreign policy was to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the state,
and the last Soviet soldier eventually left Czechoslovakia in June 1991433 \s President
Flavel declared in an address to a joint session of the US Congress in February 1990, the
Czechs and the Slovaks have a vital interest in the establishment and the maintenance of
430jSimon, "Czechoslovakia's 'velvet divorce'", pp.483-486.
431 See for instance Jelinek, The Lustfor Power, pp.35-77; Zdenek L.Suda, Zealots and Rebels: A History of
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Stanford; Stanford University; 1980), p.160 and 169.
432§ee Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Le GrandFrere: L'Union Sovietique et VEurope Sovietisee (Paris;
Flammarion; 1983).
433-fhe "temporary" presence of Soviet forces on Czechoslovak territory was officially formalised by a
bilateral treaty on 16 October 1968 (see text of the agreement in Jaromir Navratil (ed.), The Prague Spring
1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, Budapest; Central European University Press; 1998),
pp.533-536).
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democracy in Russia^34 This was dramatically confirmed at the occasion of the failed putsch
of August 1991, but the Soviet Union and its most important successor state, Russia, were no
longer perceived by Czechs and Slovaks as constituting an immediate security threat in
military terms435_
In line with the post-Cold War redefinition of security, the risk of more indirect menaces was
nevertheless taken seriously. Were the countries of the former Soviet bloc to fall into a
political and economic chaos, given their geographical positions and their relatively
favourable economic conditions, Czechs and Slovaks were prepared to face important
immigration waves of refugees. The Czechoslovak government estimated in December 1990
that from one to eight million citizens of the former Soviet Union could flood into the country
and represent a serious economic threat to Czech and Slovak security436 Czechoslovak
policy-makers were also concerned about the country becoming a transit route in the
international drug trade (according to some estimates, in 1991, between 80 and 85 percent of
drugs for Western Europe transited via the Czech and Slovak Federative republic437)
The international environment had thus by 1989 considerably changed for Czechs and
Slovaks, even if in some respects, the legacy of the past was a decisive element of the break¬
up -especially as far as Czech-German and Slovak-Hungarian relations are concerned.
434vaCiav Havel's address to the United States Congress, Washington, 21 February 1990, quoted in Wehrle,
Le Divorce,p.24.
435in January 1992, Eugen Gindl, a founder ofPublic Against Violence, however expressed his concern
about the independence of Ukraine, arguing that "[t]he emergence of Ukraine is the strongest argument against
an independent Slovakia" (Nick Thorpe, "Hopes for Slovak independence fall as Ukraine rises", The Observer,
2 January 1992).
436pmncis Harris, "Soviet border to stay shut until spring", The Daily Telegraph, 06/12/1990 ; Peter Green,
"Czechoslovakia braces itself for invasion of Soviet migrants", The Times, 24/12/1990, p.6 ; Reuter, 18
December 1990 ("Czechoslovaks fear refugee wave, increase Soviet border guards")and 30 December 1990
("Czechoslovakia expects transit of one million Soviet refugees"). The migration never however became the
threat that was anticipated (Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed : Nationhood and the National Question in
the New Europe] Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1996; p. 150; Jan Urban, "The Czech and Slovak
Republics", p. 116). As an aside, it should be reminded that, during the interwar period, the democratic First
republic had attracted a significant number of refugees from the oppressive German, Hungarian and Soviet
regimes.
437ln,stitute for International Relations (Prague), Czech national interests: contribution to a discussion
(1993), p.49
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Back to the past ?
Most significantly, the end of the Cold War had an adverse impact on Czech-Slovak relations,
because Czechs and Slovaks went back to their traditional foes - respectively Germany and
Hungary.
This further emphasized the two nations's divergent priorities, ■' "impinged upon and
complicated their mutual relationship inside the federation as well"438_
The Czechs and reunified Germany
The Czechs have been associated during seven decades with the Slovaks but the nation with
whom the Czechs have been far more often linked throughout their history is undeniably
Germany. The history of the Czech nation has often been taken to mean the history of the
struggle of the Czechs to assert their identity in front of German power and Drang nach
Osten. This reading of Czech history, for example developed by Frantisek Palacky439?
appears of course somewhat unilateral and has had to face the criticism of other eminent
scholars such as Josef Pekaf440? force is to admit that the relations of the Czechs with
their bigger and more powerful neighbours are a constant in Czech history. In Vaclav Havel's
words,
[0]ur [the Czechs] relationship to Germany and the Germans has been more than
merely one of the themes of our diplomacy. It has been a part of our destiny, even a
part of our identity. Germany has been our inspiration as well as our pain; a source of
understandable traumas, of many prejudices and misconceptions, as well as of the
standards to which we turn: some regard Germany as our greatest hope, others as our
^^M.Kraus, "Returning", p.230.
43 9Adrian Hyde-Price, The internationalpolitics ofEast Central Europe (Manchester, New York;
Manchester University Press; 1996), p.206
440on these two divergent conceptions of Czech history, see chapter 2 and Ladislav Holy, The little, pp.114-
137.
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greatest peril. It can be said that the attitude they take toward Germany and the
Germans has been a factor by which the Czechs define themselves, both politically
and philosophically^ 1.
One of the prerequisites for the establishment of a Czech state in 1993 was the disparition of
"the favored bogeyman before 1918 - fear of the Germans"442 an(j by 1989-1992, two factors
had led to a reassessment of the self-definition of the Czechs vis-a-vis the Germans.
Firstly, since 1945, there is no significant German minority in the Czech lands anymore443;
according to the 1991 census, there were 48,556 Germans (i.e a mere 0.47 percent of the
population) living in the republic444 This is the consequence of the decision of the
Czechoslovak authorities after World War II to expel the German minority, accused to have
been Hitler's accomplice in his design to break up the first republic. This is significant
because, in the homogenous Czech republic, such tactics could not be possible again and the
security of the state would not be dependent on the necessity to appease German
"pretensions".
Secondly, and more importantly, the perception of Germany among the Czech elite has
fundamentally changed. Germany is now a democratic state, whose Ostpolitik is based on the
establishment of peaceful and constructive relations with its smaller post-communist eastern
neighbours.
As a consequence, post-communist Czech leaders overwhelmingly favoured the development
of cooperation with Germany. Havel himself is the most-outspoken and consistent tenant of
this attitude, and his first official visit as president of Czechoslovakia was in Germany in
January 1990, where he expressed his support for German reunification, according to the
principle that "Germany can be as large as she wants to, as long as she stays democratic"445_
441 quoted jn Steve Kettle, "Burying the hatchet ?", Transition, 28 April 1995, p.26.
442gayard, "The changing p. 134.
443gatt, Czechoslovakia in Transition, p.25.
444 o. Krejci, Czechoslovak national interests, p.5
445qUOted in Hyde-Price, The International, p.207.
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However, this a priori idyllic picture hides a more disturbing reality as far as the Czechs are
concerned. Czech relations with Germany will remain asymmetrical: given the redefinition of
security seen earlier and the integration of Germany into Western structures, the military
imbalance is of decreasing relevance but economic relations are marked by a wide
disequilibrium.
Despite the Czech elite's positive attitude to Germany, concerns about the risk of German
economic "neo-colonialism" or the danger of becoming the sixth new Bundesland of the
unified German state, started to be commonly voiced among the Czech population446 an(j
opinion polls realised just before German reunification show that 45 percent of the Czechs
still perceived a united Germany as a threat to Czech security (even if 46 percent disagreed).
Similarly, 44 percent considered the unification as a threat to Europe and 29 percent believed
it to be susceptible to be a threat for the whole world447_
Germany does not present a direct and immediate threat to the security of the Czech republic
but the sheer power of the German state could have at least unintended effects on its small
eastern neighbour. The Czechs face the "risk of a possible diminution of [their] identity under
strong German influence"448 an(j break-up of Czechoslovakia has in this respect to be
regarded as a factor which has decreased the security prospects of the Czech nation. As a
publication of the Institute for International Relations in Prague remarks,
[t]he most evident features of the new geo-political situation of the Czech Republic, as
against former Czechoslovakia, is the increased potential role of the German factor in
its political, economic and cultural development.449
In a more alarmist way, Marian Calfa noted:
446\yehr]£> Le divorce, p.32. However, many Czechs also thought that "the only thing worse than being
dominated by the German economy is not being dominated by it" (quoted in Adrian Hyde-Price, ibid., p.207)
447pigUres jn q Krejci, Czechoslovak national interests, p. 175
Prague, Czech national interests, p.24
449ibid., p.53. Interestingly, the same report, quoted earlier, was thoroughly optimistic about Czech-German
relations: this would seem in fact rather characteristic of Czech ambivalence towards its Western neighbour.
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[Bjohemia has a giant economic conglomerate close to its western borders. Who
knows if there exists something stronger than the two German states, and there is
Austria at the south -all this is a Germanic territory. After all, the Czechs have their
own experiences with germanisation. In other words, the division of Czechoslovakia
in Czech lands and Slovakia is the beginning of the end for the Czech lands and
Slovakia450
It has been argued, citing the example of Canada and the United States, that asymmetry need
not be threatening^ 1. However, unlike Canadian-American relations, the relations between
Czechs and Germans are characterised by a deep historical ambivalence. Havel, during a
visit of Chancellor Kohl in Prague in February 1992, presented the French-German
reconciliation as the model to follow:
We are, Germans and us [Czechs] in front of the same problem that French and
Germans after the war. The ideas and the fruits of the work of Jean Monnet, Robert
Schuman and Konrad Adenauer must represent a source of permanent inspiration for
us...452
Yet, reconciliations, as Timothy Garton Ash pointed out, are far easier when the two nations
are of approximately equal size and, in this context, the Czech vision of Germany is bound to
be marked in the foreseable future by continuing misunderstandings and suspicions453_
450fVjarian Calfa, Mlada Fronta, 21 August 1990, p.3, quoted in F.Wehrle, Le divorce, pp.29-30.
451 James H.Wyllie, European Security in the New Political Environment: An Analysis of the Relationships
between National Interests, International Institutions and the Great Powers in post-Cold War European
security Arrangements (London and New York; Longman; 1997), p. 10. Even if anti-Americanism seems to
hold an important place in Canadian political culture (see for instance, J.L Granatstein, Yankee Go Home ?:
Canadians and Anti-Americanism', Toronto; HarperCollins; 1996; Ronald G. Landes, The Canadian Polity: A
Comparative Introduction', Scarborough; Prentice Hall Canada; third edition, 1991; pp.246-249).
452vaclav Havel, L'angoisse de la liberte (La Tour d'Aigues; Editions de l'Aube; 1994), p.218
453Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London; Vintage Books;
1994), pp.309-311; see also Lily Gardner Feldman, "The principle and practice of 'reconciliation' in German




Most importantly, Czech-German relations had a negative effect on Czech- Slovak relations,
and exacerbated tensions between the two nations.
Apart from the (unproved and probably unfounded) rumours that Germany financed Slovak
secessionist movements, the controversies which surrounded the signature of a
Czechoslovak-German treaty in 1991 and 1992 (the treaty was ultimately ratified by the
federal assembly on 22 April 1992) did little to improve Czech and Slovak relations.
Firstly, before a planned visit of the German president Richard von Weizsacker in Prague, Jan
Carnogursky and Frantisek Miklosko addressed in September 1991 a letter to Jin Diensbier
contesting one sentence of the treaty preamble which acknowledged the continuity of the
Czechoslovakia since 1918, and thus, according to Slovak leaders, repudiated Munich, but
also the legal existence of the Slovak state between 1939 and 1945:
We cannot credibly demand from today's parliament to act constitutionally, when at
the same time the constitutionality of the decisions of the past is denied.
The moves of the two Slovak leaders provoked indignation in the Czech side, and the Czech
prime minister Petr Pithart condemned the "lack of sensibility with regard to the Czech
people, which experienced under the German protectorate one of the most difficult periods of
its history, while Slovakia [the Slovaks] had it better than any other people in Europe".454
Secondly, after the signature of the treaty and his (re)election as Slovak prime minister in
June 1992, Vladimir Meciar, to the dismay of the Czechs, unilaterally proposed during talks
with Bavarian Ministerprasident Max Streibl in September, to offer compensations for
Carpathian Germans expelled from Slovakia after the Second World War^55
Finally, on 14 October 1992, when Meciar controversially declared in front of the Bundestag
that "[o]ur country [i.e, Slovakia] always did well, whenever we had good relations with
^^^Karl-Peter Schwartz, "Vertrag mit CSFR droht an Slowaken zu scheitem", Die Welt, Thursday 19
September 1991. See also Shari J.Cohen, Politics without a Past: The Absence ofHistory in postcommunist
nationalism (Durham and London; Duke University Press; 1999), pp.151-152.
^^J.Urban, "The Czech", p.107 ; The Slovak National Council had already adopted on 13 February a
forceful resolution on the Carpathian Germans, which stated that "[w]e, representatives of the free and
independent Slovakia, wish to enter into the community of nations with our accounts settled. We condemn the
principle of collective guilt, whiever arguments are used to justify it" (Lubomir Liptak, "Slovaquie : Une dette
encombrante", in Michel Korinman (ed.), L'Allemagne vue d'ailleurs; Paris; Editions Balland; 1992, p. 199).
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Germany", the Czech press pointedly reminded its readers that "the only such time in living
memory was during the Third Reich"456
Slovakia and Hungary
In the same way as the Germans could be said to be the traditional "Others" of the Czechs, the
Hungarians are undoubtedly the nation with whom the Slovaks interacted most throughout
history457_ -p^e union of the Slovaks with the Czechs in the Czechoslovak state founded in
1918 put an apparent end to these close relations between Slovaks and Magyars. However,
even during the existence of Czechoslovakia, some conflicts periodically reemerged between
the two nations. For example, during the First Republic, one of the reasons invoked by the
Czechs to refuse the granting of autonomy to Slovakia was the (altogether not unfounded)
fear that this would dangerously increase Hungarian revisionism, following the extremely
severe conditions imposed on Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon. This was further
corroborated by events such as the Tuka affair in 1929, when one of the leaders of Hlinka's
Slovak populist party was trialed and jailed following the disclosure of his contacts with the
Hungarian government^ 8
After World War II, the Czechoslovak authorities unsuccessfully tried to negotiate with the
Hungarian government a transfer to Hungary of Slovakia's Hungarian minority in exchange
for the return of part of the Hungarian Slovaks. Under the communist regime, apart from a
few incidents459? the animosity between Slovaks and Hungarians seemed to have subdued.
Therefore, the resurgence of certain trouble spots after 1989 appeared at first as a bad
456J.Urban, "The Czech", p. 107.
4^^For an account of Magyarisation, see R.W Seton-Watson (Scotus Viator), Racial, Paul, "Slovak
nationalism", pp. 115-159.
458Mamatey, "The development", pp.137-141; El Mallakh, The Slovak, pp.54-55.
4^For an account of the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia under the communist regime, see
Robert R. King, Minorities under communism: nationalities as a source of tension among Balkan communist
states (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press; 1973), pp.109-123.
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surprise: the claims of the Hungarian prime minister Jozsef Antall that he considered himself
as the prime minister and the protector of 15 millions Hungarians (Hungary having only 10
million inhabitants)460 or the emergence on the Hungarian political stage of populists such as
Istvan Csurka4615 as well as the fact that certain Slovak politicians like Vladimir Meciar or
Jan Slota, the leader of the Slovak national party, did not hesitate to play the nationalist card,
clearly did not help to build confidence between the two nations.
Most significantly, Hungarian talks of the legal possibility of border changes between
Slovakia and Hungary if the Slovaks seceded from Czechoslovakia, were common and two
major issues soon came to dominate bilateral relations between Slovakia and Hungary: the
controversy surrounding the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam, and more importantly, the question
of the fate of the 600,000-strong Hungarian minority in a Slovak nation-state, where they
constitute more than 10 percent of the population.
Like Czech-German relations, Slovak-Hungarian relations increased the tensions between
Czechs and Slovaks.
Firstly, the continuous support of Hungarian parties in Slovakia for the maintenance of the
Czechoslovak state between 1989 and 1992 (there were talks of an "incipient pro-federalist
Czech-Hungarian alliance inside Czechoslovakia")"^ an(j the suggestion of prominent
Czech politicians like Pithart that the Czech government might be able to arbitrate the
Slovak-Hungarian disputes463 was resented in Bratislava.
Secondly, the federal government of Prague was seen by the Slovaks as unwilling to react
more strongly to Hungarian claims and to defend vigourously Slovak interests464_ The
Gabcikovo issue became for instance in the eyes of many Slovaks a matter of national pride
with a deeply symbolic resonance and the perceived lukewarm character of Czech
interventions in defence of the project had an adverse effect on Czech-Slovak relations.
460sharon Fisher, "Treaty fails to end squabbles over Hungarian relations", Transition, 9 June 1995, p.2.
^^Szayna, "Ultra-nationalism", pp.535-538 and "The extreme right", pp.139-142.
462M.Kraus, "Returning", p.231.
Janusz Bugajski, Nations in turmoil: conflict and cooperation in Eastern Europe (Boulder; Westview
Press; 2nd edition, 1995), pp.80-81.
464M.Kraus,"Returning", pp.231-232.
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The divergence of Czech and Slovak national interests between 1989 and 1992 was not
historically new. The precedent of 1918, when both Czechs and Slovaks saw the creation of a
common state as the best way to further their interests, has for example to be contrasted with
1935 (when the ideologically strongly "anti-Bolshevik" Slovak nationalists campaigned
against the signature of the Czechoslovak-Soviet pact), 1938/39, 1948 (when communism
received a much stronger support in the Czech lands than in Slovakia) and 1968 (when,
following the crushing of the Prague Spring, the state became a federation).
After 1989, Czechs and Slovaks had the same avowed goal, going "back to Europe", but
chose two different roads. The velvet divorce comes as a reminder that, as Stephen Shulman
put it, "foreign ties symbolically or actually influence cultural characteristics and ethnic
consciousness within a state, and thus foreign policy becomes a key element and an object of
political contestation between groups with different visions of that identity "465
Conclusion
The previous discussion would a priori suggest that Czechoslovakia was an artificial state
held together by external pressures.
However, security considerations (like the political cultural differences and the economic
issues discussed in the previous chapters, and in spite of the rhetoric) were clearly not at the
root of the break-up in 1992. Indeed, what was striking between 1989 and 1992 is in many
respects the lack of serious discussion about the security consequences of the break-up of the
state: "neither the Czech nor the Slovak political representation paid any significant attention
to the foreign policy and security consequences of their mutual agreements or 'domestic'
arrangements"466
465Stephen Shulman, "National Integration and Foreign Policy in Multiethnic States", Nationalism and
Ethnic Politics, vol.4, n°4, Winter 1998, p.124.
466j Urban, "The Czech", p. 101.
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To be true, the "geopolitical argument" is not intrinsically flawed, since it rightly recognises
and emphasises the importance of the international environment and of geopolitical
constraints for the small nations of Central Europe such as the Czechs and Slovaks. However,
the trouble with the "geopolitical argument" is that it was often used by Czech and Slovak
politicians after 1989 to justify and legitimate the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
The security of Czechoslovakia as a state and of the Czechs and Slovaks as national entities
has always depended on the stability of the balance of power in Europe^67 The stability of
post-1989 Europe is however doubtful: the realist contention that "bipolarity, an equal
military balance, and nuclear weapons have fostered peace in Europe over the past 45 years"
and that "the demise of the Cold War order is likely to increase the chances that war and
major crises will occur in Europe"468 makes it difficult (perhaps impossible) to argue that the
split of Czechoslovakia was inevitable because of the absence of external constraints.
Without sharing the gloomy prediction of Oskar Krejci about the "death of the Czech [and the
Slovak?] nation[s]"4695 the end of Czechoslovakia nevertheless appears as a risky attempt to
escape the geographical and geopolitical determinism inherent to their position - what the
Hungarian writer Istvan Bibo once termed the "misery" of small East European nations^^O
Czech and Slovak politicians who, as chapter 6 will discuss, took to a large degree the
responsibility of the break-up of the state, forgot that, as Havel himself wrote,
[wjhether in our own State or in another, we have lived, Czechs and Slovaks, in a
situation of permanent threats and danger4^ 1.
467Alexander Ort, "Les consequences internationales de la partition", in Regourd, Etudes tchecoslovaques,
p.46.
4"°John J.Mearsheimer, "Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War", International security,
vol.15, n°l, Summer 1990, pp.51-52. For a rather different and more optimistic view, see Stephen Van Evera,
"Primed for peace: Europe after the Cold War", International security, Winter 1990-1991, vol 15, n°3, pp.7-57.
4690. Krejci, Czechoslovak national interests, p. 177.
470lstvan Bibo, Misere des Petits Etats dEurope de I'Est (Paris; Albin Michel; 1993).
471 Havel, Summer Meditations, p. 157.
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The dissolution of Czechoslovakia has not only in many ways intensified the dependence of
the Czech republic on Germany or increased the possibility of a conflict between the new
Slovakia and Hungary: it has also been a setback to the progress of Central European
integration and has tended to internationally isolate the young Slovak state, which, under
Meciar's rule, was not included in the first waves of Nato or EU enlargement. Moreover, even
the integration in these two "security-significant" organisations will not go without its
problems and might not dramatically increase Czech and Slovak security prospects. As Krejci
cynically put it, it is doubtful whether Nato members can realistically be expected "to rush to
the war with a nuclear superpower [Russia?] because of small Czech republic"472_
Membership in Nato, like membership in any other alliance, cannot always be taken as a
valuable guarantee of support in case of an external aggression: the Czechs, but also the
Slovaks, given their tragic historical experience in 1938 in Munich, are probably in a better
position than anybody else to be aware of this.
Without going as far as Kosik, who assimilates the velvet divorce to another Munich473? ft is
fair to say that political realism, in many ways an essential and integral part of the legacy of
Palacky and Masaryk^74 has been renounced by their post-communist heirs^75
Contrarily to 1938-39 - as the third part of the dissertation will aim to demonstrate (by
focusing on the institutional aspects of Czech-Slovak relations, the role of the post-
communist elites, the resurgence of nationalism, and the legacies of communism) -
Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992 for internal reasons.
472 o. Krejih, Czechoslovak national interests, p. 152.
473Kosik, "The Third Munich", pp. 145-154.
474see TG Masaryk, The making; The meaning ofCzech history (ed. by Rene Wellek; Chapel Hill; The
University of North Carolina Press; 1974). Eva Schmidt-Hartmann (Thomas G. Masaryk's Realism: Origins ofa
Czech Political Concept; Munich; R.Oldenbourg Verlag; 1984; p. 164) reminds that the "starting point of the
[realist] programme's considerations of Czech national policies was the true meaning of the slogan 'national
independence'. It considered full state independence of the Lands of the Bohemian Crowns 'impossible' because
of 'our' -no doubt meaning Czech- numerical inferiority, geographical situation and the fact that the Lands were
inhabited not only by the Czechs but also by Germans and Poles. Accordingly, an association with other nations
and countries was considered indispensable. Moreover, the programme argued that historical developments
intrinsically led to the creation of larger states which were to secure the national independence of smaller
nations".
475Kosik, "The Third Munich", p. 150. See also Antoine Mares, "Ruptures et continuites de la memoire
tcheque", Vingtieme siecle, n°36, October-December 1992, p.80.
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Elites used foreign policy to further their political (national) ambitions and the dissolution of






POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE BREAK-UP
OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
After having argued that political-cultural and economic differences between Czechs and
Slovaks, as well as the international environment, cannot explain the velvet divorce, the third
part of the dissertation suggests alternative interpretations of the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
This chapter focuses on the role of political institutions and political parties in the dissolution
of the state and contends that the institutional deadlock which followed the end of
communism substantially impeded the resolution of tensions between Czechs and Slovaks.
A first section provides a brief account of the institutions inherited from the communist era
and the implications of the federalisation of 1969.
The post-communist pluralisation of political life is examined in a second section. The
democratisation had as a consequence the establishment of a political "dualism", with the
Czech and Slovak party systems becoming polarised along different and sometimes
contradictory axes.
The following section then considers whether the use of a referendum could have saved the
Czechoslovak state, and, finally, the electoral law of 29 January 1992, which was applied to
the June 1992 parliamentary elections, is used to show how institutional choices adversely
affected Czech-Slovak relations, for instance by hindering the establishment of political
parties bridging the national divide.
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The Czechoslovak political system
Czechoslovak political institutions were created in 1918 on a centralist and unitary model. It
was only in January 1969 that the country was reorganised as a federation of two republics,
the Czech and Slovak republics.
Consequently, by the time of the velvet revolution of 1989, Czechoslovakia had a bicameral
system, with a Chamber of the People, where the principle of proportional representation
between the two republics was applied (101 Czech deputies and 49 Slovak deputies), and a
Chamber of Nations, where the Czech republic and Slovakia had equal representation (75
deputies each). A complex de facto bicameral system was applied as far as votes on major
constitutional issues or the election of the president, were concerned: in these cases, the
Chamber of Nations was divided into a Czech and a Slovak section, which both had to
approve the text. Moreover, the required majority was raised to three-fifths of the total
deputies elected in each of the Chamber of People and in each of the two sections of the
Chamber of Nations for the election of president or the adoption of constitutional laws. A
very small number of deputies (31) thus had a veto power on every major law. The guiding
principle behind the constitutional arrangement of 1969 was the prohibition of majority rule
(what the Slovaks call majorizacia): despite their demographic inferiority, the Slovaks were
to have an equal voice in state affairs.
The arrangement functioned under the Communist regime because the real power lay in the
hands of the centralised Communist Party, but it became a disruptive factor after 1989, when
Czechoslovakia had to adopt a new constitution. Somewhat paradoxically, a constitutional
arrangement originally designed to maintain the unity of the state by granting what clearly
amounted to an unequal representation in favour of Slovakia, provided the opponents of the
maintenance of Czechoslovakia with the means to break it, once the democratisation took
place. Czech and Slovak post-communist leaders recognised and agreed that the so-called
socialist constitution of 1960 and the federal amendments of 1969 could not constitute the
basis for the reestablishment of democracy, but they had deeply contradictory conceptions of
what should replace them.
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Following the parliamentary elections of June 1990, a law on the division of powers between
the federal and republican governments, which alloted the republics a significant financial
autonomy, was adopted in December 1990: taxation revenues from each republic now
remained in the republic that generated them, instead of being redistributed by the federal
authorities.476
But, after the elections of June 1992, two victorious parties with strikingly different
constitutional agendas - Vaclav Klaus's Civic Democratic Party in the Czech lands and
Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in Slovakia - had a de facto veto
power over each other, and were forced into a coalition at the federal level. As Karel Vodicka
writes, "Because of the inclusion in the Czechoslovak constitution of clauses precluding
majority rule, an uncontrollable constitutional crisis was bound to happen. After the transition
in 1989 it was only a question of time before it broke out"477
The constitutional provisions adopted under the communist regime thus provoked an
institutional deadlock, which ultimately proved fatal to the state. The next section examines
how this divide was crucially reinforced by the separation of the Czech and Slovak party
systems.
476wolchik, Czechoslovakia in transition, p.74.
477Karel Vodicka, "Koalitionsabsprache: Wir teilen den Staat ! Wahlergebnisse 1992 und deren Folgen fur
die tschechoslowakische Staatlichkeit", in Kipke and Vodicka, Abschied, p.78
Political parties and movements: the repluralisation of Czech and Slovak politics
With the collapse of communism, a genuine multiparty system reemerged in Czechoslovakia
(until 1989, the Communist party officially ruled through a "national front", but satellite
parties such as the People's Party and the Socialist Party were, with the partial exception of
the short-lived Prague Spring, completely subordinated to it).
The (re)pluralisation of Czechoslovak political life took place in two phases - a first phase
from November 1989 to June 1990, and a second phase from June 1990 to June 1992.
The first phase was dominated by the broad anti-communist movements formed immediately
after the start of the velvet revolution in November 1989: the Civic Forum in the Czech
Republic and Public Against Violence in Slovakia. The first free parliamentary elections held
on 7 and 8 June 1990 took the form of a referendum against communism and were dominated
by the two coalitions which polled 50 and 33 percent of the votes in their respective republics
(the Christian Democratic Movement proving however in Slovakia a strong contender with
19 percent of the votes).
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Czech parties % vote Seats % vote Seats % vote Seats
Civic Forum 53 68 50 50 49 127





8 9 9 7 10 22
Christian and
Democratic Union
9 9 9 6 8 19
Others 17 0 18 0 19 0




33 19 37 33 29 48
Christian Democratic
Movement
19 11 17 14 19 31
Communist Party 14 8 13 12 13 22




9 5 8 7 9 14
Democratic Party 4 0 4 0 4 7
Green Party 3 0 3 0 3 6
Others 8 0 6 0 8 0
Total 49 75 150
Source: Karen Henderson and Neil Robinson, Post-Communist Politics, p. 137
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The absence of a common Czechoslovak oppositional movement and the creation of the Civic
Forum and Public Against Violence along national lines, was in itself evidence of deep-
rooted problems between Czechs and Slovaks, and started the constitutional negotiations on
an ackward note. The programmes of the two movements also tended to diverge, Public
Against Violence undoubtedly stressing a national issue that had no place in Civic Forum's
electoral platform.
Yet, it is only with the collapse of the coalitions and the foundation of political parties with
more specific programmes that the extent of the Czech-Slovak cleavage became obvious.
In the Czech lands, Civic Forum split in February 1991 between the Civic Democratic Party
(CDP), a right-wing party led by Vaclav Klaus, the Civic Movement (CM), led by Jifi
Dienstbier, and the Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA) led by Daniel Kroupa.
The main responsible for the end of the Civic Forum as a political movement was Klaus,
who, elected as chairman of the group on October 13 1990, argued that Civic Forum as a
broad church had no place anymore in Czech politics at a time of decisive political and
economic debates. At the beginning of November, he stated
political parties have their reason to be...politics relying, in practice, on the sole civic
initiatives is for me just as inconcevable as the idea of the centralized planification of
the economy...I believe that civic initiatives cannot maintain themselves on the long
term. I do not think that they can constitute the structural political basis of society
under normal conditions'^
The heterogeneity of the Civic Forum (like in the case of Solidarity in Poland) could not be
maintained and gave way to a political differentiation between the advocates of "shock
therapy" and quick economic reforms (who constituted the core of the CDP and the CDA)
^^Interview with V.Klaus, Lidove Noviny, 02/11/90, p.9, quoted in Miroslav Novak, Une Transition
Democratique Exemplaire ?: L'emergence d'un systeme departis dans les pays Tcheques (Prague; Centre
Fran9ais de Recherche en Sciences Sociales; 1997), p.32. See also Steven Saxonberg, "Vaclav Klaus: The Rise
and Fall and Reemergence of a Charismatic Leader", East European Politics and Societies, vol.13, n°2, Spring
1999, pp.399-400.
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and the supporters of a more gradualist approach (who either founded the CM or joined the
newly-resurrected Social Democrats).
In Slovakia, Public Against Violence managed to outlive its Czech counterpart by only two
months. On 27 April 1991, after his eviction as Slovak Prime minister, the popular Vladimir
Meciar created its own political party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, on a far
more "nationalist" platform, while the rump Public Against Violence temporarily survived
under Fedor Gal's leadership.
As a consequence, Czech and Slovak party systems started to polarise along distinct lines.
Whereas the Czech parties tended to position themselves on an "economic" axis according to
their attitude vis-a-vis the economic reforms, Slovak political movements often defined
themselves according to a "nationalist" axis, a function of their advocacy or not of Slovak
"sovereignty" (and of the different meanings this term can take). What distinguished the
Czechs and the Slovaks was "not only the solutions to bring to the problems, but more
fundamentally the problems to solve"479
This "dual' pattern had, to be true, already existed before in the history of the state - especially
during the First Republic, when Hlinka's Slovak People's Party managed to consistently
gather the support of around one-third of the Slovak electorate for its autonomist
programme^SO Yet, this dualism became more destructive than ever after the second
parliamentary elections of June 1992, which were convincingly won in each republic by
parties with fundamentally opposed political and economic agendas - Klaus's CDP in
Bohemia-Moravia and Meciar's MDS in Slovakia^ 1.
479NOVak, line Transition, p. 135
480c;ee chapter 1
48'See for instance Brokl and Mansfeldova, "Zerfall der Tschechoslowakei", pp. 133-147.
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5 0 6 5 4 0
Others 21 0 20 0 20 0
Total 51 75 150
Source: Karen Henderson and Neil Robinson, Post-Communist Politics, p.237
Given this context, one has to examine the programmes of the Civic Democratic party and the
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and ask whether the electoral successes of Klaus and
Meciar in June 1992 gave them a mandate to break up the federation.
On the one hand, Klaus and Meciar had an electoral legitimacy that could hardly be
contested. Their victories in their respective republics with more than 30 percent of the votes
could be seen as a reflection of the different orientations of the Czech and Slovak electors.
A close reading of the electoral programmes of the Civic Democratic Party and the
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia moreover shows that the two parties made clear that the
preservation of the Czechoslovak federation at all costs was not their priority. Thus, the
electoral platform of the Civic Democratic Party stated that "[T]he division of the State is not
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part of our programme ; but, if it were to become indispensable, we would put up with it"482
The CDP advocated the notion of a "functional federation", which would have the "necessary
authority to maintain the juridical and economic integrity"483 0f the state.
The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia's programme for its part made clear that "[t]he
development of Slovakia ... is strongly dependent on a qualitative change of constitutional
organisation. In order to allow the Slovak Republic to tackle its difficult economic and social
problems, its organs must have sufficient competencies. The solution of internal problems is
also closely linked to international politics. In this context, Slovakia must have the possibility
to develop direct relations with the other States. This requires the transformation of the
existing federal structure uniting Slovak Republic and Czech Republic into a structure of
sovereign republics whose each would become subject of international law"484 Moreover,
the MDS openly stated that it would take steps to proclaim the sovereignty of the Slovak
republic and draft a republican constitution.
Ultimately, the Czechs and Slovaks might not have wanted the end of their common state, but
they nevertheless unambiguously gave their votes to parties and politicians who were not
committed to the maintenance of Czechoslovakia. As the Slovak sociologist Sofia
Szomolanyiova bluntly remarked,
[ajbsent free elections it would be plausible to blame the country divorce agreement
on a small group of psychotic politicians, and they could be held responsible in the
future for their destructive act. But these politicians were elected in free elections and
have a mandate from their voters. The Slovak people can not be exempted from
responsibility for their choices. They used their freedom, embodied in the right to
vote, to delegate power to a strong leader, the charismatic Meciar, with the hope that
he would take care of them as well as take responsability for their lives. However
tragic for the future of the two peoples, the current political leadership had a mandate
to negotiate over the fate of Czechoslovakia. The Slovaks voted overwhelmingly for a
482jvjov^ jjne transition, p. 144
483ibid., p.143
484-jezy volebneho programu HZDS, Bratislava, 1992, quoted in ibid., p.145
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party pledged against the previous, already loose federation; the Czechs voted for
rightist parties for whom saving the federal state was not a priority485.
Former MDS senior member and Slovak president Michal Kovac argues that the break-up
was the fruit of democracy and the desire of the Slovaks to gain national self-determination.
The political representations elected in the two federal units had according to him a duty to
look for an agreement and the split was the result of a legitimate constitutional process486
On the other hand, the break-up of the state was the avowed priority of neither Klaus nor
Meciar. Klaus campaigned on the issue of economic reforms and the electoral platform of the
CDP (entitled "Road to Prosperity") stated that "[w]e declare ourselves in favour of the
common state"487s whereas Meciar only vaguely referred to the possibility of
"independence".
The electoral debates in June 1992 mainly focused on economics, and the official electoral
campaign itself was lacklustre and characterised by a small amount of media coverage. It
lasted only twenty-three days (in contrast to forty days for the parliamentary elections of
1990) and the broadcasting time allotted to each political party was also significantly reduced
(a total of twenty-one hours, equally divided among competing parties, as opposed to four
hours of broadcasting for each registered party in 1990)488 As David Olson notes, "TV
campaigning was limited to paid advertisements, all run together at one time each day, in a
political, and by all accounts artistic ghetto. No TV or radio discussions about the elections,
or by the candidates as candidates were permitted"489_
In these circumstances, the Czech and Slovak electors had few opportunities to gain a clear
picture of what was really at stake. Clearly, as Jin Dienstbier put it in July 1992, "not all
485sona Szomolanyiova, "The inevitable breakup ?", Uncaptive Minds, Winter-spring 1993, p.62
^^intcrview with Michal Kovac, Bratislava, 07/09/1999
487vodicka, "Koalitionsabsprache", p.89; Novak, Une Transition, p. 143
488jifi Pehe, "Czechoslovak Federal Assembly adopts electoral law", RFE/RL Research Report, 14 February
1992, pp.28-29
489p)avid M.Olson, "Dissolution of the state: political parties and the 1992 election in Czechoslovakia",
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol.26, n°3, September 1993, p.308
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voters who cast ballots for the O.D.S [the Civic Democratic Party] and HZDS [the Movement
for a Democratic Slovakia] voted for the solution now under consideration and by no means
did they vote for a final separation of the Czech and Slovak republics"490 a public opinion
poll realised in Slovakia in 1992 for instance showed that only a mere 19 percent of the MDS
voters declared themselves in favour of independence^ 1 ? and the Slovak National Party, the
only Slovak party to campaign openly for independence, received only 9.4 percent of the
votes for the Federal Assembly and an even lower 7.9 percent for the Slovak National
Council.
Moreover, the CDP and the MDS which gained the support of one third of the electorate in
their respective republics and in fact respectively only 27 and 12 percent of the federal votes,
were hardly legitimate to divide the state without further consulting the Czech and Slovak
population492: "the parties that won the elections but failed to gain a majority obtained
rightfully the mandate for the formation of the government but not a mandate to decide the
fate of the state"493
Meciar once stated that "the democratic choice had been made at the time of the elections",
and Klaus added that the elections had been the "key referendum" about the future of the
Czechoslovak state. Given the (relatively) limited importance of the constitutional issue
amidst electoral platforms largely dominated by debates about the pace and nature of
economic transition, it seems however fair to contend that neither Klaus not Meciar had a
clear mandate from their electorate to divide the state.
49®Time, "Can this marriage be saved ?", July 6 1992, p.38
491qUOted in Novak, Une Transition, p.146; Vodicka, "Koalitionsabsprache", p.99
492v0dicka , "Koalitionsabsprache", p.90
^^zdenek Jicinsky, in Zprava a 2. spolecne schuzi Snemovny lidu a Snemovny narodnu, 2. cast, 16
cervence 1992, VII. volebni obdobi [Report of the 2nd Common Session of the Chamber of the People and the




In this context, a referendum was often presented by the supporters of the federation as an
alternative able to effectively pinpoint the continuing relevance of the Czechoslovak state. In
December 1990, President Havel proposed the Federal Assembly to pass a law "that would
permit a nationwide referendum on Czechoslovakia's constitutional setup494» a referendum
law was adopted in July 1991, but the deputies were unable to agree on the wording of the
question to be submitted to the vote. Following this, Havel suggested in November 1991 that
he be allowed to call a referendum "on his own initiative or would be obliged to hold one if at
least 20 percent of all eligible voters in one of the republics petitioned him to do so"495 This
met with fierce criticism and the Federal Assembly subsequently rejected Havel's proposals.
Taking aside the "political" argument against the referendum (Czech and Slovak politicians
would have probably had to face the embarrassing evidence of their electors' support for a
common state)4965 there are many, both general and specific, reservations to make
concerning a referendum.
At a general level, the use of the referendum as a political tool is often deemed to promote the
establishment of Bonapartist regimes, where plebiscitary democracy is merely "the servant of
authoritarian regimes"497 jn fact5 this was one of the official reasons why certain Czech
politicians like Klaus argued against holding a referendum, which was perceived as
introducing a dangerous and unnecessary element of direct democracy into political
494jjft pehe, "Czech-Slovak Conflict Threatens State Unity", RFE/RL Research report, 3 January 1992,
p.83
495Jan Obrman, "President Havel's Diminishing Political Influence", RFE/RL Research report, 13 March
1992, p. 19
496§ee ch.6
497Henry E.Brady and Cynthia S.Kaplan, "Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union", in David Butler
and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums around the World : The Growing Use ofDirect Democracy
(Basingstoke and London; Macmillan Press; 1994), p. 175.
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life - thus potentially threatening the credibility of the parliamentary institutions of post-
communist Czechoslovakia498
In addition, certain factors specific to Czechoslovakia made problematic the use of a
referendum to solve the constitutional crisis between Czechs and Slovaks.
First of all, with about 10 million Czechs and only 5 million Slovaks, a nationwide
referendum would have been biased under majority rule. The only possibility was to hold two
separate referendums, one for each republic. "Under such conditions, it seems that a
referendum can give an unambiguous answer only if the electorates in both republics reach
the same decision: either to secede or to preserve the common state"499 This relates to the
intrinsic problems of the referendum as a tool for decision-making in multinational states.
Leff gives the example of the referendum held in Bosnia Hercegovina in the spring of 1992 as
an illustration of the dangers of reliance on a system which allows the outvoting of
minorities^OO. In fact, some opponents of the referendum pointed to the Yugoslav situation
and noted that "the first shots in Yugoslavia resounded immediately after the publication of
the results of the referendum" 501.
Secondly, even assuming that both Czechs and Slovaks would have voted in favour of the
maintenance of a common state (which is a realistic hypothesis given the public opinion
polls502; ancj clearly differentiates the Czechoslovak case from the situation in Yugoslavia)
there is still a major obstacle to consider: an agreement on the continuance of Czechoslovakia
as a common state did not imply an agreement on the form this state should actually take.
498Jan Obrman, "President Havel's Diminishing Political Influence", RFE/RL Research Report, 13 March
1992, p. 19.In a revelatory interview to the French daily Le Monde, Klaus stated that "the referendum is an
extreme instrument...We are neither Serbia...,nor Georgia, nor Tadjikistan, nor Moldova. We are a normal
country with working institutions. The recourse to referendum would be an extreme step, an exceptional
instrument" ("Un entretien avec le premier ministre tcheque", Le Monde, 17 July 1992).
499jiff Pehe, "The referendum controversy in Czechoslovakia", RFE/RL Research Report, vol.1, N°43, 30
October 1992, p.37
599peff, The Czech, p. 140
591 Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p.263
592$ee chapter 6
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While the Czechs expressed their preference for a unitary state or a tight federation, the
Slovaks predominantly favoured the idea of a confederation, or at least of a looser kind of
federation^O^ thus reproducing the pattern of division between Czech and Slovak elites.
Table 5.3 : Preferred state arrangements (November 1991-July 1992) in Czech lands (CR)
and Slovakia (SR) (in percentages)
November 1991 May 1992 July 1992
Type of state
arrangement
CR SR CR SR CR SR
Unitary state 39 20 34 12 38 14






20 6 22 6 18 8




5 14 6 11 16 16
Don't know 2 7 4 7 6 5
Source: Sharon L.Wolchik, "The politics of ethnicity in Post-communist Czechoslovakia",
East European Politics and Societies, Volume 8, n°l, Winter 1994, p. 180
Therefore, a referendum with a majority in favour of the maintenance of Czechoslovakia
would probably only have prolonged the constitutional stalemate, for example hindering the
further and necessary transformation of the economic structures. For a politician like Klaus
whose main priority was to manage a swift economic transition, waiting for a referendum had
many disadvantages, above all the fact that foreign investors were likely to defer their
financial commitments for as long as the constitutional negotiations were to continue.
Furthermore, there is another strong argument against a referendum. It could have crystallised
resentment between the Czechs and Slovaks and provided a platform for the expression of
^O^Wolchik, "The politics of ethnicity", p.180 and Leff, The Czech, p.138.
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nationalist rhetorics, worsening the prospects of a successful resolution of the Czech-Slovak
conflict and even making impossible a "velvet divorce".
Finally, recourse to referendum has never been part of the "Czechoslovak" political tradition
and no referendum has been held on Czech and Slovak territories during the existence of
Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1992^04
Under these circumstances and as a result of passing events, Havel himself, though a staunch
supporter of a referendum, came to realise that it "no longer made sense" by July 1992^05
Institutional choices and their consequences for the outcome of the post-communist
Czecho-Slovak conflicts
The decision of Czech and Slovak leaders not to use a referendum is however only one
example of how post-communist institutional choices had a decisive influence on the break¬
up of the state.
More specifically, in their difficult decision-making (Jon Elster once equated constitution-
making in post-communist societies to the action of "rebuilding [a] boat in the open sea"^®^),
Czech and Slovak politicians had to answer three essential questions. First, which electoral
system - majoritarian or proportional representation - would satisfy the needs of both Czechs
and Slovaks ? Secondly, was parliamentarism or presidentialism the most effective way to
ensure the stability of the renewed democracy (and the integrity of the federation) ?. Finally,
^O^See for instance Henry E.Brady and Cynthia S.Kaplan, in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds),
Referendums around the World: The Growing Use ofDirect Democracy, pp. 177-179
^O^Jan Obrman, "Slovakia Declares Sovereignty ; President Havel Resigns", RFE/RL Research Report, vol.1,
N°31, 31 July 1992, p.26. This could also be seen as the result of Havel's personal malaise and even defection
(see ch.6)
^O^Jon Elster, "Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the boat in the open sea", Public
Administration, vol.71, Spring/Summer 1993, pp.169-217; Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K.Preuss,
Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge; Cambridge
University Press; 1998).
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and more generally, what were the levels of centralism (and decentralisation) acceptable in
the eyes ofboth Czechs and Slovaks ?
Czech and Slovak post-communist makers had not only to overcome the institutional legacy
of communism evident in the federal structures inherited from 1968 (as chapter 8 will make
clear) but were also to a not negligible extent burdened by certain institutional legacies and
traditions of the First Czechoslovak republic. This was manifest especially as far as the
eventual choice of the proportional representation and the definition of the presidential
powers were concerned. The proportional representation was one of the institutional pillars of
the interwar republic, in which political parties had a predominant role. Similarly, the indirect
election of the president echoed the fact that during the First Republic, the influence of
Masaryk on Czechoslovak politics was more a result of his personal prestige and authority
than the consequence of constitutional provisions507
The reference to the previous democratic experience of the interwar period was somewhat
logical and natural in the context of the post-1989 transition but it also had negative aspects,
since it was likely to unnecessarily limit the range of options opened to the policy-makers and
thus impede the implementation of more "innovative" constitutional solutions.
Most significantly, the electoral law adopted on 29 January 1992^08 uncjer which the
elections of June 1992 took place, implicitly recognised the shift of the centre of power from
the federal to the republican institutions. Under the system of proportional representation
adopted, the threshold of 5% established in order to prevent a fragmentation of the parliament
was applied at the republic level. A party only had to get 5 % in one of the republics to win
seats in the parliament and "would be granted seats even though its total combined percentage
507 judy Batt, "Czechoslovakia" in Stephen Whitefield (ed.), The New Institutional Architecture ofEastern
Europe (New York; St-Martin's Press; 1993), p.36; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and constitutional
choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, 1989-1991", in Ian Budge and David Mc Kay (eds),
Developing democracy : comparative research in honour ofJ.F.P. Blondel (London; Sage; 1994), p.212; Jon
Elster, "Transition, constitution-making and separation in Czechoslovakia", Archives Europeennes de
Sociologie, vol.XXXVI, n°l, 1995, p.107; Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, pp.150-151
508por more details, see Jin Pehe, "Czechoslovak Federal Assembly adopts Electoral Law", RFE/RL
Research Report, 14 February 1992, pp.27-30.
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of the vote of Czechoslovakia would be less than 5%"509 Moreover, the remainding shares
of the vote were reallocated on the basis of the votes obtained at the level of the republics^ 10.
This had two adverse consequences for the efforts to find a new constitutional agreement
between Czechs and Slovaks.
Firstly, proportional representation resulted in 1992 in a high percentage of "wasted votes" -
the total vote not represented ranging from 19 percent (for the Czech National Council) to as
much as 25.8 percent (for the Czech delegation to the Federal Chamber of People).
Table 5.4
Exclusion Index (total vote not represented in parliament)







Czech National Council 19.0 -
Slovak National Council - 23.8
These percentages were on average higher than in the rest of post-communist Central
European, and sharply contrasted with the (West) German experience, where a 5 %
^O^ibid., p 29
^^Kimmo Kuusela, "The founding electoral systems in Eastern Europe, 1989-1991", in Geoffrey Pridham
and Tatu Vanhanen (eds), Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives
(London; Routledge; 1994), p. 143
5' 'David M.Olson, "Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central
Europe", Political Studies, vol;XLVI, special issue 1998, p.457.
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Sperklausel has been applied since 1949 for the elections at the Bundestag and lost votes
never exceeded 7 % (and went as low as 1 percent in the 1970s)512.
The threshold had a negative impact on the attempts to solve Czech-Slovak tensions, since it
left out of parliament moderate parties which adopted a more conciliatory approach on the
"national" question. A significant number of political parties (called "near-winners" by David
Olson) gained between 3.2 and 5 percent and could have qualified for seats in one of the four
chambers, had a lower threshold of 3 or 4 percent been applied.
-^Milan Zemko, "Political Parties and the Election System in Slovakia : Retrospective on the last Three
Elections to the Slovak National Council and the National Council of the Slovak Republic", in Szomolanyi and
Meseznikov, Slovakia: Parliamentary Elections 1994, p.46-47.
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Table 5.5












































Total 16.22 10.94 14.44
Source: David M.Olson, "Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in
Czechoslovakia", Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol.26, n°3, September 1993,
p.311
Crucial to political developments were hence the parallel downfall of the "pro-Czechoslovak"
successors of the coalitions of 1989/90 - Civic Movement in the Czech Republic and Civic
Democratic Union (Public Against Violence) in Slovakia. The Democratic Coalition and the
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Slovak Social Democrats (led by Alexander Dubcek) also ran on a federalist platform and
equally failed to make an impact on the Slovak electorate.
Secondly, largely because of the electoral law, the political parties had no interest in diluting
their efforts by pursuing a state-wide campaign. It was more rewarding in electoral terms to
concentrate on the constitution of a "national" stronghold, either in the Czech Lands or in
Slovakia. This logically provided the most influential politicians with an incentive to
establish their power base in one of the two republics and not at the federal level: Klaus's
decision in the aftermath of the June 1992 elections to refuse the post of federal prime
minister and become instead prime minister of the Czech republic illustrates this. President
Havel had initially suggested that both Klaus and Meciar became members of the federal
government, but following Meciar's determination to reject the offer in order to run for the
post of Slovak prime minister, Klaus chose not to be part of the federal government5 13
attitude of Klaus and Meciar in 1992 had a precedent in 1990, when Jan Carnogursky, the
leader of the Slovak Christian Democrats, gave up his post of deputy prime minister of
Czechoslovakia before the June 1990 elections, in order to become deputy prime minister in
Slovakia^ 4
The attempts to create state-wide parties therefore failed, and they were sometimes only half¬
hearted as the example of Klaus's Civic Democratic Party shows.
The CDP tried an implantation in Slovakia and formed an alliance (Democratic Coalition)
with the Democratic Party. However, the coalition did not manage to win any seats in either
the Slovak national Council or the Federal Assembly. Some observers noted that the efforts
undertaken by the CDP had been considerably limited: "critics insist that establishing ODS
(the Civic Democratic Party) in Slovakia so soon before the elections was a ruse designed, on
the one hand, to give the impression that ODS was firm in its commitment to the federation,
and on the other, to split the federalist vote in Slovakia, thereby making a nationalist victory
^^Vodicka, "Koalitionsabsprache", pp.85-86
^ l^Stanislav J.Kirschbaum, A history ofSlovakia, p.255
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and the dissolution of the federation, more certain."515 In fact, the alliance CDP-Democratic
Party in Slovakia could be said to have weakened the pro federalists of what was left of Public
Against Violence after the split of 1991516
This lack of incentive to create state-wide political parties was eventually reflected by the
results of the 1990 and 1992 parliamentary elections. In 1990, 11 of the 22 parties seeking
election stood in the two republics, but only one party, the Communist Party, managed to win
seats in both. The only other statewide party which succeeded in gaining representation was
the coalition Coexistence / Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement but it won seats only
in Slovakia. By 1992, the situation had become even more unfavourable for state-wide
parties: only 9 of the 41 political parties registered stood throughout Czechoslovakia, and
they all failed to win seats^l^ Even the Communist Party was by then divided between the
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Party of the Democratic Left in
Slovakia^ <3.
James de Candole, Czechoslovakia: The end ofan illusion (London; Institute for European Defence and
Strategic Studies; 1993), p. 12
^^Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p. 183. For an approach which emphasises on the contrary the serious nature of
Klaus' efforts to campaign in Slovakia, see Karol Wolf, Podruhe a naposled, aneb Mirove deleni
Ceskoslovenska (Prague; G plus G; 1998), p.60-61.
^Gordon Wightman, "The Development of the Party System and the Break-up of Czechoslovakia" in
Gordon Wightman (ed.), Party Formation in East-Central Europe: Post-communist politics in Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria (Aldershot; Edward Elgar; 1995), pp.60-61; Paul Lewis, Bill Lomax and
Gordon Wightman, "The Emergence of Multi-Party systems in East-Central Europe: a comparative analysis", in
Pridham and Vanhanen, Democratization, p. 167
51°For more details, see Jin Pehe, "Divisions in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia", Report on Eastern
Europe, July 26, 1991, vol.2, N°30, pp. 10-13
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Conclusion
This chapter aimed to shed light on the institutional deadlock which affected post-communist
Czechoslovakia and eventually jeopardized the survival of the state.
The strict prohibition of majority rule implemented under the communist regime proved a
major impediment after 1989, when Czech and Slovak leaders attempted in vain to draft a
new and more adequate constitution (the flaws of Soviet-style federalism will be specifically
addressed in chapter 8).
The unity of the extremely heterogeneous anti-communist coalitions did not last and Czech
and Slovak party systems subsequently established themselves on essentially divergent bases.
The electoral law under which the second parliamentary elections of June 1992 were
conducted reinforced national faultlines and contributed to the emergence of two winners
with fundamentally contradictory political agendas, Klaus and Meciar.
However, if the institutional deadlock was undoubtedly a major factor in the dissolution of
the Czechoslovak state, what made Czech-Slovak tensions unbridgeable was the role - malign
or benign, intended or naive - played by Czech and Slovak elites between 1989 and 1992.
The next chapter hence looks at an "elitist" explanation of the break-up and argues that
personality issues should not underestimated when trying to understand why Czechoslovakia
did not survive the post-communist era.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK POST-COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
IN THE BREAK-UP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: AN "ELITIST" EXPLANATION
The previous chapter adopted institutions as its level of analysis. The present chapter
concentrates on the individuals and the role of personalities in the break-up of
Czechoslovakia. Individual politicians mattered in post-communist Czechoslovakia and
different personalities could have meant different outcomes as far as the Czech-Slovak
conflict was concerned.
After showing that neither the Czech nor the Slovak population wanted the break-up of the
common state, the nature of elite changes in post-communist Czechoslovakia and the role of
the elites in the velvet divorce is assessed.
A distinction is established between "postcommunist dissident" and "technocratic" elites, and
it is argued that the technocratic, carrierist elites, which came to power after the second
parliamentary elections of June 1992 - and especially, Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic
and Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia - are responsible for the dissolution of a state, whose
population still thought worth preserving.
A break-up that Czechs and Slovaks did not want
As suggested before, one of the many paradoxes of the break-up of Czechoslovakia is that the
state disintegrated even though the majority of its citizens favoured its continuance. Public
opinion polls consistently showed a high level of support among the population, both Czech
and Slovak, for the maintenance of the country. In June 1992, before the elections, 81 percent
of the citizens in the Czech Republic and 63 percent in Slovakia rejected the idea of
separation^ 19
Table 6.1: Position if a referendum were held on state arrangements (in percentages)













70 52 68 73 58 53 42
Divide the
state
9 18 13 12 16 24 32
Don't know 12 9 16 20 23
Would
abstain
31 7 6 20
- -
Note: percentages do not add to 100 percent because those who indicated they would not
particpitate in a referendum are excluded
Source: Information from the Institute for Public Opinion Research, "Nazory cs.
verejnosti,"Prague, January 31, 1992, pp. 12-13 (quoted in Wolchik, The politics of ethnicity
in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia, East European Politics and Societies, Volume 8, n°l,
Winter 1994, p. 179)
The above table however sheds light on two important developments.
Firstly, the percentage of people willing to divide the state significantly increased between
October 1991 and July 1992 (from 9% to 24% in the Czech Republic and from 18 % to 32%
in Slovakia). The simple acknowledgement that "divorce" was an option became in itself an
indication that the break-up would occur: as Sharon Wolchik put it,
the very act of seriously considering divorce can imperil a shaky marriage and is
frequently a sign that the marriage is already over. Relations between Czechs and
Slovaks had clearly reached this point by mid-1992^20
-^Leff, The Czech, p. 137
520Wolchik, "The politics of ethnicity", p. 187
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This was even more compelling, since the costs of separation appeared relatively limited.
There were no significant minority issues between Czechs and Slovaks and the republican
borders, which became in January 1993 state borders, were undisputed. The confrontation
between Czechs and Slovaks has always remained free of the bloody and violent conflicts
that for instance characterise the relations between Croats and Serbs521? and as discussed in
chapter 4, the international environment was more favourable than ever to the existence of
two separate Czech and Slovak nation-states.
Secondly, a differentiation was evident between Czechs and Slovaks, the latter appearing far
less inclined to support the maintenance of the federation: in June 1992, 53 percent of the
Czechs, but only 42 percent of the Slovaks thought that a Czechoslovak state should be
preserved.
Despite this, the majority of the citizens of Czechoslovakia was nevertheless undoubtedly
willing to continue the "Czechoslovak experience" and separatism was supported on average
by only 5 percent of the population in the Czech lands and by 12 percent in Slovakia during
the period January 1990-June 1992^22_ Moreover, surveys conducted in May 1994 in
Slovakia showed that only a mere 26.4 percent of those polled would have voted for
independence if a referendum had taken place and as much as 57.7 percent declared that they
would have voted against it^23 _ even if these figures should be taken with caution since, as
Eric Stein puts it, "they do not say much about how the Slovaks might have voted in a
referendum prior to the dissolution"524 The nostalgia for the common state does not
necessarily mean that at the time of the vote, the electors would not have endorsed the
division of the state, at the risk of regretting it later.
521 Robert Hislope, "The generosity moment: ethnic politics, democratic consolidation and the state in
Yugoslovia (Croatia), South Africa and Czechoslovakia", Democratization, vol.5, n°l, Spring 1998, pp.82-83;
Leff, The Czech , pp. 140-142
-'^Wehrle, Le Divorce, p.36
523pociJS, Center for Social and Market analysis- opinion polls conducted from 9 May to 23 May 1994 on
a sample of 2018 Slovak respondents quoted in Silvia Mihalikova, "Understanding", p. 17 ; cf also Minton F.
Goldman, Revolution and change in Central and Eastern Europe: political, economic and social challenges
(New York, London; ME Sharpe; 1997), p.147; Karel Vodicka, Politisches System Tschechiens: vom
kommunistischen Einparteiensystem zum demokratischen Verfassungsstaat (Miinster; Lit Verlag; 1996), p.210.
524stein, Czecho/Slovakia, pp.319-320
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Given the support of the population, both Czech and Slovak, for the maintenance of the state,
the velvet divorce has been considered by many analysts such as John Higley, Jan Pakulski
and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, Karel Kosik, Carol Leff, Dusan Novotny, Grigorij
Meseznikov or Karel Vodicka as the product of an "elite deal"525_
The rest of this chapter will aim to assess this argument and point out the responsibilities of
Czech and Slovak post-communist leaders.
A definition and typology of Czech and Slovak post-communist elites
Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley define elites as "the persons who are able,
by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political
outcomes regularly and substantially..., the principal decision makers in the largest or most
resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and
cultural organizations and movements in a society"526
Despite its usefulness, this description is too broad and the use of the sole word "elite"
inadequate when it comes to illustrate the disparity and diverse origins of the post-communist
Czechoslovak leadership. A typology of the post-communist Czech and Slovak elites is
therefore necessary.
Following the "velvet revolution" of 1989, the communist elite was gradually replaced by a
new elite mostly composed of the former dissidents who had been active since the post-1968
"normalisation" in organisations like Charter 77 and emerged in November 1989 as the
leaders of the two revolutionary movements, the Civic Forum in the Czech lands and the
525j0hn Higley, Jan Pakulski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "Introduction : Elite Change and Democratic
Regimes in Eastern Europe", in John Higley, Jan Pakulski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (eds), Postcommunist
Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (London; Macmillan Press; 1998); Kosik, "The Third Munich",
pp.145-154; Leff, The Czech, p.136 ; Dusan Novotny, Une dangereuse Meprise, pp.99-107 ; Vodicka,
"Koalitionsabsprache"; interview with Grigorij Meseznikov, Bratislava, 03/09/1999.
^^Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, "Introduction: elite transformations and democratic
regimes" in John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds), Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and
Southern Europe (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1992), p.8. See also Robert D.Putnam, The
Comparative Study ofPolitical Elites (Englewoods Cliffs; Prentice Hall; 1976).
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Public Against Violence in Slovakia. This elite has been qualified as the (postcommunist)
intellectual dissident or the moral-intellectual elite527_ Some of its most influential
representatives are the Czechs Jin Dientsbier, federal foreign minister from December 1989
to June 1992 and Petr Pithart, Czech prime minister during the same period, but arguably also
the Slovaks Alexander Dubcek, the former symbol of the Prague Spring who became after the
regime change president of the Federal Assembly, and Jan Carnogursky -who was federal
deputy-prime minister from December 1989 to June 1990, founded the Christian Democratic
Movement (KDS) and became Slovak prime minister between April 1991 and June 1992. The
most charismatic member of the "dissident elite" however is undoubtedly Vaclav Havel,
federal president from December 1989 to July 1992.
The post-communist "dissident elite" was characterised by the heterogeneity of its
composition. As Eleonora Schneider emphasises, the new leadership was a "conglomeration
of four groups: 1) the reform communists of the 'Prague Spring', most of whom still adhered
to socialist ideals ; 2) many non-communist dissidents; 3) younger intellectuals from informal
cultural and Christian organizations and environmentalist groups ; 4) individuals returning
from exile to play an active part in the political, social or economic reform process"^28 civic
Forum included in its ranks personalities as different as the Trotskyist Petr Uhl, the reform
communists of the group "Obroda" (Renaissance) and the conservative Catholic Vaclav
Benda, united by a common denominator, their opposition to the communist regime. As seen
in chapter 5, this absence of shared values was bound to prove fatal to the Civic Forum and
the Public Against Violence and, by 1991, the two broad movements had split up into several
political parties.
Most significantly, the "intellectual post-communist dissident elite" was itself subsequently
ousted at the most important posts of the state by other elites, which have sometimes been
527 Eleonora Schneider, Politische Eliten in der Ex-Tschechoslowakei (Teil I) (Cologne; Berichte des
Bundesinstituts fur ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien; 1995), p.4 ; Jana Smutna, "Les elections
legislatives de 1996 en Republique Tcheque: la democratic retrouvee (unpublished master thesis; Institut
d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, 1997) p.35; Lubomir Brokl and Zdenka Mansfeldova, "Czech and Slovak Political
and Parliamentary Elites", in Higley, Pakulski and Wesolowski, Postcommunist Elites, p. 134.
528 Schneider, Politische Eliten, p.38.
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called the technocrats or the economists'^^ The foremost "technocrats" were Vaclav Klaus,
Vladimir Meciar but also Vladimir Dlouhy, the first post-communist federal minister of
economics.
There are, as we shall see great differences between Klaus and Meciar, but two important
contrasts with the dissident elite appear evident.
Firstly, what distinguished the "dissidents" from the "technocrats" was often the nature of
their political involvement during the two decades of "normalisation". Most of the
technocrats had no openly dissident activity before 1989 and tended to be drawn from the
"grey zone" between collaboration and passive resistance to the regime. They worked within
the system, even if they did not approve it and even less support it: for instance, Klaus and
Dlouhy were members of the Institute of Economic Forecasting, whereas Meciar worked as a
company lawyer for a Slovak bottle factory^^O
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, technocrats answered, unlike dissidents, A.King's
definition of "career politicians" - "people committed to politics [who] regard politics as their
vocation, ... seek fulfilment in politics, ... see their future in politics, ... would be deeply upset
if circumstances forced them to retire from politics"^ 1.
Two distinct waves of elite change occurred in Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1993: the
first one in December 1989 when the communist regime fell and the dissident elite took over
power, and the second one in June 1992, when the parliamentary elections confirmed the rise
of a new and more technocratic elite. The dissident elite made "mistakes", but ultimately it
will be argued that the greatest responsibility for the break-up of Czechoslovakia lies with the
"technocrats" who took power after the 1992 parliamentary elections.
529schneider, Politische Eliten; Smutna, Les elections.
■^^For more biographical details on Klaus, see for example Hans-Joachim Hoppe, "Vaclav Klaus-
Ministerprasident der Tschechischen Republik: Ein Portrat", Osteuropa, 43Jahrgang, Heft 11, November 1993,
pp. 1083-1087 ; on Vladimir Dlouhy, see Jin Pehe, "Vladimir Dlouhy: A Politician (Almost) Everyone Loves",
Transition, 30 January 1995, vol.1, n°l, p.33 ; on MeCiar, see Jan Obrman, "Slovak Politician accused of Secret
Police Ties", RFE/RL Research Report, vol.1, n° 15, 10 April 1992, p. 15
531 A.King, "The Rise of Career Politician in Britain - and its Consequences", British Journal ofPolitical
Science, vol. 11, 1981, p.255 (quoted in Rod Hague, Martin Harrop and Shaun Breslin, Comparative
Government and Politics : An Introduction; Basingstoke and London; Macmillan; 1998, 4th edition; p. 198).
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The mistakes of the dissidents or the "powerlessness of the powerful"532
Having thus defined two distinct types of post-communist Czech and Slovak elites, we now
turn to assess the role of the dissident elite in the break-up of the state. Despite their good
intentions, the activities of the dissidents-turned-politicians had, for several reasons, an
adverse impact on Czech-Slovak relations.
First of all, the dissident elite, especially in the Czech lands, strongly underestimated the
acuity and relevance of the "Slovak question":
the great error of the new Czech ruling elite in Prague was its failure to put Slovakia
on top of its agenda...[tjhere was ...a mass of important things that the new
Czechoslovak government had to do, all of these things were urgent. But nothing was
more important or urgent than Slovakia^3
As Otto Pick bluntly put it, "the failure of the 'velvet revolutionaries' to use the enthusiasm
for change prevailing in the early months of 1990 to construct a new constitutional
framework is a sin of omission which future generations may find hard to forgive534"
The most concrete illustration of this is certainly the "hyphen war"535 jn his Summer
Meditations, Havel comments that
there would have been no need whatever to go through such a prolonged struggle over
the name of our country had we simply made a slight break with parliamentary
532-phis expression, a reference to Havel's influential essay The Power ofthe Powerless (published in 1978)
was coined by the former leading dissident Jan Urban in 1992 (Juan J.Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe",
Baltimore and London; The John Hopkins University Press; 1996; p.321).
-*33 j F Brown, Hopes and shadows: Eastern Europe after communism (Harlow; Longman; 1994), p.56 and
57.
534otto Pick, "Czechoslovakia's divisions", The World Today, May 1992, p.84
535see ch.2.
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tradition and dropped the word 'socialist' from the name 'Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic' the very same day I made the proposal to Parliament, instead of becoming
sidetracked by arguments like 'We need time to consider it'.
He adds that "other post-Communist countries have dealt with that question in an hour"536
This is illustrative of Havel's inability to realize that Czechoslovakia was not a homogeneous
state like Poland or Hungary but a binational state, in which the interests of the Slovak
minority had to be taken into consideration. The eagerness of the Slovaks to gain a measure
of international "visibility" was the first evidence of the extent of the unresolved problems
betweens the two nations and the Czech reluctance to recognise this provoked the first
outburst of Slovak nationalism in 1990.
In fact, as early as December 1989, Czechs and Slovaks did not seem to agree on a
presidential candidate, and whereas Vaclav Havel was the hero of Prague, Dubcek was
probably at the time the most popular politician in Bratislava: "[PJosters bearing [Havel's]
picture appeared on every window, door and lamp-post in Prague, with the two-word
message, Na Hrad (To The Castle) ; similar posters appeared on the walls of Bratislava, but
the picture there was of Dubcek, not Havel"537
Furthermore, after the "hyphen war", the electoral success of the Slovak National Party
(Slovenska Narodna Strana or SNS) which attracted 13.9 percent of the Slovak electors in the
June 1990 parliamentary elections, was also another evidence of the actuality of the Slovak
question^ 8
Apart from this incapacity to detect these warning signs of the Czech-Slovak conflict, the
second reproach we can address to the post-communist Czech elite relates to the nature of
their political engagement itself. Kriseova captures the dilemma of the intellectual-turned-
politician in the following way:
53t>Havel, Summer Meditations, p.23
^Michael Simmons, The reluctant president: a political life of Vaclav Havel (London; Methuen; 1991),
p.192
53&s Kirschbaum, A History ofSlovakia, pp.254-255
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[he] is by nature self-critical, and thus unable to campaign in his own favor. His self-
criticism, detachment, non-partisan approval -these are his positive qualities.
Intellectuals shy away from the power of government. They have a permanently
critical attitude to power, a lack of confidence in it. For that reason they are not very
successful at practical politics. The intellectual wishes to create ideas but dislikes
repeating them and forcing them down people's throats. He finds it painful to go over
the same story time and time again^39
The relevance of this characterisation could be illustrated, in the case of Czechoslovakia, by
several examples.
To start with, the moral stance of the dissidents, pointing at the collective guilt and
responsibility of the nation for the perpetuation of the communist regime, was not likely to
appeal to the population. Havel's statement in his 1990 New Year address that" we are all ...
responsible for the operation of the totalitarian machinery; none of us is just its victim: we are
all also its co-creators"540 was ncq rewarding in electoral terms -especially in Slovakia
where the grey zone between indifference and collaboration with the regime during the
normalisation was much more important than in the Czech republic and where, as considered
in chapter 2, communism was more positively evaluated^ 1. Dissidents often embodied an
ethic that alienated them from most people542 an(j as petr Pithart acknowledged in reference
to the 1992 elections,
[pjeople did not vote for us [the former dissidents], because we have shown them the
mirror of morality and they could not bear it543
^-^At a conference on "Intellectuals and social change in Central and Eastern Europe", published in Partisan
Review, special issue, 1992, p.704-705 (quoted in T.Draper, "The end of Czechoslovakia", p.20)
^40y.Havel, Open letters (London and Boston; Faber and Faber; 1991), p.392.
541 E.Schneider, Politische Eliten, p.14.
542fjockenos, Free to hate, p.305.
54^Lidove Noviny, 26/3/96, quoted in Smutna, Les Elections, p.36.
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In Havel's words, "[pjeople never actually liked the dissidents too much because they saw
them as their bad conscience, as they themselves had been mostly submissive, doing what
they were told, without risking confrontation with authority"544 There is something deeply
ironical in the fate of those Slovak and especially Czech dissidents, who were before 1989
largely isolated from the wider population and confined to the Prague "intellectual ghetto" but
did not fundamentally succeed after the regime change in durably escaping from their social
and political marginalisation.
A second related issue is the support of the dissidents for the notion of national reconciliation,
based on a "soft" stance as far as the fate of the former communists was concerned. Their
advocacy, as commendable as it was, of restraint and moderation in the drafting and
implementation of the process of "decommunisation" was bound to be deeply unpopular. The
so-called "lustration" (lustrace) law adopted in October 1991 controversially provided for the
screening and dismissal for five years of all high political or economic offficials found to
have held important responsabilities within the Communist Party or collaborated with the
communist secret police as StB agents or informers545 Vaclav Havel, as President of the
Federative Republic, signed the law but simultaneously proposed amendments (which were
not voted), in order to allow the officials accused to defend themselves in a more effective
way and to alleviate the fact that the law upheld to a large extent the concept of collective
guilt and did not recognise the presumption of innocence546 Because of their moderate
stance during the debate on lustrace, Havel and other leading members of the dissident elite
were accused by their opponents and especially the chairman of the ultra-nationalist
Republican Party Miroslav Sladek, of being "crypto-communists", plotting with the former
->44quoted in M.Simmons, The Reluctant, p. 193.
545jiri Pehe, "Towards the Rule of Law: Czechoslovakia", RFE/RL Research Report, vol.1, N°27, 3 July
1992, pp.13-15; Leff, The Czech, pp.85-89
546por more details on Havel's position, see for example: "Die unvollendete Revolution", Vaclav Havel im
Gesprach mit Adam Michnik, Transit, Heft 4, Sommer 1992, pp. 8-11; Speech of reception of the doctorate
honoris causa of the University of New York, 27 October 1991 in L'angoisse de la liberte, p. 184
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nomenkatura547_ 7he "lustration" process eventually further increased the tensions between
Czechs and Slovaks, since the general attitude in Slovakia towards lustration was more than
lukewarm548
The dissident elite was often misguided by an idealism which had an adverse effect on
Czech-Slovak relations - nowhere more so than in the field of foreign policy. As shown in
chapter 3, the decision announced in January 1990 by Jin Dienstbier, to restrict arms' exports,
"regardless of the economic and political consequences"5495 was doomed to be resisted by
the Slovaks, who had to face the painful conversion of their military industry and were
therefore much more affected than the Czechs by this decision. The divisions between Czech
and Slovak interests in this respect were made obvious during the controversy surrounding
the deliveries of Slovak-made tanks to Syria in 1991550 -phe idealism which dominated the
foreign policy of dissident elite was furthermore demonstrated, although with less notable
consequences on Czech-Slovak relations, in other instances such as the decision of Havel to
apologise for the expulsion of the German minority in 1945-1948551 or the high-profile
reception given by the presidential office to the Dalai-Lama552 Havel's decision to make his
first presidential trip in January 1990 to Munich and Bonn also led many Slovaks to believe
that they mattered for their president less than the Sudeten Germans553_
547see for instance Szayna, "The Extreme-Right", p. 126; Jin Pehe, "The Politics of Intolerance : the Czech
Republic", RFE/RL Research Report, vol.2, N°16, 22 April 1994, p.51
548For a more detailed account of the "lustration", see Jan Pauer, "Der tschechische
Liberalkonservativismus" in Ivo Bock and Jan Pauer (eds), Tschechische Republik zwischen Traditionsbruch
und Kontinuitat (Bremen; Editions Temmen; 1995), pp.47-58; Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing
Europe's Ghosts after Communism ( New York; Vintage Books; 1996), pp.77-78.
549paulina Bren, "Conversion slows down as Czechs and Slovak part", RFE/RL Research report, vol 1,
N°32, 14 August 1992 and The New York Times, 25 January 1990.
550see chapter 3 for more details on the economic aspects of the controversy
551 cf chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of Czech-German relations
552]yj.Simmons, The Reluctant, p. 195; Pauer, "Der tschechische Liberalkonservativismus", p.40; Speech of
Vaclav Havel in Bratislava on 9 April 1990 in L'angoisse de la liberte, p.88.
553jntervjews wjth Antoine Mares, Prague, 14/09/99 and Jin Suk, Prague, 16/09/99
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More generally, there was a tendency within the post-communist Czech elite to dismiss the
expressions of Slovak nationalism as "the product of insufficient public understanding of the
motivations of their leaders"554 Czech politicians did not distinguish between the
"constitutional nationalism" of Carnogursky and the "populist agitation" of Meciar^55 They
did not acknowledge the difference between what was called in an article of Lidove Noviny, a
"moderate" and a "virulent" anti-Czechoslovakism^56 anc} explained in a simplistic and
uniform way the successes of nationalist rhetoric in Slovakia by the idea of "Slovak
exceptionalism". The democratic credentials of Slovakia were thus put in doubt, in line with a
long historical Czech tradition of denial of Slovakia's democratic tradition. Even Havel
adopts this attitude, when he writes that "some very disturbing elements periodically occur
and reoccur in Slovak politics. One example is a tendency to make quick, sometimes almost
frightened and opportunistic changes in position"557
To a large extent, this characteristic Czech perception of Slovakia became a self-fulfilling
prophecy, which had the unfortunate consequence to further radicalise Slovak opposition to
the idea of a common state. Klaus himself indirectly stressed the dangers of such a standpoint
when he warned in July 1992 that "it would be absolutely wrong to demonize Mr. Meciar, as
is done in the Czech press and the Western press. He is a standard, rational politician who is
maximizing his position, using arguments that are most useful"558
The Czechs often considered the nationalist movement in Slovakia as the product of intra-
Slovak political conflicts, a feeling reinforced by the political instability of Slovak political
life. Typical of this attitude is a statement of Pavel Rychetsky, vice-president of the Civic
Movement and federal vice-prime minister in charge of legislation until June 1992, that
-^Leff, "Czech and Slovak Nationalism", p.l 18.
555de Candole, Czechoslovakia, p. 12
556Lidove Noviny, 29 November 1990, quoted in Wehrle, Le divorce, p. 147-148
■^frlavel, Summer meditations, p.39
$Time, July 6, 1992, p.39 ; See also Miroslav Kusy, "V. Meciar je cisty pragmatik", in Lidove Noviny,
16.06.92 and Vodicka, "Koalitionsabsprache", p.98.
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the real cause of our [Czech-Slovak] crisis is not a Czech-Slovak conflict, but a
Slovak-Slovak conflict. Indeed, the victorious political formation [in the June 1990
elections] has split up and therefore the governmental coalition has changed. The new
Slovak coalition, and thus the Slovak government, are exceedingly unstable...Because
of the forthcoming elections [in June 1992], this instability has had a specific effect:
almost all Slovak political parties and movements compete with each other to be 'the
most Slovak'559
The intellectuals-turned-politicians were inclined to regard voter displeasure and
dissatisfaction as a manifestation of the impact of populist electoral tactics rather than as the
logical and inevitable outcome of their own policies. The dissident elite was consequently not
ready to actively try to develop a power basis among existing or emerging social groups^oO
In a way, the intellectuals which assumed power after 1989 sometimes had the pretension to
be, like the communist party in its time, the "vanguard" of the society. They were in the
paradoxical position of democrats without an understanding of what democracy means or
how it actually works and were not necessarily ready to abide by the rules of the game,
especially as far as electoral campaigning was concerned.
The electoral campaign of June 1992 was hence marked by the passivity of the former
dissidents. As Pithart, one of the vice-presidents of the Civic Movement retrospectively
observed,
[W]ith two many Civic Movement ministers in the government, we devoted minimum
time to Civic Movement. It may have been good generally for the country but for us it
was not good... Our people were immensely used up and did not even see the urgency
of devoting time to the Movement and elections...More than by its center position,
559pavel Rychetsky in "Les Slovaques meconnus exigent d'etre reconnus", La Nouvelle Alternative,
December 1991, n°24, p.21
560Arista Maria Cirtautas, "The Role of Nationalism in East European Latecomers to Democracy", in
Stephen E.Hanson and Willfried Spohn (eds), Can Europe Work ?: Germany and the Reconstruction ofPost-
communist Societies (Seattle; University of Washington Press; 1995), pp.38-39.
208
Civic Movement was hurt by the fact that it was a government party, and people
simply rejected the government party561.
What is more, the electoral campaign of the Civic Movement was marred by strategic errors,
such as the decision to focus on the towns. This proved to be a mistake: the Civic Movement
was expected to perform relatively well in the Bohemian urban areas like Prague or
Pilsen^62 but failed to attract the votes of the more rural areas of the country (especially in
South Moravia) where the inhabitants were, because of the proximity of the region with
Slovakia, more "pro-Czechoslovak" and more likely to support the "Czechoslovak"-oriented
Civic Movement563. a more active campaigning outside Prague would probably have
enabled the Civic Movement to reach the 5 percent required to gain representation in the
Federal Assembly and in the Czech National Council.
The slogan "We go the right way", also proved ultimately harmful, since it was Klaus and the
Civic Democratic Party who symbolised the success of the economic reforms^64
To an extent, the coming to power of the technocrats, which saw themselves as "professional"
politicians, was a positive step towards the consolidation of the Czech and Slovak democracy
and marked the real end of the "velvet revolution" and the "routinization" of politics565 The
dissidents were "virtuous ... but not necessarily competent"566? ancj the reemergence of
Czech-Slovak antagonisms after 1989 required a political know-how that they hardly had. As
Fedor Gal, one of the leaders of Public Against Violence, noted,
' Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, pp.186-187.
562'Pomas Kostelecky, "Changing party allegiances in a changing party system: the 1990 and 1992
parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic", in Wightman, Party Formation, p.85 and 94
563(3. Krejci, History ofElections in Bohemia and Moravia (Boulder, East European Monographs; New
York; Columbia University Press; 1995), p.336.
56^ibid., p.302.
565-phomas a. Baylis, "Elite Change After Communism: Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia", East European Politics and Societies, vol.12, n°2, Spring 1998, p.268.
566jaCqUes RUpnik, "Le systeme politique a 1'epreuve du changement", in L'Autre Europe, N°28-19, 1994,
p.39, quoted in Smutna, Les elections, p.37
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we [the former dissidents] were overwhelmed with solicitations which we did not
have the capacity to handle. We had little time and a low level of professional
competence. We were convinced to live a revolution and not to find ourselves in a
American-style parliament...567
The dissident elite was often characterised by political amateurism. For instance, when
Vaclav Havel sought to constitute his Chancellery, he relied on old friends of his dissident
years, who had no concrete experience of politics, or on former exilees, like Prince Karel
Schwarzenberg, who had come back to Czechoslovakia after 1989 and were out of touch with
the situation of the country. Significantly, the circle of Havel's advisors included many men
of letters or artists like Pavel Kohout, Jifi Pelikan, Josef Skvorecky, Pavel Tigrid, the film
director Milos Forman or even the American rock star Frank Zappa (adviser in ... foreign
economic relations568) but almost no Slovak or jurist. The presidential team lacked of
professional experts, and when the single trained lawyer on the president's permanent staff
resigned, he was not replaced and Havel was left only with one consultant, Vladimir
Klokocka, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Munich of Czech origin569
Havel brought to the Castle in 1989/1990 Slovak personalities such as the former actor Milan
Khazko who had a limited visibility and authority in Slovakia570 Furthermore, the idea to
create a vice-presidency occupied by Knazko never materialized - provoking tensions
between Czech and Slovaks former dissidents and the resignation of Knazko only a few
weeks after his arrival in Prague571.
567qUOted in Smutna, ibid., p37
-'^M.Simmons, The Reluctant, p. 199
569gtein, Czecho/Slovakia, p. 109. To be fair, Havel did not have much of a choice and very few Czechs and
Slovaks were more than "amateurs" at politics after four decades of communist rule (see Ch.8).
579interview with Jana Reschova, Prague, 14/09/99
571 John Keane, Vaclav Havel: a political tragedy in six acts (London; Bloomsbury; 1999), p.457.
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Under these circumstances, the post-communist political elite issued from the ranks of
dissent, shares a responsibility in the break-up of Czechoslovakia because of its failure to
grasp the complexity and the legitimacy of certain Slovak concerns. Havel once
acknowledged that
everything indicates that most Czechs had no idea how strong was the longing of the
Slovaks for autonomy and for their own constitutional expression, and that they were
more than surprised at how quickly after our democratic revolution this longing began
to stir, and how powerfully it expressed itself->72
A rapid awareness of the acuity of the "national issue" and a willingness to address it early
could have done a lot to save the state: the dissident elite lost the opportunity to use the
euphoria of the immediate aftermath of the revolution to take rapid constitutional decisions.
The time factor was crucial, since changes were more likely to be accepted at the beginning
of 1990 than after the elections of June 1992. As Juan J.Linz and Alfred Stepan pointed out
concerning the timing of democratic transition, "[pjotentially difficult democratic outcomes
may be made manageable only if some type of pre-emptive policies and decisions are argued
for, negotiated, and implemented by political leaders. If the opportunity for such ameliorative
policies is lost, the range of available space for maneuver will be narrowed and a dynamic of
societal conflict will probably intensify until democratic consolidation becomes increasingly
difficult and eventually impossible"573.
In this context, the attempts to save the Czechoslovak federation appeared to have been "too
little and too late", and by the end of the first half of 1992 (if not before), a dynamic of
disintegration had begun. The break-up of Czechoslovakia came as a result of a "lost
opportunity"574 _ fac{ perhaps many lost opportunities - and nothing seems more
illustrative of this than Pithart's revelations that, at the beginning of the Velvet revolution,
when "leaders from the Slovak capital of Bratislava came to talk to Havel about the Civic
Forum party apparatus in Slovakia, Havel urged them to create their own separate party in
572jjavel, Summer meditations, p.26
573Linz and Stepan, Problems, p.37
574j J? Brown, Hopes, p.56
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Slovakia"575. Despite its good intentionsm Havel lost at the time an occasion to establish a
strong state-wide party576. Similarly, it has been argued that the (pro-Czechoslovak) Civic
Movement would have made it into parliament, had Havel actively supported it in June
1992577.
However, even if the opportunity to create a state-wide movement was not seized in 1989 (a
reflection of the "antipolitical" and even hostile attitude of Havel vis-a-vis political
parties)^7^ there were still many possibilities left to try to insure the success of the
constitutional negotiations between Czechs and Slovaks.
First of all, the decision taken in January 1990 and consistently defended by Havel^7^ to
limit the mandates of the first post-communist democratically-elected parliament as well as
that of the federal president, to two years, was misconceived. When the time came in 1992 to
hold the elections, the euphoria of 1989-1990 had disappeared and the state was in the middle
of a social and economic transition, whose painful consequences strongly affected
Slovakia^SO ancj made even more difficult the definition of common interests between
Czechs and Slovaks581. As Leff put it, "[i]t is certainly possible...that some agreement could
have been reached if there had been a way of postponing decision on the national bargain
until the political and economic transitions had been more firmly under way"582
5^Public Against Violence was subsequently set up in Slovakia, cf Linz and Stepan, Problems, p.331.
576vodicka, "Koalitionsabsprache", p. 102
^77Saxonberg, "Vaclav Klaus", p.404.
578ln the Czech environment, Havel's attitude was also to an extent reminiscent of Benes's profound distrust
of political parties and partisanship (O. Krejci, History ofElections, pp. 104-107).
-^Havel, Summer meditations, p.21
580see chapter 3
1 Vodicka, "Koalitionsabsprache", p.102
582Leff, The Czech, p. 143
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Secondly, the institutional deadlock which was bound to result from the strict observance of
the 1968 Constitution could have been considerably reduced, provided the dissident elite, and
especially Havel, had endeavoured to have a reformed provisional constitution adopted by the
Federal Assembly before the 1990 elections, at a time when they still had the prestige and
influence to carry on with such a step583_ The integrity of Czechoslovakia was endangered
by "[t]he retention of a 'paper' constitution which ha[d] unexpected destabilizing and
paralyzing consequences when used under more electorally competitive conditions''^^.
Finally, a direct election of the president could have reinforced the legitimacy of the
presidential office and consequently the cohesion of the Czechoslovak state^ff However,
this was made in practice impossible because of the constitutional tradition inherited from the
First republic and perhaps above all because of Havel's reluctance to consider this option. To
an extent, the Czechoslovak case somewhat contradicts the commonly-held rational-choice
assumption that "constitution makers pursue their own individual interests above all else"586
since the popularity of Havel in the immediate aftermath of the revolution would have
without doubt allowed him to be elected president, with more constitutional prerogatives, at
the occasion of a direct election. Havel had an almost Gaullist attitude to political parties, yet
he failed to assimilate early enough the other tenant of the Gaullist approach to constitution-
making, i.e the necessity of a strong presidency.
Considering all this, the defeat of the dissident elite in the 1992 parliamentary elections is not
surprising. The anti-political idealism of the former dissidents-turned-politicians was
-^Elster, "Transition, constitution-making", pp.111-112
^^Linz and Stepan, Problems, p.82
5 ^There seems to be a general correlation between presidential powers and direct elections (for example, the
directly-elected French president has more powers than the indirectly-elected German or Italian presidents). The
case of Austria and Slovakia (where Rudolf Schuster was directly elected) indicates however that the link
between directly-elected and strong presidency is far from incontestable.
^°®Arend Lijphart and Carlos H.Waisman, "Institutional Design and Democratization", in A.Lijphart and
C.H. Waisman (eds), Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder;
Westview Press; 1996), p.6; See also John T.Ishiyama, "Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist
Eastern Europe", Political Science Quarterly, vol.112, N°l, Spring 1997, pp.95-115.
213
illustrated by an inefficient electoral campaign, a difficulty to communicate their message
and, as a consequence of this absence of political realism, the impossibility to compete with
highly organised political adversaries, such as Klaus's Civic Democratic Party or Meciar's
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. The most symbolic victim was the Civic Movement
which failed to reach the 5% necessary to gain representation in the Federal Assembly or the
Czech national council.
The importance of the elite change in 1992 can hardly be underestimated, and only 17
percent of the deputies of the Federal Assembly were reelected. As Eric Stein remarks,
[t]he extent to which the political establishment was swept away by the elections was
truly astonishing. It exceeded by far the usual postelection change in the American
Congress, and it was substantially more radical than the sweep resulting from the
1994 elections in scandal-ridden Italy, where 2/3 of the Parliament failed to
return...587^
The responsibilities of the technocrats or the "power of the powerful"
The dissidents' advocacy of "antipolitics" strongly differed from the pragmatic adhesion of
the technocrats to the concept of "non-politics" or "all-economics"588 Whereas Havel had a
moral vision of politics and conceived his responsability in term of duty and
responsability5895 Klaus and Meciar understood politics as a "fight for power"590 ancj
^^Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p.185. As Rod Hague, Martin Harrop and Shaun Breslin note, "[i]n most
parliaments, re-election rates are high...The success rate of incumbents in winning reelections is over 85 per
cent in Denmark, Germany, Japan, New Zealand and the USA. It is around 60 per cent in France, Great Britain
and Israel" (Comparative, p. 198)
-^Kare Dahl Martinsen, "Vaclav Klaus und die politische Stabilitat in der Tschechischen Republik",
Osteuropa, 44.Jahrgang, Heft 11, November 1994, p. 1069.
a speech to the Federal Assembly after the elections of June 1992, he emphatically declared : "I do
believe in the moral origins of politics as a service to our fellow beings. I do believe in the moral roots of any
purposeful human coexistence on earth. I do believe in civic values and civic community. I do believe in human
freedom. I do believe in democracy..." ("President Addresses Federal Parliament", FBIS-EEU-92-124, 26 June
1992, pp.7-8, quoted in Sharon L.Wolchik, "The Czech Republic: Havel and the evolution of the presidency
since 1989", in Ray Taras (ed.), Postcommunist presidents (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1997),
p.175.
590pauer, "Der tschechische Liberalkonservativismus", p.40
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refused to recognise the existence or the validity of a political ethics. In an article written as
early as September 1989 with his colleague of the Institute for Prognostics Tomas Jezek,
Klaus had already more or less stated his credo as a politician:
[w]e try to be led by pragmatic flexibility rather than by moralistic or ideological
fundamentalism. Sound reform measures should be guided by properly understood
and well-articulated national interests, not by abstract ideas^91.
The minimal involvement of the dissident elite in the electoral campaign was bound to have
as a consequence their defeat of June 1992, especially since their main political opponents
adopted on the contrary an extremely voluntarist and active attitude. A declaration made by
Klaus in April 1992 is in itself illustrative of the different political mentality of the two
groups:
I appeared in meetings on the average twice a week, and now, before the elections,
let's say six times...for me it would have been the simplest thing to play the role of a
technocratic finance minister who only contemplates the nuances of turning and
returning economic instrumentalities of the reform. But I realized in time -hopefully
in time- that I myself had to conquer political support... In the last meetings in which I
took part the halls were literally jammed and transmission had to be arranged into
stairways and adjoining rooms...592
Klaus considered himself in "permanent electoral campaign, always 'on the road'"593 an(j
was deeply aware that political success "required enormous political activity and hundreds of
591 Vaclav Klaus and TomaS Jezek, "Social criticism, false liberalism, and recent changes in
Czechoslovakia", East European Politics and Societies, vol.5, n°l, Winter 1991, p.39.
592yaclav Klaus, Rok-Malo ci mnoho v dejinach zeme [A Year : Little or a Lot in the History of the
Country], pp.9 and 13 (Repro-Media, Praha, 1993), quoted in Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, pp.186
593spiegel-Gesprach (Vaclav Klaus), "Wohlfart untergrabt Moral", Der Spiegel, 22/1996, p. 144.
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political rallies in the country meeting thousands of people, speaking in hundreds of local
meetings"594
The media presence of Klaus and Meciar was accordingly extremely important, rythmed by
daily appearances on the major Czech and Slovak newspapers and television channels, and
gave them a visibility among the population than the main leaders of the dissident elite could
not match595 Financially, the Civic Democratic Movement and the Movement for
Democratic Slovakia relied on far more resources than their competitors - the CDP having for
instance in the Czech lands spent 87 million Czechoslovak crowns, more than twice the
budget of the Civic Movement or the Czech Social Democrats (40 million each)^96
Klaus and Meciar were electorally successful, because they were prepared to sell their vision
to the electorate597 j]-^ indirectly led to the break-up of the state, since this second
generation of Czech and Slovak post-communist elites came to have a political and personal
stake in the division of the state.
The creation of the Czech and Slovak republics fulfilled the ambitions of Klaus and Meciar,
by providing them with a solid power base and offering them the prospect of becoming prime
ministers in their respective independent republics. The unfolding of the negotiations598
between June 1992 and November 1992, when the Federal assembly finally voted after four
unsuccessful attempts the law dissolving the federation, demonstrated the lack of readiness of
both leaders to compromise. Klaus, the free-marketeer had based its political credibility on
his capacity to manage a fast economic reform, while Meciar advocated on the contrary the
slowing down of the programme of economic reforms and insisted on the rather vague and
594jQaus in Mario I. Blejer and Fabrizio Coricelli (eds), The Making ofEconomic Reform in Eastern Europe:
Conversations with Leading Reformers in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (Aldershot; Edward Elgar;
1995), p.105.
-*95See for example Pauer, "Der tschechische Liberalkonservativismus", p.27.
5 9b(), Krejci, History, p.290. Abbey Innes {The Break-up ofCzechoslovakia: The Impact ofParty
Development on the Separation ofthe State; Cambridge MA; Minda de Gunzburg Center for European studies;
Harvard University; 1996; p.26) however estimates the CDP budget at only 75 million crowns.
597xhe expression "selling a vision" is a recurrent feature of Klaus's writings.




ill-defined notions of Slovak "sovereignty" or "international subjectivity"
("mezindrodnepravni subjektivita"599)
Klaus and Meciar had not only distinct, but also to a large extent opposite, political interests,
which they were unprepared to sacrifice to save the Czechoslovak state. The smallest
common denominator between them was that the break-up of Czechoslovakia was perceived
by both as serving their respective objectives. This explains why they agreed in June 1992 to
the formation of a caretaker federal government led by a member of the Civic Democratic
Party, Jan Strasky.
In many respects, there was between Klaus and Meciar not only a clash of interests but also a
profound clash of personalities.
Klaus is above all a very pragmatic and determined politician, whose self-confidence is
widely perceived as arrogance by his political enemies (but also his colleagues). His
international profile as a respected and competent economist undoubtedly explains why
Vladimir Dlouhy once described him as "top of the class"600 In sharp contrast, Meciar is a
natural "populist", a deeply "emotional" politician, who never forgives his enemies, is
capable of swift changes of opinions, and favours bluff as a negotiating strategy.
Klaus argued that a "working federation" was the only possible option if the common state
was to be preserved, whereas Meciar pushed for a confederal solution. Unsurprisingly, the
negotiations between such opposite characters proved extremely difficult and the two men
quickly agreed to disagree and started to discuss the terms of the dissolution of the state.
More generally, the "velvet divorce" also created career opportunities for a whole new
political elite, especially in Slovakia. The establishment of an independent Slovakia created
numerous highly-paid jobs in the civil service of the new state. For example, more than 1600
positions were made available in the diplomatic service alone, including 80 posts of
ambassadors paid in hard currency^Ol. It is difficult to imagine that the members of Meciar's
^^Novak, (jne Transition, p. 142
600jean-Luc Delpeuch, Post-Communisme: L'Europe au Defi, Chronique Pragoise de la Reforme
Economique au coeur d'une Europe en crise (Paris; L"Harmattan; 1994), p.73.
60 1 Vodicka, "Koalitionsabsprache", p.99
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Movement for a Democratic Slovakia who had just won the elections were completely
unaware of the personal benefits they could gain following the end of Czechoslovakia^*^
The same argument could probably be made as far as the attitudes and private interests of the
Czech politicians are concerned. For instance, the decision in 1992 to create a Czech Senate
was arguably intended to provide jobs for the Czech deputies of the Federal Assembly -and
indirectly, to "bribe" them into accepting the break-up*>03
The inability of Czech and Slovak elites to concur on the constitutional structure of a
"Czechoslovak" state was not only a post-communist problem but a constant throughout the
existence of the common state. It had however more harmful consequences in 1992, since,
after four decades of communism, the traditional "Czechoslovak"-oriented Slovak elite was
reduced to a minimum. The Soviet-inspired system prevented communication between
Czechs and Slovaks and Slovak leaders such as Alexander Dubcek but also more
significantly, Vladimir Meciar, had been educated in Moscow, and not in Prague.
Furthermore, contacts between Czech and Slovak dissidents during the 1970s and at least the
first half of the 1980s were extremely limited by the "normalisation" undertaken by the
communist regime604
The Slovak elite of 1989-1992 was therefore less likely to be attached to the maintenance of
Czechoslovakia, even if there remained a "pro-Czechoslovak" Slovak elite -of whom the most
influential members were probably Dubcek and Calfa^OS Thjs was nevertheless in sharp
contrast to the interwar period, during which the political elite consisted of a complex
"triangle"606 formed by the Czech politicians, the Slovak nationalists but also an important
number of what could be called "Czechoslovak Slovaks" (for instance, Milan Hodza, Ivan
602 zZw/.,pp.99/100
*>02Elster, "Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea", p. 191. This did
not however prevent Klaus to delay until 1996 the establishment of the upper chamber.
604 See chapters 2 and 8
605perjjapS not Coincidentally, Calfa and Jan Carnogursky, were educated in Prague (interview with Jana
Reschova, Prague, 14/09/1999).
606'fhjs concept has been extensively developed by Carol Skalnik Leff in National conflict.
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Derer or Vavro Srobar), because of their profound belief in the union between the two
nations.
Conclusion: the naivete of the dissident elite, the malignity of professional politicians ?
As a conclusion, it appears necessary to put the role of the Czech and Slovak elites in a
broader historical perspective^O^ Qne should wonder whether the break-up of
Czechoslovakia in 1993 was not the unfortunate outcome of a "betrayal of the clerks"608
This chapter has first tried to show that the post-communist dissident elite in power between
December 1989 and June 1992 could have been more proactive in its handling of the Czech-
Slovak conflict. The former dissidents which became self-made politicians after the velvet
revolution faced the traditional dilemma of the intellectuals engaged in political activity: the
difficulty, if not impossibility, to conciliate the categorical imperative characteristic of the
intellectual reflection with the practical, and often more down-to-earth, nature of political
life609 t0 an extent, the post-1989 dissident elite had forgotten the lessons of Masaryk, who
stated in one of his conversations with Karel Capek in 1928:
[a]s far as the intelligentsia is concerned, I am myself, as an intellectual, favourable to
the intelligentsia and its influence in the administration of the state but I believe in a
genuinely cultured, practical, and I would say virile, intelligentsia... A correct and
really intelligent intelligentsia has a real possibility to be the de facto guide of the
nation. Of course, in order to achieve this, it must use the institutions and conditions
k^For general studies of the historical role of Czech and Slovak intellectuals, see Hroch, Social
Preconditions, pp.44-61; Brock, The Slovak National Awakening; Holy, The Little Czech', Jacques Rupnik,
"Intellectuals and power in Czechoslovakia", Acta, vol.2, n°5-8, Winter 1988; Bernard Michel, La Memoire de
Prague.
60^To use the famous expression of Julien Benda {La Trahison des Clercs; Paris; Grasset; 1927).
^O^See for instance Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, in a Letter intended to have
been sent to a gentleman in Warsaw, 1990 (London; Chatto & Windus; 1990), pp.8-9.
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created by the democracy and, as a minority, it must be, I repeat, credible, it must
have a precise, practical, non Utopian agenda^®.
Significantly, the attitude of certain members of the dissident elite changed after their
electoral defeat of June 1992. The clearest example of this is probably Havel himself, whose
"language" uncontestably evolved between December 1989 and January 1993, even if this
was in a way a logical process since "one cannot, being the president of a republic, remain an
intellectual which expresses himself as such"611. It has been suggested that the main reason
why Havel did not attempt after his resignation in July 1992 a last effort to use his moral
authority to save the Czechoslovak state, was his wish not to alienate Klaus, on whose
support his election as president of the new Czech Republic was to be dependent^ 2
Despite their failure to prevent the break-up of the state, the former dissidents adopted an
approach to power that undoubtedly had many positive aspects, especially since their sense of
the moral duties of the "politician" could be said to have contributed to the peaceful character
of the division of Czechoslovakia. Havel is no Milosevic and Czech and Slovak intellectuals
did not inflame nationalist passions like their Serbian or Croatian counterparts^^ Perhaps
more importantly, regardless of their shortcomings, the intellectuals-turned-politicians
probably demonstrated that, to paraphrase the French statesman George Clemenceau, politics
is much too serious a thing to be left to politicians: Havel was naive in his handling of the
Czech-Slovak crisis, yet his intentions were hardly malevolent.
610cf Lidove Noviny, April 8 1928, Masarykuv sbornik, III, p. 167, quoted in Bernard Michel, La Memoire
de Prague, pp. 116-117 (emphasis added)
Pierre Mertens, "Etre ecrivain aujourd'hui", Transcultures, vol.1, 1994, p.5
612e. Stein, Czecho/'Slovakia, p.225; for a critical approach which stresses the taste for power of Havel, see
John Keane, "The Tragedy ot King Havel", The Sunday Times, 19 April 1998, p.10 and his biography, Vaclav
Havel. Many pro-federation Czechs and Slovaks have criticized Havel for his decision not to finish his
presidential mandate (which was officially due to expire on October 5 1992), and argued that his resignation
demoralised the people who still wanted to fight for the Czechoslovak state (interview with the Slovak journalist
Robert Kotian, Bratislava, 08/08/99).
61^0n the role of Serbian and Croatian intellectuals, see Slavenka Drakulic, "Intellectuals as Bad Guys",
East European Politics and Societies, vol. 13, n°2, Spring 1999, pp.271-277 or Dubravka Ugresic, The Culture
ofLies (London; Phoenix House; 1998). Drakulic for example describes Dobrica Cosic, the Serbian novelist and
one-time Serbian president as "a sad counterpoint" to Havel (p.273).
220
Tellingly, the Czechs and Slovaks still perceived the division of Czechoslovakia as a process
that, in terms reminiscent of the Munich agreement of 1938, was "about us" and took place
"without us"614 For example, a poll conducted by the Institute of Public Opinion Research
in July 1992 shows that 82 percent of respondents in the Czech Lands and 84 percent in
Slovakia agreed that the further existence of the state should be determined not by politicians
but only by citizens in a referendum^ 15 jn a previous survey at the end of 1991, 61 percent
of the Czechs and 65 percent of the Slovaks polled expressed their belief that politicians are
using the question of nationalism for their own purposes.
Table 6.2 : Politicians are using the question of nationalism for their own purposes
(in percentages)
Czech Republic (1,209) Slovakia (1,360)
Agree strongly 26 27
Agree somewhat 35 38
Neither agree nor disagree 26 25
Disagree somewhat 10 8
Disagree strongly 3 2
Source: Michael J.Deis, "A study of nationalism in Czechoslovakia", RFE / RL Research
Report, 31 January 1992, p. 12
Those responsible for the break-up of Czechoslovakia were not Havel and his entourage, but
the two winners of the June 1992 elections, Klaus and Meciar.
Their success can largely be explained by their willingness to ride the wave of Czech and
Slovak nationalisms, at the risk of the existence of Czechoslovakia.
The next chapter therefore considers the reemergence of nationalism in post-communist
Czechoslovakia and shows how the technocrats which replaced the dissidents in 1992 were
not only more "professional", but also more "nationalist".
^^D.Novotny, Une dangereuse meprise, p. 102
^^Wolchik, "The politics of ethnicity", p.178.
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CHAPTER 7
CZECH, SLOVAK AND CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONALISMS
Our thinking has been more deeply affected by totalitarianism than I would ever have
thought possible. We celebrate how quickly, elegantly and painlessly we rid ourselves
of communism. But now we've got the angry and vociferous builders of a new
totalitarianism coming at us with clenched fists. Today it's mostly the
nationalists..."Anyone who's Slovak / Czech should think the way we do, act the way
we do, and should always be with us". "Anyone who's not with us is against us" is the
central slogan of any totalitarian system...It rejects dialogue...compromise...and
tolerance, which allows for the existence of a reasonable option that is not one's own
Miroslav Kusy, 4 May 1990
Interview with Literamy tyzdennik^16
As early as 1990, the renowned Slovak intellectual Miroslav Kusy was warning against what
had emerged as a major threat to the renewed Czechoslovak democracy: the resurgence of
nationalism in political life. There was, according to Kusy, a risk that communist
totalitarianism would merely be replaced by a new "nationalist" totalitarianism. As many
observers have said, "[t]he collapse of communism left an ideological and political vacuum in
which ethnicity naturally emerged as an attractive and available foundation of a newly
defined political community"^ 7.
In fact, the end of communism -which claimed to replace the ideology of "nation" by an
ideology based on the concept of "class" and contended that nationalism was just an
ephemeral expression of class conflicts- paradoxically showed that nationalism was still
^^"Nationalism, Totalitarianism and Democracy : An Interview with Miroslav Kusy", in Whipple, After the
Velvet Revolution, p.240
^^Charles Kupchan, "Conclusion", in Charles A. Kupchan (ed.), Nationalism and Nationalities in the New
Europe (Ithaca, NY; Cornell University Press; 1995), p. 181.
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relevant and politically salient in Czechoslovakia , as well as in all the other Central and
Eastern European states.
Chapter 8 discusses the links between communism and nationalism, but the more limited
objective of the present chapter will be to examine the role played by the reemergence of
nationalism in the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
However, before developing these points, it appears necessary to provide a working definition
of "nationalism". Nationalism is in itself a deeply controversial and ambiguous concept: one
of the most prominent students of nationalism, Czech-bom Ernest Gellner, influentially
described it as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit
should be 'congruent'"618.
Tentatively, nationalism could be characterised as an ideology or political doctrine, which
acknowledges the nation as the entity to which the loyalty of any individual is due and
therefore purports to assert the nation's rights to sovereignty and to the formation of an
independent "national" state.
More specifically, in a binational state like Czechoslovakia after 1989, there was the potential
for the apparition of three nationalisms with conflicting goals -Czech, Slovak but also
"Czechoslovak"- and this proved fatal to the existence of a common Czecho-Slovak state.
The first section therefore considers the extent to which the disintegration of the
Czechoslovak federation could be deemed to be the consequence of an upsurge of Slovak
nationalism. At this stage, the use of nationalist and populist rhetoric by Slovak post-
communist leaders, and above all by the most influential of all, Vladimir Meciar, will also be
assessed.
The second section argues that interpreting the break-up of Czechoslovakia as the outcome of
the sole Slovak nationalism is reductionist: indeed, the fall of the communist regime was also
followed by an outburst of Czech nationalism, albeit under a different form, i.e the neo-
liberalism or "liberal conservatism" of Vaclav Klaus.
The third section then turns to one of the many paradoxes of the dissolution of the
Czechoslovak federation: after 1989, Slovak and Czech nationalisms were not matched by
6l^Emest Geltner, Nations and nationalism (Oxford; Blackwell; 1983), p. 1.
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"Czechoslovak" nationalism and this made it extremely difficult for supporters of the
common state to mobilise a wide constituency.
Finally, this chapter sheds light on the phenomenon of what will be called "ethnic
outbidding" which provided Czech and Slovak elites with a strong incentive to resort to
nationalist rhetorics to achieve electoral success. Czech and Slovak elites struggled to appear
more supportive of national interests than their competitors, with fatal consequences for the
Czechoslovak state.
The break-up of Czechoslovakia: the result of Slovak nationalism ?
Western journalists^^ but aiso scholars such as Martin Butora, Zora Butorova, Minton
Goldman, Leslie Holmes, Tatiana Rosova, Sofia Szomolanyi, Sabrina Petra Ramet or Otto
Ulc have argued that the break-up of Czechoslovakia was the consequence of the
reemergence after 1989 of Slovak nationalism620 Vaclav Havel himself once suggested: "[i]t
is the Slovaks who are founding the Czech state"621.
It is undeniable that there was in the immediate aftermath of the "velvet revolution" a
widespread wish among the Slovaks to reassert their identity: the "hyphen war" which
erupted in the Spring 1990 over the name of the country is a clear example of this, as is the
electoral success in June 1990 of the Slovak National Party.
619por an analysis of Western media perceptions of Slovakia, see for instance Adam Burgess, "Writing Off
Slovakia to 'East' ?: Examining Charges of Bias in British Press reporting of Slovakia, 1993-1994",
Nationalities Papers, vol.25, N°4, 1997, pp.659-682
620[viartin Butora, Zora Butorova and Tatiana Rosova, "The Hard Birth of Democracy in Slovakia: The
Eighteenth Months Following the 'Tender' Revolution", The Journal ofCommunist Studies, vol.7, n°4,
December 1991, pp.435-459; M.F.Goldman, Slovakia Since Independence (Westport; London; Praeger; 1999);
Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge; Polity Press; 1997), p.288; Sabrina Petra
Ramet, "The Reemergence of Slovakia", Nationalities Papers, vol.22, n°l, 1994, pp.99-117; Szomolanyi, "Was
the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia Inevitable ?", p.35; Ulc, "The Bumpy Road", pp. 19-33; Ulc,
"Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce", pp.331-353.
1 Jacques Rupnik, "1993: L'an I de la Republique Tcheque", in Edith Lomel and Thomas Schreiber (eds),
L'Europe Centrale et Orientale: stabilisation politique, reprise economique, edition 1994 (Paris; Notes et
Etudes Documentaires, La Documentation Franchise; 1995), p. 157.
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These two events are significant, if only because they illustrate the determination of the
Slovaks, after four decades of communism, to reinterpret and "reinhabit" their history: the
demands for the hyphenisation of the name of state were historically grounded in the fact that
Czechoslovakia was originally spelt Czecho-Slovakia in the official documents and peace
treaties of 1918, before the centralist constitution of 1920 renunced to the hyphen^22
Similarly, the Slovak National Party (SNP) was created in December 1989 as the alleged heir
of the SNP that existed between 1870 and 1938 and constituted a significant political force
during the First Czechoslovak republic623
To an extent, this repeated invocation of history could appear somewhat paradoxical, given
that the Slovaks have commonly been described as a "people without history"624: "[t]he
history of Slovakia has never been -except in a past so remote that it belongs to quasi-
mythical reconstitutions- a Slovak history"625 Even the great Slovak (if "Czecho-Slovak"
oriented) awakener and poet Jan Kollar wrote in 1846 that "[t]he life of the Slovaks is without
history...a numbing emptiness and a spirit-destroying wasteland prevail in their past"626
Apart from the short-lived Slovak Republic of 1939-1945, it is hard to find any evidence of
Slovak statehood, and therefore the Slovak past has often been prone to "nationalist"
interpretations and the creation of a certain number of national myths.
One of the most influential of theses myths that reemerged after the fall of communism is the
so-called Great Moravian Empire of the ninth century. As seen in chapter 4, a certain Slovak
historiography regarded the medieval kingdom as the first "Slovak state"627 jn his extremely
622-rhe name of the state was also "hyphenised" during the so-called Second Republic, which lasted from
October 1938 to March 1939, and under which the Slovaks achieved a status of autonomy.
623Szayna, "Ultra-Nationalism", p.543. See Milan Podrimavsky, "The Slovak National Party as a Political
Representative of the Slovaks (1871-1914)", Human Affairs (Bratislava), vol.7, n°2, 1997, pp. 159-166
624por a useful discussion of the concept of nation "without history", see Pierre-Caps, La Multination, pp. 13-
52.
625piiippini; '"Petite nation1", p. 177.
626jan Kollar, Hlasove o potrebe jednoty spolecneho jazykapro Cechy, Moravany a Slovaky, p. 108, quoted
in Pynsent, Questions ofidentity, p. 62
627gee chapter 4, p. 159
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controversial History of Slovakia and the Slovaks, the Slovak scholar Milan Durica even
contended that Great Moravia is the origin of the independent Slovak republic established in
January 1993: he derived from this that since the whole of Great Moravian Kingdom was
Slovak and included what is today Moravia, this latter region is still nowadays a Slovak
territory occupied by the Czechs628 This "appropriation" is not a recent phenomenon: under
the wartime Slovak state, it was common to find Great Moravia simply referred to as the
"Slovak Empire"629 However, there is no serious evidence concerning Great Moravia which
is in any case more likely to have been a state made of several Slavic tribes than a purely
Slovak state and, as John Morison put it, "[t]he claims of some contemporary Slovak patriots
that [Great Moravia] was the first Slovak state seem to be wide of the mark. Archeological
evidence suggests that its capital was in Moravia, perhaps at Mikulcice. Moreover the terms
'Czech' and 'Slovak' were meaningless in those days of predominantly tribal identity"630
Having seen that the claims of Slovak scholars that the Great Moravian Empire was a Slovak
state are based more on nationalist interpretations of history than on concrete proofs, the
Slovaks are mostly left with a history of Hungarian domination -from the fall of the Moravian
kingdom until the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918.
More importantly, the Czechoslovak state represents, according to a nationalist reading of
history, a period of Czech domination on Slovakia.
Therefore, the only period to which the Slovaks could refer to as a testimony of their
statehood was the Slovak state of 1939-1945.
As seen in chapter 2, the birthdays of Hlinka, the charismatic leader of the interwar Slovak
People's Party and Tiso (executed on 18 April 1947 as a war criminal) were proudly
commemorated. Similarly, 14 March, the anniversary of the proclamation of "independence"
in 1939, came to be regarded by Slovak nationalists as a landmark of Slovak history.
628as quoted in an interview with Dusan Kovac, La Nouvelle Alternative, n°48, December 1997, p. 15
629jelinek, The Parish, p.82
630j Morison, "The road to separation", in Paul Latawski (ed.), Contemporary Nationalism in East Central
Europe (Basingstoke, London; Macmillan; 1995), p. 67
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These celebrations of the wartime Slovak state are deeply problematic because of the dubious
nature of its political regime.
Despite the claims of Slovak nationalists that it was merely the expression of the legitimate
right of the Slovaks to sovereignty and independence and that its fascist elements were hardly
avoidable and even something of a lesser evil given the international context, the Slovak state
cannot provide the basis for a Slovak "civic" nationalism. It has rightly been considered as a
"watershed in the consolidation of Slovak national self-affirmation"631 but it also constitutes
the most tragic and shameful episode of Slovak history.
Even if the attempts to rehabilitate the Slovak wartime state were probably no more than the
fact of a hard-line minority, the post-communist Slovak political life nevertheless became
polarised around the "national" question: an objective discussion of historical myths matters
very little when leaders are prepared to mobilize them for their own political motives.
What differentiated the different Slovak political parties between 1990 and 1992 was their
attitude towards the (vague and ambiguous) concept of Slovak sovereignty. And, by the
parliamentary elections of June 1992, the four most important Slovak parties, the Movement
for a Democratic Slovakia, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Slovak National Party
and the former communists of the Party of the Democratic Left, were, to various degrees,
playing the nationalist card -even if only the Slovak National Party openly advocated
outright independence^2
The redefinition of the constitutional and political position of Slovakia quickly reemerged
after 1989 as the main item on the agenda of Slovak politicians. This was in itself not a new
phenomenon in Czechoslovakia, where Slovak nationalism had regularly reasserted itself:
most crucially, in 1938-1939 (when the Slovak Populists decided to ally themselves with
Hitler and declared independence) in 1945-1948, when the Slovaks struggled to replace the
"Czechoslovakism" of the First republic with the concept of a state of two equal nations
("equal with equal"633) an(j jn the Sixties, when the destalinisation of the country allowed
631 Leff, National Conflict, p.90
632]sjov£k5 jjne Transition, p. 136. See also chapter 5.
^^^See Jelinek, The Lustfor Power.
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the Slovaks to openly reaffirm their identity, eventually leading to the federalisation of the
state in 1969.
Slovak nationalism has been called "unrelenting"634 an(j populism has been a constant of
Slovak politics: "[a] characteristic of Slovak political life in this century...was the appearance
of a charismatic political leader who articulated not just Slovak interests, but above all
opposition to non-Slovak interests seen to be imposing their agenda on Slovakia"635
Kirschbaum explicitly refers to Hlinka and Tiso, but after 1989, one man became the
incarnation of this tradition, Vladimir Meciar636_ There is a continuity in Slovak history,
which implies that
[b]y presenting themselves as the interprets of past disappointments, one part of the
Slovak political leaders - Hlinka, then Tiso in the interwar period, Husak at the time
of the Prague Spring, Meciar during the post-revolutionary period - ... was able to
skilfully mobilise the masses and thus played a great role in the Czecho-slovak
polarisation and ...in the setting in motion of the process of disintegration, that
Czechoslovakia twice tragically experienced in 1939 and 1992^37
In this context, Meciar was undoubtedly the most influential Slovak post-communist
politician and his domination of the political stage was only reinforced by the
"personalisation" of Slovak politics638
634The expression has been used in the context of the First Republic in El Mallakh, The Slovak autonomy
movement, 1935-1939: a study in unrelenting nationalism
633stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Dilemmas of Democracy in Slovakia", Osterreichische Osthefte, Jahrgang. 38,
1996, Heft 4, pp.483-484.
^^One could also add to the list the names of Vlado dementis, Ladislav Novomesky or Gustav Husak, who
were tried for bourgois nationalism in the 1950s.
^37-\Vehrle, Le Divorce, p.242.
63^The American scholar David W. Paul talks about a "personality syndrome" to describe the strong
identification in Slovakia between political parties and movements and their leaders. He gives the examples of
the First republic Slovak parties, who were often better-known by the name of their leaders : Hodza's party
(The Agrarians), Derer's party (the Social Democrats), Razus's party (the National Party) and of course Hlinka's
Slovak People's party (Paul, The cultural limits, p. 199).
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Meciar emerged after the Velvet revolution to become Slovak minister of Interior on the
recommendation of Dubcek. After the first post-communist elections of June 1990, as a
member of the winning movement Public Against Violence, he was elected Slovak prime
minister. However, his real breakthrough on the Slovak political stage happened on April
1991, when he left Public Against Violence and, dismissed from the post of Prime minister
after allegations of corruption, founded his own party, the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia and became the most popular politician in Slovakia.
Meciar can be qualified as a nationalist and populist to the extent that he adopted a
demagogic rhetoric that tended to blame the federal centre and the Czechs for Slovakia's
problems.
This could be demonstrated at three different levels: in his economic programme and policies,
in his insistence on the concept of the international sovereignty or at least visibility of
Slovakia, as well as in his biased and ambiguous use ofhistorical references.
Firstly, Meciar began to claim, as early as in the Autumn of 1990 that the Scenario for
Economic Reform, adopted in September by the federal government and which followed the
radical "shock therapy" perspective of the then federal Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, was
"unsuitable for Slovakia"639
Meciar contended that the economic transition to a market economy engaged under the
supervision of the federal authorities did not take enough into account the "specificities" of
the Slovak economy. This argument was based on the fact that Slovakia was hit much harder
than the Czech lands by the economic reforms and unemployment.
Chapter 3 showed that the notion of a Slovak economic specificity is in practice difficult to
prove and rather contestable, but Meciar was able to exploit the economic fears of the Slovak
population. There was among the Slovaks a widespread feeling to be unfairly treated in the
process of economic reformat)
The nationalist option which consisted in blaming the Czechs for the economic problems of
Slovakia, was politically viable and Meciar unambiguously chose to follow this strategy. The
639Robert Young, The Breakup ofCzechoslovakia (Research Paper N°32, Institute of Intergovernmental
Relations, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada), p.7.
640see Ch.3 ; Petr Pithart, "The Division of Czechoslovakia: A Preliminary Balance Sheet for the End of a
Respectable Country", Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol.XXXVII, Nos 3-4, Sept-Dec. 1995, p.331.
229
electoral programme of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in June 1992 hence devoted
a large place to economic issues and asked for a redefinition of the economic reforms.
Secondly, Meciar gradually established himself as the most outspoken spokesman for the
notion of the international "sovereignty" of Slovakia. He insisted on making Slovakia
"visible" on the international stage and his emphasis on the necessity of some form of
autonomous international representation and status for Slovakia was one of the main reasons
for the failure of the constitutional negotiations after June 1992^41.
Finally, Meciar did not hesitate to resort to symbolic politics. He exploited national myths,
for example when he declared at the ceremony marking the Slovak declaration of sovereignty
on 17 July 1992 that the Slovaks had been waiting for this moment "for more than a thousand
years" - implicitly relating Slovakia's sovereignty to the times of the Great Moravian
Empire^42 Slovak constitution ratified in September 1992 (and sponsored by the
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) equally acknowledges in its preamble the "historical
legacy of Great Moravia"643
Slovak politics seems thus marked by what Marta Simeckova calls the " Janosik
tradition"644 Janosik is one of the most popular Slovak heroes, the Slovak Robin Hood,
executed in 1713 at Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas645_ He has been regarded as the "symbol of the
aspiration to freedom of the Slovak nation"646 as Simeckova points out, the myth
641 Stein, Czecho/Slovakia.
642cSTK, 17 July 1992, quoted in Obrman, "Slovakia declares sovereignty", p.25.
643"Constitution de la Republique slovaque", in Michel Lesage (ed.), Constitutions d'Europe centrale,
orientale et balte (Paris; La documentation frangaise; 1995), p.207; Pavel Mates, "The new Slovak
constitution", RFE/RL research report, vol.1, n°43, 30 October 1992, pp.39-42.
644fviarta Simeckova, "Sie schauen ins Feuer, sagen kein Wort", in John Pattillo-Hess and Mario Smole
(eds), Nationen (Wien; Locker Verlag; 1994), p.30.
645see for example Paul, The cultural limits, p.219
646perr£ai ancj Mikus, La Slovaquie: une nation, p.l 17
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conveys a much more ambiguous meaning: the tendency of the Slovaks to rally around
politicians perceived as fighting on behalf of the "Nation".
Meciar was in many respects perceived as a new Janosik, standing up to Prague and to the
Czechs in defence of Slovak interests. During the negotiations with his Czech counterparts
Meciar adopted an uncompromising stance and continuously strove to appear as the only
legitimate defender of the interests of the Slovak nation. This sometimes implied making
claims that he was sure the Czech side could not accept, such as the demand for an
independent Slovak membership in the United Nations or a slow down of economic
reforms"^. Typical of Meciar's attitude was his reaction to the short-lived Treaty of Milovy
signed in February 1992 and which he considered too centralist: Meciar called the agreement
"a betrayal of the contemporary national movement, a betrayal which is the peak of the
evasive tactics of the Democratic Party, of a part of the Christian Democrats, of the Public
Against Violence and of the Hungarian Independent Initiative [parties of the Slovak
govememental coalition which negotiated the agreement]. They have acted against the
interests of Slovakia"648 He further added that "[he was] afraid that in order to be able to say
that he has done something, Mr Carnogursky [then Slovak prime minister] sacrificed the
basic interests of the Slovak Republic, to be able to present a certain document that he was
able to get through. This is not allowed"649
Slovak nationalism is of a somewhat paradoxical nature. On the one hand, it largely derives
from an inferiority complex of the Slovaks towards their Czech neighbours^!) pp,e
impossibility for the Slovaks to relate to an autonomous history offers a sharp contrast to the
Czechs and fosters Slovak nationalism by increasing the importance of myths and symbols in
the national psyche. "Contrarily to the Czech lands, evidently present at the heart of the
construction of European humanism, Slovakia has some difficulty to find in its past the
^Tstein, Czecho/SIovakia, p.222
648wehrle, Le Divorce, pp. 142-143
649pBIS, 18 February 1992, p. 11, quoted in Young, The Breakup, p. 15
650Fiiippini, '"Petite nation'", p. 183. "[T]he Slovaks have had something of an inferiority complex toward the
Czechs ever since their political merger in 1918, and one of the primary reasons is the Slovaks' lack of a
centuries-old cultural heritage comparable to that of the Czechs" (Paul, Cultural limits, p.76)
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promises of a great culture... The Czech nation has its models and does not even have to
resort to myth to historically anchor its revival"^ 1.
This probably explains why after 1989, several Slovak "symbols" were so forcefully
reasserted. As discussed earlier, the question of the "hyphen" illustrates this but the choice of
the Slovak double-cross used by the Slovak state in 1939-1945 as the national flag^52j as
well as the noticeable process of "Slovakisation" of certain family names and places653 are
equally significant. However, the most potent symbol of Slovak nationalism is perhaps the
Slovak language itself.
Historically, as considered in chapter 1, the affirmation of the individuality of the Slovak
language has been a decisive feature of Slovak nationalism and after 1989, there was a
tendency to reassert the dominant position of the Slovak language in Slovakia, especially in
relation to the Hungarian-speaking minority. Two controversial language laws adopted in
1990 and 1995 established Slovak as the official language of the Republic. The 1990 law was
in theory favourable to the minorities and granted them the right to use their own language in
towns and districts where they constitute 20 % or more of the population^54 However, the
new law passed in November 1995 considerably reduced the linguistic rights of the
Hungarian minority and tended to reflect the rise of Slovak "linguistic" nationalism^5 _^s
article 6 for instance stated that "the Slovak language is the most important symbol of the
special character of the Slovak nation, the most precious value of its cultural heritage and the
expression of the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic"656
65'Micheline de Seve, "De la Crispation ethnique a l'ldentite Nationale: le cas de la Slovaquie", Politique et
Societes, vol.14, n°28, autumn 1995, p.92.
652ihere are some similarities between Slovakia and Croatia, which adopted as its national flag the heavily
compromised "checkered" coat of arms of the Ustasa regime.On the significance of national flags, see Eric
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention ofTradition (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press;
1983).
^^Andre Reszler, "Identite nationale et heritage culturel: le cas de la Slovaquie", Revue d'Europe Centrale,
Tome 1, N°2, 2eme semestre 1993, p. 163.
^^^Batt, The New Slovakia, p.33
655por a discussion of the concept of linguistic nationalism and of its role in Eastern Europe, see Bibo,
Misere, pp. 137-139
656quoted in Batt, The New Slovakia, pp.32-33
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On the other hand, if Slovak nationalism is thus subject to self-doubt and Slovaks often
appear to resort to myths to assert their identity, it also seems that Slovak nationalism is
based on the belief in the exceptional destiny of the Slovak nation. This is of course not
unique to the Slovaks (suffice it to evoke the messianism attached to Polish nationalism657^
but the self-assurance of the Slovaks differs from the Czech reflective attitude to their
national identity:
[t]he Slovaks appear to have a self-confidence about what a Slovak is which one
might compare with that of the English, Scottish or Welsh. They do not appear to
need the endless self-defining 'philosophies' of national history that the Czechs
have658
This is also what the Czech scholar Vladimir Macura acknowledges when he states that
"Czechs "often" feel "insecure about their 'conscious identity'...we are not Czechs because we
exist... our closest neighbours, the Slovaks, with whom we shared a state for three quarters of
a century, have no problems with their identity: they are Slovaks because they are
Slovaks"659
Slovakia has often been said to experience identity problems following the establishment of
the independent state in 1993^60 but the concept of Slovak statehood was in many ways
more firmly anchored among the Slovak population than the notion of Czech statehood was
among the Czechs. Arista Maria Cirtautas for instance emphasises the relative facility with
which the Slovak constitution was drafted in 1992 -especially if compared to the Czech
Republic. This did not overshadow the many disturbingly undemocratic ambiguities of the
Slovak constitution but, "[aljthough the regime emerging in Slovakia promises to be
profoundly anti-liberal, it is a regime based on a dominant collective identity and as such has
657por a discussion of the messianistic aspect of nationalism, Adam Zamoyski, Holy Madness: Romantics,
Patriots and Revolutionaries, 1776-1871 (London; Weidenfeld & Nicolson; 1999).
658pynsent, Questions ofidentity, p. 152
659qUOted in Pynsent, ibid., p. 152
660Batt, The New Slovakia, passim.
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broken through the institutional stalemate generated by competing elites elsewhere in Eastern
Europe"661. Significantly, whereas the Slovaks had no problem to find the name of their
independent state, the Czechs wrangled for some time in search of a name^62
This would tend to confirm that Slovak nationalism has been the main cause of a break-up in
which Czech nationalism, mostly self-reflective, self-effacing and politically insignificant,
has not been a factor.
The emergence of a post-communist Czech nationalism: nationalism with a neo-liberal
face ?
In fact, the "very existence of a conscious, purposive [Czech] nationalism, if not as a sense of
identity, then as an active force driving politics and policy" has been questioned^63
Since the days of Palacky and Masaryk, Czech "patriotism" has usually been associated with
a more universalist and humanist view of the world. Vaclav Havel further exemplifies this
traditional attitude when he writes that
[m]y home is the house I live in, the village or town where I was born or where I
spend most of my time. My home is my family, the world of my friends, my
profession, my company, my workplace. My home, obviously, is also the country I
live in, and its intellectual and spiritual climate, expressed in the language spoken
there. The Czech language, the Czech way of perceiving the world, the Czech
historical experience, the Czech modes of courage and cowardice, Czech humour - all
661 Arista Maria Cirtautas, "In Pursuit of the Democratic Interest: the Institutionalization ofParties and
Interests in Eastern Europe", in Christopher G.A Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki (eds.), The New Great
Transformation: Change and Continuity in East-Central Europe (London, New York; Routledge; 1994), p.50
662Bohemia-Moravia, "Cesko","Velka Morava" (Great Moravia), "Cesko-Moravska" or "Cesko-Moravska-
Slezska republika" (Czech-Moravian-Silesian Republic) were presented as alternatives to "Czech Republic".
See for instance Susan Greenberg, "A splitting headache", The Guardian, 28 August 1992, p.19 ; Jan Zielonka,
Security in Central Europe (London; Brassey's for IISS; Adelphi Papers n°271; 1992), p.3.
^^Leff, "Czech and Slovak Nationalism", p. 134
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of these are inseparable from that circle of my home. My home is therefore my
Czechness, my nationality, and I see no reason at all why I shouldn't embrace it
since it is as essential a part of me as, say, my masculinity, another stratum of my
home. My home is not only my Czechness, of course; it is also my Czechoslovakness,
which means my citizenship. Beyond that, my home is Europe and my Europeanness
and - ultimately - it is this world and its present civilization and for that matter the
universe.664
However, the "cosmopolitan" Havel can hardly been seen as representative of the average
Czech and the theory according to which the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1992 was solely
the consequence of Slovak nationalist separatism is reductionist and fails to acknowledge that
the reemergence of nationalism after the fall of communism was not a strictly Slovak
phenomenon, but also an integral part of the Czech political landscape^S
One of the most evident manifestations of Czech nationalism after 1989 was the electoral
showing of the Republican Party. Sladek's rhetoric included references to the necessity of the
maintenance of Czechoslovakia, anti-Gypsy and anti-German slogans as well as demands for
the reannexation of Transcarpathian Ukraine by the Czech state. These elements which
tended to make from the Republican Party "the ultimate protest group"666 WOuld therefore
also appear to allow us to define it as "nationalist".
However, the impact or influence of the Republicans on Czech political life has remained
marginal (the party did not manage to gain representation in the 1998 parliamentary
elections) and should therefore not be overestimated.
More indicative of the strength of the Czech national sentiment is the use that mainstream
political parties made of nationalism. Following the June 1992 elections, in the Czech
^^Havel, Summer Meditations, pp.30-31
665p0r an article which forcefully makes this point, see Sigurd Hilde, "Slovak Nationalism", pp.647-655.
This section limits itself to a discussion of Czech nationalism in the context of the post-1989 democratic
transition (for a general assessment of Czech nationalism, see ch.2).
^^Szayna, "Ultra-Nationalism", p.542
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Republic, the winning Civic Democratic Party (CDP) led by Klaus formed a government with
the Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA) and the Christian Democratic Party (KDS), two parties
which could be said to have based their electoral success on the defence of Czech national
interests.
The CDA advocated the idea of a unitary state and took an uncompromising stance towards
Slovak constitutional demands. Daniel Kroupa, the vice-chairman of the party, declared that
the federation was not viable any longer because of its adhesion to the "harmful" principle of
protection against the majority667 an(j the CDA therefore asked for a removal of the
prohibition of majority rule, described as a "communist conceit" and "allegedly incompatible
with membership in the European Union668 [n fact, it has been suggested that the electoral
position of the CDA as "the one mainstream champion of Czech nationalism"669 was the
main reason why the party narrowly managed to poll more than 5 percent of the required
votes to gain representation in the Czech National Council (it failed to win any seats in the
Federal Assembly)670
Similarly, the Christian Democratic Party pressed for a separation on the grounds that
Slovakia had become a burden and an hindrance to the success of the democratic transition in
the Czech republic. According to the KDS, the political developments in Slovakia
demonstrated the lack of democratic traditions of the Slovaks and the only solution for the
Czech republic was to go on its own671. Vaclav Benda, the chairman of the party, summed
up the general approach of the KDS towards the common state in an interview he gave to
Lidove Noviny on 1 September 1992 where he contended, talking about the June 1992
elections: "[i]n the Czech Republic, the democratic forces won a victory over the non-
667]y[iian Znoj, "The Ideology of Czech Innocence", Telos, n°94, Winter 1992-1993, p.159.
668stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p. 146 and 149.
^'hniies, The Break-up, p.25
670znoj, "The Ideology", p. 159. Being perceived as the defender of Czech national interests allowed the
CDA to differentiate itself from the ideologically close and more powerful CDP. Abbey Innes however argues
that, on the contrary, the failure of the CDA to enter the Federal Assembly can be ascribed to the fact that
"ethnic animosity toward Slovakia as such (as opposed to conflicts over constitutional arrangement) was
discouraged by the electorate" (ibid., p.5).
671 see for example, Znoj, ibid., pp. 160-161
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democratic crypto-communist left... But in the Slovak Republic, 85 per cent of mandates
were won by nationalistically or even separatistically oriented, predominantly left-wing, and
strongly anti-reformist parties. The election results confronted us basically with the decision
of whether we want another relapse of socialism in a common state or a democratic
development in an independent Czech Republic"672
However, the main carrier of Czech nationalism was in many respects the Civic Democratic
Party itself.
Behind his declared adhesion to practical politics and his refusal of the former socialist
dogma as well as of the "antipolitics" of the former dissidents, Vaclav Klaus made extensive
use of "nationalist" images and myths.
In several speeches, he tried to put his political actions in the broader context of Czech
historical and national traditions. For example, in an address he gave on 28 September 1992,
Saint-Vaclav (Wenceslas)'s Day, Klaus related the Western-oriented attitude of his
government and his policies of a fast "return to Europe" to the deeds of the medieval Czech
king and national saint, assassinated in 935. He described Vaclav as:
a prince basically more humane and educated than were his still semi-barbarian
surroundings; a prince, who, in the spirit of the faith that he took literally and
seriously, to the letter, strove to elevate and cultivate these surroundings; who felt that
from the West come not only attackers and conquerors but also, perhaps primarily,
bearers and communicators of values in which the life of the individual and the
existence of the state can be reliably anchored [...]. It is a tradition of Czech statehood
- I emphasize Czech and I emphasize statehood. It is a Christian tradition that pushes
certain values to the fore, such as humaneness and culture. It is a tradition linked with
Europe673
^^Liclove Noviny, 1 September 1992, quoted in Holy, The Little, p. 113
673yaclav Klaus, Rok-Malo ci mnoho v dejinach zeme, p.68, quoted in Kieran Williams, "National Myths in
the New Czech Liberalism", in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin (eds), Myths and Nationhood (London;
Hurst & Company; 1997), p. 137.
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After the achievement of independence in January 1993, Klaus still resorted to national
mythological figures, for instance in a speech in September 1993, in which he "suggested that
he was the new forefather Cech, surveying the glittering Promised Land of a successfully
transformed society"674
He emphasised the continuity of the Czech protestant and Hussite tradition by attending the
ceremonies commemorating the death of Jan Hus on 5 July 1993^75
More fundamentally, Klaus's vision of the Czech "return to Europe" via the unconditional
adoption of capitalism and free-market, "right-wing" economic principles masks a
"nationalist" reading of Czech history, which perceives the Czech nation as having a
"mission". As Kieran Williams explains,
Klaus makes pronoucements that conform perfectly to myths of national mission. He
tells his countrymen that they can make a great contribution to Europe just by being a
free people. What this means is that Czechs, located, (he claims) equidistant to
Maastricht and Sarajevo, can use their experience of Communism to warn the world
against the contructivist conceit. In particular, Czechs can warn Europe against the
dangers of the trend that Klaus claims to see in the West of pursuing vaguely left-
wing, interventionist policies, both nationally and supranationally in Brussels676
Klaus's political success marked at first sight a rupture in Czech politics, given the absence of
right-wing tradition in the Czech lands677 There are a few Czech historical figures
representative of a conservative tradition, such as Rieger, Kaizl, Rasin678j Kramar and Pekar,
^^^Kieran Williams, ibid., pp. 136-137
675Rupnik, "1993: L'anl", pp. 160-161
676k.Williams, "National Myths", p. 139
677jylares, "Ruptures et Continuites", p.79.
678Alois Rasin (1867-1923) was the first Finance minister of the Czechoslovak republic in 1918 and
conducted a policy of economic and financial austerity. Klaus explicitly acknowledges him as one of his
intellectual inspirations (Interview of Vaclav Klaus, "Tchecoslovaquie: Part des privatisations", Politique
Internationale, n°53, autumn 1991, p.216).
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but they never achieved the symbolic importance and impact of leaders like Masaryk679 or
even Benes^SO, who upheld principles close to the social-democratic (non-Marxist)
doctrines*^ 1. Moreover, it is also possible to consider the establishment of a Communist
regime in Czechoslovakia in 1948 as the outcome of a certain indigenous Czech (but not
Slovak) leftitst political subculture as much as the result of the external intervention of
Stalin's Soviet Union682_
One factor that explains why Klaus's liberalism emerged as the dominant force in the post-
communist Czech Republic was the widespread rejection after four decades of communism of
this "leftist-communist" tradition. More precisely, the crushing of the Prague Spring reforms
by the Warsaw Pact troops in August 1968 put an end to the credibility of the idea of a
"socialism with a human face". Klaus and his colleague Jezek could hence confidently claim
in 1989 that "[t]he faulty dreams from the sixties about the Third Way or 'socialism with a
human face' were definitely forgotten. What remained is our clear understanding that the
market is not divisible, that it is not an instrument in the experienced hands of central
planners, and that the invisible hand of the market is much better than the visible hand of the
central planners"^83
For all these reasons, by early 1992, the Civic Democratic Party and its allies of the Civic
Democratic Alliance had come to represent a rather outspoken position in defence of Czech
national interests in opposition to what they identified as the excessive willingness on the part
^^^Fran5ois Fejto describes Masarykism as a "radical-socialist" movement, mixing "progressist idealism,
free-mason inspiration, practical spirit, respect of authority and individualism" (Le Coup de Prague 1948\ Paris;
Editions du Seuil; 1976; p.52)
680por an insight on Benes's political ideas, see for example Z.Zeman, The Life ofEdvard Benes.
681 See for example Pauer, "Der tschechische Liberalkonservativismus", pp.11-15
682see ch.2; Rupnik, Histoire.
683vaclaV Klaus and Tomas Jezek, "Social criticism, False Liberalism, and Recent Changes in
Czechoslovakia", East European Politics and Societies, vol.5, N°l, Winter 1991, p.40.
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of some federal and Czech politicians to conciliate Slovak nationalism at the expense of the
federation and the Federal government's economic policies"*^.
Czech nationalism, meaning the awareness and defence of Czech national interests (as
opposed to Slovak or "Czechoslovak" national interests) thus became an important
component of post-communist politics.
Ultimately, it is therefore necessary to refute at least partially the idea that the division of the
state was the outcome of Slovak nationalism. There was undoubtedly after 1989 an upsurge
of Slovak nationalism, but Czech nationalism (mostly as a reaction to Slovak nationalism)
was decisive in bringing about the break-up of Czechoslovakia. A symptomatic manifestation
of the impact of Czech nationalism was the fact that most Czechs tended to blame the
Slovaks for the division of the state and became convinced that Slovak nationalism would
only be satisfied at the price of the federation. This state of mind incited the Czechs to strive
for a Czech, and not Czechoslovak, statehood, deemed likely to enhance legitimate
specifically Czech interests . Milan Znoj for instance stated:
there is such a thing as Czech nationalism. One of its remarkable masks is the
ideology of Czech innocence, which played its part in ending the Czechoslovak
federation. Central to this ideology is the thesis that "the Slovaks destroyed the
federation with their nationalism".685
One of the most typical exponents of this point of view was the Czech intellectual Ludvik
Vaculik, who, in an influential and controversial article entitled "Our Slovak Question"
("Nase slovenska otazka") published in the daily Literarni Noviny on 3 May 1990, argued:
By severance from the Slovaks, which is solely at our will, we will forfeit -judging by
previous experience- economic losses. Politically we will forfeit the Hungarian and
Ruthenian problems. We will place yet another boundary between ourselves and the
Soviet Union. We will have only one government. All matters will finally be
^^^Batt, "Czechoslovakia" in S.Whitefield, The new Institutional Architecture, p.42
6^Znoj, "The Ideology", p.158 (emphasis added)
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resolvable quickly and pertinently, without special regard for the Slovaks. Without the
occasion for the eruption of national disputes, we can perhaps introduce democratic
forms and methods more quickly. By ourselves we can undoubtedly catch up faster
with the more developed states. We will have more peace in the search for a life-style
resistant to aggressive commerce and consumption...Let us consider whether we can't
gain from the Slovak stimulus our own favorable opportunity to start a new life. After
three centuries of Habsburg subjection and seventy years of oppressing another nation
[we would ] live with a clean conscience and new horizons. As a matter of fact,
everything would be different ! 686
While Slovak nationalism has been diversely described as a "minority nationalism"687 or the
nationalism of the "small nation''^^ Czech nationalism was able to take the perhaps more
respectable face of the nationalism of a "dominant nation" since, for the huge majority of the
Czechs, their nation had already been sovereign since the creation of the Czechoslovak state
in 1918689.
There was a widespread confusion between Czechoslovak and Czech statehood and as late as
1991, Havel could still safely declare that "the idea of Czech statehood ... has very little
resonance in the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia...so completely is the idea of Czech
statehood identified in people's minds with the idea of Czechoslovak statehood that to many a
separate Czech state makes no sense at all".690
686quoted and translated by Leff, "Czech and Slovak Nationalism", p. 111.
687stanislav J. Kirschbaum defines "minority nationalism" as "the awareness of an ethnic group to wish to
work towards its own goals and to translate this awareness into political revendications, which do not
necessarily lead to separatism, but rather to the transformation of the State... separatism can become the ultima
ratio ; its realisation would indicate the failure of the State to adapt itself to minority nationalism" ("Le
nationalisme minoritaire : le cas de la Tchecoslovaquie" (Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science/revue
Canadienne de Science Politique, vol.7, n°2, June 1974, p.250)
688Filippini, '"Petite nation"'.
689Holy, The Little Czech, p.7 ; see also Jan Rychlik, "The Development of the Consciousness of the Czechs
and Slovaks and its Political Consequences", in Armand Clesse and Andrei Kortunov (eds), The Political and
Strategic Implications ofthe State Crises in Central and Eastern Europe (Luxembourg; Institute for European
and International Studies; 1993), p.274.
69®Havel, Summer Meditations, p.29.
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In a similar spirit, Vaculik summed up the nature of the assimilation made by the Czechs
between Czechoslovak and Czech statehood in the following way:
My frame of reference was the whole Czechoslovak territory; all Slovaks were
Czechoslovaks to me; I set great store by the Czechoslovak state course for the long
run, as well as the Czechoslovak flag and the two-part anthem, which they sang here
in Prague last year as one song. The Czech state did not exist for me, Czech symbols
and circumscribed Czech interest recede. I think that the majority of us are this kind of
"bad"Czech691.
In fact, "until 1990, the Czechoslovak state was sufficiently Czech to satisfy potential Czech
nationalists"692 but under the pressure of Slovak nationalism after 1989, there was now room
for a specifically Czech nationalism.
The break-up of the Czechoslovak state was therefore speeded up by the absence of a
"Czechoslovak" nationalism, which could have acted as a counterweight to Slovak and Czech
nationalisms.
The riddle of "Czechoslovak" nationalism
The immediate aftermath of communism saw the upsurge of both Slovak and Czech
nationalisms, which pursued goals implicitly or explicitly contrary to the maintenance of the
Czechoslovak state.
This might come as a surprise, since, as shown in chapter 6, opinion polls conducted between
1990 and 1992 showed the consistent support of the Czech and Slovak population for the
preservation of a common state and to an extent, the application of the principle of self-
determination, so often invoked by Slovak but also Czech politicians, would have tended to
691 Ludvi'k Vaculik, "Our Slovak Question", quoted in Leff, "Czech and Slovak Nationalism", pp.108-109.
^^Wehrle, Divorce., p. 103
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ensure the continuing existence of Czechoslovakia. As Alfred Cobban stated, "a genuine
desire for union ... [could be said to be] quite as legitimate an expression of self-
determination as the desire for separation"693
But, beyond this, the root of the problem seems to be that there was after 1989 no
"Czechoslovak" nationalism.
The absence of a Czechoslovak-oriented nationalism is in no way a new phenomenon, and as
early as 1969, Joseph F. Zacek contended that "[i]t is unhappily apparent that a
"Czechoslovak nation", a single community composed of the majority of Czechs and
Slovaks, sharing a "Czechoslovak national consciousness", and asserting a "Czechoslovak
nationalism", has never really existed"694 As a survey conducted between 28 May and 16
June 1991 demonstrates, Czechs and especially Slovaks, did not relate to a Czechoslovak
identity. Even if 71 percent of the Czechs also thought of themselves as "Czechoslovak", 74
percent of the Slovaks did not consider themselves "Czechoslovak". Furthermore, 61 percent
of the Slovaks who declared themselves "Czechoslovak" still predominantly regarded their
Slovak identity as more important than being Czechoslovak695
The lack of a widespread feeling of a "Czechoslovak" identity among the population had two
implications as far as the break-up of the state is concerned.
First of all, it was one of the factors^96 that made it difficult, if not impossible, for the
opponents of the split to channel a high level of support for the maintenance of the
Czechoslovak state. Czechs and Slovaks were not favourable to the break-up but they were
not ready to mobilise themselves in the name of a "Czechoslovak" ideal. This explains why
the appeals of President Havel to save the federation only received a lukewarm backing, as
6^3Cobban, The Nation State, p.263 ; see also Pierre-Caps, La Multination, p. 152
694joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", in Peter F.Sugar and Ivo J.Lederer (eds), Nationalism
in Eastern Europe (Seattle, London; University ofWashington Press; 1969), p.166
695seemingly confirming the "assimilation" between Czech and Czechoslovak identities, 55 percent of the
Czechs who described themselves as "Czechoslovaks" considered being Czechoslovak more important than
being Czech (AISA, Czechs and Slovaks, p.30) .
696<3ne other factor that will be examined in the next chapter of this dissertation is the general political
apathy of the population, one of the legacies of communism.
243
well as why the organisation of pro-Czechoslovak manifestations, on the model of the
demonstrations that accompanied the fall of communism and were characteristic of the velvet
revolution, failed to materialise. Jan Carnogursky remarks that "some organizations in both
countries tried to organize protests against the split in Autumn 1992, but their meetings were
poorly attended -only a few hundred turned out or, in the best case, between two or three
thousand. Trade union leaders raised the possibility in October 1992 of a general strike
against the split but the idea found no response among workers and was quickly
abandoned"697
However, the absence of "Czechoslovak" consciousness also had a more positive
consequence, since "no group in the state felt intensely enough about its continuance to raise
violent objections to its demise"698
From a broader point of view, the absence of a "Czechoslovak" nationalism served to
emphasise the fact that Czech and Slovak nationalisms had a intrinsic appeal and dynamics
that could be matched only with difficulty. As Havel reminded,
[pjopular outrage is systematically directed against federal institutions as the alleged
source of every kind of misery in life, while the good work they do for all citizens in
both republics is passed over in silence. It is so easy and, at the same time, so
irresponsible to garner applause by declaring in some public square that Slovakia has
been robbed by the federation. If I were to call out in a Czech square that the
federation is robbing the Czechs, I would no doubt be applauded as well^99
The nationalists-separatists were only a minority, but they were the most vocal and organised
of Czech and Slovak post-communists groups^OO Moreover, Czech and Slovak media
largely played up the increasing tensions between the two nations.
697jan Carnogursky, "The hesitant way to independence", Scottish Affairs, n°8, Summer 1994, p.29
698Leff, The Czech, p. 139
699HaVel, Summer meditations, p.41
^OORamet, "The reemergence", p. 108
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The "electoral use" of nationalism
The use of nationalist themes in post-communist Czechoslovakia was not the outcome of the
deeply-felt convictions of the new elites, but the consequence of the electoral appeal of
populist slogans.
Meciar and Klaus were more "pragmatists" than "nationalists": they resorted to nationalist
rhetoric but did so primarily out ofpolitical (electoral) interests.
The evolution of Meciar's attitudes towards the federation could thus almost read as a lesson
in political opportunism. Meciar is only what Kusy calls an "occasional" nationalist, which
uses nationalism "when he needs it and throws it away when he does nofi'701.
He started off by advocating a federation with confederative elements, but, by the summer of
1991, came to campaign for a confederation of two "sovereign", (subject of international law)
republics.
In 1990, he could still appear as one of the moderate Slovak politicians and overtly repeated
his intention to advance Slovak interests within the framework of the federation^OS In
August, he declared: "[w]e reject the accusations of trying to destroy the Czechoslovak
federation, if we want to destroy something, it is centralism and bureaucracy. We want to
change the federation to a better and more effective model"703 He equally firmly asserted
that "[a] split in the country must not occur, we see how nationalism develops in the USSR or
Yugoslavia"704_
The turning point in Meciar's thinking seems to have been April 1991, when, ousted from the
post of Slovak prime minister, he came to realise that becoming the champion of the Slovak
cause was the fastest and easiest way to get back to power, and founded the Movement for a
79'Miroslav Kusy, "Always Ready to Wave the Flag", (translated from "V. Meciar je cisty pragmatik", in
Lidove Noviny, 16 /06 / 1992, p.8), The Guardian, 17 July 1992.
702see for example Vaclav Zak," The Velvet Divorce: Institutional Foundations", in Musil, The End, p.254 ;
Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p.62
703Ramef "The Reemergence"., p. 103
^O^Svobodne Slovo, 20.08.1990, quoted in Innes, The Break-Up, p.19
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Democratic Slovakia on a much more nationalist platform: "[w]hen he was forced into
opposition, only one path was left for [Meciar] to fight successfully a return to power, the
national one"705
Meciar followed the lead of several other influential Slovak leaders which started to put the
Slovak question on top of the agenda. Jan Carnogursky, the chairman of the Slovak Christian
Democrats (KDM), for instance played the "sorcerer's apprentice"706? first fueling
nationalist feelings by promoting the idea of a state treaty between the two constituent
republics of Slovakia and choosing to resign from his position of deputy federal prime
minister after the first parliamentary elections of June 1990 to concentrate his political
activities in Slovakia^?. The use by the Slovak Christian Democrats of the "national"
question proved electorally successful, since by the municipal elections of November 1990,
the KDM was (briefly) the most popular party in Slovakia, winning 27 percent of the votes
and overtaking Public Against Violence: this probably constituted an incentive for other
politicians to adopt the same strategy708
What characterised Meciar appears to be not his nationalist convictions, but his political
pragmatism. As Sabrina Petra Ramet states, "[Meciar] had been striking a careful balance. On
the one hand, he had repeatedly avowed his commitment to the federation and had eschewed
any endorsement of separatism whatsoever. On the other hand, he had stressed nationalist
concerns and had won for himself personally the strong and enthusiastic approval of
Slovakia's nationalist groups. Thus, many people thought that Meciar was 'really' a separatist.
But Meciar's tactics were too convoluted to allow his protests to be taken at face value"709
^O^zdenek Jicinsky, "Das Scheitern der tschechoslowakischen Foderation" in Kipke and Vodicka, Abschied,
p.70
^^de Candole, Czechoslovakia, p. 11
707stein, Czecho/Slovakia., p.67
708 James de Candole however points out a difference between Meciar and Camogursky: according to him,
Carnogursky seems to have shared nationalist feelings, whereas Meciar skilfully exploited them.
{Czechoslovakia, p.l 1)
709s.Ramet, "The Reemergence", p. 107
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Similarly, the case of Vaclav Klaus is just as illustrative of a discrepancy between rhetoric
and practical actions. Behind his unconditional and unreserved advocacy of free market
policies, tainted by nationalist images, Klaus's actual policies were much more socially-
oriented: as Peter Rutland writes, "Klaus is much more a pragmatist than an ideologue. He
uses the rhetoric of neoliberalism, while pursuing a more nuanced economic policy that
preserves social harmony"^ 10. Thus, in practice, bankruptcy laws were not implemented^ 11
and the Czechs still benefited from a elaborate system of social protection and a "very
generous" social safety nef712
Klaus politically exploited the widespread support among the Czechs for a rapid "return to
Europe", and managed to translate it into economic terms with the underlying message: "only
economic reforms based on neoliberal principles will take us back into Europe". The name of
Klaus was therefore linked for many Czechs with the success of the economic transition to
capitalism. Klaus's policies were -deliberately or not- conducive to the constitution of a solid
electoral constituency in the Czech Republic: the most significant example of this is probably
the so-called voucher or coupon privatisation. By directly and massively involving the
population in the privatisation process, Klaus gained the potential support of many Czechs,
who now had an economic interest in the success of his reforms. This was further enhanced
by the fact that Klaus's signature appeared on each of the coupon books purchased by more
than 8.5 millions Czechoslovak citizens (among them 5,9 millions Czechs) during the first
wave of large privatisations in 1992^13 In an interview with the Spanish daily El Pais, Klaus
acknowledged: "the reform in Czechoslovakia is linked with my name" (and this even
included a television series called The Therapy ofKlaus)?34
^hpeter Rutland, "Thatcherism, Czech-style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic", Telos, n°94,
Winter 1992-1993, p. 103.
711 Rutland notes that a bankruptcy Law "was introduced in October 1991, but not a single sizeable [firm]
has been liquidated and the right of creditors to force closure only came into effect in April 1993". (ibid., p. 114)
^l^Marie Frydmanova and Hana Zelenkova, "Creation and Development of a social safety net", in Krovak,
Current, p.224.
^l^Eric Magnin, "La Trajectoire Tcheque de transformation economique post-socialiste : une approche par la
complexite", Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest, 1996, n°l (March), p.46. See also P.Rutland,
"Thatcherism", pp.114-115.
71^Interview with Klaus, "Yo estoy curando a la gente despues de 40 anos", El Pais, 21 July 1991, p.8
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Therefore, Czech and Slovak post-communist nationalisms are best seen as a "means of
conflict" rather than as a "cause of conflicts" between Czechs and Slovaks7^ -phe hardships
associated with the economic, political and social transitions from communism to democracy
allowed the new Slovak and Czech elites to exploit nationalism as an electorally-rewarding
tool, even it is hard to find evidence of a deeply-entrenched hatred between Czechs and
Slovaks716
Nationalism as a self-reinforcing process
Czech and Slovak politicians set in motion a dynamic that they could ultimately not control.
As Havel made clear:
[Slovak nationalism] is playing with fire, and it's a game that provokes Czech
politicians to do the same, thus further provoking the Slovaks. It is a vicious circle
driven more by vanity and spite than by an interest in the truth. It no longer matters
who started it; all those who indulge in it, without exception, are trifling with the lives
of the citizenship.
Slovak nationalism was the first to reemerge after the fall of communism, but it was quickly
(and somewhat logically) followed by a similar reassertion of Czech national identity, if only
as a reaction to the political developments in Slovakia. Ultimately, it was the Czech
delegation led by Klaus which took the final decision to divide the state, since it appears that
Meciar might have been bluffing during the negotiations in the belief that Klaus would be
willing to make concessions to save the common state. As Stein states, " Meciar ... did not
7' ^Blanka Richova, "The Disintegration of States-Myth of Nationalism: The Case of Czechoslovakia", in
Clesse and Kortunov, The Political, p.294
716Leff,The Czech, p.142
7^7Ilavel, Summer Meditations, p.41
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have in mind ending the common state. Indeed, to hold his popular support and affirm his
political power..., Meciar needed the common state, first as an enemy, the 'Prago-centered'
bully imposing a socially 'disastrous' economic policy on Slovakia, and, second, as a source
of federal funds required for the conversion of the obsolete arms industry and for economic
transformation generally. His tactic was predicated on a continuing negotiation and the belief
that the Czechs, Klaus included, would blink when finally faced with the prospect of a
complete split"718_
Meciar thus made unsucessful eleventh-hour attempts -such as the project of a Czech-Slovak
union which suddenly and rather mysteriously emerged on 21 August 1992 from the offices
of his party, the MDS -to secure some form of constitutional association between Slovakia
and the Czech Republic.
Conclusion
Nationalism became a major dimension of Slovak and Czech post-communist political life.
This development was not so much due to an intrinsic nationalistically-oriented resentment
between Czechs and Slovaks, as to a political context favourable to "ethnic outbidding" -i.e,
"a situation where competing elites try to position themselves as the best supporters of a
particular ethnic group's interests, each accusing the others of being too weak on ethnic
nationalist issues"^ *9
In other words, what came to prevail between 1990 and 1993 was intra-republican elite
competition: in Slovakia between Czechoslovak-oriented Slovaks and "nationalist" Slovaks,
and in the Czech republic, between Czechs favourable to the common state and Czechs who
declared themselves not willing to sacrifice what was perceived as Czech national interests to
reach a modus vivendi with the Slovaks.
Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p.222 ; see also Young, The Breakup, p.12
^ ^Stephen M.Saideman, "The dual dynamics of disintegration: ethnic politics and security dilemmas in
Eastern Europe", Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol.2, n°l, Spring 1996, pp.20-21
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And, as a result of the electoral appeal of nationalism, moderate politicians advocating the
maintenance of the federation, like the Slovak federal prime minister from January 1990 to
June 1992 Marian Calfa or Petr Pithart who was Czech prime minister until June 1992, were
often side-lined and branded as "traitors", accused of not taking the interests of their
respective nations into consideration.
Every issue became heavily "ethnicised" and considered from the "national" angle and the use
of nationalist myths and half-truths "provide[d] a 'transcendent' perspective on the present,
categorize[d] social problems, and bestow[ed] on them relevance, meaning, and moral value.
They effortlessly relieve[d] one of the need to exercise common sense or to take any
responsability, and they offer[ed] ready identification of those who bear the blame"720
By June 1992 and the second post-communist parliamentary elections, Czechoslovak political
life was polarised around the national question - "us" (the Czechs or the Slovaks) against
"them" (the "other" nation)721 . and the confrontation of Czech and Slovak nationalisms with
contradictory objectives had definitively established a pattern ofmutual scapegoating.
Such process was actually made even easier since Czechoslovakia was a binational state,
where Czechs and Slovaks tended to define their respective identities in direct contrast to the
identity of the other nation of the state^22 ancj where there existed no strong feeling of a
"Czechoslovak" identity, which could have fostered a civic "Czechoslovak" nationalism.
This chapter has thus endeavoured to demonstrate that nationalism undoubtedly played a
significant role in the break-up of Czechoslovakia. It has also tried to refute the argument that
the division of the state was solely the result of Slovak nationalism after 1989, by
emphasizing the existence of a Czech nationalism, essentially under the perhaps more subtle
and disguised shape of Klaus's neo-liberalism.
However, our conclusions have to be nuanced by two considerations.
720jift' Kabele, "Czechoslovakia", in Hans-Peter Neuhold, Peter Havlik and Arnold Suppan (eds), Political
and Economic Transformation in East Central Europe (Boulder, London; Westview Press; 1995), pp.78-79.
221 Holy, The Little Czech, p.9
222jhis point will be developed in Chapter 9.
250
9
Firstly, this chapter has deliberately adopted an intrumentalist approach to nationalism, by
stressing the extent to which the political elites can manipulate national sentiments to achieve
their political and electoral objectives^23 This could however be a somewhat reductionist
and partial view, since there were also, as previous chapters of this dissertation demonstrated,
some manifest historically-based grievances between Czechs and Slovaks, that made credible
and possible ethnic outbidding.
Secondly, as suggested by Kusy's quotation in introduction to this chapter, the reemergence
of nationalism in post-communist Czechoslovakia cannot be understood without referring to
the ambiguous links between communism and nationalism.
The next chapter therefore analyses the impact of legacies of communism on the break-up,
and more specifically investigates why nationalism became the "highest stage of
communism"^24-
723 See for instance the discussion by Daniele Conversi of the debate instrumentalism / primordialism in
"Reassessing current Theories ofNationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation",
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.1, n°l, Spring 1995, pp.73-85. I would tend to adopt on this matter
Anthony D. Smith's ethno-symbolic approach, which "aims at overcoming the distinction between
primordialism and instrumentalism by rejecting the axiom that nations may be ipsefacto invented and that
nationalism may be a purely a product of elite manipulation. Although nations are a modern phenomenon, they
rely on a pre-existing texture of myths, memories, values, and finally, symbols" (pp.73-74)
^"^Rupruk, L'Autre Europe, p.412
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CHAPTER 8
THE LEGACIES OF COMMUNISM AND THE BREAK-UP OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The traditions of all the dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the
living
Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire ofLouis Bonaparte^25
The struggle to overcome nationalism in the communist movement is the most
important task of Marxist-Leninists
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia^^
The fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe has been accompanied by the rapid
disintegration of the three communist-run ethnofederations, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union. This has often been taken as evidence that the impossibility to overcome
the legacies of communism was the most important reason for the break-up of the three
multinational states.
The purpose of this chapter however is not to adopt a systematic comparative approach, but
merely to consider how the specific case study of Czechoslovakia could be said to confirm or,
on the contrary, disprove this hypothesis.
In other words, we will try to critically assess the relevance of the argument according to
which, as for instance Bernard Michel put it, "what has provoked the fall of ...Czechoslovakia
^^Karl Marx, Der achtzehnte Briimaire des Louis Napoleon, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, Werke: Band 8
(Berlin; Dietz Verlag; 1972), p. 115
^26quoted in Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton;
Princeton University Press; 1984), p.xiii.
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is not the rejection of the peace treaties of 1919-1920... What has killed [it]...is
communism"727
This would indeed come as a further implicit refutation of the idea earlier exposed of the
inevitability of the break-up of a state doomed from the start because of the fundamental
political, socio-cultural and economic divergences between its two constituent nations, the
Czechs and the Slovaks.
Our (provisional) alternative hypothesis would therefore assert that the division of the
Czechoslovak state in 1992 was the result of four decades of totalitarian and post-totalitarian
communist rule, which disallowed genuine initiatives for cooperation and integration, and
during which Czechs and Slovaks became increasingly alienated from one another and
eventually openly voiced their mutual grievances after the velvet revolution.
A first section looks at the economic, political, "semantic" and, perhaps most importantly,
"institutional" legacies of communism in Czechoslovakia, and the way they have negatively
affected the prospects of a resolution of the Czech-Slovak conflict between 1989 and 1992.
The built-in flaws of the Soviet-style federalism "imported" to Czechoslovakia in the
aftermath of the crushing of the Prague Spring accordingly receives special treatment.
The second section - following (but chronologically preceding) the emphasis of the previous
chapter on the reemergence of nationalism in post-communist Czechoslovakia - considers the
ambiguous links between communist and nationalist ideologies in the Czechoslovak context.
The Czechoslovak Communist Party, despite its official commitment to internationalism,
often exploited for opportunistic reasons Czech and Slovak national feelings. The communist
regime adopted a strategy of "divide to rule" that made it even more difficult after 1989 to
reach a satisfying compromise between the aspirations of the two nations.
ichel, Nations et nationalismes, p.210 ; see also his article, "Tchecoslovaquie: le Divorce de Velours",
pp.27-37. See also for example: Anton Bebler, "Das Schicksal des kommunistischen Foderalismus:
Sowjetunion, Tschechoslowakei und Jugoslawien im Vergleich", Europa-Archiv, Folge 13, 47.Jahrgang.,
10.7.1992; Peter Ferdinand, "Nationalism", pp.466-489; Ferdinand Kinsky, "La Reconstruction de l'Ordre
Politique Europeen", in Les Donnees nouvelles de la Securite en Europe: L'impact de la reunification
Allemande (Monaco; Academie de la Paix et de la Securite Internationale; 1992), pp.63-70 ; Vladimir Kusin,
"The Confederal Search", Report on Eastern Europe, vol.2, n°27, July 5, 1995, pp.35-47 ; Lukic and Lynch,
Europe.
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A third section subsequently turns to an analysis of a phenomenon which has been described
as "chauvino-communism", i.e the fact that, in the former Soviet bloc, "many high-placed
functionaries discovered that they could salvage some of their political power by a rapid
ideological conversion to nationalism''^^
It will be argued that Vladimir Meciar could in many respects be defined as a "chauvino-
communist" -a manipulative and cunning politician who cloaked himself in the new fashion.
The legacies of communism and their impact on the Czech-Slovak conflict after 1989
The communist regime was quickly dismantled but some of its legacies were to have a lasting
impact on the political developments in the renewed Czechoslovak democracy.
This section will therefore specifically consider four types of legacies - economic, political,
"semantic" and institutional - which had a negative impact on the resolution of the Czech-
Slovak conflict between 1989 and the official division of the state on 31 December 1992.
The economic legacy of communism
Firstly, the economic legacy of communism was one of the important roots of the Czech-
Slovak tensions after 1989.
This could at first come as a surprise, since, as seen in chapter 3, it is widely acknowledged
that the communist economic policies were rather successful in their declared objective to
achieve an equalisation of the level of economic development of Slovakia and the Czech
Lands^29 Under the communist regime, the structure of the Slovak economy fundamentally
"^George Schopflin, "Nationalism and Ethnicity in Europe, East and West", in Kupchan, Nationalism, p.64.
Alternatively, Wojciech Roszkowski calls this phenomenon "nomenklatura nationalism" (see Wojciech
Roszkowski, "Nationalism in East Central Europe: Old Wine in New Bottles ?", in Latawski, Contemporary
Nationalism, pp.22-23)
729§ee for example Sharon L.Wolchik, "Regional Inequalities in Czechoslovakia", in Daniel N. Nelson (ed.),
Communism and the Politics ofInequalities (Lexington, Toronto; LexingtonBooks, DC Heath and Company;
1983), pp.249-270.
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changed: an overwhelmingly rural region in 1945, Slovakia emerged at the end of
communism as a highly-industrialised area. It was still lagging behing the Czech republic in
many indicators, but the gap had been by 1989 considerably narrowed.
Nevertheless, the nature itself of the communist-led industrialisation of Slovakia became
problematic after 1989. The economic development of Slovakia depended on a few
industries, such as the arms industry, which rapidly proved too obsolete to survive the
economic transition to capitalism.
This one-sided approach to the modernisation of Slovakia was not however a characteristic
feature of the communist era and it should be recalled that a significant proportion of the
(relatively rare) industrial development projects pursued in Slovakia during the interwar
periodic) were aiso centered around the defence industry^ 1. Similarly, during the short
existence of the Nazi-sponsored Slovak state, the armaments industry grew and new military
enterprises were established in Dubnica and Povazska Bystrica - mostly to further German
war aims in the framework of the "treaty for the Organization for Total War"
(Wehrwirtschaftsvertrag)^32
Moreover, one could wonder whether it is entirely fair to blame the communist planners for
this misconceived policy of regional development, when their intention was still after all to
modernize and elevate Slovakia. As Adrian Smith points out, economic inequalities between
the Czech lands and Slovakia pre-dated communism and their perpetuation should be
"^Slovakia was actually "desindustrialised" during the interwar period. Whereas 20.9 percent of the Slovak
population worked in the industrial sector in 1910, the corresponding figure for 1948 was down to 14 percent
(figures quoted in Adrian Smith, "Uneven Development and the Restructuring of the Armaments Industry in
Slovakia", Transactions ofthe Institute ofBritish Geographers, Volume 19, n°4, 1994, p.409).(see also Zora
P.Pryor, "Czechoslovak Economic Development", p.211)
^^^Adrian Smith, Reconstructing, p.101.
732yudit Kiss, "Lost Illusions ? Defence Industry Conversion in Czechoslovakia, 1989-92", Europa-Asia
Studies, vol.45, n°6, 1993, p.1047 ; Jorg K. Hoensch, "The Slovak Republic, 1939-1945", in Mamatey and
Luza, A History, pp.281-282; A.Smith, Reconstructing. There are in fact also strategic reasons for the
localisation of an armaments industry in Slovakia. As Smith points out, the Soviets, like the Germans before
them , recognised the value of Central Slovakia, - after 1945, "a geopolitically safe region away from the front
line of the Cold War and closer to the 'security' of the Soviet border" (pp. 103-104)
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analysed as part of a broader historical pattern of uneven development between the two
regions^ 3 _
Despite these two caveats then, as discussed earlier"^^ Slovakia was much more affected by
the economic reforms than the Czech lands, and this undoubtedly fueled resentments between
Czechs and Slovaks.
The political and social legacies of communism
However, the political legacies of communism were probably even more harmful to the
integrity of the Czechoslovak state than its economic legacies.
Communism, based on the monopoly of power of the Communist Party, did not allow (with
the partial exception of the Prague Spring) the expression of competing political and social
interests.
This had after 1989 several adverse consequences on the attempts to find a viable solution to
the Czech-Slovak conflict.
Firstly, as seen in chapter 6, post-communist Czechoslovakia suffered from a dearth of
experienced, trained politicians or lawyers, able to address effectively the issue of the
constitutional relation between the Czech republic and Slovakia. Policy-making on this
crucial issue was inevitably left in the benevolent, but unfortunately amateurish hands of the
former dissidents. Havel acknowledged after the division of the state that
we [the Czech and Slovak post-communist leaders] were all amateurs at governing-
Writers, doctors, philosophers, economists were suddenly pressed into service. Forty





Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, communism had a highly negative moral impact.
This was once again repeatedly noted by Havel, perhaps nowhere more eloquently than in his
first New Year's address as Czechoslovak president in January 1990:
The worst thing is that we live in a contaminated moral environment. We fell morally
ill because we became used to saying something different from what we thought. We
learned not to believe in anything, to ignore each other, to care only about ourselves.
Concepts such as love, friendship, compassion, humility, or forgiveness lost their
depth and dimensions, and for many of us they represented only psychological
pecularities, or they resembled gone-astray greetings from ancient times, a little
ridiculous in the era of computers and spaceships'^-^
After the fall of communism, necessary attributes of a genuine democratic polity such as
tolerance and the habit of compromise were absent. The Czech and Slovak elites who tried
between 1990 and 1992 to renegotiate the constitutional structure of the common state were
unwilling to compromise and political divergences were often narrowly perceived in terms of
"betrayals" or personal antagonisms. Post-communist politicians proved unable to look for or
put forward much-needed innovative and creative solutions to the institutional deadlock.
Thirdly, the bequest of an era where politics was the exclusive preserve of apparatchiks of
the Communist Party was the widespread disillusion of the population. Timothy Garton Ash
claimed in an essay written before the revolution of 1989 that he had never visited "a country
where politics, and indeed the whole of public life, is a matter of such supreme
indifference"737
In the immediate aftermath of the fall of communism, the interest and participation of the
population in the political life seemed reborn: 96 percent of the Czechs and 94.41 percent of
^-^Thomas J.Abercrombie, "Czechoslovakia: The Velvet Divorce", National Geographic, September 1993,
p. 15. See also chapter 6.
736y^clav Havel, "New Year's Address" January 1990, in Open Letters, p.391
^Timothy Garton Ash, "Czechoslovakia Under the Ice", in The Uses ofAdversity, p.63
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the Slovaks cast their votes during the first post-communist free parliamentary elections held
in June 1990 -more than in the corresponding elections in Poland and Hungary^^^.
But this enthusiasm remained short-lived. There was a consistent level of support among the
Czechs and Slovaks for the maintenance of a common state^39? but the political apathy of the
population made impossible the transformation of this latent feeling into a massive and active
display of "Czechoslovak patriotism", which could have had an impact on the constitutional
negotiations.
Furthermore, Czechs and Slovaks also inherited from the communist era a fundamentally
cynical vision of their political leaders and of the influence they could exert as individuals on
the political life of their country. For instance, whereas 58 percent of the Americans and 46
percent of the Swiss thought that they had an influence on their government, only 23 percent
of the Czechs and 22 percent of the Slovaks believed they could have a say (see table 2.3).
After the experience of communism, Czech and Slovak electors often did not realise that in
the second post-communist parliamentary elections of June 1992 their votes would this time
matter and the separation came as a shock to those who still thought that, as under the
communist regime, "politicians never actually mean what they say".
Ultimately, the most damaging socio-political legacy of communism was probably the lid it
put for forty years (with the partial exception of the Prague spring) on Czechoslovak civil
society740 The embryos of civil society that timidely reemerged in the Czech lands and
Slovakia during the second half of the seventies often conducted the majority of their
activities in only one of the two republics. Czech and Slovak dissidents were engaged in a
parallel struggle against the monopoly of power of the communist regime, but remained only
occasionally in contact with each other.
738oanica Fink-Hafner, "Political Culture in a Context of Democratic Transition: Slovenia in Comparison
with other Post-Socialist Countries", in Plasser and Pribersky, Political Culture, pp.74-75.
7-^See chapter 6
^^^Ernest Gellner for example contends in Conditions ofLiberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (London;
Penguin Books; 1996), that Marxism and civil society are inherently incompatible. See also Jeffrey C.Goldfarb,
Civility and Subversion: the Intellectual in Democratic Society (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press;
1998), p.90.
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As discussed in chapter 2, this was not so much the result of a concerted and overt
unwillingness to cooperate as a reflection of the fact that the communist regime effectively
managed for a long time to prevent the establishment of contacts and the holding of meetings
between Czech and Slovak activists'^.
"Socialist" cultural policies in effect enhanced the isolation of Czech and Slovak societies.
Despite the official claims that the communist regime had reinforced the cultural exchanges
between Czechs and Slovaks742) it was in practice easier for Czech political ("official") and
dissident elites to meet their Soviet, Polish or Hungarian colleagues than their Slovak
counterparts - and vice versa.
The Czech intellectual Zdenek Eis for instance observed in 1968 that whereas the
departments of Russian had experienced a considerable development within Czech
universities, the study of Slovak language and culture lagged significantly behind. From the
Slovak side, Anton Hykisch similarly complained that "Slovak culture must often be exported
to Prague or Pardubice with absolutely the same efforts and mechanisms than those used to
export it to Kiev, Warsaw or Montreal"743.
The "semantic" legacy of communism
The third legacy of communism could be called "semantic".
Under the communist regime, language was used merely as an instrument of artificial
legitimisation of the political system. Words became imbued with ideological significance
and lost in the process their capacity to convey real, credible meanings.
Havel, as early as 1965, talked about the "ritualization of language" and contended that
34 1 See chapter 2 ; Vaclav Havel, Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvizdala (London;
Faber; 1990), pp. 136-137.
342 josef Korcak, prime minister of the Czech republic, for instance declared in 1978 that he was "happy"
that "Czech theatre plays, books and music meet with an always larger audience among Slovaks and the reverse
is equally true" (in Tvorba 34, 23/ 09/1978), pp.3,5, quoted in Wehrle, Le Divorce, pp.235-236).
343\yehrle, Le Divorce, p.235
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From being a means of signifying reality, and of enabling us to come to an
understanding of it, language seems to have become an end in itself. In this process,
language - and, because it is related to it, thought as well - may appear to have
increased (the duty to name things having been superseded by the duty to qualify
things ideologically), but in fact language is thus degraded: the imputation to language
of functions that are not proper to it made it impossible for language to fulfill the
function it was meant to fulfill. And thus, ultimately, language is deprived of its most
essential importance... The word - as such- has ceased to be a sign for a category, and
has gained a kind of occult power to transform one reality into another744 _
The general confusion of terms brought about by communism did not simply wither away
with the communist regime in 1989 and it consistently permeated the debates between Czechs
and Slovaks.
The most relevant illustration of this phenomenon is perhaps the controversy surrounding
concept of "authentic federation"^45 -much used after the "velvet revolution", when a chance
to save Czechoslovakia still existed. Czechs and Slovaks agreed that the federalisation
officially introduced by the communist regime in January 1969 was not viable under the new
political circumstances but their understanding of what an "authentic federation" actually
meant was deeply contradictory. Whereas the Czechs tended to stress, in a manner
reminiscent of the Prague Spring slogan "no federalisation without democratization", that
democracy in itself should be a guarantee against the centralisation of the state, the Slovaks
insisted on a "grassroot federation", i.e a federation in which "the basis of sovereignty is the
sovereignty of each of the two national republics, to which the sovereignty of the federation is
delegated"746 There was thus a clear opposition between the Czech insistance on the notions
744v^clav Havel, "On Evasive Thinking", in Open Letters, p.12 ; L'Angoisse de La Liberte, p.l 1. See also
his essay, "A Word About Words" (Open Letters, pp.377-389).
745Leff, The Czech, p. 129
74^Dusan Nikodym, "Bez suverenity niet naroda", Verejnost (2 June 1990) and "Sanca pre Slovensko",
Verejnost (29 May 1990), quoted in Leff, "Czech and Slovak nationalism", p. 146.
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of individual civil rights and majority rule and Slovak advocacy of collective rights and of a
"federation re-negotiated 'from below"'747_
This debate about the meaning of "federation" was an indirect consequence of the communist
period because "the most noble juridical terms in the West have been distorted by the
propaganda and the wooden language and, for the most part, ended up signifying the contrary
of their real meaning"748 The concept of "federation" was discredited, not because it was in
itself unacceptable or inadequate in the Czechoslovak context, but above all because the
Czechoslovak federation had been primarily "communist".
The institutional legacies of communism: the flaws of Soviet-style federalism
This leads us to examine more specifically the institutional legacies of communism, i.e the
fact that the Czechoslovak federation was largely a "fake" or a "paper" federation.
On the one hand, the federalisation had undeniably some genuine and positive federative
elements. It answered the long-standing wish of the Slovaks to be the "equals" of the Czechs
and enhanced their constitutional and political position within the state. The prohibition of the
majority rule and the recognition of the principle of parity in the legislative organs'^ COuld
ensure that the Slovaks had a say in the policies of the federal centre.
The communist federation was even arguably too "efficient", since the prohibition of
majority-rule gave a disproportionate representation to the Slovaks. After 1989, it allowed the
747Batt, "Czechoslovakia" in Whitefield, The new institutional architecture, p.52
74°Michel, Nations et nationalism.es, p.210
749"The principle of parity was honored in the composition of federal committees, the constitutional courts,
and, to a lesser extent, in the structure and procedures of the National Assembly. Parity was not, however, the
basis for ministerial and government appointments. Within these agencies, despite measures to ensure Slovak
representation, simple majority rule prevailed" (Leff, National Conflict, p. 127). See also Wehrle, Le divorce,
p.69.
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new-democratically elected Slovak representatives to dispose of a de facto veto power on the
federal authorities and block the attempts to find a constitutional solution to the Czech-Slovak
conflict.
On the other hand however, the appearance of a working federation hid between January
1969 and December 1989, the predominance of the Communist party, its leading role as a
"vanguard", as well as the strict application of the concept of "democratic centralism" - once
rather bluntly defined by a Soviet theoretician as:
the main principle on the basis of which the life of our society, its economy, social
sphere, state and party systems are formed. The basis of this principle is centralism,
the addition "democratic" being used only to soften it a little. The essence of this
principle is the priority of the centre in relation to all the other levels, which permeates
the entire theory, politics and practice^!).
The Czechoslovak socialist federation was "federal in form", but "centralist in substance"^ 1^
and one of its major flaws was the non-federalisation of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.
There was initially some talks of establishment of a permanent Czech Party Bureau^^ on
the model of the Slovak Communist Party, but during the plenum of the Central Committee
of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in May 1969 -hardly five months after the official
federalisation of the country - Gustav Husak put a definitive end to this project, when he
unambiguously declared:
^^^A.Yemelyanov as quoted by Miervaldis Ramans, "Socialist federalism: Federalism and Democratic
Centralism" in Alastair McAuley (ed.), Soviet Federalism, Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation
(Leicester; Leicester University Press; 1991), pp.128-129 (emphasis added).
'Kirschbaum, A History ofSlovakia, p.245.
Williams, The Prague Spring, p. 156.
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[t]he party is not federalized; on the contrary, it is unified, and we [the Czechoslovak
Communist Party] are responsible for the work of communists at all levels, federal as
well as national755.
This continuing asymmetry of the party institutions limited the impact of a federalisation
process already restricted by the constitutional amendments adopted in 1970 and 1971 in the
context of the post-Dubcek "normalization". The Czechs came to feel that they were
discriminated against and that the dual federation gave an unduly influence to the Slovaks,
who constituted only one third of the population of the country75 \ To an extent, as Lloyd
Cutler and Herman Schwartz pointed out, it seems indeed hard to find anywhere in the world
a federative structure which gave so much political leverage to a minority755.
Yet even the Slovaks, a priori the main beneficiaries of the federalisation, grew increasingly
dissatisfied with its actual working. The state was officially a federation of two equal nations
but they still perceived the influence of the Czechs as dominant and experienced a strong
feeling of relative deprivation.
For all these reasons, the federalisation discontented the two nations and had the unintended
consequence that "the Czechs now felt that they were being governed by the Slovaks, while
the Slovaks thought that it was once again 'Prague' that was depriving them of genuine home
rule"756.
Czechoslovakia suffered from the ills characteristic of Soviet-style federalism. In the context
of the country's enrolment in the Soviet bloc,
there was no inherent ideological difficulty in legitimizing federation in accordance
with Leninist principles and Soviet practice. The only roadblock to federation had
been government insistence that the national question was already solved; once this
753Rude Pravo, 2 June 1969, quoted in R.Dean, Nationalism and Political Change, p.41.
734jo be more precise, less than that, since the Slovak republic is far from being ethnically homogeneous
and is also inhabited by several minorities, the most important of them being the Hungarians (more than 10
percent of the population of the republic)
755cutler and Schwartz, "Constitutional Reform", p.549
756yiadimir Kusin, quoted in ibid., p.520
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position was abandoned, the 'Leninist principles and the experience of the Soviet
multinational state' were an irresistible precedent"^
The Czechoslovak constitution -in contrast to the 1977 Soviet constitution (article 72)758.
did not grant its constituent republics the right to secede^ 9 it still followed Soviet
practice and specifically included two provisions that reinforced the Czech-Slovak cleavage.
Firstly, as noted earlier, because the federalisation of the state was not accompanied by a
corresponding federalisation of the Czechoslovak communist party and the creation of a
branch in the Czech lands next to the Slovak party, the organisation of the Czechoslovak
party duplicated the asymmetrical structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
where each of the constituent republics of the USSR -except Russia- had its own Communist
party760
In September 1968, when after the crushing of the Prague Spring, the Czechoslovak
leadership (then still led by Dubcek) argued with the Soviet Politburo that the creation of a
Communist Party of the Czech Lands was a necessary step towards federalisation, Leonid
Brezhnev opposed the move, not only because it would have constituted an "inexplicable
departure" from the Soviet model, but also because it could potentially lead to "unhealthy
feelings of a nationalist character"761.
7^7Leff) National Conflict, p. 124 ; for example, the Slovak historian Milos Gosiorovsky drew a plan for the
creation of a federation in Czechoslovakia, emphasizing the fact that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were
both federal states and arguing that "the Slovak nation was the only Slavic nation in the socialist camp that did
not have national organs of socialist state power" (Milos Gosiorovsky, Historicky casopis, XVI, 1968, n°3, 354,
quoted in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Federalism in Slovak Communist Politics", Canadian Slavonic Papers /
Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, n°4, 19, 1977, p.459)
758-rhe article 72 of the 1977 Soviet constitution thus states that "Each Union Republic shall retain the right
freely to secede from the USSR" (see for instance Jane Henderson, "Legal Aspects of the Soviet Federal
Structure", in McAuley, Soviet Federalism, p.36)
759Leff notes that it was felt that the right of secession would be inapplicable in a binational, as opposed to a
multinational state (National Conflict, p. 124). In any case, it seems fair to acknowledge that the right to secede
granted to the Soviet union republics was purely formal (see for instance Michael Bruchis, "The National Policy
of the CPSU and its Reflection in Soviet socio-political terminology", Illrd World Congress for Soviet and East
European Studies, Washington, 1985, pp.6-7)
760r seems however interesting to note that in the third communist ethnofederation, Yugoslavia, the
"dominant" Serb republic had its own communist party (called League of Communists).
761 This episode is related in K.Williams, The Prague Spring, p. 159
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Brezhnev's justification appears in retrospect ironical, since the non-federalisation of the
Czechoslovak party unwittingly reestablished the preexisting divide between the dominant
Czech nation (who did not "need" an autonomous party) and the "inferior" Slovak part of the
state (whose subordinate status was implicitly acknowledged by the "gift" of an
"independent" Slovak Communist party). Slovaks came to perceive the Czechoslovak
Communist party as in essence a "Czech" communist party762? committed to the defense of
Czech interests, while Czechs were precisely able to deplore the absence of a party organ
specifically devoted to these same "Czech" interests763.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Czechoslovak federalism was based, once again in
accordance with Soviet practice, on ethnoterritorial units. From 1969 to 1992,
Czechoslovakia was a bipartite ethnofederation, where federal (republican) boundaries were
congruent with national (Czech and Slovak) boundaries . Like in the Soviet Union, the
national principle was put at the centre of the Czechoslovak federal structure^64
This is important because, as demonstrated by Robert Kaiser in the context of the USSR7655
it institutionalised and consolidated the dominance of Czechs and Slovaks in their respective
republics: the Czech socialist republic (Ceska Socialistickd Republika) and the Slovak
socialist republic (Slovenska Socialistickd Republika) became the geographical "homelands"
and the "virtual nation-states" of the two nations.
This "national territoriality" became politically relevant after the velvet revolution, when
democratisation allowed it to become a determining factor in Czech and Slovak political life.
For post-communist politicians, "national territoriality" had the explosive potential to become
"a politically mobilizing strategy to gain greater sovereignty for the nation in its perceived
^^Leff, National Conflict, p. 123
763p0r example, some anonymous authors writing in the review Listy stated that the independent existence of
the Slovak Communist Party established "a new, inverted asymmetry" - in which Slovaks had their own secure
base while retaining the capacity, acting through the federal party apparat, to "meddle in Czech affairs", (see
Leff, ibid., p.246)
764see Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923
(Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press; 1954), p.l 12.
765see Robert Kaiser, The Geography ofNationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton; Princeton
University Press; 1994).
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homeland"766 _a sure r0ute to electoral success. This explains why Meciar and Klaus, the
winners of the June 1992 elections, built their power base in their respective republics and
consistently strove during their electoral campaigns to appeal to their "national/republican"
constituencies.
In many ways, what is striking is the extent to which the failed constitutional negotiations of
1990-1992 followed the pattern of the negotiations of 1968
In his seminal Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution, H. Gordon Skilling emphasised the
differences between the constitutional projects defended by Czech and Slovak politicians and
jurists in 1968.
The Communist Party's Action Programme ofApril rejected the existing asymmetrical
arrangement and stated:
It is essential to recognize the advantages of a socialist federation which allows two
equal nations to live together in a common socialist state...It is therefore necessary to
draw up and pass a constitutional law to this effect.. .thereby solving the status of
Slovak national bodies in our constitutional system in the nearest future...767
Yet, the interpretations of what this should mean in practice were highly contradictory.
The two leading advocates of federalism in the Czech lands, Jin Grospic and Zdenek
Jicinsky, stressed the necessity of strong federal institutions with "full functions", whereas
the Slovak constitutional experts Karol Laco and Vojtech Hatala 'argued that the "center of
gravity" should rest in national organs and that federal powers should exist "only where
unavoidable for the functioning of the whole federal organization'"768_
In essence, this national divide was reproduced in 1992 by the opposition between Klaus's
view of a centralised, "working" federation and Meciar's concept of a loose confederation
766ibid., p.28
767xhe 1968 Action Programme, quoted in Steiner, The Slovak dilemma, p. 172.
Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution, (Princeton; Princeton University Press; 1976),
p.464.
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whose sovereignty would originate from the two constituting republics linked by a state
treaty.
The same cleavages could be found in the economic standpoints defended by the
constitutional projects in 1968 and in 1990-1992, with the continuing debate between the
(mostly Czech) advocates of an integrated federation and a single all-state economy and the
(mostly Slovak) advocates of a looser structure which would for instance have allowed
Slovakia to establish its own central bank or its own currency769
It is interesting to note in this context that this continuity of issues was also to a not negligible
extent paralleled by the continuity of what could be called the "legal" elites.
For example, Jicinsky, who had been one of the drafters of the 1960 constitution and a major
participant to the 1968 federalisation debate, reemerged in 1989 as a member of Civic Forum
and an advocate of a constitutional reform along less centralist lines, taking into account the
Slovaks' legitimate concerns.
Jicinsky, a supporter of the common state, had warned Havel about the possible reactions of
some Slovaks to his suggestion to simply drop the adjective socialist from the name of the
country in March 1990770 (he is accused by Miroslav Macek ofbeing responsible for the
"hyphen war"771) and argued that the separation could not and should not have occurred
without a referendum772_
769ibid., p. 467-469. See chapter 3 tor the economic debates of 1990-1992.
770john Keane, Vaclav Havel, p.418-420; Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p.57
721 Miroslav Macek, "Fragments from the Dividing of Czechoslovakia", in Michael Kraus and Allison Stanger
(eds), Irreconcilable differences ?: Explaining Czechoslovakia's Dissolution (Lanham, Boulder; Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers; 2000), p.241.
772see for instance Zdenek Jicinsky and Vladimir Mikule, "Einleitung zu den Verfassungstexten", in Karin
Schmid and Vladimir Horsky (eds), Das Ende der Tschechoslowakei 1992 in verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht
(Berlin, Berlin Verlag; 1995); Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p.230
267
The dangerous liaisons between communism and nationalism
Why nationalism was bound to become the "supreme stage of communism"
After having seen in the first section how the legacies of forty years of communism (and
especially the institutional consequences of the Soviet-style federalism) contributed to the
break-up of the state in 1992, it seems now necessary to examine the ambiguous links
between communism and nationalism in the Czechoslovak context.
The previous chapter has contended that nationalism played a major role in the events of
1989-1992 but the reemergence of Czech and Slovak nationalisms after the velvet revolution
could be said to be the ineluctable result of the "nationality policies" of the communist
regime, which adhered to the ideological framework of Marxism Leninism -and not only as
far as its understanding of federalism (described in the previous section) was concerned.
Marxism and its Leninist "variant" considered nationalism a "bourgeois and petit bourgeois
ideology and policy"773 doomed to disappear in a communist society. The emergence of
nationalism was seen as the consequence of economic inequalities and the result of the
insidious (listig, cunning) manipulation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie - since,
according to Marx, in truth,
[t]he nationality of the worker is neither French, nor English, nor German, it is labour,
free slavery, self-huckstering. His government is neither French, nor English, nor
German, it is capital. His native air is neither French, nor German, nor English, it is
factory air. The land belonging to him is neither French, nor English, nor German, it
lies a few feet below the grouncfl^.
^-^according to the definition of The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, quoted by W.Connor, The National
Question, p.XIII
^^^Karl Marx, "Draft of an Article on Friedrich List's Book Das nationale System der politischen
Okonomie", Collected Works, volume 4, p.280, as quoted by Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism:
Karl Marx versus Friedrich List (New York, Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1988), p.35
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In theory therefore, Marxism-Leninism and nationalism appeared incompatible and Marx and
Engels made clear in the opening sentence of the Communist Manifesto that "the history of
all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles"775 - not the history of "national"
struggles'^. The official cornerstone of Marxism-Leninism was consequently "proletarian
internationalism", not nationalism.
Despite their seemingly contradictory starting points, the ideological similarities between
communism and nationalism have however recently been the subject of an important and
growing literature^^. As George Schopflin states,
[A]t the level of theory, communism and nationalism are incompatible. Communism
insists that an individual's fundamental identity is derived from class positions;
nationalism, that it derives from culture. In practice, however, the relationship
between the two doctrines, both of which were partial responses to the challenge of
modernity, was much more ambiguous^™.
From a general point of view, communism and nationalism are all-encompassing -
"totalitarian"- world views with what Peter Zwick defined as "quasi-religious" features^?
"^^Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p.3 (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1992)
7^See for example Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford; Blackwell; 1994), p.6
^77see for example: Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism", Foreign Affairs, vol.68, n°5,
Winter 1989/1990, p.2 ; Jacques Rupnik, LAutre Europe, pp.411-412 ; George Schopflin, "The Problem of
Nationalism in the Postcommunist Order", in Peter V.E Volten (ed.), Bound to Change: Consolidating
Democracy in East Central Europe (New York, Prague; Institute for East-West Studies; Westview Press; 1992),
pp.31-33 ; Peter F.Sugar, "Nationalism, the Victorious Ideology", in Peter F. Sugar (ed.), Eastern European
Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p.427; Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism', Maria
N.Todorova, "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the communist legacy in Eastern Europe", in Millar and Wolchik,
The Social Legacy, pp.89-107; Walter Kemp, Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union: a basic contradiction ? (Basingstoke, London; Macmillan Press; 1999)
^^Schopflin, "The Problem of Nationalism", p.31
"^See Peter Zwick, National Communism (Boulder; Westview Press; 1983), p.l 1
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Communism and nationalism are largely messianistic ideological outlooks, answers and
reactions to the idea of "Progress"780.
Furthermore, they are both "collectivist" approaches to the world, with the somewhat logical
result that the vacuum left by the collapse of "collectivist" communism was likely to be filled
by another "collectivist" ideology , nationalism^ 1.
The Czechoslovak communist regime, like all the other communist parties of the Soviet bloc,
purported to eliminate the expression of "national" feelings among Czechs and Slovaks.
The Party, especially under the leadership of the Czechs Gottwald and Novotny, espoused the
main tenants of Marxist-Leninist (Soviet) nationality policy and above all the notion of
zblizenie7%2 (j e the idea that the equalisation of the level of economic development of the
Czech lands and Slovakia would ultimately lead to "the bringing together and then fusion" of
the two nations)^ it was assumed that
[t]he national question [would lose] its dimension and political significance and
[would be] resolved to some degree automatically by an economic and cultural
evolution ; that is, in concrete Czechoslovak conditions, by the industrialization of
Slovakia and the equalisation of its level with that of Bohemia-Moravia^S4
The elimination of the developmental differential between the Czech lands and Slovakia (the
economic and social "flourishing" of Slovakia) would de facto suppress nationalism, and
paradoxically ("dialectically") lead to the "merging" of the Czech and Slovak nations into a
780§ee for example: Gellner, Encounters, pp. 1-2; Zwick, ibid., p. 12
781 On the common points between communism and nationalism, see also Montserrat Guibernau,
Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge; Polity Press; 1996),
pp.19-22 ; Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Oxford; Martin Robertson; 1979), p.143.
782-phe original Russian concept ofsliyaniye was translated in Slovak as zbllzenie, in Czech as sbllzovani,
and in Serbo-Croatian as zblizavanje.
783\yehrle; Le Divorce, p. 182 ; see also Leff, National Conflict, p. 143.
784zdenek Jicinsky, "25 let socialistickeho vyvoje statopravnich vztahu ceskeho a slovenskeho naroda",
Pravnlk, CLX (1970), n°5, 375, quoted in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Federalism in Slovak Communist Politics",
Canadian Slavonic Papers, 19, n°4, 1977, p.455.
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new "socialist" construct -a "Czechoslovak" people (ceskoslovensky narod) or at least a
homogenous "national political society"785
However, the aftermath of the velvet revolution and the resurgence of Slovak and Czech
nationalisms described in the previous chapter demonstrated the failure of communism to live
up to these "ideals": the communist regime succeeded in furthering the "flourishing" of the
Slovak nation but fell conpiscuously short in its attempt to foster any form of zblizenie
between Czechs and Slovaks.
The inherent contradiction in the Marxist-Leninist dialectical solution (one could almost say
"recipe") to the nationality question eventually proved impossible to overcome and this,
despite Stalin's early confident claim that it was precisely the "contradictory" character of the
communist approach that would enable it to "capture the most impregnable fortress in the
sphere of the national question"^".
There are several potential explanations for the failure of Marxist-Leninist nationality policies
in Czechoslovakia and the subsequent resurgence of Czech and Slovak nationalisms after
1989.
As discussed earlier, the territorialisation of Czech and Slovak national identities, their
consolidation and "crystallisation" within a specific federal "homeland" led to the
reaffirmation of Czech and Slovak nationalisms.
It was however also the consequence of a more general and profound "ideological"
ambiguity.
785Leff, National Conflict, p. 145; W.Connor quotes an article written by a Yugoslav journalist in 1976
which remarks that references to the creation of a single "socialist" nation are increasingly present in
Czechoslovak publications and further states that "[t]he Soviet experience... points to a path of'bringing closer
together, of overcoming differences, of merging, of removing the specific traits of nations'and, finally, of
creating a 'socialist nation'. If in a multinational state, such as the USSR, 'a single-Soviet Nation had been
formed', why should not a 'single nation' be created in the countries of the 'socialist community'?" (The National
Question, p.447)
78 6joseph Stalin, "Deviations on the National Question: Extract from a Report Delivered at the Sixteenth
Congress of the C.P.S.U, June 27, 1930", in Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National-Colonial Question: A
Collection ofArticles and Speeches (San Francisco; Proletarian Publishers; 1975), p.394.
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The internationalism promoted by the regime was opposed to the idea of "bourgeois
nationalism", "an excessive consciousness of belonging to a given ethnic group and an undue
emphasis on local government"787_ Hence, it is for the alleged crime of "bourgeois
nationalism" that the Slovak communist leaders Vlado (Vladimir) Clementis, Ladislav
Novomesky or Gustav Husak were jailed or even executed (in the case of Clementis) at the
beginning of the fifties. This attitude towards the expression of a national-oriented approach
persisted until at least 1968 and as late as in October 1967, during the plenum of the Central
Commitee, Novotny could still publicly accuse Alexander Dubcek, then head of the Slovak
party, of being the spokesman of "narrow national interests" and a "bourgeois
nationalist"788
Yet, this nationality (or perhaps more appropriately dubbed "anti"-nationality) policy of the
Communist Party did not alleviate the deep national divisions between Czechs and Slovaks.
On the contrary, it "pushed under the carpet"789 what was clearly a genuine issue, by failing
to address it or even to tolerate any serious and non-dogmatic discussion about it.
Under communism, the Czechs and Slovaks could not settle their historical disputes, and, as
soon as the communist regime collapsed, the long suppressed national sentiments of the
Czechs and Slovaks loudly reasserted themselves.
This is especially significant as far as the development of post-communist Slovak politics is
concerned.
The communist, Marxist-dominated historiography presented a rather degrading picture of
Slovak historical heroes or myths. Two of the most eloquent examples of this are the negative
assessment of the attitude of Slovak awakeners, such as Eudovit Stur, during the springtime
"^^Edward Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960 (Princeton; Princeton University Press;
1961), p.131, quoted in William Shawcross, Dubcek (London; Weidenfield & Nicolson; 1970), p.56.
788see for example the insider view of DubCek in Hope Dies Last, pp.115-116; See also H. Gordon Skilling,
Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution, p. 167 ; E.Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, p. 112; Shawcross, Dubcek,
p.131.
789-rhe expression is used by Schopflin, "The Problem of Nationalism", p.33
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of the nations of 1848 and the distorted interpretation of the National Uprising of August
1944790.
Marx and Engels had qualified as "reactionary" the support that Stur and other Slovak leaders
had given to the Habsburg monarchy against the Hungarian revolution in 1848^91 and this
seemed enough to condemn Slovak nationalism as intrinsically opposed to communist
ideals792
Similarly, according to the official historigraphy, another decisive event in Slovak historical
development, the Slovak National Uprising was the result of the activities of Moscow, and
especially of the communist partisans parachuted from the Soviet Union793. The negation of
the role played by the Slovak-based communist and non-communist resistance (emphasised
by the arrest of those Slovak communist leaders who had taken an active part in the Uprising
such as Husak and Novomesky) humiliated a large part of the population.
The "Slovak spring" which started in 1962-1963 with Dubcek's election at the head of the
Communist party of Slovakia^94 ancj the release and rehabilitation of the "bourgeois
790see for example Dean, Nationalism and Political Change, p.8; Stanley Riveles, "Slovakia: Catalyst of
Crisis", Problems ofCommunism, May-June 1968, vol. XVII, pp.4-5
^91 See for instance Shawcross, Dubcek, p. 121
792jhe three texts which illustrate more clearly the contempt of Marx and Engels for the Slovaks and the
Czechs are Engels's "Der Magyarische Kampf' (The Magyar Struggle), "Der demokratische
Panslawismus"(Democratic Panslavism) and "Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany" (the first two
articles published in "Neue Rheinische Zeitung" in 1849, pp.165-176 and 270-286 in Karl Marx und Friedrich
Engels, Werke, Band 6, Berlin; Dietz Verlag; 1970 -the last published in the New York Daily Tribune in 1852,
p.46, in Karl Marx / Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, volume 11, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1979)
793RjveieS) "Slovakia", p.4
794por an assessment of the role of Slovakia in the destalinization process, see for example: Gordon Skilling,
Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution; J.M Kirschbaum, "Slovakia in the de-Stalinization and Federalization
Process of Czechoslovakia", Canadian Slavonic Papers, X, 4, 1968, pp. 522-556; Vladimir V. Kusin, Political
Grouping on the Czechoslovak Reform Movement (London and Basingstoke; Macmillan Press; 1972), pp. 143-
161 ; Riveles, "Slovakia", pp.1-9.
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nationalists" jailed in the fifties^^ therefore led to a fundamental reappraisal of Slovak
history796.
The attacks on the official historiography predictably first came from the former released
"bourgeois nationalists" such as Husak, who published in 1964 his Testimony to the Slovak
National Uprising but, more surprisingly, the movement was soon joined by high-ranked
communist officials such as Dubcek, who in 1965, during the celebrations for the 150th
anniversary of Stur's birth, called the previously reviled Stur "the greatest son of the Slovak
people". In an obvious contrast to the usual Marxist assessment of Stur as a reactionary
counter-revolutionary, Dubcek endeavoured to justify Stur's actions:
Stur lived in a period when feudalism was dying, in which the power of the
bourgeoisie began to gain ascendancy. It was the period when the revolution began.
The ideas and actions of Stur can be understood only in the context of the deep
revolutionary movement thrusting through all European countries. The development
of his ideas was very complex. He was inspired by love of his country. His feelings
and emotions were in harmony with his reason. With the unity of the people, his
personality grew in stature. He worked for his people's language, for their own laws,
for education. He showed up the brutality of feudalism which was such a great barrier
to the evolution of society. He demonstrated the great gap between lords and serfs. He
understood the principal social and economic problems and the tendencies of his
period, and he understood that everything must change797
However, despite these significant changes of attitude, the process of relegitimation of the
expression of Slovak "national" feelings still remained, even up to 1989, to a large extent
constrained by what was considered "acceptable" by the communist authorities.
"fiction of so-called bourgeois nationalism" was officially abandoned and repudiated by the
Czechoslovak Communist party at the December 1963 Central Committee meeting. See Leff, National Conflict,
p. 109
^9t>E.Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, pp.122-128.
797Pravda (Bratislava), 31 October 1965, quoted in Shawcross, Dubcek, pp. 122-123 (anecdotically, Dubcek
was born in the same cottage of the Slovak village of Uhrovec as Stur)
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For many "Czechoslovak" communists, the Slovaks (notwithstanding their quiescence during
the "normalisation" era and the high profile of leaders such as Husak or Bil'ak) were
perceived as less "progressive" than the Czechs who were still the "vanguard" of the Party,
"the vanguard of the vanguard".
Slovak history could become again the subject of objective studies only after 1989 and,
unfortunately, at that point, the Slovaks in search of a new and more "glorious" identity leant
towards a nationalist conception of their past. This process amounted to a genuine "cognitive
liberation"798; with an audience "tired of Communist propaganda" and understandably
"hungry for information"799
"National communism" in Czechoslovakia
However, what was probably most harmful to the maintenance of a common state between
the Czechs and Slovaks was not the misguided nature and ultimate failure of communist
nationality policies but the opportunistic use of nationalism that often characterised, in blatant
contradiction to its internationalist rhetoric, the policies of the Czechoslovak communist
party.
The Czechoslovak communist regime, like in the other countries of the Soviet bloc, used
"national communism" (the merging of socialist and national themes) to consolidate its
monopoly of power.
798(-}ail Lapidus, "From Democratization to Disintegration: the Impact of Perestro'rka on the National
Question", in Gail W.Lapidus, Victor Zavlavsky with Philip Goldman (eds.), From Union to Commonwealth:
Natioalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics (Cambridge, New York; Cambridge University Press; 1992),
p.48.
^99jelinek, "A Whitewash in Colour", p. 120
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Czechoslovakia never had charismatic and outspoken proponents of "national communism"
such as Tito, Ceau§escu or even Gomulka. Neither Gottwald nor Novotny had the required
independence of mind vis-a-vis Moscow, Dubcek always remained an "internationalist" at
heart^OO ancj Husak, a potential (Slovak) "national communist" forfeited its "nationalist"
tendencies when he was chosen as general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in
1969.
Yet Czechoslovak communists exploited nationalist feelings and, in a bi-national state like
Czechoslovakia, a policy of "divide-to-rule" was an attractive, political option.
The federalization of 1968 was the only reform that survived the crushing of the Prague
Spring because it was a sure and effective way to gain some much-needed measure of
"support" (if only passive) for the normalisation process among the Slovak population^®! .
even if this strategy prevented the establishment of a constructive dialogue between Czech
and Slovak elites.
Most significantly, the Party set a risky and unfortunate precedent for what happened after
1989: regardless of the official rhetoric, there was an intrinsic link between nationalism and
communism and "national communism" became a normal feature of communism "in
practice"802
The next section therefore turns to the examination of a phenomenon which is in many ways
typically "post"-communist and most vividly illustrates the dangerous liaisons between
communism and nationalism, "chauvino-communism".
800gee Shawcross, Dubcek, passim
^^^Elster, "Transition, Constitution-making and Separation in Czechoslovakia", p.109
^O^See for example W.Connor, The National Question; Szporluck, Communism; Zwick, National.
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A typically post-communist phenomenon: "chauvino-communism" and its role in the
break-up of Czechoslovakia
"Chauvino-communism", as previously defined, refers to the fact that many former
supporters of the communist regime endorsed nationalism as a means to retain or gain power,
and the most successful "chauvino-communist" is widely acknowledged to be the Serb leader
Slobodan Milosevic^^ but "chauvino-communism" also had an impact in Czechoslovakia.
The Communist party of Bohemia-Moravia^04 took a nationalist stance in its opposition to
the restitutions of the property of the Sudeten Germans expelled from the country after the
second World War^05 but "chauvino-communism" was essentially a Slovak occurrence,
exemplified by the most influential Slovak politician, Vladimir Meciar^^^
A portrait of Meciar as a "chauvino-communist"
Meciar, a former leader of the Slovak Socialist Youth Union between 1963 and 1969, who
studied in Moscow at the Leninists' Komsomol College807 was dismissed from his
responsibilities after the end of the Prague Spring because of "reformist" tendencies.
However, he never became involved in the activities of dissident networks and, as a firm
^O^See for example Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences
(London; Hurst; 1995); Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death ofYugoslavia (London; Penguin Books;
revised edition, 1996; 1995), pp.37-47.
804jjfi pehe, "Divisions in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia", Report on Eastern Europe, July 26,
1991, vol.2, n°30,pp.l0-13.
^O^Schopflin, "Nationalism and Ethnicity", p.64. See also Jeffrey S. Kopstein, "The Politics of National
Reconciliation : Memory and Institutions in German-Czech Relations since 1989", Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics, vol.3, n°2, Summer 1997, p.71.
806For a portrayal of Meciar as a "chauvino-communist", see for example Attila Agh, The Politics ofCentral
Europe (London; SAGE Publications; 1998), p.72; Elster, Offe, and Preuss, Institutional Design, p. 16 ; Hermet,
Histoire des Nations, p.222.
^O^Jan Obrman, "Slovak Politician Accused of Secret Police Ties", RFE/RL Research Report, vol.1, n°15,
10 April 1992, p. 15
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lawyer between 1973 and 1990, was clearly part of the "grey zone" between active
collaboration and passive support for the regime.
In fact, the sole accounts of his political activities under the communist regime is clearly not
enough to describe Meciar as a "chauvino-communist". After all, he did not hold any high-
ranking job in the communist hierarchy under normalisation and the huge majority of the
Czech and Slovak leaders after 1989 had in any case been at some point in their life members,
often with important responsibilities, of the Communist party808
Meciar can nevertheless be qualified as a "chauvino-communist" because he based his
electoral successes on a "red-brown coalition". He managed to rally around his name a broad
constituency: his demagogic, nationalist-populist rhetoric appealed not only to the average
Slovak eager to elect a politician perceived as able to stand up to the Czechs, but also often
provided the former red nomenklatura in Slovakia with a convenient channel of reconversion.
One part of the former Slovak communist elite was successfully able to replace the old
socialist-internationalist slogans by nationalist catchwords, thus retaining some form of
political, but more often economic, influence.
At an economic level, the opposition of Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia to the
radical, neo-liberal economic reforms advocated by Klaus found an audience among the
former communist Slovak industrials. As Martin Butora and Zora Butorova explained,
the Slovak industry had been based on a heavy industry (mining, smelting, etc.)
calling for intensive work and a lot of energy and having often devastating
repercussions on the environment, as well as on a rather intrusive military industry.
Since the industrial lobby was isolated from the world-wide tendencies, it was not
surprising for it to feel threatened by the monetarist policy, inspired by the theories of
Friedman - policy which came from Prague. The proportion of those which have been
called "pure socialists"... was higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. The
808y£cjav Havel, who never adhered to the Party, appears to be in this respect the exception that confirms
the rule. In the Czech republic, a considerable proportion of the prominent politicians of the immediate post-
communist era, such as Marian Calfa, Vladimir Dlouhy, Karel Dyba, Jin Dientsbier, Pavel Rychetsky,
Miroslav Vacek or Lubos Dobrovsky, were indeed former members of the party. An identical situation
prevailed in Slovakia, where not only Mediar but also the two politicians who would turn out to become his
fiercest opponents, Michal Kovac and Jozef Moravcik, were all former members of the Party (see Thomas A.
Baylis, "Elite Change After Communism: Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, East European
Politics and Societies, volume 12, n°2, Spring 1998, pp.278-279)
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former was therefore less ready to undergo the radical reform which got under way in
the federation. That is the reason why the high-ranking industrial managers regarded
the HZDS [MDS], and Meciar in particular, as the movement and the man which were
defending their interests^^9
The process of privatisation in Slovakia has been characterised by the massive participation
of the former communist elites, which were able to use their experience and contacts to
prosper under the new capitalist system. This emergence of "red capitalists" is not a purely
Slovak phenomenon and could be observed in virtually all the countries of the former Soviet
bloc, including in the Czech lands (even if on an arguably smaller scale)810, but the Slovak
"red capitalists" seemed to have been at least implicitly encouraged by the rather complacent
and favourable attitude of Meciar towards them. During his second tenure as Slovak prime
minister from June 1992 to April 1994, Meciar headed the National Property Fund {Fond
Narodneho majetku-FNM), in charge of the privatisation of Slovak industries^! 1 -thus
exercising a considerable amount of control on the attribution process and putting himself in
the convenient position of being able to "reward" his political followers^! 2.
At a political level, the opposition of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia to the
lustration law could similarly be considered as an evidence of this alliance of interests
between Meciar and the former communist elite. Former communists which gave their
allegiance to Meciar's nationalism were able to retain some of their power - even more so
once Slovakia gained its independence. Significantly, 18 out of the 19 members of the
^O^Butora and Butorova, "Identites", p. 119
8!®See for example Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzej Rapaczynski, Capitalism with a
Comrade's Face : Studies in the Postcommunist Transition (Budapest; Central European University Press;
1998), pp.42-54 and the comparative study of the adaptation of the Polish and Czech nomenklaturas to the post-
communist economic transformation by Georges Mink and Jean-Charles Szurek, "Agir ou subir: les
nomenklaturas polonaise et tcheque face a la grande mutation economique (1988-1993)", Revue d'Etudes
comparatives Est-Ouest, n°4, December 1994, pp.47-63
^ 11 Frydman, Murphy and Rapaczynski, Capitalism, p.18; Adrian Smith, "Uneven development", p.417
^ ^For a description of Meciar's patronage and clientelist practices, see Frydman, Murphy and Rapaczynski,
Capitalism, pp.55-66
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governmental coalition set up by Meciar in November 1994 with the Slovak National Party
and the Federation of Slovak Workers were former communists^ 13
For all these reasons, "chauvino-communism" -the overwhelmingly opportunistic union
between Meciar and the former red nomenklatura around nationalist and populist themes-
became an integral part of the Slovak post-communist political life and contributed to the
break-up of the Czechoslovak state.
More generally, Meciar's rise to preeminence and power in Slovak politics (what Samuel
Abraham calls the "phenomenon Meciar" 814) was the result of his skilful exploitation of the
Slovak grievances against the Czechs, as well as of Slovakia's longing for a charismatic
leader. If anything, Meciar is a "pure" pragmaticalwho understood that "chauvino-
communism" was the surest way to reach power in post-communist Slovakia, and was ready
to do so at the price of the Czechoslovak republic.
The Czechoslovak case is in this respect relatively close to the Yugoslav case, and, to a
certain extent, Meciar used the same tactic as Milosevic - with however three fundamental
distinctions.
Firstly, whereas Serb nationalism is traditionally "expansionist" and grounded in the dream of
a "Greater Serbia"^ 16, Slovak nationalism has remained mostly "defensive" and state-
claiming. Notwithstanding the wild imaginings of some isolated Slovak intellectuals^!^
Meciar could not appeal to the myth of a "Greater Slovakia" and never intended to lay claims
on Czech territory.
813yiviane du Castel, "Slovaquie: a la recherche d'une reconnaissance internationale", Defense Nationale,
53eme annee, Aout-Septembre 1997, p.85
8 ^Samuel Abraham, "Early Elections in Slovakia: A State of Deadlock", Government and Opposition,
volume 30, n°l, Winter 1995, pp.88-89
815see chapter 6; Miroslav Kusy, "V. Meciar je cisty pragmatik", Lidove Noviny, 16/06/1992, p.8 (see also
an English translation of this article in The Guardian, 17 July 1992)
^l^See for example Anzulovic, Heavenly, Bennett, Yugoslavia', Timothy Judah, The Serbs: Myth, Reality and
the Destruction ofYugoslavia (New Haven and London; Yale University Press; 1997).
^Nsee chapter 6.
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Secondly, the "chauvino-communism" of Meciar and his followers expressed itself within an
altogether strikingly different political environment. Whereas Milosevic's "interlocutors"
were nationalists such as Franjo Tudjman, Meciar's rhetoric was met with the benevolent
moral authority of Havel. This is important since it probably made it impossible for Meciar to
resort to force to achieve his goals: an unilateral secession would have been extremely
difficult to justify in front of the international community, because of both Havel's prestige
and the values promoted by the international community.
Finally, Meciar did not dispose in Slovakia of the military means that Milosevic could
marshal in his bid to establish a "Greater Serbia". The Czechoslovak army did not side with
either the Czechs or the Slovaks during the events which led to the break-up of the state.
This brief and fragmentary comparison between Milosevic and Meciar could therefore serve
to highlight and further illustrate the extent of the potential threat that "chauvino-
communism" posed in post-communist Czechoslovakia.
Conclusions
This chapter has argued that the legacies of communism (economic, politico-
social, "semantic" and institutional) and the ambiguous links that it entertained with
nationalism contributed to the break-up of Czechoslovakia - if only because it made possible
after 1989 the emergence of "chauvino-communism".
There is a prevalent feeling in the literature that under communism the past was merely
"frozen" or "anesthetized": Czech and Slovak nationalisms were therefore "sleeping beauties"
waiting to be reawekened. Havel once characteristically wrote that
281
one could say that communism was an anesthesia of sorts and that society is now
awakening to a state that existed before having been anesthetized. All the problems
that predated this anesthesia are now coming back, to everyone's astonishment^^.
There are however at least two caveats to this approach.
It seems difficult to detect such thing as a historical, "primordial" hatred between Czechs and
Slovaks, somehow bound to provoke the division of their common state^^
What is more, one should not, as the present chapter makes clear, underestimate the extent to
which communism also created its own, new problems as far as Czech-Slovak relations were
concerned: history was not simply "frozen" during forty years. Four decades of communist
rule did not help to build a constructive relation between Czechs and Slovaks but the goal of
this last section will however be to somewhat nuance this assessment and present "mitigating
circumstances".
First of all (and this should not be seen as incompatible with a rejection of a "sleeping
beauty" proposition) after 1989, Czech and Slovak policy-makers who tried to save the
common state had to overcome not only the legacies of communism but also the legacies of
the pre-communist era^^O Czechoslovak state was founded in 1918 around the political,
cultural, economic and numerical dominance of the Czech nation and when the communist
regime federalised the state in 1969, it was in many respects too little and too late. As Leff
already pointed out in 1988, "this belated formal recognition of Slovakia's equal national
status within the state has many of the characteristics of a last resort, not least of which is the
possibility that it has come too late to animate the lost good will of previous generations"821.
81 ^quoted in Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europefrom Stalin to Havel (New York;
Toronto; The Free Press; 1992, 1993), p.289. Tismaneanu also quotes Adam Michnik: "the end of communism
meant the opening of a Pandora's box. Into that vacuum began to creep the demons from bygone epochs :
ideologies proclaiming chauvinism and xenophobia, populism and intolerance" (emphasis added).
°l"See chapter 6
820jvan Volgyes, "The Legacies of Communism: An Introductory Essay", in Barany and Volgyes, The
Legacies, pp. 1-2
821 Leff, National Conflict, p.4
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Throughout the existence of Czechoslovakia, there were persistent tensions between Czechs
and Slovaks and persistent desires, if not outright attempts, by Slovaks to secure greater
"autonomy (if not "independence") from the Czechs : the communist experience is thus
merely one part of a larger picture.
Communism has certainly aggravated the mutual grievances between Czechs and Slovaks, it
has also changed the nature of Czech-Slovak conflicts and tensions, but it did not create
them^22_
Our earlier reference to the communist ethnofederation as having institutionalised Czech and
Slovak predominance within federal republics with some features of "virtual nation-states" is
in this context an instructive example. The federalisation "crystallised" Czech and Slovak
conflicts, but the process of consolidation of Czech or Slovak identities largely predated the
communist era. Even in the arguably more ambiguous case of the Slovaks, the cultural
development experienced under the First republic and the (even if "shameful") self-
confidence gained during the Slovak state had already firmly established the existence of a
Slovak national identity^S
Secondly, it is less than clear whether we can reasonably contend that the Czechoslovak
federation broke up in 1992 because it had been between 1969 and 1989 a "communist-
engineered" federation. It seems impossible to assert that the chances of survival of a
common state between the Czechs and the Slovaks would have been higher, had
Czechoslovakia not become in 1948 a communist state.
Indeed, there is no real evidence that the management of interethnic conflicts in multinational
polities under democratic political systems is more "efficient". "Democratically-engineered"
ethnofederations in Canada or Belgium have also been continuously and regularly plagued by
tensions between their ethnic minorities. Contrarily to Czechoslovakia, the Canadian and
822see for instance Terry McNeill, 'State and Nationality Under Communism", in Jack Hayward and R.N.
Berki (eds), State and Society in Contemporary Europe (New York; St-Martin's Press; 1979), p. 130.
^■^See Chapter 1, p.60.
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Belgian states have of course managed to maintain their integrity, but one could legitimately
wonder whether this is likely to be the case five or ten years from now824_
Given all this, the starting hypothesis of this chapter could be reformulated in the following
terms: the problem might not be with "communist" ethnofederations per se, but more
generally with the concept of "ethnofederation"- a federation based on ethnicity. The break¬
up of Czechoslovakia could be explained in terms of the structure of the Czechoslovak
federation itself, explicitly based on the national principle: Czechs and (versus) Slovaks.
The next chapter therefore tries to shed new light on the break-up, by considering to what
extent a bi-national country like Czechoslovakia could be said to be more or less "stable" than
a multi-national state like Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union.
°24§ee for example an article in the Independent which claims that Belgium might be on the way to a "Czech
and Slovak solution", i.e a peaceful breakup (Katherine Butler, "Sickened Belgium is tearing itself apart", The
Independent on Sunday, 26 April 1998, p. 18). Similarly, Alain Dieckhoff argues that "the velvet divorce
between Czechs and Slovaks is ... a model of peaceful state dissociation that some Flemings and Catalans have
studied with care" (Alain Dieckhoff, "Europe Occidentale: l'Effervescence Nationalitaire", Politique





THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF A BIPOLAR STATE: A SYSTEMIC
APPROACH TO THE BREAK-UP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
After having examined in the previous chapters several explanations for the break-up of the
Czechoslovak state in 1992 (the institutional deadlock, the role of political leadership during
the democratic transition, the reemergence of Slovak and Czech nationalisms after 1989, as
well as the legacies of communism), this chapter adopts the analogy of the balance of power
in order to demonstrate that the ethnopolitics of Czechoslovakia and the eventual failure to
preserve the integrity of the state after the fall of communism was to a large extent
conditioned by certain systemic and structural features.
In other words, this chapter aims to provide an insight into the arena and the "rules of the
game" of Czechoslovak ethnopolitics and considers a new layer of explanations for the break¬
up of Czechoslovakia: the "system" itself.
As a starting point and framework of analysis, the "systemic" approach adopted will primarily
base itself on two works.
First, Morton A Kaplan's Systems and Process in International Politics, in which Kaplan
distinguishes six distinct types of international systems: (1) the "balance of power" system,
(2) the loose bipolar system, (3) the tight bipolar system, (4) the universal system, (5) the
hierarchical system in its directive and non-directive forms, and (6) the unit veto system^25
And secondly, Sabrina Petra Ramet's Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991,
in which Ramet applies Kaplan's typology of systems of international behaviour to the study
of the ethnic politics of Yugoslavia. By designating "ethnic groups, rather than states as
actors in the system and treating] the state, rather than a group of states, as the conceptual
825p0r a full description of these six systems, see Morton A. Kaplan, Systems and Process in International
Politics (Huntington, New York; Robert E.Krieger; 1975, first edition 1957), pp.21-53
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system"°26j she categorises the Yugoslav state as having gradually "evolved from a
configuration that paralleled a loose bipolar system (1918-1963) [where the main cleavage
was the conflict of interests between Serbs and Croats] to a balance-of-power model" (from
1963 to its de facto violent disintegration in 1992)827) when the recognition of the separate
identity of Slovenes, Macedonians or Muslisms came into effect828
This chapter proceeds from the assumption that the adoption of a similar methodological
approach constitutes a valuable way to look at the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Categorising
and studying the Czechoslovak state as an autonomous "system" allows to draw some
implications about its inherent stability or instability and offers a new perspective on the
"velvet divorce" of 1992.
In more theoretical terms, following Kenneth Waltz, the aim is "to show how the structure of
the system affects the interacting units and how they in turn affect the structure"829
The introduction of game theory has been deliberately rejected on several grounds.
Game theory is undoubtedly a useful tool in social science, but applying it to a study of the
break-up of Czechoslovakia would have met with several conceptual problems.
Firstly, as Shaun Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis emphasise in Game Theory: A
Critical Introduction, "the point about games is that objectives and rules are known in
advance"830 _ a situation which appears to be the opposite ofpost-1989 Czechoslovakia
826sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 (Bloomington and Indianapolis;
Indiana University Press; 1992), p.4
^27ibid., p.5
^^Titoist Yugoslavia consisted after the constitutional reform of 1974 of six republics (Serbia, Croatia,
Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro), plus two autonomous regions rattached to Serbia
(Kosovo-Mehtoja and Voivodina).
^^Kenneth N.Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics (New York; MacGraw Hill; 1979), p.40
830shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory: A Critical Introduction (London, New
York; Routledge; 1995), p.xi
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where one cannot deny the depth of the uncertainties which marked the transition from
communism to democracy.
The rules of the games had to be created anew and the objectives of most political actors (and
above all, of Meciar) were ever shifting and contradictory. The assumption "that individuals
know the rules of the game - .. .that they know all the possible actions and how the actions
combine to yield particular pay-offs for each player"831 seems unconvincing in the
Czechoslovak case.
Secondly, game theory is usually criticised for being more "predictive" than "explanatory"
and would have at best given an insight into how things should have been rather than why
they actually happened the way they did^32
Thirdly, game theory relies on a subjective characterisation of the agents and actors of the
game and of their "rationality".
In the Czechoslovak context, this would have implied a dangerous neglect of the multifaceted
and non-unitary nature of the agents: there was (and there is) for instance, as demonstrated in
chapters 2 and 6, no easy way to define Czech and Slovak political cultures or to draw a
typology of Czech and Slovak political elites.
Finally and perhaps even more importantly, game theory would have led the dissertation
away from its original focus and would not have provided simple answers to the complex




Balance of power, actors and poles: some definitions and a framework of analysis
To start with, it is essential to define three notions essential to our analysis: balance of power,
actors and poles.
Firstly, the concept of balance of power is at the centre of most systemic approaches and
remains, despite its limitations and close associations with the realist and neo-realist schools
of international relations theory, one of the most powerful analytical tools to look at a
political system^33
Clearly, then, it should be made clear from the start that a distinction is made between
Kaplan's use of "balance of power" as merely one of six possible international systems and
the use adopted in this chapter of "balance of power" as a generic term834
The meaning of balance of power is in itself deeply ambiguous and contested, and, as pointed
out by Paul W.Schroeder,
Students of international politics do not need to be told of the unsatisfactory state of
the balance of power theory. The problems are well known: the ambiguous nature of
the concept and the numerous ways it has been defined, the various distinct and partly
contradictory meanings given to it in practice and the divergent purposes it serves
(description, analysis, prescription and propaganda); and the apparent failure of
attempts clearly to define balance of power as a system and specify its operating
rules835>
^ See for example the Special issue on the balance of power of the Review ofInternational Studies, 1989
(15), pp.75-214 and Michael Sheehan, The Balance ofPower: History and Theory (London and New York;
Routledge; 1996)
834in his critique of Kaplan's six models, Waltz indeed argues that "[b]y identifying his principal system, the
balance of power, with the historical condition of condition among five or so great powers, [Kaplan] obscures
the fact that balance-of- power theory applies in all situations where two or more units coexist in a self-help
system" (Waltz, Theory, p.57)
835paui W.Schroeder, "The Nineteenth-century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium ?",
Review ofInternational Studies, vol.15, 1989, p.135
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However, since "[t]he trouble with the balance of power... is not that it has no meaning, but
that it has too many meanings"836; what matters for the purpose of the chapter is to adopt a
consistent definition.
Balance of power will be conceived in its descriptive, as opposed to normative, sense - as a
system rather than a policy837 ("a collection of states, autonomous units of power and policy,
involved in such intimacy of interrelationship as to make reciprocal impact feasible"838)
Such a deterministic definition of balance of power should best shed light on the relationship
between the structure of the Czechoslovak state and the behaviour of the actors of the
system8 3 9
The second important step is therefore to specify what the actors of the system
"Czechoslovakia" were.
By actors is meant every potential player on Czechoslovak ethnopolitics and one could in fact
differentiate three principal types of actors in the Czechoslovak state: the ""national", the
"sub-national" (or "non-member national actors"), and the "universal" actors.
The "national" actors are the two so-called "state-founding" (statotvorny narod) nations^O^
the Czechs and the Slovaks. But Czechoslovakia has also been consistently inhabited during
the 74 years of its existence by several minorities -Germans, Hungarians, Romanies, Poles,
etc- which could be defined as "sub-national" (or "non-member national") actors.
The "universal" actor in the Czechoslovak system is the state itself, the authority and power
of the "centre" (for instance, the "federal" centre from January 1969 to December 1992).
836inis L. Claude, Jr, Power and International Relations (New York; Random House; 1962), p. 13, quoted in
James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Contending Theories ofInternational Relations: a
comprehensive survey (New York; HarperCollins; 1990), p.31. Hans Morgenthau for instance distinguished at
least four different meanings of balance of power, Martin Wight nine ("The Balance of Power", in Herbert
Butterfield and Martin Martin (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory ofInternational Politics;
London; George Allen & Unwin; 1966; p. 151), and Ernst Haas eight ("The Balance of Power: Prescription,
Concept or Propaganda ?", World Politics, V, July 1953, pp.442-477)
^-^Sheehan, The Balance ofPower, p.53
Oaude, Power, p.42, quoted in Sheehan, The Balance ofPower, p.53
^39as Sheehan put it, "the key feature about the systemic approach to the balance of power is that it posits a
direct relationship between the structure of the state system and the behaviour of states within the system... state
behaviour is seen as being governed by the nature of the system" {ibid., pp.76 and 80)
^4®See for instance on the concept ofstatotvorny narod, Felak, "At the Price", pp. 182-183
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This chapter deliberately concentrates on "internal" actors, direct players in Czechoslovak
politics - as opposed to "external" actors, which only exerted an indirect, even if in practice
crucial, impact on Czechoslovak politics and have been considered in chapter 4.
A further distinction has to be made between "actors" and "poles", by defining poles as
autonomous and above all politically-salient (having a significant impact on Czechoslovak
ethnopolitics) "centres of power".
Thus, an actor is not necessarily a pole, even if it can have the potential to become one - as
exemplified for instance by the position of Slovakia's Hungarian minority (or inversely, a
pole can lose its status and be reduced to the position of an actor - as the fate of the federal
centre after 1989 examined later would appear to demonstrate). Moreover, if several actors
form a coalition of interests, the resulting bloc of influence is considered as a single "centre of
power", in fact a single pole.
We therefore adopt a somewhat hierarchical or concentric view of the system
"Czechoslovakia", where the system is composed of poles, themselves subsequently
composed of one or more actors.
Following this analytical framework, post-communist Czechoslovakia will be described as
closely resembling a "bi-polar" state, characterised by the overwhelmingly dominant cleavage
between its two constituent Czech and Slovak nations - by opposition to a "multi-polar" state,
defined as including within its borders three or more "poles" of political interests.
Introducing such a distinction should therefore show that bi-polar Czechoslovakia was to an
extent inherently more "unstable" than a multi-polar state like for instance Yugoslavia or the
Soviet Union and that the events of 1989-1992 that led to the split of the state did not take
place in a vacuum, but were in many respects predetermined by the systemic "rules of the
game", i.e the bipolar structure of the state.
To achieve these objectives, the chapter first briefly expounds why Kaplan's model of
international systems might be useful to an explanation of the division of Czechoslovakia.
After having identified and overcome three potential problems with the use of a systemic
model to the study of a single state-unit, we proceed to define Czechoslovakia according to
three of the six distinct models of international systems described by Kaplan ("universal",
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"loose bipolar" and "tight bipolar"), and eventually show why post-1989 Czechoslovakia
suddenly became "bipolar", after the collapse of the communist "centralist" (even if
theoretically federalist) regime and the eventual capitulation of the federal centre in front of
the growing assertiveness of two Czech and Slovak "poles" with divergent interests.
A second section then examines the implications of this "bipolarity" on the stability of the
Czechoslovak state and argues that, for several reasons that are developed, a "bipolar" state
such as Czechoslovakia was in many ways inherently unstable.
A third section consequently considers whether, given this seemingly intrinsic instability of a
"bipolar" Czechoslovakia, the establishment of an alternative "multipolar" state could have
prevented the break-up. Two options that could have transformed Czechoslovakia into a
potentially more "stable" multi-polar state are examined: the upgrading and
institutionalisation of Slovakia's Hungarian minority as a "third" constituent part of the state,
or perhaps more importantly, the creation of a tripartite Bohemian-Moravian / Silesian -
Slovak federation.
However, it will be contended that neither of these two possibilities were viable or politically
credible in the context of Czechoslovak ethnopolitics between 1989 and 1992.
Finally, the positive aspects of the Czechoslovak bipolarity are emphasized. The dual nature
of the Czechoslovak state could paradoxically be seen as one of the factors that explains, and
in fact made possible, the peaceful character of the dissolution.
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An "internal-systemic" or "subsystemic" approach to the break-up of Czechoslovakia
Kaplan's model is intended as a simple, if necessarily reductionist, tool of analysis of the
international system as a whole.
However, as we have seen, this chapter derives from the assumption that Kaplan's model
could be applied to the study of the ethnopolitics of a state like Czechoslovakia and might
thus shed a hew light on the division of this country in 1992.
There are nevertheless three important caveats to this approach.
First of all, using Czechoslovakia as a "system" does not take into account the fact that
Czechoslovak domestic/internal politics was itself influenced, and perhaps even conditioned,
by international and environmental factors - as the first break-up of the state under Nazi
pressure in 1939 makes clear.
Therefore, a distinction has to be made at this stage in the level of analysis between the
traditional systemic approaches of international relations which are mostly concerned with
the "world" system as a whole (world politics) and the reductionist focus of this chapter
which purports to consider Czechoslovakia as a self-containing unit of analysis,
independently of the external constraints studied in Chapter 4.
The approach adopted could therefore perhaps more adequately be termed "subsystemic" (by
opposition to systemic). John Burton states that a subsystem "is a system in itself that can be
isolated"841 and William R. Thompson gives four conditions for the specification of a
subsystem: "regularity and intensity of interactions so that a change in one part affect other
parts; general proximity of actors; internal and external recognition of the subsystem as
distinctive; and provision of at least two, and probably more, actors in the subsystem" 842
**41 J.W. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1968),
p. 14, quoted in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Contending Theories, p. 137
<*42"\yjUiam R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional
Inventory", International Studies Quarterly, 17, N°l, March 1973, p.101, quoted in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff,
Contending Theories, p. 164
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On this basis, a study of Czechoslovakia as an "isolated" system is valid, since
Czechoslovakia fulfilled Thompson's four conditions. The interactions between the
"national", "subnational" and "universal" actors were regular, intense and their relative
position and power evolved throughout the years. The actors of the system "Czechoslovakia"
were closely interconnected to each other and Czechoslovakia was a state recognised by the
international community, in which there were consistently at least two distinct and
recognisable "players" - most significantly (and continuously) the Czechs and the Slovaks.
Therefore, "Czechoslovakia" conforms to Kenneth Waltz's definition of a system as "a set of
interacting units":
a system consists of a structure, and the structure is the systems-level component that
makes it possible to think of the units as forming a set as distinct from a mere
collection^43
Secondly, systemic approaches of international relations have been widely criticised for
elaborating theories removed from the reality of politics and therefore unable to capture what
Stanley Hoffmann calls the "stuff of politics"844
This critique is difficult to discard, but the fact that this chapter specifically endeavours to
apply systems theory to the concrete case of Czechoslovakia should allow us to, at least in
part, eliminate this caveat.
Finally, and perhaps most problematically, it has been commonly pointed out that systemic
approaches are invariably based on the dubious and contestable assumption of the presence of
"rational" actors^45_
^43waltZ, Theory, p.40. In a similar vein, Barry Buzan defines a system as "a group of parts or units whose
interactions are significant enough to justify seeing them in some sense as a coherent set" (Barry Buzan, Charles
Jones and Richard Little, The Logic ofAnarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism; New York; Columbia
University Press; 1993; p.29)
^^Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, p. 173
84^This point is indeed acknowledged by Kaplan himself (System, p.2)
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On the one hand, it seems fair to acknowledge some seemingly "irrational" aspects of the
break-up of Czechoslovakia: the Slovaks had no evident economic interests to leave their
richer Czech neighbours and the division of the state did to an extent damage the security
prospects of the Slovaks and the Czechs^46
On the other hand, however, what seemed to predominate between 1989 and 1992 is the
pragmatism and electoral opportunism of Czech and Slovak leaders, such as Klaus and
Meciar, and their cold-blooded political "rationality"847
A categorisation of the system "Czechoslovakia"
Having thus shown the utility of a "systemic" analysis of Czechoslovakia, we now turn to the
classification of Czechoslovakia according to Kaplan's models.
The definition of three types of actors ("national", "sub-national" and "universal") is
potentially useful, but it is incomplete and merely inadequate if it fails to consider that the
system "Czechoslovakia" (like every system studied in international relations) was not static
but dynamic and subject to changes in its internal balance ofpower.
In other words, a systemic analysis of ethnopolitics in the Czechoslovak state can only make
sense and become relevant in a chronological, evolutive perspective. To quote Kaplan,
since a system has an identity over time, it is necessary to be able to describe it at
various times, that is, to describe its successive states. It is also necessary to be able to
locate the vatiable changes which gives rise to different succeeding states"848 _
846cf chapter 4
847§ee chapters 5, 6 and 7
^^Kaplan, System, p.4
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Looking for shifts in the "internal balance of power" and "distribution of capabilities" among
poles and actors of the system "Czechoslovakia"*^ wjH therefore be a primary objective of
the systemic analysis, and one could a priori discern two major historical turning points in
the ethnopolitics of Czechoslovakia: 1945 and 1969*^0.
1918-1945: Czechoslovakia as a "universal system"
The interwar Czechoslovak republic (1918-1938) was a truly multinational state, where the
Czechs and Slovaks constituted only around 65 percent of the population. More than 22
percent of the republic citizens were Germans, 4.8 percent were Magyars, 3.8 percent
Ruthenians, 1.3 percent Jews and 0.6 percent Poles.
849Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in Robert Keohane (ed.),
Neorealism and its critics (New York; Columbia University Press; 1986), p. 15; Waltz, Theory, p.97
85^1 deliberately do not consider here the events of 193 8-1945 and the first breakup of Czechoslovakia
following the Munich agreements, because they seem to be more the consequences of the larger international
environment than the result of purely domestic ethnopolitics (the German minority - but also Slovak nationalists
- exploited by Hitler as "fifth columns" in his determination to "crush" Czechoslovakia).
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Slovakia Ruthenia The whole state
Population in
thousand
10 674 3 331 725 14 730
Of which, in
percentages:
Czechs 68.4 3.7 (3.8) 51.1
Slovaks 0.4 67.6 (1.0) 15.8
Ruthenians 0.2 2.9 63.0 3.8
Germans 29.5 4.6 1.9 22.3
Magyars 0.1 17.8 15.4 4.8
Poles 0.9 0.2 - 0.6
Jews by
nationality
0.3 2.0 12.9 1.3
Others 0.2 1.2 2.0 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which Jews
by religion
1.1 4.1 14.1 1.3
Source: Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonin, Czechoslovakia, 1918-92: A Laboratory for
Social Change, p. 12
Given this ethnic diversity, "Czechoslovakism" was the (necessary) cornerstone of the
legitimacy of the state. It formally and constitutionally (in 1920) established Czechoslovakia
as the national state of the "Czechoslovak" nation, and granted to its numerous non-
"Czechoslovak" citizens the status of minorities.
Later historical developments have made clear that the existence of a so-called
"Czechoslovak" nation was to a large extent purely fictional: the Slovaks were politically,
economically and culturally considered as the younger, less developed brothers of the Czechs,
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and, as discussed earlier, Czechoslovakism hardly concealed the (even if benevolent)
domination of the state by the Czech national.
In many respects, interwar Czechoslovakia could thus be assimilated to Kaplan's "universal"
system - "a semi-unified political system under a world government, in which a central actor
dominates peripheral actors enrolled on a formally voluntary basis"852 The "central actor" in
pre-WWII Czechoslovakia was the Czech nation, which enjoyed a dominant position
somewhat similar to that of the ethnic Russians in the Soviet Union - the paradigm of a
"universal system" according to Ramet^^3
The internal balance of power of the first Czechoslovak republic could be represented by the
following table, with one "pole" (the Czechs) and several more (Germans, Slovaks, Magyars)
or less (Ruthenians, Poles, Jews) significant "actors".








1 Raymond Pearson for instance calls the interwar Czechoslovak republic a "Czech empire" (Raymond
Pearson, National Minorities in Eastern Europe: 1848-1945; London and Basingstoke; Macmillan; 1983;
p.155)
^^Ramet, Nationalism, p.5
853"xhc Soviet Union closely resembles the universal system...the Great Russians dominate a multiethnic
realm in which the non-Russian republics enjoy the formal right of secession" (ibid., pp.4-5)
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1945-1989: "virtual" bipolaritv
However, 1945 constitutes a first rupture in the ethnopolitics of the system "Czechoslovakia"
and a fundamental change in the "distribution of capabilities" between poles and actors.
The post-war expulsion of the entire Sudeten German population and, to a lesser extent, the
transfer of Ruthenia to the Soviet Union and the aborted attempts to negotiate the exchange of
Slovakia's Hungarian minority for Slovaks living in Hungary^^ fundamentally altered the
ethnic structure, and as a consequence, the internal balance of power of the state855_
As demonstrated by the tables below, the "sub-national" or "non-member national" actors of
Czechoslovakia saw their numerical weight and their corresponding political and economic
influence dramatically and abruptly reduced, in both the Czech lands and Slovakia.
The example of the German minority, which still constituted in 1930 29.5 percent of the
population of the Czech lands and 4.7 percent in Slovakia, is probably the most eloquent: by
1961, there was only 1.4 percent of ethnic Germans in the Czech lands and 0.1 percent in
Slovakia.
The disappearance of the German minority as a political factor in the Czechoslovak state
marked a profound shift in the Czechoslovak balance of power and left the Czechs and the
Slovaks virtually sole masters in the state.
^54on the Hungarian question, see for example Brubaker, Nationalism reframed, p. 157.
"^Another minority which virtually disappeared after World War II from the Czechoslovak political and
cultural life was the Jewish population. Following the establishment of the Nazi protectorate of Bohemia-
Moravia and of the Slovak state, 89 percent of the Czech Jews and 83 percent of Slovak Jews did not survive
the war. It should furthermore be added that the Jews hardly constituted an autonomous "actor" in interwar
Czechoslovakia, because of the strong assimilationist tendencies which prevailed within the Jewish associations
-as exemplified by the activities of the League of Czech Jews (Svaz Cechu Zidu). See Pearson, National
Minorities, p.200 ; Erich Kulka, "The Jews in Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1968", in Norman Stone and
Eduard Strouhal (eds), Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and Crises, 1918-88 (Basingstoke, London; Macmillan;
1989), pp.271-296 ; Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews ofEast Central Europe between the World Wars
(Bloomington; Indiana University Press; 1983), pp. 130-169.
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Table 9.3 : The development of ethnic structure (census data-percentages): the Czech Lands
1910 1930 1961
Czechs 63.4 68.4 94.3
Germans 35.0 29.5 1.4
Poles 1.6 0.9 0.7
Slovaks - 0.4 2.9
Others - 0.8 0.7
Slovakia
1910 1930 1961
Slovaks 57.7 67.7 85.3
Magyars 30.3 17.6 12.4
Germans 6.8 4.7 0.1
Ruthenians 3.4 2.9 0.9
Czechs - 3.7 1.1
Others 1.8 3.4 0.2
Source: Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonin, Czechoslovakia, 1918-92: A Laboratory for
Social Change, pp.51-52
It is only after 1945 that it becomes possible to theoretically describe Czechoslovakia as a
"bipolar" unit, characterised by the polarisation between the two overwhelmingly numerically
and politically dominant "national actors", the Czechs and the Slovaks.
But the evolution of Czechoslovakia from an "universal" to a "bipolar" system after 1945 was
also prompted by the rapidly changing nature of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks.
The Slovaks emerged from the war with the experience of both autonomy (during the short¬
lived Second Republic between October 1938 and March 1939) and independence (from
1939 to 1945). The Slovak state was a Nazi-puppet state with strong authoritarian and fascist
leanings but it furthered the Slovaks' sense of distinctiveness vis-a-vis the Czechs and made
definitely obsolete the ideology of "Czechoslovakism": "at the war's end, the basis for
reconstituting the Czech-Slovak relationship was a generalized commitment to proceed on the
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basis of 'equals with equals', enunciated during the war and enshrined in the Kosice
proclamation that set the framework for provisional governance of the liberated territory in
1945-856
From 1945, the Slovaks were not satisfied by the position of "junior partners" or "younger
brothers", and aspired to be recognised as members of a distinct nation.
After having suffered some significant political setbacks in the aftermath of the communist
takeover of power, notably during the purges of the so-called "bourgeois nationalists" and the
subsequent "Dark fifties"8^ the 1960s saw the reemergence of Slovak self-confidence when
the opposition to the centralist policies of Novotny resulted in the "Slovak spring" of 1962-
1963858.
The rise of the political influence of Slovakia was furthermore accompanied (or the logical
consequence of, if we adopt Paul Kennedy's conception of systemic changes of balance of
power859) by the continuous ascent of the region's relative economic power compared to the
Czech lands860.
Between 1945 and 1969 therefore, Slovakia progressively emerged as a "pole" -a centre of
influence able to contest credibly Czech domination, at both a political and economic level.
For all these reasons, one could suggest that Czechoslovakia, from 1945 to 1969, closely
followed Kaplan's categorisation of a "loose bipolar system" (applied by Ramet to
Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1941 and 1945 and 1963861).
856Leff, National Conflict, p.88
857The expression is from E.Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, p.93
858See chapter 7
859paui Kennedy argues in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict
from 1500 to 2000 (London; Fontana Press; 1989) that systemic changes in the balance of power are brought
about by changes in relative economic and technological standings (p.20).




As defined by Ramet, a "loose" bipolar system "presumes two permanently hostile core
powers around which lesser powers cluster in a non-random fashion that approximates equal
distribution of allies. Within a multinational state, this configuration results if ethnic groups
are polarized on a salient and durable issue or issues and divide into two fairly stable
camps"862
As shown in the table below, a systemic representation of post-World War II Czechoslovakia
should therefore theoretically take into account the rise of Slovakia from the status of "actor"
to the status of "pole" as well as the dramatic diminution of the importance of the remaining
"actors" (the non-Czech and non-Slovak minorities).
Table 9.4






Communist Czechoslovakia as a de facto "universal system"
After 1945, the official federalisation of Czechoslovakia in January 1969 appears as a second
turning-point in the ethnopolitics of Czechoslovakia. From 1969 until its dissolution on 31
December 1992, Czechoslovakia was a dual federation composed of the Czech and the
Slovak republics.
This constitutional arrangement institutionalised the ethnic cleavage between Czechs and
Slovaks and the federal Czechoslovak state could be tentatively described as a "tight" bipolar




The increasingly influential role played by the Slovaks in the state and party apparatus was
illustrated by the nomination in 1969 of Husak and Bil'ak as number one and number two of
the Czechoslovak Communist party863? ancj there was a general trend in direction of a higher
visibility of the Slovaks:
[i]n the institutions of the central government, where they had occupied on average
only 17.3 percent of ministerial posts during the period 1948-1967, the Slovaks were
holding on average 30 percent of the portfolios between 1969 and 1987, as in the
leading authorities of the Party, in the politburo and the secretary of the Central
Committee of the KSC 864
However, both 1945 and 1969 had a limited impact on Czechoslovakia's internal balance of
power, and the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 seems to be the turning point in
Czechoslovak ethnopolitics.
During the communist era, the Czechoslovak Communist Party exercised a pervasive
monopoly of power on Czechoslovak political, economic and cultural life and was the
dominant "actor" of the system: its function matched to a large extent Kaplan's understanding
of an "universal" actor. As chapter 7 demonstrated, communism's use of coercion prevented
the expression of ethnic grievances between Czechs and Slovaks: de jure a "bipolar" system,
communist Czechoslovakia was de facto close to a "universal system", just as the interwar
first republic was. The ideology of "Czechoslovakism" was superseded by the official
Marxist-Leninist ideology and nationality policy8°5
Going back to our definition of "poles" as "influential centres of power", in communist
Czechoslovakia, the Party was the only salient centre of power and, far from being "bipolar",
Czechoslovakia was in many ways "mono or uni-polar".
863 I tusak remained president of the Czechoslovak Socialist republic until December 1989 (he had to let the
direction of the Communist Party to the Czech Milos Jakes in December 1987) and Bil'ak was ousted in 1987
from his position in the Central Committee.
864\yehrle, Le Divorce, p.213
865§ee chapter 7
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For all these reasons, only after the "velvet revolution" did the potential, formal "bi-polarity"
of the Czechoslovak state become a political reality. In 1989, the "institutional" Czech and
Slovak poles of the dual federation finally gained political significance.
1989-1992: Czechoslovakia as a "bipolar system"
We hence turn to what primarily interests us in the perspective of an explanation of the break¬
up of 1992, the period 1989 -1992.
Between December 1989 and December 1992, Czechoslovakia was for the first time of its
history a genuine ("tight") bipolar system, and this despite two caveats.
Firstly, as the data of the 1991 census below indicate, Czechoslovakia was not, even in 1991,
inhabited only by Czechs and Slovaks. Assuming for the moment that Moravians and
Silesians are ethnic Czechs (see below), the largest, Hungarian-speaking, minority still
represented 3.8 percent of the state population and, crucially, 11 percent of the population of
Slovakia.
Table 9.5 : Ethnic groups in Czechoslovakia in 1991 (in percent)
Total Czech republic Slovakia
Czechs 54.0 81.3 1.0
Slovaks 31.0 3.0 85.6
Moravians 8.7 13.2 0.1
Silesians 0.3 0.4 -
Russians 0.1 - 0.1
Ukrainians 0.1 0.1 0.3
Poles 0.3 0.6 -
Germans 0.3 0.5 0.1
Hungarians 3.8 0.2 11.0
Romanies 0.7 0.3 1.5
Others 0.4 0.5 0.2
Source: OECD report, Politiques et Problemes regionaux en Repnblique Tcheque et en
Republiqne Slovaque, p.20
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However, in the dual Czechoslovak ethnofederation, the only politically salient cleavage was
between Czechs and Slovaks. The institutions inherited from the communist era provided for
certain cultural and education rights for the Hungarians -especially through the Cultural
Association of Hungarian Working People in Czechoslovakia (CSEMADOK), established in
1949866. 5ut not formally establish a constitutional channel of articulation of minority
interests867
The second and more important caveat to the qualification of post-communist
Czechoslovakia as a bipolar system is the continuing existence between 1989 and 1992 of a
"universal actor", the federal centre -embodied by the federal presidency of Vaclav Havel, the
federal ministries and the Federal Assembly.
These federal institutions personified a "Czechoslovak" standpoint, by opposition to specific
"Czech" or "Slovak" interests. There was for instance clearly a differentiation between
"Czechoslovak" Czechs like Havel and Czech "nationalists"868 dke Klaus and Pithart869
who came to support "Czech" interests, often contradictory with "Czechoslovak" interests.
This divide appears perhaps even more marked if we consider Slovak elites and the
divergence of views between, for example, Calfa and "republic-based" politicians such as
Meciar or Carnogursky.
866 See for example: Batt, The New Slovakia p. 19; Alfred A. Reisch, "Hungarian Ethnic Parties Prepare for
Czechoslovak Elections", RFE/RL Research Report, vol.1, n°18, 1 May 1992, p.27
867pe;isct) notes that "[t]he 1960 constitution had referred to the Magyar, Ukrainian, Polish, and German
minorities ; their legal status was subsequently defined in Constitutional Law N°144 of 1968, although it was
not specified how their rights as minorities should be guaranteed. Even though minorities were entitled to
proportional representation in the federal and republican parliaments, magyar and other deputies were bound by
communist party rules and discipline and thus could do little to promote the interests of the minorities" (Reisch,
"Hungarian Ethnic Parties", p.27)
86&See Chapter 7 for a definition of the specific nature of Czech nationalism after 1989
869pithart's position on the Czech political landscape was somewhat ambiguous since many Slovaks
considered that Pithart (a historian by training) understood the Slovak question more than many other Czech
leaders (interview with Robert Kotian, Bratislava, 08/09/99).
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As noted in chapter 7, the expression of a distinct "Czechoslovak" position remained
nevertheless marginal and did not acquire a significant level of active public support870_
In practice therefore, the Czech-Slovak polarisation endured as the main political cleavage
and was further enhanced by the widespread perception of the federal centre as representative
of Czech interests. Prague, capital of the state and of the Czech lands, was widely held by the
Slovaks as the symbol of the dominant role of the Czech republic in the federation.
This analysis seems to fit Kaplan's definition of the "tight" bipolar system as a system where
the "universal actor" no longer provides a wider frame of reference:
Even if universal actors continue to exist, the universal actor becomes a microcosmic
replica of the tight bipolar... system. For all practical purposes, universal actors will
cease to function in the tight bipolar system even if they continue to exist^^l.
This phenomenon could be illustrated in the Czechoslovak case by the erosion of the role and
powers of the federal institutions between 1989 and 1992.
Both the executive and legislative branches of the federal centre became gradually unable to
make an impact on political developments, because the initiative now predominantly lay in
the hands of the republican authorities, in essence the Czech and Slovak "poles".
The Federal Assembly grew increasingly powerless in front of the assertiveness of the
Republics' legislatures, the Czech and Slovak National Councils, whose powers had been
already significantly expanded by the so-called Competence Law of December 1990^72
Perhaps more symbolically, the influence of the federal president Havel ineluctably
diminished8735 un^i hjs eventual resignation in July 1992, when he stated that he was not
prepared to preside over the break-up of the state and did not wish to "become an obstacle to
chapter 7 on the (non)existence of a "Czechoslovak" nationalism
^71 M.Kaplan, System, pp.44-45
872gee for instance Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, esp. pp.72-78 and Karol Svoboda, "Legal and Political Events
between 1989 and 1992" in Knapp and Bartole, La Dissoluzione, pp.66-68
^73see for example Jan Obrman, "President Havel's diminishing political influence", RFE/RL Research
Report, 13 March 1992, pp.18-23; Wolchik, "The Czech Republic: Havel", pp.168-194.
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the substantial changes in our statehood embarked upon since the [June 1992] parliamentary
elections and to the emancipation efforts of the Slovak Republic"874;
I cannot bear responsability for a development upon which I am beginning to lose any
influence...the function of federal president no longer enables me to work creatively
and constructively^"^
Between 1989 and 1992, the federal centre appeared more and more irrelevant and, to use an
analogy with the international system, ultimately hardly more powerful than than the United
Nations during the Cold War. The state authorities, the traditional "universal actor" of
Czechoslovak ethnopolitics, lost the capacity to act as a pole and a counterweight to the
Czech and Slovak centres of power.
After their electoral successes of June 1992, the two leading representatives of Czech and
Slovak interests, Klaus and Meciar, for all purposes beat the federal centre, which
subsequently capitulated and autodestructed itself through the ratification by the Federal
Assembly of a bill on the dissolution of the common state on November 25, 1992^76
The definition of Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992 as a "bipolar" system would thus
appear vindicated rather than contradicted by the continuing existence of the federal centre.
This bipolarity, institutionalised in a bipartite federation, has been regarded as a distinctive
feature of Czechoslovak ethnopolitics and a factor which made Czechoslovakia unique
among the other "multinational" states (and not only in respect to Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union, the two other communist ethnofederations).
874csTK, 17 July 1992 and Jan Obrman, "Slovakia Declares Sovereignty ; President Havel Resigns", REE/
RL Research Report, vol. 1, n°31,31 July 1992, p.26
875as quoted in Frantisek Samalik, "Political Parties and the Split of Czechoslovakia", in Knapp and Bartole,
La Dissoluzione, p. 115.
^76see for example: Jiff Pehe, "Czechoslovak Parliament Votes to Dissolve Federation", RFE/RL Research
Report, vol.1, N°48, 4 December 1992, pp.1-5; Sergio Bartole, "Introduzione", in Knapp and Bartole, La
Dissoluzione, p.XX.
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As Katarina Mathernova pointed out^7^ Czechoslovakia differed from federal (or
confederal) states such as India, Spain, Switzerland, the United States and even Canada^78?
which are all divided in more than two units.
Ultimately, the closest and most illuminating analogies with Czechoslovakia are perhaps the
Norway-Sweden Union which (peacefully) broke up in 1905, and, more recently,
Belgium879_ Belgian ethnopolitics is overwhelmingly -and increasingly- dominated by the
Walloon-Flemish cleavage but the divide is somewhat mitigated by Brussels's constructive
role as the state capital and its status as the main centre of the European Union, as well as by
the "distinction made between linguistic communities and geographical communities"^*).
Whereas the so-called Community councils represent the linguistic interests of the Dutch,
French and (the much smaller) German speaking groups, the regional councils (the federal
units) are established on a strictly geographical and territorial basis on a tripartite basis -with
the Brussels area having the same legal status as Wallonia and Flanders^.
However, what interests us here is not merely to consider the relatively unique position of
Czechoslovakia as a purely "bipolar" system, but more importantly, to explain why this made
Czechoslovakia inherently unstable.
877Mathemova, "Czecho?Slovakia", p.66; see also Leff, National Conflict, p.250
878The case of Canada is indeed more contestable, since as Mathernova herself reckons, "Canada, though
consisting of ten provinces, resembles Czechoslovakia by the clear polarization and resulting controversies
between the English-speaking population and the French-speaking population concentrated almost exclusively
in the Quebec province" (Mathernova, "Czecho?Slovakia", p.85).
87^See for example Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p. 19; Mathernova, "Czecho?Slovakia", p.66; Cutler and
Schwartz, "Constitutional Reform", pp.551-552 (on the relevance of the Belgian experience for
Czechoslovakia)
88frjohn Fitzmaurice, The Politics ofBelgium: A Unique Federalism (London; Hurst & Company; 1996),
pp. 122-123; Michael O'Neill, "Re-imagining Belgium: New Federalism and the Political Management of
Cultural Diversity", Parliamentary Affairs, vol.51, N°2, April 1998, p.248
88lSee O'Neill, "Re-imagining", p.248; Wilffied Dewachter ("Belgique: La Dechirure", Politique
Internationale, n°78, hiver 1997-1998, p.177-178) adopts a more pessimistic view than O'Neill on Belgian
federalism, even if he acknowledges that Brussels remains (in contrast to Prague) "an important unitary
institutional construction. An essentially French-speaking city situated in Flemish territory, it plays the role of a
bridge" (p. 178).
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Bipolarity and stability of Czechoslovakia: the unbearable lightness of a dual federation
The bipolar character of the Czechoslovak state had at least three adverse effects on the
stability of the country.
Firstly, bipolarity implied that the repudiation of the constitutional arrangement by one of the
two constituent parts was enough to automatically put the existence of the state itself in
jeopardy. As Stein put it,
[t]he character of the Czech-Slovak state as a two-member federation posed a...
complication: unlike in a multimember entity, a secession would mean the end of the
federal state with direct consequences in international law and relations°°2
Secondly, and more importantly, in bipolar post-communist Czechoslovakia, there was no
room for a credible and neutral mediation between Czechs and Slovaks. As discussed earlier,
the federal centre, which could have played this mitigating role, became gradually powerless
and was too often perceived as Czech (Prago-centric) to appear as an impartial arbiter of the
Czech-Slovak disputes.
The duality of the Czechoslovak state furthermore prevented the possibility of coalition-
building, which could have stabilised the country. Leff emphasised as early as 1988 that in a
dual federation like Czechoslovakia,
[tjhere is no possibility of coalitional alignment with other states or republics, as
would be the case in other federal systems, which might serve to mitigate the central
confrontation by compromise or negotiation^^
This made Czechoslovakia an inherently instable state, different from Yugoslavia, where
Ramet shows that the process of coalition-building between the six republics and the two
autonomous provinces contributed to keep in check for a long time the ethnic divisions884
^^stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p.44
Leff, National Conflict, p.251
884Ramet, Nationalism, pp. 3-18 and 270-279
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Thirdly, the process of self-definition of the Czech and Slovak nations was at the root of the
instability of the Czechoslovak state.
Czechoslovakia's constituent nations were bound to define themselves in opposition and
contradiction to each other^^: Slovaks came to perceive the Czechs as their "constituting
Other", and vice versa^86_
Bipolarity therefore meant that Czechoslovak ethnopolitics was not merely a question of
Czechs and Slovaks but more often of Czechs versus or against Slovaks (or Slovaks versus
Czechs). The conflict between Czechs and Slovaks closely resembled a zero-sum game in
which the success of one nation was considered to occur at the detriment of the other887 and
this made even more difficult the constitutional negotiations between Czech and Slovak
representatives:
two constituent units with divergent aspirations and political cultures are unable to
find a compromise on fundamental issues of the future form of a common country.
The existence of only two partners in the federation causes each constitutional issue to
become overpoliticized. Consequently, all issues are typically solved at a negotiating
table rather than by a rational search of optimal constitutional solutions*^
^-Tloly for example states that "[N)ational identity, like all other identities, is always constructed in
opposition to those perceived as the Other" (Holy, The Little Czech, p.5). The process of self-definition of a
nation by contradiction to a "constituting Other" indeed seems a rather common historical and political
phenomenon: for instance, it has been argued that English and French identities are born as a consequence of
the Hundred Years' Wars (see David McCrone, The Sociology ofNationalism (London and New York;
Routledge; 1998), p. 130. See also Frederik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of
Cultural Difference (Boston; Little, Brown and Company; 1969); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in
Conflict (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London; University of California Press; 1985), p.144 and 182; Katherine
Verdery, "Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania", Slavic Review, 52, n°2, Summer
1993, pp.193-194.
^^Although, as we have seen in chapter 4, the traditional historical and cultural "Others" of the Czechs and
Slovaks are respectively the Germans and the Hungarians, during the course of their coexistence in a common
state, Czechs and Slovaks increasingly perceived their national identity as each other's opposite (for a discussion
of Czech images of Slovaks and of themselves, see Holy, The Little, p. 107).
8^in iine with the notion of "mutual betrayals" (1938/ 39 and 1968) which we considered in chapter 2
888Mathernova, "Czecho?Slovakia", p.66
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A related issue is the numerical imbalance between Czechs and Slovaks, the Czechs being
twice as numerous as the Slovaks. This is in itself a recipe for instability, since it creates a
dilemma between the principles of parity and proportionality. The adoption of the principle of
parity is likely to provoke discontent in the larger republic: as seen in chapter 6, this could
actually explain why the Czechs were more and more favourable to the division of the state
after 1989.
But, similarly, applying the proportionality principle would have met with the refusal and
resentment of the smaller republic, Slovakia - as the insistance of the Slovaks on the
maintenance of the prohibition of majority rule (majorizacia) would tend to prove^89_
In Czechoslovakia, bipolarity implied that "demands for parity ran sharply counter to the
significant disparity in the size of [the Czech and Slovak] populations"^*)
An alternative multipolar Czechoslovakia ?
Given the seemingly intrinsic instability of a bipolar state like Czechoslovakia^!, there are
grounds to wonder whether the reorganisation of the state as a multipolar system could have
effectively curbed secessionist tendencies and prevented the break-up of 1992.
Two alternative institutional multipolar structures can a priori be identified, one involving
Slovakia's Hungarian minority and the other the possibility of a tripartite Bohemia-Moravia /
Silesia- Slovakia federation.
^^Elster, "Transition, Constitution-making and Separation in Czechoslovakia", pp.124-125
^Ostein, Czecho?Slovakia, p.302
^91 From the point of view of international relations theory, bipolarity is indeed for most writers - for
instance, Morton Kaplan, Stanley Hoffman, David Singer or Karl Deutsch - associated with a high level of
instability, (see for a more general idea of the debate: Sheehan, The Balance, p.84); Paul R. Viotti and Mark V.
Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism; Globalism; Basingstoke, London; Macmillan;
1993, second edition; pp.53-55)
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First of all, the Hungarian minority represents around 11 percent of the Slovak population,
and one has to consider whether it could have acted as a "third party" in the relations between
Czechs and Slovaks.
There was a possibility (if only because "one's enemy's enemy is one's friend") of coalition
building between Czechs and Hungarians. The overwhelming majority of Hungarians was
favourable to the maintenance of the Czechoslovak state, perceived as the most efficient
protection against Slovak nationalism: for instance, "over 95 % of supporters of the main
Hungarian parties declared in opinion polls that, had they been given the chance, they would
have voted against the dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation" 892
However, the Hungarian minority did not have the capacity to influence political
developments in Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992 and was never in a position to act as
a credible and respected third party.
Without negating the significance of the Hungarian counterweight to Slovak independence,
Slovakia's Hungarians were only in the position of a subordinate, minor balance of power in
Slovakia (by opposition to the dominant Czech-Slovak balance of power)893 The Hungarian
minority, an "actor" of the system "Czechoslovakia" could not constitute itself as a "pole"
able to effectively counterbalance the Czech and the Slovak poles
At best, there was a possible coalition of interests between Hungarians and Czechs but
formalising it would have achieved little more than a slightly modified and still unstable
bipolar order, Czechs and Hungarians versus Slovaks.
The second alternative, the setting up of a tripartite federation Bohemia - Moravia / Silesia-
Slovakia, therefore seemed in many ways a more promising option^^4
^'^Batt, The New Slovakia, p. 18
893por a discussion of the concept of dominant and subordinate balance of powers, see Hedley Bull, The
Anarchical Society: A Study ofOrder in World Politics (Basingstoke, London; Macmillan; 1995; 1977), p.103
a useful general discussion of the Moravian question, see Jan Obrman, RFE /RL, "The Issue of
Autonomy for Moravia and Slovakia", RFE / Rl, April 12, 1991, pp.13-22
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The proposal was based on the belief in the existence of a specific Moravian identity, distinct
from the Bohemian one. For a long time during the Habsburg domination and until the end of
the first World War, Bohemia and Moravia had each their own autonomous diets895
The idea of a tripartite federation was first evoked during the debates of the Prague Spring in
1968^96 ancj reemerged after 1989, especially under the influence of a newly created political
party, the Movement for a Self-Governing Democracy- Association for Moravia and Silesia,
who polled a surprising 7.9 percent of the votes to the House of People and 9.1 percent to the
House of Nations of the Federal Assembly at the June 1990 elections^97 The party
furthermore gained 10.3 percent of the votes to the Czech National Council and briefly
formed a coalition with the ruling Civic Forum^98
The fact that in the 1991 census, 8.7 percent of the inhabitants of the Czech Republic declared
their ethnic origin as "Moravian" appeared to provide further evidence of the desire of many
Moravians to be recognised as distinct from the Bohemian Czechs: "35 percent of the Czech-
speaking residents in the two regions... which correspond to the historical Lands of Moravia
and Silesia, declared themselves Moravians or Silesians in 1991 (The latter made up only 1.1
percent of the total) "899
This sense of Moravian identity -moravanstvfi00 (Moravism)- has been said to be
characterised by the higher impact of the Catholic religion in Moravia901, as well as by the
^^^Michel, La memoire, p. 124
896§ee for example Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution, pp.470-474; Galia Golan,
Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia, The Dubcek Era, 1968-1969 (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1973),
p.197
89^Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, p.52
%9^ibid., p.74
899 Krejci and Machonin, Czechoslovakia, 1918-1992, p.52
900\Vehrle, Le Divorce, p.81
991 In this respect, Moravia could appear as a bridge between Bohemia and Slovakia. See Sharon L.Wolchik,
Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp.212-215; Michel, La Memoire, p. 126; Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p. 119
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importance of Brno - second town of the Czech Republic (389 824 inhabitants in 1994) and
only slightly smaller than Bratislava, with its 449 000 inhabitants (in 1993)902. as an
economic and cultural centre903
At the beginning of 1991, several demonstrations were held in Moravian towns, demanding
the creation of a tripartite federation, in which Moravia would stand as a partner of Bohemia
and Slovakia904_
However, the idea faced the criticisms ofboth Czech and Slovak leaders.
Among the Czech politicians, the support for the proposal was at best lukewarm and marked
by a willingness not to hurt Slovak susceptibilities (that was for example the case of Havel
and the Christian Democrats), but much more often overtly hostile. Jan Kalvoda, deputy
chairman of the Czech National Council, thus considered demands for a tripartite federation
as a "step back, against the trend towards integration of Europe"905 There was among many
Czechs the feeling that Moravia was too similar, both linguistically and culturally, to
Bohemia to legitimate its constitution as a third republic in Czechoslovakia.
Similarly, the Slovaks equally rejected the idea, because it would, according to them, only
increase the power of the Czechs in the state: in a tripartite arrangement, Slovakia was bound
to be constantly outvoted by what would be in essence two "Czech" republics^O^ as Calfa
once stated, "Slovaks would probably consider that by elevating Moravia and Silesia to a
republic, their own status as a nation had been degraded"907
Even if a tripartite federation had constituted a possible and credible alternative to the bipolar
arrangement, the absence of major cross-cutting interests between, say, Moravia and
902pigures in OECD report, Politiques et Problemes Regionaux en Republique Tcheque et en Republique
Slovaque (Paris; OECD; 1996), p. 136 and p.50
903Bmo is the fourth industrial region of the Czech Republic (after Prague, Ostrava and the mining region of
North Bohemia), but it is also an important cultural centre, with for instance six universities or establishments of
higher education. (OECD, Politiques et problemes Regionaux, p. 136)
904see for example Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p. 120; Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, p.57
905cTK, Feb.3 1991 in Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p. 120
^®%.Kinsky, "La Reconstruction", p.69
quoted in Eric Stein, Czecho/Slovakia, p. 120
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Slovakia, would have significantly hindered its functioning. The traditional links between
Bohemia and Moravia were likely to make from a tripartite arrangement no more than a new
form of dual federation, a de facto bipolar system characterised by a divide Bohemia and
Moravia versus Slovakia. As Jon Elster put it,
[T]he idea [of a three-state federation of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia]
came to nothing, probably because it was clear that on all important issues
these smaller republics would align themselves so as to reconstitute the Czech-
Slovak divide. Moravia and Slovakia, for instance, had hardly any substantive
interests in common^OS
Moreover, on top of being rejected by most Czech and Slovak post-communist leaders, it is
doubtful whether the so-called Moravism could be considered to be anything more than an
expression of regionalism (by opposition to Czech and Slovak nationalisms^^).
The manifestations of "Moravism" after 1989 were intended more as a form of opposition to
the "centralising tendency of the Prague government"910 than as a genuine "nationalist"
feeling. The electoral fortunes of the Association for Moravia and Silesia - who did not
manage to regain representation in the Federal Assembly during the second parliamentary
elections of June 1992 and only attracted 6 percent of the votes to the Czech National
Council - would seem to confirm this impression.
Even a Moravian "sympathiser" like Milan Kundera, in an article of 1968, dismissed the
reality of Moravian identity in the following terms:
I have asked myself the question of the specificity of Moravian art. I have experienced
a period of a certain moravism [moravanstvi], even if I considered it to be rather like a
game. Moravism is a beautiful game which rests on memories^ 1.
^^^Elster,"Transition, constitution-making and separation in Czechoslovakia", pp. 124-125
909§ee chapter 6
910 KrejCi and Machonin, Czechoslovakia, 1918-92, p.52
91 IfTilan Kundera, "Trialog o zemi moravske a o Brne", Host do domu, 1968, 7, p.32, quoted in Michel, La
Memoire, p. 126 [emphasis added]
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The prospects for the successful establishment of a tripartite Czechoslovak federation
accordingly looked rather grim. Moravia could arguably be an "actor" in the Czechoslovak
system, but it could not aspire to the status of autonomous "pole".
It seems therefore that neither the Hungarian minority of Slovakia nor the creation of a
tripartite federation including Moravia alongside Bohemia and Slovakia could constitute the
basis for a transformation of the Czechoslovak state into a multipolar system. Neither of these
two options provided a realistic way to "escape" the inherent instability of a bipolar
arrangement.
Bipolarity and break-up of the Czechoslovak state
However, if "[a] bipartite federation has a tendency to sharpen the polarisation"912? it was
also paradoxically one the factors that allowed the peaceful character of the Czech-Slovak
divorce.
This link between bipolarity and the possibility of a "velvet divorce" could be established on
two grounds.
Firstly, as a comparison of the break-up of Czechoslovakia with the violent disintegration of
multi-polar Yugoslavia would tend to prove, the "universal" actor, the federal centre, tends to
wither away more easily in a tight bipolar system than in a "balance of power" system. The
"centre" does not usually have the means and the legitimacy to use force to maintain the
integrity of the state913
The rapid erosion of the role of the Czechoslovak federal institutions between 1990 and 1992
noted earlier appears to corroborate this point.




Similarly, a multipolar state fitting the "balance of power" model914 rnight have certain
stabilising features^ 5^ bin the ethnopolitics of such states, as the examples of Yugoslavia
and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union appear to demonstrate, might be more complex and
potentially more disruptive if and when the equilibrium of the internal balance of power
comes to be destroyed.
Another analogy with the international system might in this context be relevant: whereas the
end of the European multipolar balances of power of the nineteenth century was marked by
two world wars, the end of the bipolar system of the Cold War took place in an altogether
peaceful way and was overwhelmingly free of large-scale "violence".
In fact, in line with systemic balance of power theory as developed by Kenneth Waltz^f 6 or
John Mearsheimer, a bipolar system is "stable", provided stability is understood -in a
reductionist sense- as the absence of war in the system.
A bipolar system is "characterised by high levels of certainty and predictability. As the
number of key actors increases then, by the same token, certainty and predictability decrease.
In a bipolar system the enemy is easy to recognise, the issues are clearer, alliance patterns are
simpler, there is only one other culture and political system that has to be monitored and
understood, interdependence is low..."917
For all these reasons, the bipolar nature of the Czechoslovak state is a useful notion, which
serves to explain both the "event" of the break-up and its peaceful character.
9 Inhere in Kaplan's definition of "balance of power" as merely one possible form of international system
9Uas Ramet shows in her study of Yugoslavia (Nationalism)
^IfrKenneth Waltz argues that "[ujncertainties about who threatens whom, about who will oppose whom, and
about who will gain or lose from the actions other states accelerate as the number of states increases.Even if one
assumes that the goals of most states are worthy, the timing and content of the actions required to teach them
become more and more difficult to calculate...In multipolar systems there are too many powers to permit any of
them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection
low. With three or more powers flexibility of alliances keeps relations of friendship and enmity fluid and makes
everyone's estimate of the present ansd future relation of forces uncertain...In a bipolar world uncertainty
lessens and calculations are easier to make" (Theory, pp.165 and 168).
9Usheehanj The Balance, p. 197
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Conclusion
As a conclusion, the systemic approach and the conception of the Czechoslovak state as a
"system" can provide a different insight on the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
The bi-polar post-communist Czechoslovak state was to an extent structurally,
"systematically", unstable: in a dual (and by 1989, democratised and genuine) federation,
there was no possibility of mediation of the Czech-Slovak conflicts and Czechoslovak
ethnopolitics commonly took the shape of a disruptive "us" (Czechs or Slovaks) versus
"them" (the "Other" constituent nation of the state).
Moreover, the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a more stable "multi-polar" structure -
either through the constitution of the Hungarian minority as a "third" part or the creation of a
tripartite federation, with Moravia/ Silesia alongside Bohemia and Slovakia - always
remained a remote and unrealistic political option.
As every "system", Czechoslovakia was dynamic and the fragile equilibrium of the balance of
power between the two constituent Czech and Slovak nations gradually evolved.
During the interwar period, the Slovaks had a subordinate status in the unitary, centralist
First republic. They were formally recognised as part of the state-founding "Czechoslovak"
nation but the then 2.5 million Slovaks largely lived under the domination of the more
numerous and more politically and economically advanced Czechs^ ' 8.
Moreover, Czechoslovakia was between 1918 and its first disintegration in 1939, a
multinational state, in which the 3-million strong German minority had arguably more impact
than the Slovaks on the elaboration of the domestic and foreign policy of the state.
It is only after 1945 and the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans that there are "theoretical"
grounds to define Czechoslovakia as a "bipolar" state, characterised by the overwhelmingly
dominant Czech-Slovak cleavage.
However, from 1948 to 1989, the communist regime -thanks to a mixture of coercion and
"divide-to-rule" policies - effectively managed to put a lid on ethnopolitics in
918see chapter 1
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Czechoslovakia. The federalisation of January 1969 institutionalised the polarisation between
Czech and Slovak republics, but without any significant effect on the "internal balance of
power" of what was in reality still a centralist state, marked by the power monopoly of the
(non-federalised) Communist party.
The "velvet revolution" therefore abruptly changed the nature of the Czechoslovak "internal
balance of power" and the duality of the state, purely formal and ceremonial under the
communist regime, became a reality.
The two "national actors", Czechs and Slovaks, then logically began to assert their autonomy
vis-a-vis the "universal actor", the federal centre.
Perhaps more importantly, as seen in chapters 6 and 7, certain political leaders like Meciar
and Klaus, came to have a vested political stake in modifying the "internal balance of power"
of the state. They were successfully able to use the institutions of the dual federation to erode
the powers of the "universal actor". In many respects, post-communist Czech and Slovak
politicians had no interest in the maintenance of the constitutional and institutional status
quo,
Meciar's nationalist-populist ideology, as well as the Czech nationalism in neo-liberal
disguise of Klaus919? converged on one single common denominator: the break-up of the
Czechoslovak state was possible, and indeed beneficial to their political "causes".
By the time of the parliamentary elections of June 1992 and the highly symbolic resignation
of Havel from the federal presidency in July, the instability of the bipolar Czechoslovakia had
become too serious to avoid a "velvet divorce".
The "internal balance of power" approach thus allows us to shed a new light on the role of
leadership in the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
The failure of the constitutional negotiations between Czechs and Slovaks can partly be
explained by the bipolarity of the state, which made it more difficult to reach a viable
political agreement. The decisions of the Czech and Slovak post-communist leaders did not
take place in a vacuum, and this chapter shows how the political and institutional structure of
919gee chapter 6
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the Czechoslovak state - its bipolar or dual character - probably conditioned and constrained
their actions, in practice considerably limiting the range of options available to them.
Because of the bipolar arrangement that characterised the state, the most beneficial way for
Czech and Slovak politicians to enhance their fortunes in post-communist Czechoslovakia
was to consistently appear as defenders and supporters of the interests of the Czech and
Slovak poles, and there was no powerful "Czechoslovak" constituency able to moderate the
clash between them.
Because of the weakening of the centre, which lost its status of pole and potential mediator,
Czechs and Slovaks were left to face one another in a "zero-sum" game which proved lethal
to the integrity of Czechoslovakia - even if the predictable character of the Czech-Slovak
confrontation helped the engineering of a non-violent "velvet divorce".
This chapter has, by applying the determinism of a system analogous to the balance of power,
contended that the systemic structure of Czechoslovakia had an impact on the outcome of the
Czech-Slovak conflict between 1989 and 1992, when the Czechoslovak state became clearly
marked by bipolarity. However, the bipolarity of the state should clearly be considered as
only one among the several causes of the break-up examined in this dissertation and the use
of systemic balance of power theory is not incompatible with the recognition of the decisive
role of leadership in the division of Czechoslovakia. As Inis L.Claude put it, "balance of
power caters for the sovereignty of the statesmen, giving him full scope for shrewdness and
skill and artistry"920 yhe political actions of Czech and Slovak post-communist leaders -
most significantly, the gradual diminution of the influence of Havel and the failure of Klaus
and Meciar to agree on a constitutional compromise- were to an extent conditioned by the
inherent stability of the state but it does not exonerate them from their responsibilities in the
break-up of Czechoslovakia.
The conclusion therefore turns to a general assessment of the possible explanations for the
dissolution of the Czechoslovak state, and their relative impact on the events of 1989-1992.
92®Inis L. CLaude, Jr., "The Balance of Power Revisited", Review ofInternational Studies, 1989 (15), p. 81
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CONCLUSION
THE RESISTIBLE FALL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AND THE POLITICAL USES OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
It is possible to feel better in bad times than in the good kind. Tyranny binds people
together whereas freedom distracts them by holding out opportunities to them
Ivan Klima, The Ultimate Intimacy^^
This thesis has sought to provide a multifaceted account of the break-up of Czechoslovakia
and has examined several possible explanations for the split of 1992.
It has attempted to challenge traditional interpretations and argued that the velvet divorce was
not the ineluctable result of historical, political-cultural and economic differences between
Czechs and Slovaks and that the international environment played only a supporting role in
the events of 1989-1992 -determining the peaceful character of the division of the state more
than the division itself.
There were undoubtedly some deep-rooted misunderstandings and tensions between the two
nations, and the so-called Slovak question periodically recurred at critical moments and
turning points of the (troubled) history of Czechoslovakia: most significantly perhaps, in
1938/39, 1945 and 1968.
Yet, after the velvet revolution of 1989 and the collapse of communism, Czechs and Slovaks
had perhaps a better chance than ever before (certainly better than in 1918, 1945 and 1968) to
reach a viable understanding as far as the nature and institutional form of their coexistence
within a Czechoslovak state were concerned.
The communist-engineered federation could have been replaced by a working and
"democratic" federation, freely negotiated and supported by Czech and Slovak leaders.
The international environment, as we saw earlier, was probably more favourable than at any
time before.
921 Ivan Klima, The Ultimate Intimacy (London; Granta Books; 1997), p. 152
The long-standing economic differential between the Czech lands and Slovakia had been
considerably reduced and, by 1989, the Slovaks could even claim to have overtaken the
Czechs on certain important indicators (such as educational achievements).
More generally (and more controversially), by 1989, there was a visible pattern of
convergence of Czech and Slovak political cultures and societies and the enduring Czech-
slovak "dualism" appeared to a large extent on the verge of being bridged. In Jih Musil's
words,
the two societies, at the time of the split, had substantially more in common -at least
in sociostructural terms- than they had had at the time of Czechoslovakia's formation.
At the beginning of the 1990s, both featured similar economic and social structures,
and demographic behaviour, and nearly identical legal, technical and educational
systems. Slovakia's level of urbanization approached that of the Czech Lands and
economic interdependence was very high^22
Finally, Czechoslovakia was in many respects in a better position than most of the other
countries of the Soviet bloc to embark with success on its democratic transition and its
"return to Europe". Its economic situation was more similar to that of East Germany than to
that of Romania and Bulgaria, and its basic macroeconomic indicators were far sounder than
those of its Central European neighbours Poland and Hungary (characterised by a low
inflation and foreign debt). The country furthermore benefited from an outstanding
international image boosted by the popularity and moral authority of its new president, the
former dissident and playwright Vaclav Havel.
As in 1945 and 1968, the resurgence of the Slovak question in 1989 did not imply that
separation was the option favoured by the Czech and Slovak population and what conditioned
the events of 1989-1992 was therefore much more accidental than usually acknowledged in
the literature.
Musil, "Czech and Slovak Society", in Musil, The End, p.77; See also Henderson and Robinson (eds),
Post-Communist Politics, p.238.
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The break-up was not inevitable and could instead be seen as the "price of ffeedom"923 anc]
the consequence of the interaction of several "ideologies" which competed for influence in
post-1989 Czechoslovakia: communism, populism, neoliberalism and "antipolitics".
First of all, as discussed in chapter 8, the economic, political, semantic and institutional
legacies of the communist era had a deeply negative impact on the abilities of the Czech and
Slovak elites and populations to agree on a new constitutional arrangement.
Under communism, Czechs and Slovaks were never in the position to overcome the historical
misunderstandings which resulted from the "Czechoslovakism" of the first interwar republic
and Czech-Slovak relations were, as a result, marred by the absence of serious debates about
the past and the thread of "mutual betrayals" which ran throughout the seven decades of the
two nations' coexistence.
Secondly, the populism of Vladimir Meciar, the most influential figure in Slovak politics,
played up and exacerbated these tensions by exploiting the perception of many Slovaks that
their interests were not protected enough in the common state. In the context of the social
hardships experienced by the Slovaks after 1989, this was a winning political and electoral
strategy, and it was (somewhat logically) matched on the Czech side by the neo-liberal and
Thatcherite rhetoric of Vaclav Klaus. The Civic Democratic Party and its coalition partner the
Civic Democratic Alliance appealed to the Czechs who thought that staying with what they
considered to be the "backward" Slovaks would unnecessarily delay the long overdue
(re)integration of their nation in mainstream Western European structures and institutions^4.
Finally, the commitment to "antipolitics" of former dissidents like Havel was certainly
laudable and was probably a factor which allowed the divorce to be called "velvet". Yet, the
post-communist dissident elites missed the significance of the Slovak question and did too
little, too late to address the issue^25 jhe small window of opportunity which tentatively
923ft is the title of a book by Piotr Wandycz (The Price ofFreedom: A History ofEast Central Europe




existed in the immediate aftermath of the "velvet revolution" to try to draft a new federal
constitution was not seized by the former dissidents-turned-policy makers.
Combined with the systemic instability generated by the bipolarity of a state in which politics
became ethnicised and reduced to a zero-sum game between Czechs and Slovaks, this made
for a dangerous mix which exploded when the lid that communism had put for more than
forty years on civil society and political expression was suddenly opened.
The paradoxical aspects of the process which led the National Assembly to vote to dissolve
Czechoslovakia on November 25 1992 (by a majority of only four votes and after two
attempts) are nevertheless evident.
On the one hand, the Czechs' desire to continue with the tight and "centralist" federation was
opposed by the Slovaks, overwhelmingly favourable to a looser and more confederative form
of union. While the Slovaks increasingly campaigned for a higher visibility on the domestic
and international stage, the Czechs had traditionally equated "Czechoslovak" and "Czech"
and had consequently never developed a strong and genuine attachment to a multi
(bi)national conception of the state.
Yet, on the other hand, both Czechs and Slovaks consistently supported the maintenance of
the common state, a fact that the "technocratic" politicians who swept to power after the
parliamentary elections of June 1992 chose to ignore.
Klaus and Meciar are also considered to have widely contrasting political personalities: the
"erudite economist...with an exceptional intellect" against "the man who behaved like a
village farmer...with an inclination towards melancholic paranoia"926
It is however the common points between the two men which appeared striking. Klaus and
Meciar were rational actors. Their political leadership was based on pragmatism and they
adopted ideas and positions which suited their "electoral" interests.
In Politics without a Past: the absence ofHistory in postcommunist nationalism, Shari Cohen
analyses the historical background of Slovak post-communist politics and argues that the
main problem for Slovak society is not nationalism but, on the contrary, the absence of a
926K_aroi Wolf, Podruhe a naposled, p.62
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coherent and unifying ideology. In this context, the success of a politician like Meciar can be
explained by his lack of commitment to any specific view of the world. A population which,
as a result of the communist socialisation process, was "not equipped or inclined to try to
assess the validity of politicians' claims" adopted the politics of opportunism and voted for
the politicians who "reflected a society that was just like them"927
This was most evidently illustrated by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia's 1992
electoral platform which rejected both full-fledged independence and the existing federal
structure and put forward instead the rather ambiguous and vague notion of "sovereignty"928
Even the leaders of the Slovak National Party, a priori the most genuinely "nationalist" of
Slovak political forces seemed far from primarily concerned with the defence of the interests
of Slovakia. Jozef Matula, the first general secretary of the party, openly admitted: "I do not
believe in nationalism, nation or things like that. I believe in power and influence"929
But Cohen's analysis could also be applied to Klaus because the extent of the Czech
reformer's commitment to neoliberalism was highly debatable. The well-documented
discrepancy between Klaus's hardline neo-liberal rhetoric and his actual policies (markedly
more concerned with the social aspects of the economic transition and perhaps therefore not
necessarily very different from Meciar's approach) illustrates how Klaus was prepared to
sacrifice his economic convictions to the ultimate goal of gaining and staying in power930
Like Meciar in Slovakia, Klaus was successful because, for a long time, he said and, more
importantly perhaps, did what the Czech population wanted: a promise of prosperity based on
an economic reform "high" on rhetoric but "low" on unemployment.
Both politicians rose to power in similar circumstances. After having started their career in
the "broad churches" of Civic Forum and Public Against Violence, they built their success on
their distrust of intellectuals like Havel, Pithart or Dienstbier and their willingness to create
their own Western-style and organisationally-efficient political parties.
927g.Cohen, Politics without a Past, p.21
928Seepp. 184-186
929quoted in K.Wolf, Podruhe a naposled, p.21
92®For a discussion of this, see Robin H.E.Shepherd, Czechoslovakia: The velvet revolution and Beyond
(Basingstoke, London; Macmillan Press; 2000), pp.89-95.
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It could of course be argued that Klaus and Meciar were the products of historical traditions
and tendencies which were bound to lead to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state.
Created in the name of the self-determination of a fictional "Czechoslovak" nation, the
common state collapsed when other politicians, in Slovakia and in the Czech republic,
decided to further their electoral position by invoking the right of self-determination of the
Czech and Slovak nations.
The problem is however that, as President Eduard Benes contended in 1939:
[t]he principle of self-determination itself would need very detailed and precise
explanation. It was misused and continues to be misused in an incredible degree.
Everybody gives to it the interpretation that serves his political interests and aims^31 .
In 1992, national self-determination came, according to the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia and the Slovak National Party, to mean "independence" but this thesis has attempted
to demonstrate that the creation of two independent states in the middle of Europe was not the
result of the predetermined failure of state-building.
Klaus and Meciar, like Milosevic and Tudjman in Serbia and Croatia and Yeltsin in Russia,
used the concept of national self-determination to justify their decision to divide the state and
there were clearly some long-term historical and economic grievances (real or perceived)
which gave them the leverage to do so and made their arguments appealing and credible
among a certain part of the Czech and Slovak population.
Yet, ultimately, like in Yugoslavia (if under infinitely less tragic circumstances), it is only the
mobilisation of these latent feelings by unscrupulous elites which could provoke and did
provoke the break-up of the state932
93 ^Edvard Benes, Democracy Today and Tomorrow (London; Macmillan; 1939), p. 121.
932>jational self-determination has also worryingly become the slogan of separatist movements in Western
countries such as Belgium, Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom. Leaders of the Vlaams Blok in Belgium and
Lega Nord in Italy have for instance seen the velvet divorce as a path to follow. The 1995 electoral platform of
the Vlaams Blok argued that the "Belgian state is a historical mistake...We want a separation and a division on
the Czechoslovak model" and the authors of a pamphlet The Project ofa Flemish State (Project Vlaamse Staat)
published in May 1998, applauded the "quick, democratically legitimate" break-up of Czechoslovakia. In June
1996, the chairman of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, declared: "it's time to choose the Czechoslovakian
way...Let us divide the country" (Dewaechter, "Belgique", p. 180; Interview with Gerolf Annemans, Luk Van
Nieuwenhuysen and Karim Van Overmeire on the Vlaams Blok website, http://www.vlaams-blok/project.html;
John Newhouse, Europe Adrift, New York, Pantheon Books, 1997, p.69)
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Despite the alarming forecasts of 1990-1992, the economic consequences of the break-up
have been limited. The economic transitions in the Czech republic and Slovakia have
certainly not run smoothly and the Czech "miracle" came to a less than glorious end in 1997,
but it is hard to believe that the situation would have been significantly brighter had
Czechoslovakia survived.
Similarly, there are continuing uncertainties about the application for EU membership of the
two countries but it seems equally impossible to attribute them to the break-up of 1992.
One of the major causes and the most disheartening consequence of the "velvet divorce",
however, is the parochialism and "provincialism" which have often become predominant in
Slovak but also Czech politics.
This was evident in the increasingly authoritarian rule of Meciar and the relative worsening of
the position of the Hungarian minority after the birth of independent Slovakia but could also
be illustrated in the Czech republic by the widespread anti-Romany racism among the
population. Xenophobia is of course unfortunately, to paraphrase Descartes, "the best
distributed commodity in the world" and Czechs and Slovaks are not uniquely intolerant. Yet,
there are grounds to believe that the creation of two (more) ethnically homogenous nation-
states would increase rather than decrease these human tendencies.
This dissertation argues that the break-up of Czechoslovakia was ultimately the product of an
elite deal between Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and Klaus's Civic
Democratic Party. The deal need not be seen as the consequence of the nature of the common
state or irreconcilable differences between Czechs and Slovaks, but resulted from the unique
conjunction after 1989 of several factors: the hardships of the economic transition, the
legacies of communist-style federalism, the political immaturity of the Czech and Slovak
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